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EDITED BY

BASIL L. GILDERSLEEVE

Professor of Greek in the Johns Hopkins University

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I.—LIMITATION OF TIME BY MEANS OF CASES IN EPIC SANSKRIT.

In *JAOS.* xxiii, p. 150, I have given an instance of a predicate nominative taking the place of a space-accusative: *yojanānāṁ sahasrāṇi caturaçītir ucchritaḥ*, (the mountain is) "eighty-four (nom.) thousands of leagues high" (nom.). So in time, although the accusative is the norm, the nominative serves, but in paratâxis, to indicate duration. Thus iii. 296. 26: *saṁvatsaraḥ kiṁcid ūno na niṣkrāntā 'ham āçramāt*, "a year (nom.) almost, I have not gone out from the hermitage". Usually, when an event is described as subsequent, such a clause is filled out with its verb, and *atha* follows: *tato nā 'timahān kālaḥ samatīta ivā 'bhavat, atha*, etc., "a short time passed, then", etc., i. 39. 3; *māsajātas pitā bhavati atha jagmuḥ*, "thy father becomes a month old, then came they", xiv. 70. 13. But there is another construction, which has been credited with the implication of preterite time. It is common enough in the epic, though our Sanskrit Syntax illustrates the case but scantily. This is the nominative with a dependent genitive. The examples following, showing that the time does not depend on the case, may introduce the general question as to the kind of time indicated by

The Genitive.

The examples are: *ṣaṣṭho hi divasas te 'dya prāptasye 'ha*, "it is to-day the sixth day (since) you got here"; *saptāṣṭa divasās tv adya viprasye 'hā 'gatasya vāi*, "a week (since) the priest came hither", xii. 359. 5; 360. 13; *sāgraḥ saṁvatsaro jātaḥ tava paçyataḥ*, "a whole year has been born (*while*) you (were)

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looking on", xiii. 19. 48; *tasya vahyataḥ kālo munimukhyān abhyavartata*, "a long time elapsed (while) he (was) making the saints his bearers", xiii. 99. 12; *catvāriṅçad ahāny adya dve ca me niḥsṛtasya vāi*, (it is) "now forty-two days (since) I set out", ix. 34. 6; *evaṁ vimṛçatas tasya dīrghaḥ kālo vyatikrāntaḥ*, "a long time passed (while) he was", etc., xii. 267. 44; *kadācid bhramamāṇasya hastinaḥ . . . kālo 'gacchan niçāniçam*, "time passed night by night (while) the elephant (was) wandering", xii. 117. 6; *kālo mahāṁs*[1] *tv atīto me çūrasūnum apaçyataḥ*, "a great while has passed since[2] I saw" (without seeing), xiv. 50. 20. Compare *mṛtakasya tṛtīyāhe* and *mṛtasya daçarātreṇa*, in xiii. 136. 15 ff.

The so-called "genitive of time after" (the only meaning given by Professor Speyer, *Syntax*, § 128) is confined exclusively to indefinite phrases and (as is usually said) may have been developed from the construction *trir abdasya*, "thrice a year," etc. But it does not really, so far as I have observed, connote time after, but time in which, interchanging with the "within" of the ablative (in this sense, see below) and instrumental, *dīrghasya kālasya = dīrgheṇa kālena*. The epic phrases are few and stereotyped, *cirasya, kasya cit kālasya*, and (accompanied with the word for "then") *tataḥ katipayāhasya*, i. 8. 17; xiv. 71. 10, "then within a few days".

Of course, in the ptc. construction (above), a preterite idea lies neither in the ptc. (as it is also present), nor in the genitive, which is either absolute or loosely dependent, e. g. "forty-two days (of) me gone", or "me being gone". At any rate, "since" is only a convenience suited to our idiom and does not imply that the genitive gives time after. A strong argument against "after" is that we never find a case where definite periods of after-time are so construed, but only a vague time-notion; e. g. 'after three days' is never expressed by *trayāṇāṁ divasānām*. On the contrary, a definite time in the genitive never means "after" but "within".

[1] This is the right form. In xiv. 56. 18, *mahākālaḥ* must be changed to *mahān*, as in C.

[2] This may be expressed (but not often) by *cira*: *mātulaç ciradṛṣṭo me tvayā*, "it is long since you saw my uncle", xiv. 53. 45. The idea here is really "long ago", as in *svargato 'pi pitā ciraṁ tava*, "died long ago", i. 157. 28. But with a ptc. this *cira* (*cirarātra*) usually means for a long time, *cirasupta*, long asleep, *cirarātroṣita*, i. 168. 3.

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In this instance, as in the case of the ablative, to get the real meaning we must not start with a theory of the genitive, then make it apply in examples so indefinite as to explain nothing (for whether we say "in" or "after" a long time is indifferent), and finally force this meaning upon the definite cases or regard them as exceptions; but start with the definite time-words, establish their required genitival significance, then apply this to the indefinite time-words, and if it suits these also, construct a theory. Thus we may take the definite time indicated by a fortnight. There are two in a month and the second is called the "other wing" of the month. Now in the ritualistic rule of Āp. ii. 7. 16. 4, there is something mentioned which must be done every month in the "other wing" of the month, and this is expressed by *māsi māsi kāryam aparapakṣasya*, and it is quite impossible to translate it otherwise than by "month by month in the other wing this is to be done" (not "after"). So in Manu xi. 260 and iii. 281, *trir ahnaḥ* and *abdasya* is "three times in a day, in a year", and though we may dispose of this as a partitive genitive, we cannot do so when "year" stands alone in the genitive. Thus in Manu v. 21, *saṁvatsarasyāi 'kam api* must mean "at least one in a year"; and in Manu vii. 137, *varṣasya* means "in a year" or yearly (not "after a year", as given by Professor Speyer, *Ved. u. Sk. Syntax*, § 65). So when we find in the epic, i. 152. 8, *upapannaç cirasyā 'dya bhakṣaḥ*, we should render it "food furnished now in a long time", rather than "after"; and *sudīrghasya 'pi kālasya*, Manu viii. 216, etc., "in a very long time", however well, in these general time-words, "after" will suit our idiom. The genitival relation is really adjectival, *saṁvatsarasya = saṁvatsarīṇa; saṁvatsarābhiçasta*, "a year-accused" is "accused within a year", Manu viii. 373. Parallel stands *antar* with the genitive of space, *sarvabhūtānām antaç carati*, "permeates all", iii. 76. 34 (*tasyā 'nu*, "after", is incorrect).

When this genitive is formally identical with the locative, it is impossible to tell which is intended. Thus in Manu ix. 104, *jīvatoḥ* means "in the life-time of the two" (parents), and may be either genitive or locative, though probably the former.

Again, time within, or during, which is the only time-meaning implied when other words are used, as, for example, when one says "he shall not study while his hands are wet", *prodakayoḥ pāṇyoḥ*, Āp. i. 3. 10. 25.

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Finally, in ἠοῦς = *vastos*, the meaning is not "after" but "in, within", the dawn-time; and πολλῶν ἐτῶν should also be taken in the same way, "in many years," that is, in the course of many years, rather than "after". Compare the Avest. gen. "in the night, day," etc. So *nahts*, in Gothic, etc. In emphasizing in and within as the force of the temporal genitive, I wish merely to protest against the meaning "after". The fundamental meaning seems to me to be rather the loose adjectival relation usually implied by the genitive, best expressed in English by "of". Old English offers good parallels, as well as our colloquial "of old", "of a morning". Compare (cited in Cent. Dict.) "earn ten shillings of a night" (Mayhew); "Sir, I moste go, and of long tyme ye shul not se me ageyn", (Merlin, E. E. T. S.); "not wink of all the day" (Shakespeare).

The Locative.

As in *tasminn ahani*, "on that day", *aparedyuḥ*, "on the next day" (i. 63. 20; iii. 65. 35); *samaye*, "in good time", iii. 192. 38, the locative gives the time "at or (with) in". The notion "after" lies not in the case but in the idiom of translation. In xii. 122. 16, "after a thousand years it fell" is the natural English of "on the thousand years completed it fell" (as he sneezed, *kṣuvato 'patat*; after the words "he carried it many years", acc.). The "after" idea is formally expressed when required, *tato 'ṣṭame tu divase*, "on the eighth day from this", i. 129. 20; *tataḥ saṁvatsarasyā 'nte (kāle)*, "at the end of a year from this", i. 139. 1; 167. 4; *pūrṇe saṁvatsare tataḥ*, xiii. 111. 70; or, as above, simple completion is expressed, ib. 136. 16, *dvādaçāhe vyatīte*, "on the twelfth day completed". So *sthite Pārthe (ājagmuḥ)*, xviii. 3. 1, "on (or at) his standing". So xv. 1. 6; 3. 12 and 34, etc. In *kāle bahutithe*, iii. 65. 2; *bahutithe 'hani*, i. 108. 2; *kāle bahutithe vyatikrānte kadācana*, "once on some time being passed," iii. 296. 1; *dvimāsoparame kāle vyātīte*, "at the expiration of two months' time," xii. 282. 26; xii. 360. 1, etc., time at and not (as generally rendered) time after is expressed. In iii. 61. 12, PW. renders this "viele Tage hindurch", although the verb is "saw", and the action immediate; the meaning being "in (within) considerable time he saw some birds." In i. 173. 14 and 31, the same event is narrated, *sthite tasmin . . . jagāma viprarṣis tadā dvādaçame 'hani*, "on his standing there (night and day), then on the twelfth day came

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the priest"; and again, *dvādaçarātre . . . samāhite*, (he came) "on the twelfth day completed". So ib. 45, *tasmin praviṣṭe pravavarṣa*, "it rained on his returning". The locative absolute connotes the same time as does the simple locative.

The asterism at (under) which is usually locative; but with Puṣya, Tiṣya, regularly, and with other asterisms occasionally, Hasta, Abbijit, the instrumental is used. *Puṣyeṇa samprayāto 'smi Çravaṇe punar āgataḥ*, ix. 34. 6, is a typical case.

The durative sense, though found, as in ÇB. vi. 1. 3. 20, "recite during a year or two", *saṁvatsare, dvayor* (*vā*), and ib. xi. 4. 2. 19–20 (where "during a year" is expressed by both acc. and loc.), is often injected into a locative because the accompanying verb seems to require it. Thus in i. 3. 35, "on going to the teacher's house at the end of the day, *divasakṣaye*, after guarding the cows in (during) the day," *ahani gā rakṣitvā* (*ahni*, i. 185. 29), like *ekāhnā*, "in the course of one day." So in i. 148. 17, "they stood guarding the house in (during) the night", *rātrāu*. In the repeated locative, *māsi māsi çataṁ samāḥ*, "month by month, a hundred summers", i. 79. 6, the pure locative sense is not lost, though the concurrent construction, *anudinam*, "day by day," i. 185. 15, equal to *divase divase*, is durative. The translation "during" is often given for the meaning "at some time in the course of". Thus, strictly speaking, though too pedantic for practical use, when in Manu iii. 28, *yajñe tu vitate sutādānam* is translated (the gift of a daughter) "during the course of the sacrifice", the translation is incorrect; for the gift is not given "during" the sacrifice but at some one time in the course of the sacrifice, and "at the sacrifice begun" is the literal meaning. In the subsequent stanza, iii. 108, *vāiçvadeve tu nirvṛtte*, the translation "after the offering has been finished" puts the meaning of the verb into the case. It is not quite wrong, but it is not quite right; since, as far as the time goes, it means "on the completion". The compass of the locative is formally expressed by *antar, antardaçāhe*, "within ten days", M. v. 79, etc.

It is customary, since Gaedicke, to say that the locative means "after", when it marks the culminating time and (Delbrück, *Syntax*, p. 225) to compare the Sanskrit use with *ἐνιαυτῷ*, "after a year", *πολλῷ χρόνῳ*, "after a long time", etc. But in reality the "in" sense not only suffices but is the real meaning in all these

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cases. The Hindu, who uses these expressions, *saṁvatsare*, "in a year", etc., never really uses them in the sense of "after a year", etc. For example, to take a case carefully measured, the epic war lasts eighteen whole days. On the evening of the fourteenth day, the prophecy of victory is expressed in the words *pañcame divase tāta pṛthivī te bhaviṣyati*, vii. 183. 65, "on (not "after") the fifth day earth will be yours." One does not and cannot express "the fourth day is after the third day" by putting "third" in the locative. So *çvobhūte dvyahe vā* cannot be "after", but "on the morrow or next day". Hence the locative expresses "after" only because we choose to render it so in accordance with our idiom, and in so doing sometimes mistranslate, as when Delbrück, *AIS.* p. 117, renders *daçame māsi sūtave*, "after the tenth month", whereas (cf. *JAOS.* xxiv. 1) the real meaning (as in the loc. at Manu ii. 34–35) is "in the course of the tenth month", this marking the usual limit of time in cases like that of the pregnant sentence under consideration (sometimes even in the ninth month). In his *Syntax*, p. 224, Delbrück thus renders *quadriduo quo haec gesta sunt* and *is occisus est* by "on the fourth day after", though the real (locative) meaning (in or within which *quadriduum*) is as clear as in *qua nocte*. But this can be only a matter of translation and I wish merely to point out that the locative in no wise really connotes "time after", any more than "place from", e. g. *yad yonāv abhi jāyate*, "when one is born from (in) the womb", Manu ii. 147. If we translate in ĀB. v. 29. 3, *astamite sāyam* as "at eve *after* sunset" we must remember that the following *anudite* means just as well "*before* sunrise" (ib. iv. 17. 5, *paçce'va ṣaṣṭyām* is "after, in sixty" years).

The Dative.

Cirāya, cirakālāya, cirarātrāya, "for (up to) long"; *ānantyāya*, "for ever"; *ahnāya ca cirāya ca*, "for ever and a day", xiii. 8. 19 (*ahnāya*, "up to a day", "soon"). We have to do (in the epic) with a few phrases only, and as in the case of the genitive the meaning "after" will do in a translation but is not in the original. For example, *sucirāya nagarṁ viveça*, i. 177. 38, "he came up to very long to the town" is in sense not "for a long time" but "after a long time", yet only for our idiom; since the literal sense is clearly "it was for (or up to) a long while (as) he came". So also in *cirarātrāya*, not only in *cirarātrāya jīvitum*, iii. 131. 8,

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"live for a long time", but also in *adhyāsva cirarātrāya pitṛpāitāmaham padam*, iii. 299. 7 (N. *bahukālam*), and in *çasayec cirarātrāya yogakṣemavad avyayam*, v. 129. 5, where the meaning is "for long" (not "at last" or "after a long time", as given in PW.). Thus in Mbh., in R. (e. g. ii. 40. 18), and in the rare but more specific *saṁvatsarāya*, "for a year", of ÇB. xii. 2. 1. 9; 3. 3. 1, etc. The "for", "up to", idea as practically equivalent in our idiom to since or after, when of a past action (as in the example above "to a long while he came"), may be illustrated by the use of the preposition *prati* in the same sense; for this means not only "toward" (sunrise, etc.) and "for, during", *pratitryaham pibed uṣṇān*, Manu xi. 215, but, in *kāṅkṣitaṁ ciram prati*, "desired up to (i. e. for or since) a long while". Cf. M. iv. 26; Y. i. 125; M. iii. 119; Y. i. 110.

The Accusative.

The durative sense is implied by an acc. with an active verb, *kālam*, *rātrim*, etc. with *vartayati*, *viharati*, pass or dissipate the time, *vartayām āsa varṣāṇi catvāri*, i. 100. 45 (intransitive sense, iii. 79. 3, *vartayām āsa muditaḥ*); *samāḥ sapta viharan*, i. 102. 70 (intransitive, iv. 1. 28). Whether the accusative is objective or durative, since, like Latin *degere*, the verbs are both intransitive (even when active in form) and transitive, is as difficult to say as in the parallel English, "he dissipated a whole day," compared with "he dissipated his time" and "he dissipates all the time." So doubtful is the acc. in *ekaviṅçatim ājātīr jāyate*, "he (in sinful wombs) is born twenty-one births" (during these rebirths), Manu iv. 166.[1]

Three shades of meaning appear in the epic time-accusative, (a) during, (b) in the course of, (c) at.

(a) The usual durative sense is illustrated by *bahulāḥ samāḥ*, *avasaṁ suciram*,[2] "for many summers I lived, a long time", i. 131. 41; *na sarvakālam puṣpavanto bhaviṣyatha*, "for all time not" (never), xii. 343. 59 (cf. *na bhūyaḥ*, "no longer"); *bahūn kālān*, i. 94. 41; *yasmāi vavarṣa Parjanyo hiraṇyam parivatsarān*, "rained gold for years", vii. 56. 5; *uvāsā 'bdagaṇān bahūn*, xii. 283. 18; *ṣaṇ māsān nityayuktaḥ* (phrase, passim); with a verb or

[1] On the development from an inner accusative, compare Delbrück, *AIS.* p. 170. In Manu v. 35, the acc. above is wholly durative, "becomes an animal (for) twenty-one existences".

[2] So *kiyantaṁ kālam avasat*, xii. 344. 27; *nyavasan māsamātram*, xii. 1. 2. etc.

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ptc. But the verbal idea may be nominal: *saptāham bhūmikampanam*, "an earthquake for a week", iii. 202. 25; *etāvān iha saṁvāso vihitaḥ . . . ṣaṇ māsān, saptame māsi*, etc., "so long a stay is settled, six months", xi. 20. 29. Cf. *vāyubhakṣā* as well as verb with acc., v. 186. 20–33. So time distributed but durative takes the acc., as in v. 182. 30:

tataḥ punar vimale 'bhūt sughoram
kalyaṁ kalyaṁ viṁçatiṁ vāi dināni
tathāi 'va cā 'nyāni dināni trīṇi,[1]

"then again, at dawn, a terrible (fight) occurred, morn-and-morn, days a twenty and three more", that is, every morning during this time.

(b) The idea of duration passes into that of 'in the course of,' i. e. the final result is indicated by the acc., as if it were an instrumental. For example, *tvagasthimātraçeṣaḥ sa ṣaṇ māsān abhavat*, xv. 37. 13, means "(in the course of) six months he became mere skin and bone" (not "during"). According to the free translations noticed above in other cases, this might also be rendered "after six months he became a mere skeleton". Compare the ancient equivalent of *saṁvatsare jātaḥ* found in ÇB. ix. 5. 1. 68, *yaḥ saṁvatsaraṁ jātaḥ syāt*, "who should be born (in) a year".

(c) The accusative of time when (sume niht, ealne daeg, sume hwile, aelce niht ic sice & wepe) is still in the epic a similar visible modification of the durative use. Thus,[2] in ix. 30. 21, *yadi 'māṁ rajanīṁ vyuṣṭāṁ na hi hanmi parān raṇe*, "if in the course of (not during all) this night". But in i. 121. 34, *aṣṭamīm . . . saṁviçethā mayā saha*, which Professor Speyer, *Syntax* §54 R. i, gives as "time when", the durative idea still seems prominent, "stay through (the fourteenth or) the eighth night with me". It can scarcely be distinguished from *rātriṁ tām uṣitvā, uṣitve 'ha niçām ekām*, i. 214. 34; xiv. 81. 28; *sukhoṣilās te rajanīm*, ii. 58. 38; and *uvāsa kila tāṁ rātriṁ saha tena . . . vyatītā sā niçā kṛtsnā sukhena divasopamā*, xii. 357. 9, "she stayed that night with him; that whole night passed", etc.[3]

[1] Compare my *Great Epic*, p. 243 (light syllable in epic poetry before *tr*). On this page there is no case of *st* (*h*); but the example is put under *triṣṭubh* forms, p. 280; and I have given no Mbh. (only R.) cases of *tr*, which omission is herewith made good.

[2] Holtzmann, *Grammatisches*, §276.

[3] So in *tad ahar brahmacārī syāt*, Gāutama xv. 23, the acc. may be durative.

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The "time when" idea is antique in phrases and is probably extended gradually, just as already in Homer's *αὐτῆμαρ*, but especially in late Greek inscriptions, as illustrated by Professor Delbrück in his *Syntax*.

Other examples where the durative notion seems to have disappeared are: *agamat tāṁ velāṁ nartanāgāram*, "he came that evening to the dance-hall", iv. 22. 39; *sa pūrvasaṁdhyām yāti sarvadā; ubhe dvirātrisaṁdhye vāi nā 'bhyagāt sa mamā 'layam*, "he always comes (at) the gloaming; both the (last) two days' gloamings he has not come", xii. 172. 6–7 (C. *ubhe dvirātraṁ saṁdhye*); *gamiṣyati vanaṁ rājan āgatāṁ kārtikīm imām*, "that full-moon Kārtika day arrived [when it arrives] he will go", xv. 11. 3. But in these cases, as in Manu iii. 273, *yat pradadyāt trayodaçīm*, and like cases in the epic, there may (as above) be a notion of the course of the day, as in the adverbial accusative, e. g. *ekarātraṁ tu te kāmaṁ dāsyāmi bhojanam*, "one night I will give thee food", i. 131. 73. A good example of this is offered by (ĀB. viii. 15. 2=) R. vi. 20. 33. *yāṁ ca rātrim mariṣyāmi jāye rātriṁ ca yām aham*, "the night I am born, the night I die". So in xiii. 85. 155 ff., after "at sunrise," *ādityodayasamprāpte* and *uditamātre*, follows "at midday" and "the gloaming" (acc.): *madhyāhne dadato rukmaṁ hanti pāpam anāgatam, dadāti paçcimāṁ saṁdhyāṁ yaḥ suvarṇam*, etc., not "during". Just where "in the course of" shades into the "at" of *naktam, trivelam, tad ahaḥ* and such phrases,[1] is impossible to determine. Thus *vyuṣṭāṁ niçām* in vi. 60. 1 takes the place of a stereotyped locative (56. 1; 69. 1, etc.) and can mean scarcely more than "at dawn".[2] So perhaps in xii. 138. 24, (*eti*) *prabhātāṁ çarvarīm*, though one might render "in the course of the morning". The word time itself gives an opportunity for three accusatives in one clause, for not only have we *trikālam abhiṣekaḥ*, xiii. 142. 6 and 23; and *dvikālam agniṁ juhvānaḥ*, xiv. 46. 4; but also *ekakālaṁ caran bhāikṣyaṁ kulāni daça pañca ca*, i. 119. 12. The adverbial

[1] The word *trivelam*, like *triṣavaṇam*, occurs at xiii. 136. 15, *sa trivelaṁ samunmajya dvādaçāhena çudhyati*. Instead of the antithesis of *pūrvāṁ* (*saṁdhyām*) and *paçcimām* in i. 2. 393 (at gloaming) we find *paçcāt saṁdhyām* in the same sense, xviii. 5. 43 ff. (with *ahnā, rātrāu*).

[2] Manu iv. 128 has *amāvāsyām aṣṭamiṁ ca*, acc.; but xiii. 104. 29 has in the same stanza all locatives. Gāutama xviii. 22, *saptamim*, "on the seventh," is loc. in Manu xi. 16.

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form of *cira* is used in all oblique cases; thus it is indifferently accusative, dative, and instrumental, *ciraṁ na paritapyate, cireṇa niçcayaṁ kṛtvā, cirāya yadi te sāumya ciram asmi na duḥkhitaḥ*, in the Cirakārika story, xii. 267. 67–73.

Of these meanings, the first and last are most antique, and the second may perhaps be found in the later Vedic language; but I have seen no epic examples cited for this use, though it is clearly to be differentiated from the other two classes. As a specimen unique in form I may cite *dvirūnaṁ daçarātram*, "eight days", xii. 359, 10, apparently an accusative of time, though it might be an independent nominative, such as is given above.[1] The repeated *ahar-ahaḥ* accusative, *çvaḥ-çvaḥ*, ÇB. iv. 3. 4. 33; *nimeṣam-nimeṣam*, ib. iii. 6. 2. 9; *kalyaṁ-kalyaṁ* (above), adds nothing to the syntax of the case, but it shows how durative may have glided into punctual time, if it is necessary to assume any transition at all.

The Instrumental.

How this borders on yet differs from the accusative may be seen by comparing these examples: (*akhanat*) *ahāni triñçat pañca*, "he dug (for) thirty-five days", xiv. 58. 27; *saptabhir divasāiḥ khātvā dṛṣṭaḥ*, "seen with a week's digging", iii. 204. 21; *kadācid divasān pañca samutpatya . . . ṣaṣṭhe 'hani samājagmuḥ . . . kadācin māsamātreṇa samutpatya nāi 'vā 'gacchan*, "once flying off (during) five days they returned on the sixth day; once flying off with (in the course of) a month they returned not", xii. 262. 35 ff. So there are cases where the instrumental (means) is absent: *tasya kālena mahatā tasmiṁs tapasi vartataḥ, tam āçramam anuprāptāḥ*, "they came to the asylum of that man, when he was engaged in that austerity, at the end of a long time", i. 107. 4. Thus *divā* (cf. *doṣā*), "by day", etc., shows the weakest sense of the case in the earliest period; no means but only the "with" idea.

But the epic instrumental usually indicates accompanying (temporal) means, which necessarily implies the end of the whole time: *atyakrāman mahārṇavam . . . setunā 'nena māsenāi 'va*, "he crossed the sea with (by) that dike and with (by the end of) a month", iii. 283. 50; *ekenā 'bhipataty ahnā yojanāni caturdaça*, "he gets over fourteen leagues with (by the end of) one day",

[1] The context shows that the meaning is (ten less two) eight days, so the v. l. *dviguṇam* (cited by Mohan Ganguli) will not answer.

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v. 86. 12; *so 'bhavad dvādaçasamo dvādaçāhena*, "he became twelve years old with (by the end of) twelve days", vii. 62. 9; *jagmus tribhir ahorātrāiḥ Kāmyakam*, "they reached K. with (by going all of) three days"; *sabhāṁ kṛtvā māsāiḥ paricaturdaçāiḥ* "made the hall by (the end of) fourteeen months", ii. 3. 37; *tribhir varṣāir labdhakāmaḥ*, "he got his wish by (the end of) three years", i. 62. 41. "By means of" is actually implied in some instances (see below).[1]

We thus see that the notion of "time after" is suggested but not expressed by the instrumental. In the example above, for example, *kālena mahatā* does not mean (the robbers came) "after" a long time (a great while), but with or in the course of a long time; and when, i. 75. 58, we find *kālena mahatā paçcāt*, this also means the same, not "after a great while" but "afterwards in the course of a great while". So in i. 160. 7, *sa vāro bahubhir varṣāir bhavaty asukaro narāiḥ*, "the choice comes (not after but) in the course of many years"; Manu x. 93, *saptarātreṇa*, "by the end of a week". Of course, in indefinite time-expressions it makes no difference whether we say "comes after a long time", or "comes in the course of a long time", but as soon as a definite period is given it makes a great difference: *kālenāi 'tāvatā punaḥ, udghāṭanīyāni*, "they are to be reopened by the end of just so much time", i. 115. 23;[2] *akṣauhiṇyo daçā 'ṣṭāu ca aṣṭādaçāhena hatāḥ*, "killed in the course of or by the end of eighteen days" (not afterwards), xv. 10. 29 ff.; *tenā 'hnā gatvā sumahad antaram*, "going a great distance in the course of that day", ib. 18. 16.[3]

[1] The instrumental sense is clearly expressed in Manu's phrase, viii. 394, *saptatyā sthaviraḥ* "a man aged by (reason of) seventy" (years).

[2] It is not often that, as in this section, i. 115. 3 ff., one finds so many time-cases together and so clearly marked: *kiyatā kālena jajñe*, "in how much time"; *saṁvatsaradvayam*, "during two years" (and *dvivarṣasambhṛtā*); *kālaparyayāt*, "in course of time"; *kālenāi 'tāvatā*, "by (and not after) the end of just so much time"; *yasminn ahani*, "the day in which." In giving the limit of time the instrumental has the same function as in its non-temporal use, e. g. "the size of the mouthful is within (limited by) non-distorting of the mouth," *pramāṇam, avikāreṇa*, Gāut. xxvii. 10.

[3] I append some of the epic phrases: *kālena, kālayogena, kālena mahatā, alpena kālena, adīrgheṇa kālena, dīrghakālena mahatā*, xii. 285. 69 (a mighty long time); *acireṇāi 'va k. svalpena.*

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The Ablative.

The "from" meaning of the ablative glides so naturally into that of "after" that it is rather surprising how restricted is the time-function of this case. Most of the early examples are still clearly "from", interchanging with the causal "in consequence of", such as *tataḥ* and *etasmāt*, "from this", "therefore". No Indo-European time-function is claimed for the ablative (but Avest. has abl. "by day and night") and the Vedic language offers no examples of time-words used in the pure ablative (i. e. without preposition) in the sense of "after". Even in the Sūtras this sense with time-words is quite lacking and there is but one case in Manu where it is probable, although this case also is not that of a time-word, as will be shown. All that we have from this earlier period is the Vedic examples (above) continued, together with such examples as *janmataḥ = janmaprabhṛti*[1] or (as well), "in consequence of birth",[2] and the similar use of *garbhāt*, "from conception". The test of the meaning "after" as applied to time must be sought, however, not in such expressions as these, but in the application of the ablative to words of time in the sense of "after". For example, we should find "I will go after three days", or its like, expressed by an ablative; and if we do not find any such examples, or only doubtful and late cases; if on the contrary we find that a time-word in the ablative instead of meaning "after" always means "up to", then we may safely declare that the meaning attributed to the ablative of time-words must be in accordance with this necessary interpretation.

Even from the examples *tataḥ*, "from that", *itaḥ*, "from this", it may be seen that the meaning of the case is "from", measured in either direction, and that therefore "after" is not a necessary meaning. Thus, in the epic, *itaḥ* may measure time back to a

[1] Or *janmataḥ prabhṛti*, and other such phrases marking time locally from a station, *suciram bālyāt prabhṛti*, "for a long time, from boyhood onward", i. 131. 44, etc.

[2] Or "according to", Manu ix. 125 ff. For *garbhāt* in the parallel cases, Āp. and Vas. use the indefinite *garbhāṣṭameṣu*, etc.; Āp. i. 1. 18, etc. It is scarcely necessary to insist that *mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyum āpnoti*, from the earlier Upaniṣad period (e. g. K. 4. 10), like *tamasaḥ tamaḥ praviçati*, Āp. i. 1. 10, means "from", and that from such phrases no "after" sense can be shown from the ablative; that is, "one (coming) out of darkness enters into darkness" (not "after darkness one enters darkness").

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certain point, as well as forward, and so imply "before" rather than "after". For example, in i. 126. 29, *itaḥ saptadaçe 'hani*, means "on the seventeenth day before this" (i. e. "from this", reckoned back), the event referred to having taken place seventeen days previously. The *prabhṛti* clauses also, even when taken by themselves, oppose the sense of "after" in an ablative not really required by the construction; while in *cirāt prabhṛti*, for example, the meaning is clearly not "after a long time onwards", but "from a long time onwards".

Besides the "from" ablative, however, there is the ablative with an adverb-preposition, the usual type of which is *ā*, meaning, as in RV. iii. 53. 20, "up to", with a background which may be analyzed as "toward (or hither) from", *ā Manoḥ*, i. 95. 3, a meaning afterwards quite reduced to "toward", "up to".

This ablative may include the time of the ablative-word, though this is left to the sense of the hearer; as it is in the construction with space-words, when *ā* is expressed. Compare, for example, Manu ii. 108, *ā samāvartanāt*, "up to his return home"; ib. 161, *ā nakhāgrebhyaḥ*, "up to (including) the nail-points"; ib. 22, *ā samudrāt*, "up to (excluding) the ocean". In pure time-words, however, the whole time is included in Manu's examples (see below).

All these local and temporal examples, which may be called the *ā tamitoḥ* type of the Brāhmaṇas and Sûtras, Āp. ii. 5. 12. 15, etc., indicate the end reached in place or time, and they are the usual type through legal and epic literature, as in the oft repeated phrase *ā ṣoḍaçāt*, "up to the sixteenth" (year). Thus: Vas. v. 21, *ā dinakṣayāt*; ib. vii. 4, *ā çarīramokṣāt*; Manu, ii. 243, *ā çarīravimokṣaṇāt*; ib. iv. 137, *ā mṛtyoḥ*; Mbh. xiii. 26. 71, *ā dehapatanāt*; Gāut. ii. 11, *ā jyotiṣo darçanāt*; Gāut. i. 36 and Vas. iii. 26, *ā maṇibandhanāt* (place); Vas. ii. 6, *ā māuñjibandhanāt* (time); Manu v. 88, *ā vratasya samāpanāt*; Āp. i. 3. 10. 27, *ā ca vipākāt*; Āp. ii. 6. 15. 23–25, *opanayanāt, sā niṣṭhā*, "up to the initiation, this is the limit". This ablative is sometimes paralleled by the instrumental, as when *ā saptamād yugād*, Manu x. 64, is distinctly within the seventh generation, and is paralleled by *saptamena* in Gāut. iv. 22. Cf. also ĀB. iii. 19. 16, adv. *ājarasam* (RV. x. 85. 43, *ājarasāya*), as limit.

As in the case of the genitive, where we lack the basis for a true interpretation in such examples as *cirasya*, "in a long time", and first find the real sense of the case in definite time-words,

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not in words so indefinite that it makes no difference whether we translate by 'within' or 'after', so, as regards the ablative, to adduce *kṣaṇāt*, *cirāt*, *muhūrtāt* as examples of the "after" sense of the ablative is inadmissible till the sense in definite time-words is established. That this latter, in pure ablatives as well as in the *ā*-cases just cited, is not "after" but "by the end", or "up to the end", can I think be shown by the cases in the Sūtras, Manu, and epic. It may be that an "after" sense creeps into grammatical phraseology, but it is not in connection with words of time but with the position of one letter as marked from another, as illustrated by the example in Whitney's grammar, § 291, b. The BS. has an "after" abl., but this is late Sanskrit.

All this, however, is in direct opposition to the received teaching of our grammarians, and for this reason must be established by a careful examination of the examples.

In his *Sanskrit Syntax*, Professor Speyer asserts that the meaning "after" is fundamental to the genitive and ablative of time, saying: "It does always express after what time something is happening", § 128; and again: "When denoting time the ablative carries the meaning from, since, after", § 99. Adhering to this still, in his *Ved. u. Sk. Syntax*, the same eminent authority gives again the same examples and carries them back into the Vedic language with the help of one further specimen of the same interpretation. He adduces Pāṇ. ii. 3. 7 as authority for this view. Whitney in his Grammar, as has been said, adds the example of a letter "after" another, adopting Speyer's view and employing one of his examples. In my opinion, the statements in both these works should be greatly modified if not radically altered, somewhat as follows: When denoting time, the pure ablative of time-words in epic and earlier Sanskrit means "up to" (as a limit) and not "after".

As to Pāṇini's authority, he permits either locative or ablative (in the rule cited) as follows: "The accusative of time and space in uninterrupted continuation, *atyantasaṁyoge*; the instrumental in giving the end, *apavarge*; the locative or ablative in giving the interval for the agent, *kārakamadhye*". The scholiast gives an example "having eaten to-day Devadatta will eat in two days", *dvyahe* or *dvyahāt*. But "by the end of" two days serves as well as "after" to fulfil the rule, and the former is more probable because the other example, given to illustrate space, says that *kroçe* or *kroçāt* the mark will be hit, stationed,

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obviously, not more than a *koss* away, but within an interval, to the limit of a *koss*. Compare Yājñ. ii. 272, *bahiḥ kroçāt*, "up to a *koss* outside (the village)".

The one Vedic example recently added (*Ved. u. Sk. Syntax*) by Professor Speyer (Professor Delbrück gives no Vedic case of pure ablative in this sense) is ĀB. i. 12. 2, *tam* (*somam*) *trayodaçān māsād akrīṇan*, which he translates "they bought Soma after the thirteenth month". But the thirteenth month is here classed with the wicked Soma-seller as "unfit", and what is the time after the thirteenth month? And if bought in that after-time, how can the thirteenth month be implicated in the transaction and thereby made unfit? The words must mean "they bought from the thirteenth month" (as a Soma-seller). Compare ÇB. v. 1. 2. 14; vi. 2. 2. 29; xii. 7. 2. 12, "buy from" (abl.).

Some of Professor Speyer's examples are of the *janmataḥ* class already referred to and cannot be utilized till the usage with real words of time has shown that they must bear this sense. Others are from Manu and the epic where the interpretation, as it seems to me, is either incorrect (as shown below) or dubious, the last case being Manu iii. 119, *parisaṁvatsarāt*, "after a year". But this example is ill able to support the weight of the contention, for Kullūka takes it as *pari saṁvatsarāt*, and Medhātithi (the older commentator) reads *parisaṁvatsarān*, an adj. pl. acc., which is the construction of the epic parallel (see Jolly's text) and Gāutama's parallel has *saṁvatsare punaḥ*, v. 28. Even if Āp. ii. 4. 8. 7 has the form of Manu, it may be questioned whether Kullūka's interpretation is not valid here, especially since in all other cases Āpastamba uses this ablative in the sense of "up to" and never in the sense of "beyond". Thus *çamyā-prāsāt*, "up to the cast of the stick", i. 3. 9. 6; *iṣumātrāt*, "up to the length of an arrow", i. 5. 15. 19; *uttamād ucchvāsāt*, "up to his last breath", i. 10. 29. 1.

The ablative sometimes seems to mark time where in reality it does not. Thus in Āp. ii. 6. 14. 16, *pāṇigrahaṇād dhi karmasu sahatvam*, is not "union in religious acts after marriage", but rather "from the joining of hands in marriage there is union in religious acts". One is typical of the other, and that other union is not simply posterior but is symbolized by the joining of hands. On the other hand, there is occasionally an ellipse that prevents the assumption of a pure ablative. Thus in Vas. xi. 15, *anujñātād vā*, "or till permitted", is preceded by *ā sīmantād*

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anuvrajed, "accompany up to the border", and the *ā* doubtless affects the second clause; as in iv. 9–10, *dvivarṣāt prabhṛti . . . dantajananād ity eke*, the *prabhṛti* is to be supplied with the second ablative (compare Manu v. 71, *nā 'trivarṣasya . . . jātadantasya vā*; 58, *dantajāte 'nujāte ca*), ("by death made impure) from (a child of) two years and onward; some say from teething" (onward).

Turning from the Sūtra, I will now examine the examples I have found in Manu and the epic, including among them those already used by Professor Speyer.

Manu ii. 101, *pūrvāṁ saṁdhyāṁ japaṁs tiṣṭhet sāvitrīm arkadarçanāt*, the ablative can mean only "till sunrise".

Manu v. 64–67, the time is given at the end of which one becomes pure. The limit is set by the instrumental, *rātryā*, "pure by the end of the night"; by the ablative, *trirātrāt*, "by the end of three nights"; and by the adjective, *viçuddhir nāiçikī*, "purification that ensues in a night". Here the circumstances are in each case the same. The purification is attained by the end of the time mentioned, as expressed by the ablative, within, up to the end. This formal within, as in the case of the locative, is actually expressed in Manu viii. 222, where "within ten days" (giving the limit of time allowed to repent of a bargain and undo it) is *antardaçāhāt*.[1]

In Manu viii. 142, interest by the month is *māsasya*; in Yājñ. ii. 37, *māsi māsi*; in Gāut. xii. 29, *māsam*, giving the limit; but these two last stanzas correspond in content to Manu viii. 140, where the same rule is expressed by: *açītibhāgaṁ gṛhṇīyād māsād vārdhuṣikaḥ çate*, when *māsāt* must also give the limit, "up to the end of the month".

In Manu xi. 131, one is directed to perform a vow *ṣaṇmāsāt*, "up to the end of six months".

In Manu viii. 108, *saptāhāt* is said in PW. *s. v.* and by Speyer, *Sk. Syntax*, loc. cit., to mean "after a week". But a closer examination of the passage will show that this is exactly what the ablative does not mean. Manu is asserting here that proof of a sinner's guilt may be seen in misfortune coming to him *within* a week. This is the very proof, for otherwise he would be liable on account of misfortune at any time after a week. But no judgments of God are framed in such wise. In Yājñ. ii. 113,

[1] PW. renders "before" (literally "up to a *within-ten* period").

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the time is simply doubled, *arvāk caturdaçād ahnaḥ*, "up to the fourteenth day". In the very stanza preceding, Manu uses the same construction in the same sense, *tripakṣād abruvan*, "if he does not make a declaration within, by the end of, three fortnights". The corresponding passage in Yājñ. ii. 76, gives the first day *for the fine* as the forty-sixth. In M. viii. 58, occurs again, *na cet tripakṣāt prabrūyāt*, not "after" but "by the end of three fortnights", as an extreme limit of time allowed for silence.

In every one of these cases the ablative fails to show the meaning "after" time, but in all clear passages means "within" (up to, by the end of) the time. Of the doubtful *parīsaṁvatsarāt*, I have spoken above. There remains a *taḥ* ablative of a noun in viii. 375, *vāiçyaḥ sarvasvadaṇḍyaḥ syāt saṁvatsaranirodhataḥ*, "a Vāiçya shall be mulcted in all his possessions after a year's imprisonment". But, as in the other doubtful passage, so there is here a varied reading *nirodhitaḥ*, and this weakens the force of this example, which, strictly speaking, is an ablative of a word implying time, rather than of a time-word.

I turn now to the epic examples. First, there are endless cases of *cirāt*, *kṣaṇāt*, *muhūrtād iva*, etc., all of which I should provisionally render as "up to the end of", in accordance with the sense given by the examples above, e. g. i. 133. 4, and xii. 326. 43, *tato muhūrtād utthāya*, "up to or by the end of an hour from midnight"; i. 135. 21, *kṣaṇāt . . . kṣaṇāt . . . kṣaṇena*, "within a moment, in a moment", etc. Similarly, as in the law-examples, i. 99. 38, (*mokṣas te bhavitā*) *kasmāc cit kālaparyayāt*, "within (by the end of) some time", *anusaṁvatsarāt*, "in the course of (not after) a year", i. e. by the end of it (you will be free from the curse). Then we have cases where the instrumental might be expected: *ekāhāt pṛthivī vijitā çāsanāt*, "he conquered earth within (by the end of) one day by an edict", iii. 126. 39. Conversely, the instrumental where the ablative might be looked for (and if used would be rendered by "after"), *saptāṣṭabhir dināir darçayiṣyati*, "he will appear within a week" (the same verb, cf. Eng. "show up" for appear, without object in i. 63. 85), xii. 358. 8.

This interchange brings us to the case where the ablative and instrumental are used indifferently in the same word and phrase, *varṣaçatāir* and *varṣaçatād* followed by *api*, "even by the end of a hundred years". The former case is found several times

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(as in Manu ii. 227) in the epic, i. 97. 13; ii. 33. 7; and with a redundant *api* in *api varṣaçatāir api*, xiii. 161. 44. The ablative form has been taken by Professor Speyer (loc. cit.) as an example of the ablative meaning "after", in the verse found in the Rāmāyaṇa v. 34. 6 (= Gorr. vi. 110. 2) and vi. 126. 2:

eti jīvantam ānando naraṁ varṣaçatād api.

But, as in the case with the example chosen from Manu, "after" is here exactly what the ablative does not mean. The hundred years ("living even to the end of a century") are the conventional equivalent of a long life, and what the poet says is: "However long one lives (not after one's life) joy is sure to come to a man". This is the very sense and application of the proverb, that one should not despair but live bravely, for sometime within one's long life one is sure to find joy (compare the scholiast on R. v. 34. 6). This is in fact the same thought as that expressed in Manu iv. 137 (compare ib. ix. 300), "till death seek bliss nor deem it hard to win":

ā mṛtyoḥ çriyam anvicchen nāi 'nām manyeta durlabhām.

Professor Speyer does not translate his example from Mbh.; but since it is found in this group it has been taken up in Whitney's grammar, § 291, b, and translated "they went to the shrine after a whole day". The passage is i. 170. 3; the words are *te tv agacchann ahorātrāt tīrtham*; and the meaning is, "they arrived at the shrine (for which they had already started) within a day and night" (that is by the end of a whole day).

As the ablative interchanges with the instrumental in the example above, so does it with the accusative. The PW. gives a case of *avatiṣṭate kṣaṇam*, "stop for a moment". So in xii. 332. 6, we find an example where the ablative gives the same limit (expressed idiomatically by our dative): "Night and day pass away; the change of bright and dark halves of the month does not cease for a moment", *nimeṣān nā 'vatiṣṭhate* (up to a moment's length).

Again, we find the date of a new moon set by the ablative. The locative or instrumental in giving dates is the concurrent construction, and as one would not translate, iii. 282. 20, *sa māsaḥ pañcarātreṇa pūrṇo bhavitum arhati*, by an indefinite "after" but render, "the month will be complete by the end of

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five nights", so in *saptamāc cā 'pi divasād amāvāsyā bhaviṣyati*, v. 142. 18, we should render, "there will be a new moon within (by the end of) the week".

A very clear epic case is given by the drama of i. 41 ff. Here the announcement of a man's death is made in the words *saptarātrād ito netā Yamasya sadanam prati*, çl. 14, "by the end of (within) seven days from this I shall lead him to hell". Then in 18 follows the locative of the precise time, *saptame 'hani*, "on the seventh day"; and then again, 42. 20, the instrumental sets the date, *saptarātreṇa*, "by the end of seven days"; and finally, when the fatal day arrives, *prāpte divase*, just at sunset, *astam abhyeti savitā*, 42. 32–33, in the last moment of the allotted seven days, even as the victim thinks he has escaped the curse, death nabs him. The scene is repeated at i. 50. 11 ff.

To give one more epic illustration. In the same account, *ā caturdaçakād varṣāt* stands parallel to the pure ablative, *bālo hi dvādaçād varṣāj janmato yat kariṣyati*, "what a boy may do from his birth up to his twelfth year" (inclusive), i. 108. 14 and 17. The same *ā* is used with the adverb-accusative: *ā-kumāraṁ ca pāurāḥ*, (all) the citizens (were grieved) "even to boys", xv. 21. 7, as in a temporal sense, the Sūtra phrase, *ākālam, ākālikam*, "to the (same) time" (next day).

The limitation of the ablative in time and place (*yojanāt* = *ā yojanāt*) is paralleled by the limitation in action. Thus in i. 128. 71, *ekocchvāsāt tataḥ kuṇḍam pibati sma*, "then he drank up the jar with one swallow", i. e. by the limit of a swallow.

It is of some interest to see how time-limit is given apart from the pure cases. The use of adverb-prepositions, illustrated by *ā* above, is the oldest and in the Vedic stage of the language the only way of limiting time with an ablative case. Whether the limit is before or after depends not on the case but on the meaning of the word that governs it. Thus *purā*, before, with the ablative in Veda, Sūtra, *purā kālāt*, etc., and epic, *purodayāt; prāk*, both as adverb, e. g. *prāg evā 'nāgate kāle*, "a little before the time arrived", i. 54. 15; and as preposition, *prāg astagamanād ravīḥ*, i. 155. 17; also *arvāk*, in the same way, especially as preposition: *arvāg eva hi te sarve mariṣyanti çaracchatāt*, "they will all die before (they are) a hundred years (old)", xii. 104. 20; *nā 'rvāṅ niçīthāt*, "not before midnight", ii. 21. 34; *nā 'rvāk saṁvatsarāt*, "not till the end of the year", xii. 96. 5.

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The same means is employed to express "after"; *param, parataḥ, pareṇa, ūrdhvam;* not giving the sense of the ablative but explaining the nature of its limit: *ūrdhvaṁ tribhyo 'pi varṣebhyaḥ*, "beyond, more than, three years", xii. 165. 56 (compare *adhikam*, "more" and "longer"); *ata ūrdhvaṁ tataḥ*, "then after that", i. 165. 1 (often in Sūtras); *ūrdhvaṁ dehāt karmaṇā jṛmbhamāṇāt*, "after a body has been developed by acts", i. 90. 7 (*parastāt*, "afterwards" in 17). So Manu uses *ūrdhvaṁ kālāt*, "beyond the time"; and either genitive or ablative with *para* forms: *abhivādāt param, pareṇa daçāhasya*, ix. 90; ii. 122; viii. 222. Compare *ūrdhvam pituḥ*, "after the father" (is dead or gone away), M. ix. 104; Yājñ ii. 123. Āpastamba still uses *adhi* in the same sense, *pāṇigrahaṇād adhi* "after marriage", ii. 1. 1. 1.

More precise is the actual employment of *anta*, common in the Sūtras, e. g. *vidyākarmāntam*, Āp. i. 1. 1. 12; *dvādaçarātrasyā 'nte*, Gaut. xxvi. 15; so *trirātrānte*, Yājñ iii. 288, etc. The adjective corresponding is joined with *ā* in iii. 88. 7, and Manu ix. 101, Yājñ. ii. 183, *āmaraṇāntikaḥ*, "ending up with death" (Manu, ib. 89, *ā maraṇāt*). For "next after" the (negative) interval is used, *anantaras tasmāt* (*ekavarṣānantarāḥ*, "at intervals of a year", i. 221. 86), or an adverb of coordination, *ānupūrvyeṇa samprāptāḥ*, "arriving one after the other", in due order, i. 185. 4 ff. So "before" is implied by a negative, *anirdaça*, "before ten days", Manu, v. 75; *ūnadvivārṣika*, "before he is two years old", ib. 68. Then "before and after" are expressed by two adverbs or by a combination of a compound and adverb, *pūrvotthāyī caramaṁ co 'paçāyī*, "rising before (him) and retiring after", i. 91. 2; *utliṣṭhet prathamaṁ cā' sya caramaṁ cāi 'va saṁviçet*, Manu ii. 194. The usual preposition is *anu*, as in ÇB. xii. 1. 1. 7, *kḷptim anu;* ĀB. viii. 12. 4, *tān anu*, of time and place. Finally, "after" is implied by participles, *samāvṛttavrataḥ*, "(after) having completed his vow", i. 77. 1. etc., passim, and, to our idiom, by gerunds (instrumentals, *gatvā*, with).

There is, however, quite a different method by which the limit of time may be expressed, and as I have discussed other means so fully, I may add a word on this old usage as it survives in the epic. I refer to *yāvat* used adverbially, as in *yāvadāyuṣam*, Ch. Up. viii. 15. 1, etc. Either the accusative or instrumental here marks the limit, *yāvadjīvam, yāvatkālam, yāvadjīvena, yāvatkālena*, "as long as one lives", "as long as life lasts"; the last also as "until", v. 35. 68; xii. 303. 13; i. 155. 20 (*yāvatkālena*

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bhavati putrasyo 'tpādanaṁ çubhe, tāvatkālaṁ gamiṣyāmi tvayā saha, "I will accompany you so long, until a son is born". Time as long as possible (all time) is expressed by this phrase, ***yan na kṣarati pūrveṇa yāvatkālena vā 'py atha***, "which perishes not by reason of time past or (future) however long", xii. 303. 13. The ordinary correlation is accusative in both clauses.[1] A more definite word is sometimes used with *tāvat*, as in xii. 319, 32, ***muhūrtam uṣyatāṁ tāvad yāvad evaṁ vicintaye***, "just wait a moment (so long) while (or till) I think it over."

The epic has taken up a Suçruta phrase in its description of the attacks of the grippe, and in doing so illustrates an extension of the use of *yāvat*, iii. 230. 57:

yāvat saptativarṣāṇi bhavanty ete grahā nṛṇām, "these attacks of grippe last up to the seventies."

Compare the following verse, with its interesting metaphor, xii. 83. 7:

te tvāṁ tāta niṣeveyur yāvad ārdrakapāṇayaḥ,

"they will court you as long as they are wet-handed", that is, as long as they are not empty-handed. The metaphor occurs again in xii. 139. 30, ***bhrātā çatruḥ klinnapāṇir vayasyaḥ***, "your brother is your enemy; he whose hand has been wetted is your friend" (N. *upakriyamāṇaḥ*, "benefited").[2]

As regards the evolution of the meaning of the ablative in connection with words of time, it is easy to see how a case that means "from" glides into the meaning "after". Even where the "from" is still clearly marked, as in the expression found in Vedic prose *tasmād dvitīyaḥ*, "second from him", secundus ab, it requires a moment's thought to realize that "after" is not the meaning of the ablative (which in this stage of the language never, when pure, has this meaning). Yet even in English, "from" and "after" are not always interchangeable. We can

[1] "A homely man thinks himself beautiful as long as he does not see his face in a mirror", *yāvat (na) tāvat*, i. 74. 87; the same in i. 203. 11 ("a man lives as long as his glory is not destroyed"), and in i. 128. 69 ("give to him as long as he drinks"). As a simple time-word, *tāvat*, passim, means "for a while", "now", "to begin with" (cf. tantum); and *na tāvat*, as in xiv. 81. 30, *na sa tāvat praveksyāmi puram*, "not at present".

[2] But *ārdrapāṇiḥ samuttiṣṭhet* and *pañcārdro bhojanam bhuñjyāt*, "one should wash the hands before rising"; "one should eat only after washing the five", i. e. hands, feet, and mouth, xii. 193. 6–7.

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say "I will walk from breakfast till dinner", but we cannot say "I will walk from breakfast", without suggesting that we are walking away from it. Now this "from", marking continuity, is found only in a very few phrases, "from now", "from this", "from birth", etc., but it was never developed into a free "ablative of time after" used with words of time. On the other hand, in the earliest period, the *ā* + ablative construction means "hither to (*ā*), from", so that this construction still preserves the true "from" of the ablative, but unites with it by means of an adverb the notion of "up to" (from). Thus, *tasmād ā* is "from that hither" i. e. "since" (Whitney, Gr. § 293 c). So *ā mūlāc chākābhiḥ*, ĀB. ii. 1. 6, is "here-to (from) the root, with the branches". But in the later language the force of the adverb, "up to", gains in power and ends by suppressing altogether the sense of "from", so that *ā* + ablative finally mean simply "up to". The next step is to elide the adverb-preposition and use the ablative in the same sense without it, both in space and time. Compare for the former, *yojanāt* ("from" or) "up to a league".[1]

Synchronous with this transformation of the ablative-meaning is its causal modification from "from" to "in consequence of", and from this to "by reason of", and eventually to "by" (concurrent in this with the instrumental).[2] Thus even in Brāhmaṇa style we find *ekān na çatam* (*AIS.* p. 112), i. e. ninety-nine, as "not one hundred, up to or by one". The parallel construction in this case, being instrumental, is opposed to Delbrück's interpretation "from the point of view of one, not a hundred" (loc. cit.). Thus in time-words employed in legal phrases, "made pure by" a month's penance is expressed either with the instrumental or ablative of the month, and it seems hypercritical to say that while *kṛcchreṇa pūtaḥ* is "purified by penance", *kṛcchrābdena* must be "by the end of a year of penance". For the latter is also "by a year of penance", as time in the instrumental still clearly in many cases is "by means of". By analogy, with *māsena*, therefore, *māsāt pūtaḥ* may be

[1] In Manu iii. 91, one is directed to give an offering to the Manes *dakṣiṇataḥ*, not "from the south" but "toward the south", or "on the south", the ablative having in such *-taḥ* phrases from antiquity an indefinite case of locality. So *māsam antataḥ* is "(during) a month, to its end", iv. 36. 3.

[2] Compare *na nāmagrahaṇād eva*, "not by naming it alone" (will the *kataka* purify), Manu vi. 67, and other cases interchangeable with instrumental.

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either "purified by reason of a month" (of penance), or "by the end of a month". It is worth while to regard this correlation rather closely, as the sense of "after" in the instrumental is admitted by all to be merely a convention of translation. The instrumental (with, by) gives the time as accompaniment or means, thereby implying all of the time within which anything is done, and this interchanges with the ablative in the same phrases and in almost the same sense, "within" or "up to the end". This may be shown first by words which merely imply time and are often translated as if they were used in the sense of after (in the ablative), for example *maraṇāt*, in legal language, "after death" (he is purified, etc.). But it is doubtful whether time is even implied in this phrase since it interchanges with constructions implying no time when the same rule is given. For example, in Vas. xx. 41–42, *maraṇāt pūto bhavati* interchanges (in the same law) with *çāçanāt* in Manu viii. 316, and with *vadhe* in Āp. i. 9. 25. 4. So Vas. ib. 14, *maraṇān mukto bhavati*, interchanges with *mṛtyunā sa viçudhyati* in Manu xi. 104, and with *mṛtaḥ* in Gaut. xxiii. 11. Here then *maraṇāt* (though there is no objection to adapting an English translation to our idiom and rendering it "after death") means "by death". But this is also the meaning, as is shown by other parallels like *mṛtyunā* = *maraṇāt*, in time-words used in the same way; for example, "by a month" he is purified, when a penance is enjoined. Compare, for instance, Manu v. 64 and 83, where one is purified *trirātrāiḥ* and *trirātrāt*; xii. 54, *tatkṣayāt*; so *tryahāt* in xi. 254; *māsāt*, xi. 249. One is not purified "after", but "within, by the end of" the time of penance; in completing the penance one is *ipso facto* purified. Compare the instr. case of time "by means of", ĀB. v. 1. 5; ÇB. iv. 6. 2. 1; M. xi. 163. Thus in Yājñ. i. 188, earth is "purified by sweeping and by time", *mārjanāt kālāt* (not "after a time"). So in evil prophecies, as in BS., *ṣaṇmāsāt*, etc., the dire event is to happen "by the end of six months".

Just how this meaning arose, whether by syncretism or by a shortening process, may be argued. But it seems to me indisputable that the pure ablative of time in the case of real time-words means "by the end" and not "after", and that "after", when found in connection with words implying time, *janmataḥ*, etc., is really "from", implying in all cases a continuity of time lacking in "after". One can say in Sanskrit "he was wise from

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birth" and use the pure ablative, because there is an unbroken series. So "on the third day from birth" implies a series, from one end of which one reckons. But one cannot say "this unborn one will marry after his birth" (implying a non-serial interval of time) and use the ablative, unless prefaced with the formal word "after". Conversely, if one wishes to say "he will do this before the week is over" (implying an interval) one can use "before", but, just as well, the pure ablative meaning "by the end of the week". In such cases the difference between "by the end" and "after", which is dimmed in adverbs ("up to, in, or after a long time") and in loose phrases, stands plainly forth. To say "I will slay him *saptarātrāt*" (within a week), and not having done so to claim on the morning of the eighth day that the promise was to kill *after* a week, would be impossible. This seems to me to settle the meaning in respect of time. The only remaining question in regard to the meaning of a pure ablative (without preposition) of a real word of time is whether it means "all the time up to" or simply "by the end of". In the Sūtras, the former meaning reigns supreme in (place and) time-words. In Manu, the same meaning obtains in time-words, all the examples giving the meaning "within up to", the time set by the case. The epic use seems at first to be a little looser. Thus, "there will be a new moon within a week" evidently does not indicate full time exactly as it is indicated in "let him stand till sunrise". But it may still imply the interval up to, if we look on it as "in the course of time up to the seventh day", and as this seems to be the only exception to the general implication of time measured up to the point limited by the ablative, the latter may perhaps be accepted as the real meaning, especially as it accords with the *ā*+ablative meaning, out of which construction the ablative in this sense seems to me to have been evolved.[1]

New Haven, Conn. E. Washburn Hopkins.

[1] Professor Eggeling, at ÇB. iv. 2. 4. 5, renders *āitasmāt kālāt* (*upaçete*) by "from that time"; better, "up to this", as in 7, *āitasya homāt* (*na sarpet*), "up to the offering of this". Cf. iv. 2. 5. 13 (*upaçete*) *ātṛtīyasavāt*, "up to" (till); iii. 2. 2. 1, *ā 'stamayāt*, "till sundown", and so in all other cases. On the Construction in BS., see a note in the next number of *JAOS.* (xxiv, First Half).

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II.—THE ORDER OF CONDITIONAL THOUGHT.[1]

I.

The intellection that finds expression in speech has two aspects. First, we may lay stress on the *selective process by which words are chosen and grouped* to express the thought; this is the point of view of (e. g.) Morris in Chap. II of "On Principles and Methods in Syntax". Secondly, stress may be laid on the *process of thought itself* which is to find expression in words. I need not argue that these two kinds of intellection are different, and that the second is the real and essential thing, the first being merely an incidental. For otherwise the untrained deaf and blind who do not know that things (to say nothing of abstractions) have names, would be incapable of intellection; this, of course, is not true. James (Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, p. 253 ff) makes such a distinction very clearly; he says in part, "and has the reader never asked himself what kind of a mental fact is his *intention of saying a thing* before he has said it? It is an entirely definite intention . . . . an absolutely distinct state of consciousness therefore; and yet how much of it consists of definite sensorial images? Hardly anything! Linger, and the words and things come into the mind; the anticipatory intention, the divination is there no more. But as the words that replace it arrive, it welcomes them successively and calls them right if they agree with it, it rejects them and calls them wrong if they do not. It has therefore a nature of its own of the most positive sort, and yet what can we say about it without using words that belong to the later mental facts that replace it? . . . . One may admit that a good third of our psychic life consists in these rapid

[1] The matter set forth in this study is the result of long and patient deliberation and the collection of a great number of conditional sentences. These facts may excuse a syntactician for encroaching on a subject that properly falls within the realm of psychology, the more so as little seems to have been done by professed psychologists along these lines. I wish here to express my obligation to my colleague, Prof. G. M. Stratton, for his careful examination of the psychological parts of the paper and for his helpful suggestions.

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premonitory perspective views of *schemes of thought not yet articulate*" (italics mine). In the sections of this paper numbered 1–3 inclusive I invite the reader's undivided attention to the schemes of thought—the attitudes of mind—that find expression in conditional sentences, leaving for consideration in the following sections the wholly different problem of the words and the verbal form generally through which we communicate these schemes of thought to others.

I.

In the panorama known as the stream of consciousness there is a constant progression of concept-groups. Every conditional thought-period involves at least two groups; these, according to their function, may be called the *conditioning* and the *conditioned* concept-groups.[1] Obviously there are two possible orders for the concept-groups that are most intimately concerned in conditional thought-periods; a concept-group may *condition* another group that lies further down the stream of consciousness, or a concept-group may *be conditioned* by a subsequent group. Of course, complicated cases arise—the two groups may not be closely contiguous, or a group already conditioned by a preceding group may be again conditioned by a following group, but *ultimately* all conditional thought-periods can be reduced to the two types above mentioned.

According as the prior group conditions or is conditioned, the result may be styled a Consequence or a Proviso period. The distinction thus drawn is not a mere formal one; the thinking of a Proviso Period involves a process of intellection quite different from that which occurs in the thinking of a Consequence Period. This I hope to make clear by a careful analysis of the two orders of conditional thought. In order to get examples of conditional thinking in which there is no suspicion of complication from previous concept-groups, it is perhaps most satisfactory to sup-

[1] I hesitate to use a more definite term than "concept". However, Jerusalem (Die Urtheilsfunction, p. 158) says of conditional periods, "Sie bestehen aus zwei Urtheilen und aus der Behauptung einer Beziehung zwischen diesen Urtheilen", thus apparently conceiving of the concept-groups in question as judgments. But it certainly seems that this name describes more accurately the conditioned group (excepting those cases, perhaps, in which there is an element of will or the like) and the act of intellection which binds the two groups together than it does the conditioning group.

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pose cases of dialogue. Here the words of one person may suggest to another a new idea quite foreign to his present attitude of mind. Thus a new train of thought is started in the mind of the latter, and we can examine at our leisure the intellection that ensues according as this first group suggests another concept-group which it conditions or as it is itself conditioned by a subsequent group.

2.

THE CONSEQUENCE PERIOD (the prior concept-group conditions).

To illustrate this order of conditional thought simply, suppose that A and B are working together; they come to a prop that stands in A's way, and he says to B, "Let us take out this prop". These words suggest to B's mind the concept-group "our taking out the prop"; then, knowing his business better than A, his mind leaps forward to the consequence that will be entailed by the carrying out of A's suggestion—that the roof above will fall; this forms the second concept-group, "the falling of the wall", and the connection of thought between the two is that the realization in fact of the first concept-group *entails* the realization in fact of the other. If B chooses to communicate his thought to A, observing the order in which it occurred to his own mind, the result, expressed in a hypotactic period, is

"If we do that (i. e. take out the prop), the wall will fall".[1]

The intellection here involved may be described as the apprehension that the coming to pass of one event *entails* the coming to pass of another[2]—in this case that the taking out of the prop will result in the fall of the wall; the prior concept-group conditions, i. e. makes the second group dependent on itself.[3]

[1] This, of course, is not the only order or the only way in which B might express his thought. Here the verbal form is chosen to help to a clear understanding of the thought and its order. The other question will be treated later.

[2] To make of this statement a definition that would apply to all Consequence Periods, the term "apprehension" must be taken broadly enough to include those cases that have an element of will or the like in the conditioned group (indicated in speech by e. g. an imperative in apodosis). "Entail" here refers to a literal sequence; in other cases it has to be otherwise interpreted.

[3] It may be interesting to note that this statement just reverses the mechanical nomenclature of formal grammar.

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Such intellection, in its lowest forms, is fundamental, and the necessary consequence of rationality. Even the most careless observation of the workings of cause and effect in the happenings of every day life could not fail to place an intellect of the rudest order in a position to forecast the outcome of many a projected action. The veriest savage who saw a child stretching out its hand to the fire, would judge, on the basis of his past observation, that the contact of the hand with the fire entails a burn. He may not, like B in the example above cited, have at his command a hypotactic sentence for the conveyance of his thought and say to the child,

"If you touch that, you will be burned".

But we are not at present concerned with the form of speech used to convey the thought. What I would emphasize is the fact that when the savage realizes that the child is planning to touch the fire, and his thought leaps to the consequence entailed by the projected action, his intellection is identical in kind with that which passes in B's mind when A suggests that they take out the prop. The difference between the two examples is that in the second it takes a more trained observation to arrive at the consequence of the impending action. This being so, the fundamental and essential nature of the Consequence Period must be obvious; the happenings of every day life cannot fail to produce such intellection in us and in all rational creatures when and wherever found—if we would, we could not help forecasting the outcome of many a projected or impending action with which, and with whose consequence, our experience had made us familiar. To the simplicity and ingenuousness of the intellection here involved the Proviso Period affords a sharp contrast.

3.

THE PROVISO PERIOD (the prior concept-group is conditioned).

To illustrate simply, suppose that A says to B, "I want C to come over to my house this afternoon. Do you think he will come?" B, knowing the pleasure this invitation will bring to C, is inclined to accept for him, but a second thought leads him to condition the acceptance of the invitation. If we represent his thought in words with a view to retaining the order in which it stands in his own mind, the result is (e. g.),

"He will come, if it does not rain".

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Or, if the second thought does not occur to B's mind instantly, he may begin to speak before the conditional thought-period is formed, thus producing a sort of hybrid expression—an out-and-out acceptance, with a conditioning clause appended; thus,

"He will come—that is, if it does not rain".

B's first concept-group (suggested by A's invitation) is "C's going to A's house this afternoon", and this is conditioned by another group lying further down the stream of consciousness, namely, "its not raining". But (and this fact makes the Proviso Period something more than a Consequence Period reversed) B does not pass *directly* from the prior group to the conditioning group. A closer inspection of his intellection will make this clear. As the concept-group "C's going to A's house this afternoon" rises in B's mind, for one brief instant he perhaps fancies C as actually performing the act in question—he sees nothing to prevent; then the thought of rain—*a possible hindering circumstance*—flashes across his mind. It is on the converse (or, if you will) the non-occurrence of this possible hindering circumstance that B conditions the acceptance. Such an intermediate step as this possible hindering circumstance is absolutely essential to the thinking of every Proviso Period; for without the occurrence to the mind of some reason why the thing in question should or may not come to pass, how would it ever occur to the speaker to condition his prior group? In the present case B would not condition the acceptance were it not for the thought of possible rain.[1]

[1] There is a chance for a little confusion here regarding those cases where a person is casting about for a cause to account for, or a means to produce, a given effect. Thus, suppose A and B enter a building, *looking for a means to bring down its roof*. A first solves the problem and says to B, "It will come down, if we take out that beam". Apparently the conditioned group ("the falling of the roof") is the starting point of the thought, while the conditioning group follows; if this be true, the thought constitutes a Proviso Period according to the terms of my own definition. Yet manifestly the intermediate step above referred to is lacking—it would be absurd to claim that, under the given circumstances, A first is sure that the wall is coming down, and then conditions his statement because the thought flits through his mind that B will be unwilling to take the beam out. The solution of the difficulty is reached by comparing the thought in this example with that which underlies "He will come, if it does not rain". In this latter case the (ultimately) conditioned group is not at first conditioned at all—there is no

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The possible hindering circumstance, "its raining", by its very nature involves still another group that has not yet been mentioned, namely, "C's not going to A's house this afternoon"; this group embodies the consequence entailed by the realization in fact of the possible hindering circumstance, and is at the same time the converse (i. e. it deals with the non-realization in fact) of the first group that appears in the speaker's mind, "C's going to A's house this afternoon". We must admit the presence of this new group in the thought complex of the Proviso Period; for, as shown above, the presence of a possible hindering circumstance is essential to that order of conditional thought, and (e. g., in the present case) "its raining" takes on the necessary character of a *hindering* circumstance only as it is felt to entail C's not going. The relations of the four groups concerned in the Proviso Period under discussion may be illustrated as follows:

(1) C's going to A's house this afternoon → (2) its raining.

(3) C's not going to A's house this afternoon (converse of 1). (4) its not raining. (converse of 2).

The two groups that receive full verbal expression are 1 and 4;

"He will come, if it does not rain".

If B were to give full verbal expression to 2 and 3, the result would be;

"(but) if it rains, he will not come".

The thought underlying this last sentence is a Consequence Period; for the prior concept-group conditions, and its realization in fact is felt to entail the realization in fact of the other.[1] This involved

thought of the act being contingent until the possible hindering circumstance looms up. But when A and B go into the house *looking for a means* to bring down the roof, the coming down of the roof *is already contingent*—contingent upon the working of an (as yet) undiscovered means. If we represent this as yet undiscovered means as x, the attitude of mind of the two searchers is "the coming to pass of x will bring down the roof". When x is solved by A as = the taking out of a given beam, this value takes the place of x in his mind, and his thought now is "the taking out of that beam will bring down the roof". In other words, "the coming to pass of x will bring down the roof" is a skeleton Consequence (not Proviso) Period which is filled out when the value of x is discovered.

[1] In many cases the Consequence Period is of the type described in the preceding footnote. This is true (e. g.) when a person casts around for some reason why the thing suggested should or may not happen (for instance, to find an excuse for not accepting an invitation).

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Consequence Period is not only present to the mind of the speaker, but it is conveyed to the hearer "by implication" i. e., by the general circumstances under which the words are spoken, and by the tone and manner of the speaker perhaps. For when B says to A,

"He will come, if it does not rain",

and he thus finds his invitation accepted with a condition attached, he instantly will infer the possible hindering circumstance "its raining" which causes B to condition the acceptance. And inasmuch as this is a *hindering* circumstance, it cannot fail to carry with it the suggestion of C's not coming. Consequently the thought really conveyed to A would find fuller expression in,

"He will come, if it does not rain; *otherwise not.*"

The last clause in this sentence is a shorthand way of saying,

"(but) if it does, he will not come".

It might be noted in passing that, conversely, it is the suppression or slighting of groups 2 and 3 in the spoken form that causes the "implication" that lurks about the verbal expression of the Proviso Period.[1]

[1] That there is such an implication lurking about the expression of a Proviso Period may be brought out clearly by contrasting with the above sentence the one used as the expression of a Consequence Period, when A suggests to B the taking out of the prop, namely,

"If we do that, the wall will fall".

There is nothing in the thought underlying this sentence to justify adding "otherwise not" to it. If B should add these words A would think that he was either joking or had lost his senses. As a matter of fact it does not follow that if the prop is not taken out the wall will not fall—an earthquake might bring it down; but that is not the thing of prime importance for this discussion. The really important thing is that the attention of neither the speaker nor the hearer is centered on what will happen if the prop is *not* taken out—that is not the angle, so to speak, from which they are viewing the situation; their thought is concerned with the projected action and its outcome. Though Jerusalem does not distinguish between Consequence and Proviso Periods, still (l. c. pp. 160–161) he feels the Proviso implication in one of his random examples. The sentence is "Wenn morgen schönes Wetter ist, werden wir einen Ausflug unternehmen". Later he adds "In dem Urtheil liegt zugleich der Gedanke, das der Ausflug bei schlechtem Wetter nicht unternommen wird". Of course the implication is not always "otherwise not"; that phrase is convenient

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The fact that a Consequence Period is bound up in the thinking of every Proviso Period justifies the statement that the latter is the more complex form of intellection; I hope to show also that it is less ingenuous. This is a difficult matter to judge of, principally because of our long familiarity with conditional thinking and with conditional speaking of a highly developed type. Offhand, the thought that underlies

"He will come, if it does not rain"

seems just as ingenuous as that which produces

"If we do that, the roof will fall".

But I have tried to show that the veriest savage cannot help thinking Consequence Periods; the most careless observation of the workings of cause and effect in the happenings of daily life place him in a position to forecast the outcome of many projected and impending actions. The train of thought that passes through his mind when he sees a child stretching out its hand to the fire (namely, the apprehension that the consummation of the impending action will result in a burn) is thoroughly ingenuous; yet it contains all the essentials of a Consequence Period.

On the other hand the intellection involved in the Proviso Period—the apprehension that the coming to pass of one event is dependent on another—appears to be a reflex of language on thought—a result of *hearing* clauses conditioning and conditioned put together in speech. Of course the situations in which we think Proviso Periods (e. g. when we wish to accept an invitation, but are checked by the thought of a possible hindering circumstance) were doubtless paralleled in primitive times; but that they, without any outside influence, would lead to thought in the form of Proviso Periods is not so obvious. This will perhaps be

for reference, but in practice it has to be varied to suit the apodosis if that chances to contain a negative.

With this implication of the Proviso Period must not be confused concept-groups that *follow* certain Consequence Periods. E. g., in the case supposed above, B, after he apprehends that the taking out of the prop will result in the fall of the wall, may wish the prop not taken out, feel an impulse to stop A, etc. These elements are not a part of the Consequence Period as may be seen by taking a case in which the speaker has no interest in the outcome. For instance, "I think the rock will fall"; "If it does, it will bring down much earth".

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made clearer by a reference to the analysis above given of the process of thought which finds expression in the sentence,

"He will come, if it does not rain".

The groups and their relations were as follows:

(1) C's going to A's house this afternoon → (2) its raining.

(3) C's not going to A's house this afternoon (4) its not raining.

The process of thought up to and including 3 is thoroughly ingenuous—B is inclined to accept the invitation for C, then there flashes across his mind a possibility (its raining) with which he had not reckoned and which takes on the character of a possible hindering circumstance, as it suggests the outcome entailed by its realization in fact, namely, C's not coming. A simple form of expression for this intellection would be a sentence of the following type:

"He will try to come" / "He will want to come" } (but) it may rain".

Instead of accepting the invitation outright, the speaker here says, "He will try to come" or "He will want to come", because he has in mind the possibility of rain and feels it as a possible hindering circumstance; to the first clause he appends a statement of this possible hindering circumstance.

In situations like this I see nothing to force a mind under no outside influence to the thinking of Proviso Periods—nothing that would suggest the trick of bringing to light the converse of group 2, thus producing group 4, and in this way arriving at a conditional thought-period made up of 1 and 4. Nor yet is it clear how the mere *thinking* of the simpler types of the Consequence Period (the apprehension that a projected or impending action entails a certain result) could suggest the wholly different process of intellection involved in the Proviso Period (the apprehension that the coming to pass of one event is dependent on the coming to pass of another). By a process of exclusion, then, we seem forced back to the *hearing* of clauses conditioning and conditioned in actual speech to explain how the thinking of Proviso Periods originated. Whatever the truth of this last consideration, the simple fact that there is nothing in the situations themselves which suggest to us thought on the Proviso form to force such thinking on an unbiased mind, whereas the same

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situations that suggest to us thought in Consequence Periods must necessarily produce a like result in all rational minds everywhere, is enough to substantiate the claim that the Proviso Period is the less ingenuous order of conditional thought.

4.

The Stages of Conditional Speaking.

There are three—perhaps four—distinctly marked stages in the verbal expression of the conditional thought-periods described in the two preceding sections. In casting about for the simplest form of conditional speaking we ought to look first to the Consequence Period perhaps; for it is the simpler and more ingenuous order of conditional thought, and the intellection involved in it—the apprehension that the coming to pass of a projected or impending action entails the coming to pass of another—calls loudly for expression in words, e. g., to warn another of the dangerous outcome of something he seems about to do. Suppose a mother sees her child stretching out its hand toward the fire; her mind will leap to the consequence of the projected action. The simplest clear expression for this intellection is unquestionably a one-clause phrase, e. g.,

"Burn hand".

This scant form of speech, which gives full expression only to the second concept-group, is clear to the hearer because the projected action—the thing which starts the Consequence Period in the mother's mind—is clearly present in the child's mind also. Accordingly the words are felt, not as an assertion that a certain event is coming to pass, but rather as the expression of a conditioned concept-group—the child realizes that he is being told what the result entailed by his projected action is. Doubtless the tone of the speaker (in addition to the general circumstances under which the words are spoken) helps the hearer to an understanding that the mother's words are, grammatically speaking, an apodosis. Such a phrase as "Burn hand" may be called conditional speaking of the one-clause stage. The ingenuousness of the intellection involved, the need for its expression, and the simplicity of the verbal form (which we even now affect in speaking to children) all point to the greatest antiquity for conditional speaking of this type.

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In the example just used the mother is of course intensely interested in the outcome of the situation before her eyes, and the Consequence Period in her mind *is followed* by a feeling of will that the child shall not act. I say *followed* because clearly she will not experience this feeling of will until she apprehends that the action is projected and forecasts the harmful outcome entailed, i. e., until the Consequence Period has passed through her mind. Though last in intellection, this added element is apt to be first in speech, if expressed at all; e. g.,

"No, no; burn hand".

Expressions of this kind have caused much confusion to workers in the field of syntax. Take, for instance, a sentence spoken under circumstances that are similar, but with the prohibition more fully expressed:

"Don't do it; you will be hurt".

Prohibitions and exhortations thus placed have generally been regarded as substitutes for conditioning clauses. But the real underlying thought (as just shown) in this particular case would find true expression in

"If you do that, you will be hurt; don't do it".

For it is only because the speaker has passed through the intellection of a Consequence Period that he is moved to interfere. The process of thought may be lightning-like in its rapidity, but there is no mistaking *the order* in which the elements occur to the mind. "Don't do it" is the simple bona fide expression of a prohibition—nothing more, nothing less; "you will be hurt" is a conditional sentence of the one-clause stage. What is true of a prefixed prohibition is true of hortatory and like expressions so placed.

If the conclusion reached in section 3 is sound, to the effect that the thinking of Proviso Periods is a reflex of a stage of conditional speaking in which both conditioning and conditioned clauses appear, there is of course no one-clause stage in the verbal expression of the Proviso Period to correspond to the one-clause stage in the expression of the Consequence Period just described. But, waiving this consideration, there is still a mechanical difficulty that would seem to preclude such a one-clause stage.

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It is true that, *after the hypotactic stage* has been reached, it is possible to convey the thought of a Proviso Period by a single clause; but it is because the presence of a subordinating particle then makes the function of the clause clear; e. g., when A says to B, "I want C to come over to my house this afternoon. Do you think he will come?" B may answer merely, "If it does not rain". A will understand his meaning because he has already in mind the starting point of B's thought, and the "if" shows that the clause is the expression of a conditioning concept-group. But if B had at his command no conditional particle, and simply expressed his new thought by "it not rain" or "it does not rain", the hearer might well be at a loss to divine the meaning; these words are not by any means as obviously the expression of a conditioning concept-group, as "Burn hand" (in the example of a Consequence Period above cited) are of a conditioned concept-group. Pronouncing the words with an effort to convey the thought of a conditioning concept-group will demonstrate the difficulty involved and the obscurity of the resultant expression, even to us to whom thinking in Proviso Periods is an old story. We may then fairly assume that one-clause conditional speaking is due originally to the Consequence rather than the Proviso Period.

The advance to the next stage of conditional speaking—the two-clause stage—is perhaps also due to the Consequence Period; certainly so, if the thinking of Proviso Periods is a reflex of conditional speaking more developed than that of the one-clause stage. But in any case the need of communicating certain Consequence Periods is sufficient to account for the advance to two-clause conditional speaking. Such a form is demanded in the interest of clearness when the starting-point of the speaker's thought is not obvious to the hearer. For instance, A asks B for aid; C, a friend standing by, sees what will be the outcome of granting the favor and says in B's ear,

"You give to him, he will come again",

i. e., "If you give to him, he will come again." In a case like this the Consequence Period in B's mind could not be conveyed with any certainty by a one-clause phrase "he will come again." The hearer, not knowing surely what was the beginning of the train of thought in C's mind, might not grasp the fact that the words are intended as the expression of a conditioned concept-

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group, and thus quite miss the thought to be conveyed.[1] Wherever this two-clause stage of conditional speaking has become established, it may of course be used in cases where the demands of clearness do not call for it imperatively. Thus in the example above, the mother, instead of saying simply, "Burn hand" might use the fuller form,

"Touch fire, burn hand."[2]

If I now apply the name parataxis to such examples of two-clause conditional speaking as "You give to him, he come again" and "Touch fire, burn hand", the sense in which I use that term will be perhaps clear. Parataxis here means that two clauses stand side by side as the expression of a conditional thought-period, the inner connection of meaning existing between the clauses being indicated by no subordinating conjunction.[3]

[1] The single clause could be made somewhat clearer to the hearer by the addition of a prohibition, e. g., "Don't do it; he will come again." But even this is ambiguous; the hearer could take it to mean that he was not to give the assistance asked by A because the latter was coming another time, and he would thus have another (and perhaps better) chance to give the desired assistance.

[2] It is quite possible that the thinking of Proviso Periods is a reflex of this stage of conditional speaking. In this stage the conditioning clause naturally precedes, whatever the order of the underlying thought. In the case of the Consequence Period such an arrangement follows the thought order; but it is also required in the case of the Proviso Period as well, in the interest of clearness; for it is much easier to indicate to the hearer that a prepositive clause is conditioning than it is a postpositive clause. E. g., a man comes to a village and says, "All the men come to fight." One, wishing to accept the invitation, but overtaken by the thought that the chief might object, might conceivably say, "We will come, our chief allows." But his meaning would be conveyed more surely by the other order, "Our chief allows, we will come." Pronouncing these sentences will make this point clear to the reader. That the spoken expression of the Proviso Period should stand in this order is all the more natural if, as suggested above, thinking in the Proviso order is a reflex of hearing two-clause expressions used to convey the Consequence Period; for there both the thought order and the demands of clearness tend to bring the conditioning clause into the first place.

[3] This use of the term parataxis will not be acceptable to some; e. g. Bennett (Cornell Studies, IX. p. 66) says "Whatever differences of detail may exist as to the conception of parataxis, all scholars, so far as I am aware, are at least agreed in recognizing its existence only when a sentence is capable of having a value for its own sake as well as for the purpose of determining more fully the meaning of another sentence. In order to exhibit parataxis, the two sentences assumed to have the paratactic relation must each be capable

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The third stage of conditional speaking is hypotaxis, a form brought about by the adaptation of a demonstrative or other word to become the bearer of the meaning already existing between the clauses of a conditional sentence in the paratactic stage; e. g. "Touch fire, burn hand" now becomes,

"If you touch the fire, you will burn your hand".

The schemes of thought—the Consequence and Proviso Periods—underlying this type of conditional sentence are identical with those which find expression in the more primitive types of speech above described. Any difference in the intellection that accompanies the paratactic and the hypotactic types of conditional speaking has to do with the process by which thought is rendered into speech, and does not at all affect the closeness of the bond of union that unites the conditioning and the conditioned groups of the thought-period.

Still a fourth stage of conditional speaking should perhaps be recognized. It is conceivable that a hypotactic form of conditional speaking might *be displaced* by a rival form that originally,

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of possessing an independent value. Just as soon as one of the two clauses is not capable of functioning alone, but only in conjunction with its neighbor, we have subordination or hypotaxis". If parataxis be defined in this way, there is no paratactic stage of conditional speaking, and we advance at one stride from the one-clause type "Burn hand" to the hypotaxis "Touch fire, burn hand." For conditional thought is in periods, and consequently the two clauses through which the concept-groups involved in a given conditional thought-period find expression must inevitably be bound together by an inner connection of meaning, and could not conceivably (at least the conditioning clause) function separately. This matter will be discussed more fully in the second paper. The use of the term parataxis in this paper is in harmony with the statement of Morris (On Principles and Methods in Syntax, p. 147), "It (parataxis) covers all that lies between coördination and the suggestion of relation by musical means, as the upper limit, and the expression of relation by subordinating words as the lower limit". Even Bennett, when speaking of the conditional sentence (Lat. Gram. App. § 394) seems to use the term in this sense; "Conditional sentences are the development of an earlier Parataxis. Thus we may assume that the earliest type of *si valet, bene est* was *bene est, valet*, 'it is well; he is well'. The conditional force was purely the result of the context, which indicated that *valet* was something assumed. As language developed, the fact that one clause was related to the other as an assumption or condition *was brought out more definitely*" (italics mine) "by the use of *si*." This statement applies the name parataxis to a pair of clauses mutually dependent and which lose their distinctive meaning the moment they are torn apart; I am using the term above in just this sense.

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or perhaps I should say, in its literal meaning, was not the expression of conditional thought at all. For instance, "grant that" in its literal sense has no conditional meaning, but we use the phrase in certain cases as a substitute for "if". It is conceivable that, in the course of time, "grant that" might come into greater use and finally supplant "if" altogether. Therefore when we take up a given hypotactic conditional construction and attempt to reconstruct its earlier history, it should not be assumed offhand that it is a direct outgrowth from parataxis—it may perhaps be that the word we find introducing the protasis has displaced some other (now lost) which really passed through the development of meaning that advanced the form of conditional speaking in the language under discussion from parataxis to hypotaxis.

In this section four types of conditional speaking have been described; the one-clause stage, parataxis, hypotaxis, and substitution. I have perhaps already indicated clearly enough that these are *types of speech* merely, and that the conditional thought-periods are in all essentials the same whatever the form of verbal expression. These types of conditional speaking have been enumerated in the order of their complexity, taking the simplest first. It is not to be supposed that the history that lies back of the various hypotactic periods in existence to-day can be reduced in every (or perhaps any) case to such an orderly progression. Conditional speaking of the simplest types must be of untold antiquity; since that time language may have supplanted language, conditional speaking may have advanced to a certain point of development and then fallen back again, and one language may have influenced the forms of conditional speech of another. In view of these possibilities one needs to go very slowly in a reconstruction that professes to go back to origins.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. H. C. NUTTING.

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III.—THE IE. ROOT *SELO-*.

I.

There is a wide-spread root *selo-*, with the by-form *selā-*, which seems to have expressed primarily motion from side to side or in a circle or downward. Most common among the derived meanings are: 'swing, throw; sway, dance; wind, twist; slink, creep; bend, sink; slip, slide'. These meanings are apparently not very closely connected, yet most of them, and others in addition, will be found under the base *sele-q̑ᵘa*- below, and we shall see how easily the various significations are derived from a common center. The root is represented in the following words:—

1. ChSl. *sŭlati* 'schicken', Gk. ἅλλομαι, Lat. *saliō* 'leap, spring', *salebra* 'jolting, rough road' (from which certainly Goth. *saldra* 'possen' need not be separated), Lith. *selù* 'schleiche' (cf. Prellwitz, Et. Wb.; Brugmann, Grd. I², 456), Lith. *sėlà* 'schwachheit, ohnmacht', i. e. 'a slipping, falling away', *sėlůju* 'zage'. With Lith. *sėlà* compare Lat. **sōlā-* 'weakness, softness, gentleness', whence *sōlā-rī* 'lindern, mitigare, soothe, lighten, comfort, console'.

Here also probably ON. *selja* 'treiben; überliefern, abliefern, geben', Goth. *saljan* 'opfern', primarily 'let slip, let go', and hence closely connected in meaning with ChSl. *sŭlati* 'schicken'. Gk. ἑλεῖν 'seize, take' probably comes from the idea of rapid motion. Compare ON. *hreifa* 'stir, move': *hrīfa* 'seize'; MHG. *snaben* 'springen, eilen; stolpern, straucheln', *snappen* 'wanken, straucheln: angreifen, strassenraub treiben'.

From the primary meaning 'fall, befall, happen' may belong here OE. *sǣl* 'occasion, time; opportunity; condition; happiness', *sǣlan* 'happen', *sǣlig* 'happy, prosperous', Goth. *sēls* 'gütig, mild', etc. Such a development of meaning would be perfectly natural. And it is certain that OE. *sǣl* represents this Germ. word in its earliest extant meaning. Not 'happiness' but 'occasion, time' is the earlier signification. But Germ. *sēla-* may go back to a pre-Germ. **sē-lo-* 'a sowing, season, proper time', root *sē-* 'sow' (cf. author, PBB, XXIV, 531), and could, in that case, not be connected with the root *selo-* under discussion.

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If, however, we assume that this group is derived from the root *selo-*, we may then separate Germ. *sēla-* into two sub-groups with divergent meanings, the first represented by OE. *sǣl* 'occasion; opportunity; happiness', *sǣlig* 'happy', OHG. *sālig* 'glücklich', etc. (compare MLG. *slumpen* 'glücken', I, 4 below); the second by Goth. *sēls* 'gütig, mild'. These would represent a pre-Germ. **sēlo-* 'falling, befalling, fortunate: falling away, yielding, mild, soft'. Goth. *sēls* would therefore be most closely related in meaning to Lith. *sėlà* 'schwachheit', Lat. *sōlā-rī* 'lindern, mitigare'. Although this brings us to a connection between Goth. *sēls* and Lat. *sōlārī* made by Brugmann, Die Ausdrücke für den Begriff der Totalität, 47, the explanation of this connection is entirely different.

Now from the root *selo-* are formed, with the suffixes *-no-* (*-nā-*, *-ni-*, *-nu-*), *-mo-*, *-lo-*, *-bo-*, etc., the derived bases *sele-no-* (*sel-no-*, *slĕ-no-*, *sl̥-no-*), *sele-mo-*, etc.; and, with the suffixes *-i̯o-*, *-u̯o-*, the bases *sele-i̯o-*, (*slei̯o-*, *slī-*) and *sele-u̯o-* (*sleu̯o-*, *slŭ-*), whence the derivatives *slei-mo-*, *-bo-*, *-po-*, etc. and *sleu-mo-*, *-bo-*, *-po-*, etc. (cf. Persson, Wz. 189 f.).

2. Base *sele-na*ᵉ-: Gk. ἑλένη 'wicker basket' < **selenā-* 'a twisting, twining', Skt. *sr̥ṇí* 'sichel', *sr̥ṇi* 'haken zum antreiben des elefanten', Lith. *šėlinu* 'schleiche, lauere', ON. *slen* 'trägheit', *slinni* 'schwerfälliger mensch, lout', Lat. *lēnis* 'soft, mild', *lēniter* 'slowly, indolently', perhaps from **slē-ni-* 'bending, weak, soft'.

3. Base *sele-ma*ᵉ-: Skt. *srāmá* 'hinkend, lahm', *srâma* 'verrenkung des fusses, lahmheit, siechtum', MHG. *slemen* 'umkehren, stürzen, wenden', ON. *slǿma* 'swing, brandish', *slamra* 'beat', Norw. *slamre* 'lärmen, toben', Sw. *slamra* 'klappen, klirren', E. *slam* 'zuschmeissen'.

4. Base *sele-ba*ᵉ-: Lat. *labō* 'totter, waver, sink', *lābor* 'slip, fall; go to ruin, perish', Skt. *lámbatē* 'hängt herab', ON. *slapa* 'los hangen', *slāpr* 'schlaffer mensch', OHG. *slaf* 'schlaff', *slāf* 'schläfe', i. e. 'thin, sunken-place', Goth. *slēpan* 'sleep', Lith. *slābnas*, ChSl. *slabŭ* 'schwach', OHG. *sleffar* 'lubricus', ON. *slepja* 'schleimen', *sleppa* 'entschlüpfen', MHG. *slampen* 'schlaff herabhangen', *slump* 'schlumpig', NHG. *schlamp*, *schlempe*, *schlump*, *schlumpe*, *schlumpen*, etc., Sw. *slumpa* 'schleudern, schlaudern', *slump*, Dan. *slump* 'zufall', *slumpe* 'etwas zufällig bekommen; über etwas fallen', MLG. *slumpen* 'glücken', E. *slump*, *slumpy*, Gk. λαμβάνω 'fall upon, seize, grasp, take', λάβρος 'furious, violent', λαβίς 'forceps, buckle, clasp', NHG. *schlimpe*

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'catch'. Or *schlimpe* may be compared with Lat. *limbus* 'noose; band' (cf. II, 5).

5. Base *sele-pa*^{u}-: ON. *slafask* 'sagtnes, aftage, nachlassen', *slefa* 'slobber', *slafr* 'babbling, gewäsch', NHG. *schlabbern*, Lith. *sìlpnas* 'schwach, kraftlos', *sìlpti* 'schwach werden', *slepiu* 'verberge, verstecke', *slapùs* 'wer sehr heimlich thut, schleicher', Lett. *slẽpt* 'verheimlichen', MHG. *slimp, -bes* 'schief, schräge; nicht richtig, verkehrt', NHG. *schlimm*, Gk. λαπαρός 'slack, loose', λαπάρα 'flank, loins', Lith *slẽpsna* 'dünnung, weichen'.

Gk. λαπαρός may come from the base *seleq*^{u}*-o-* and be cognate with Lat. *lacūna* (v. infra). Some of the Germ. words may be from the base *sele-bho-*. So we may compare ON. *slefa* 'slobber', G. *schlabbern*, MHG. *slam, -mes* 'schlamm' (for older **slamp, -bes*), *slemmen* 'prassen, schlemmen' with Gk. λίμφος 'schleim, rotz' (cf. Prellwitz, Et. Wb. s. v.). For the development of the meaning 'slime' see below.

6. Base *sele-ga*^{u}-: MHG. *slenken* 'schwingen, schleudern', *slanc* 'schlank, mager', Du. *slank* 'dünn, behende', ON. *slakke* 'slope', E. *slink* 'creep away, sneak', *slinky* 'thin, lank', *slink* 'produced prematurely', as, a *slink* calf, Dan. *slunken* 'schlaff, schlotterig, leer', Sw. *slinka* 'schlüpfen, schleichen', *slankig* 'schlotterig, nachlässig', OE. *slincan* 'creep, slink', OHG. *slinc* 'left' (hand), Gk. λήγω 'cease', λαγαρός 'slack, hollow; pliant', λαγών 'empty space, cleft, cave; flank', Lat. *langueō* 'be languid', OHG. *slah*, ON. *slakr slækinn*, OE. *slæc* 'slack' (cf. Schade, Wb. s. v. *slac*; Uhlenbeck, Ai. Wb. s. v. *lágati*), to which add OE. *ā-seolcan* 'become languid', *ā-solcen* 'slothful, remiss', *ā-solcennes* 'torpor, sloth', Lith. *slẽgiu* 'bedrücke, presse', *slogus* 'beschwerlich, schwierig'.

7. Base *sele-q*^{u}*a*^{u}-: Lith. *slenkù* 'schleiche', *slìnka* 'faulenzer, schleicher', *slankė* 'bergrutsch, erdfall', ChSl. *sląkŭ* 'krumm', OHG. *slango* 'schlange', *slingan* 'winden, flechten, hin- und herziehend schwingen', OE. *slingan* 'schleichen', Du. *slingeren* 'schwingen, schleudern', ON. *slyngva* 'werfen', *slyngr* 'flink, rasch, keck', *slunginn* 'umgeschlungen; schlau, listig', Sw. *slängd* 'geschickt, durchtrieben', *slyngel* 'schlingel, flegel, strick', i. e. 'a slinger, word-slinger, a forward, bold, impudent fellow' (so that ON. *slyngr* 'rasch, keck': Sw. *slyngel* shows a development similar to MHG. *quec, kec*: NHG. *keck*), Norw. *slengja kjeften* 'sling the jaw, use insulting language', *slengjeord* 'insulting word, sling', E. *slang* 'insult with vulgar language',

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Dan. *slænge* 'schleudern, werfen; umhertreiben', *slæng* 'geschlepp, gefolge, anhang, sippschaft'. Similarly developed is perhaps OHG. *slahta* 'geschlecht', Norw. *slægt* 'verwandt', Dan. *slægt* 'verwandschaft, familie'. Compare ON. *slōđi* 'schleppe': Sw. *slödder* 'anhang, gesindel, bande'.

8. With *schlingen, schlinge* we may also compare Lat. *laqueus* 'noose, snare', *lacūna* 'hollow, opening, cleft', *lacūnar, laquear* 'a fretted or paneled ceiling', and perhaps Gk. λαπαρός 'slack, loose', though this may belong to the base *sele-po-*. (Compare Gk. λαγαρός 'slack, hollow, sunken', λαγών 'empty space, cleft, cave', Dan. *slunken* 'schlaff, schlotterig, leer'.)

Here also belongs Lat. *loquor* 'talk', primarily 'flap, clack, chatter'. Compare ON. *slōđa* 'schleppen', Sw. *sladdra* 'hin und her schwatzen', Dan. *sladre*, LG. *schladdern* 'schwatzen, plaudern'; ON. *slođra* 'sich hinschleppen', MHG. *sloten* 'zittern, klopfen', *slotern* 'schlottern, zittern; klappern, schwatzen', Dan. *sludre* 'schwatzen, faseln, schnattern'; ON. *slōra* 'dally, dawdle', Gk. λῆρος 'idle talk, nonsense'. For many other examples of the same development see author's Color-Names and their Congeners, XVI, 51 ff.

9. Base *sele-qo-*: OE. *sealh*, OHG. *salaha* 'willow', primarily 'bending, pliant', Gk. ἕλκω 'draw, drag, trail', ὁλκός 'attractive; grasping, greedy; trailing, slow' (notice the widely divergent yet quite natural development in meaning: 'attractive': 'greedy': 'slow'), ὁλκαῖος 'drawn, towed; trailing, creeping', ὁλκός 'a drawing, dragging; track, furrow', Lat. *sulcus* 'furrow', OE. *sulh* 'furrow; plow': Av. *harecayeiti* 'schleudert, wirft', Skt. *sr̥kvá* 'lanze', Goth. *slahan* 'schlagen'.

This is the same change in meaning as seen in Lith. *slenkù* 'schleiche', OHG. *slingan* 'winden, flechten, schwingen, schleichen', Sw. *slinga* 'schlingen', *slänga* 'schleudern, werfen', *släng* 'schlag, streich, hieb'. That *slahan* meant primarily 'swing, sway' is evident from the derivatives of this base. If the primary meaning were 'cut', 'thrust', 'pierce' or 'hammer', 'pound', NHG *schlag* would not be used in some of its significations nor should we expect such compounds as *umschlag, einschlag*, etc. Compare also Sw. *slag* 'schlag; umdrehung', *slå* 'querholz, riegel', ON. *slaga* 'kreuzen, schief gehen', *slōgr* 'schlau, listig', Dan. *forslagen*, NHG. *verschlagen*; and Du. *sluw*, Sw. *slug* 'schlau', in which *slu-* may possibly come from *sl̥-*, as also *la-* in Lat. *lax* 'fraus', *lacit* 'in fraudem inducit', *lactō* 'allure, dupe'. Here

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we evidently have the primary meaning 'turning quickly, geschickt, gewandt, wily' as in Sw. *slängd* 'geschickt, durchtrieben', ON. *slunginn* 'wound up: sly, artful'. Compare the same development in Lith. *vejù* 'turn, twist', *vėlà* 'wire': OE. *wīl* 'wile' (cf. author, Mod. Lang. Notes, XVI, 22 f); OE. *wrencan* 'twist': 'play tricks', *wrenc* 'artifice, trick', Skt. *vr̥jiná* 'krumm, falsch, ränkevoll'; Lith. *verpiù* 'spin', i. e. 'twist', Skt. *várpa* 'list, kunstgriff' (cf. Uhlenbeck, Ai. Wb. s. v.).

10. Bases *sele-lo-*, *-do-*, *-dho-*: Lith. *slatau* 'sich vor etwas ducken, drücken', Lat. *lateō* 'lurk, skulk, lie hid', *latus* 'side, flank', OSw. *slind* 'seite', early LRh. *slenden* 'gleiten', early Du. *slinderen* 'gleiten, ausschlüpfen', MHG. *slint* 'schlund; schlinger', *slunt* 'schlund, kehle, hals; kluft, abgrund; schluck; schlemmer', Goth. *fraslindan* 'verschlingen', LG. *slendern* 'schlendern', Sw. *slända* 'spindle', ODu. *slinder* 'thin, slender'; ON. *slōð* 'spurweg', *sl̥̄ða* 'über die erde hinschleppen'; E. *slatter*, *slattern*, Dan. *slat*, *slatten* 'schlaff, lose, schlotternd', *slentre* 'schlendern', *slunte* 'schlendern, treiben', Sw. *slinta* 'gleiten, ausgleiten, abgleiten', E. *slant* 'slope', MHG. *slenzic* 'träge, müssig', NHG. *schlenzen*, *schlunzen*; Lith. *slėdnas* 'abschüssig, OE. *slæd* 'dell'; Gk. λανθάνω, λήθω 'escape notice, entschlüpfe, entgehe', base **slă-dho-*, perhaps also in ON. *slōð* 'track'.

11. Base *sele-sa*-*: Skt. *srāṁsatē* 'fällt ab, senkt sich, erschlafft, schwindet hin, zerfällt', ON. *slas* 'a coming to harm', *slys* 'misfortune', *slasask* 'come to harm', Sw. *slask* 'geschlampe; schlackwetter; schmutz', *slaskig* 'schlackerig', *slaska* 'sudeln; schlackern', *slusk*, 'unsauberer mensch', E. *slash*, *slush*. Compare Sw. *slumpa* 'schleudern', MHG. *slampen* 'schlaff herabhangen', *slump* 'schlumpig', NHG. *schlempe*, etc.

12. Base *sele-ra*-*: ON. *slōra* 'dally, dawdle', Gk. λῆρος 'idle talk, nonsense' < **slēro-s* 'schlotternd', ληρέω 'talk or act foolishly', λαρύνω 'coo', Lith. *slardau* 'murmelnd antworten'; Dan. *slark* 'taugenichts' < **slorgo-* 'drooping, slack', *slarke* 'die zeit verträumen', Lat. *largus* 'abundant, copious' < **sl̥rgo-* 'loose, wide, large' like *laxus*, ON. *slark* 'noise', MHG. *slurc* 'schlund' < **sl̥rgo-* 'fallen away, sunken, hollow', *slurken* 'schlucken', Dan. *slurk* 'schluck', *slurke* 'trinken', Gk. λάρυγξ 'schlund, kehle', Lat. *lurcō* 'glutton' (cf. Prellwitz, Et. Wb.); Sw. *slarfva* 'nachlässig sein', Dan. *slarve*, *slurve* 'unordentlich sein', MHG. *slerfen* 'die füsse schleppend einhergehen, schlarfen', *slarfe* 'abgetretener schuh, schlarfe, pantoffel', *ge-slerfe* 'schleppe', Du. *slurpen* 'schlürfen', Scotch *slorp* 'snivel; slobber; slump'.

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II.

With the suffix *-i̯o-* the base *sele-i̯o-*, *slei-*, *sl̥i-* is formed, from which many derived bases. For this formation compare Skt. *dhūnṓti* 'schüttelt, bewegt hin und her, entfernt, beseitigt', *dhū-yá-tē* 'wird geschüttelt', Lat. *suf-fiō*, *suf-fītus*, *suf-fīmen* (cf. Brugmann, Grd. I², 323), OE. *dwīnan* 'waste away, dwindle', *dwīmor* 'specter, delusion' (cf. author, Color-Names, X, 1 g). So from *selo-* in Lith. *selù* 'schleiche' comes the base *sleu̯a*- as in Pruss. *sloyo* 'unschlitt', whence the bases *slei-ma*-, *-ba*-, *-pa*-, etc. Similarly with *-u̯o-* is formed a new base *sele-u̯o-*, *sleu-*, *slū-* as in Skt. *sísarti*, *sárati*: *srá-va-ti*; *drā́ti*: *drá-va-ti*; *tárati*: Gk. *τέρυς*, *τρύω*, and many others (cf. Persson, Wz. 100 ff.).

1. Base *sele-i̯a*-, *slei-*: Gk. *ἑλί-τροχος* 'whirling the wheel', *ἑλί-χρυσος* 'creeping plant with yellow flower', Pruss. *sloyo* 'unschlitt'.

2. Base *slei-na*-: Gk. *ἕλινος* 'tendril', *ἑλτνύω* 'slack from work, be slack, lazy; rest, sleep; enjoy leisure, keep peace, keep holiday', *ἑλτνύες* 'days of rest, holidays'.

3. Base *slei-ma*-: Lith. *selejimas* 'das schleichen', Lat. *līma* 'file', *līmō* 'rub, schleifen, file, polish', *līmus* 'slanting, sidelong' (compare Sw. *slinta* 'slide': E. *slant*), Lat. *līmen* 'threshold, lintel, barrier', primarily 'thwart, cross-piece', *līmes* 'cross-path', Skt. *srēman* 'fehler', Lat. *līmus*, OE. *slīm* 'slime', Gk. *λείμαξ* 'shell-less snail', *λειμών* 'moist place, meadow', OIr. *slemain* 'lubricus' (cf. Persson Wz. 110). Some of these may belong to the root *lei-*, which is confused with *slei-* in some forms.

4. Base *slei-u̯a*-: Skt. *srívyati* 'missrät', *srēváyati* 'lenkt aus der bahn', Gk. *λαιός*, Lat. *laevus* 'link' <**sl̥iu̯ó-* 'slipping, slanting', OHG. *slēo* 'kraftlos, träge, matt, stumpf, welk', OE. *slāw* 'sluggish, slow'; Lith. *slývas*, ChSl. *sliva* 'plum', OHG. *slīo* 'schleie', Lat. *saltva* 'slime, spittle'. The 'plum-tree' was the 'gummy, sticky tree'; the *schleie* 'the slimy fish' (cf. Kluge, Et. Wb. s. v.).

5. Base *slei-ba*-: OHG. *slīfan* 'gleiten, ausgleiten, gleitend sinken; schleifen, glätten, schärfen', MHG. *sleif* 'schlüpfrig', E. *slope* 'schräge, abhang', *slope* 'neigen, senken; schief sein', OE. *slipig* 'slimy', NHG. *schlimpe* 'schliesskrampe', Lat. *limbus* 'noose, snare; fillet, band; belt, girdle; welt, border' (compare MHG. *sliefen* 'schliefen, schlüpfen': *slouf* 'öffnung, kreis; bekleidung' (eines säuglings), NHG. *schleife*), *l̥bō* 'pour out, offer;

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take away, diminish, impair', Gk. λείβω 'pour forth', mid. 'flow, trickle, melt away', Lat. *lĭber* 'loose, free, bold'.

6. Base *slei-pa*^{u}-: Lith. *nù-slimpa* 'entschlüpft', Lett. *slīpt* (*slīpu*) 'gleiten, schief werden', Lat. *lippus* 'dropping; blear-eyed, dim-sighted', ChSl. *slěpŭ* 'blind', i. e. 'triefäugig', OE. *tō-slīfan* 'split' (compare Lat. *lĭbō* 'pour out: take away, crop' <**sleibō* 'cause to slip or run out: cause to fall away'), E. *sliver* 'a long piece cut or rent off, splinter', ON. *sleif*, Dan. *slev* 'rührlöffel', Sw. *slef* 'kelle' (compare OHG. *spān* 'spahn'; E. *spoon*), prov. E. *slive* 'sneak, schleichen', *slive* 'split'.

7. Base *slei-dha*^{u}-: Skt. *srédhati* 'strauchelt, geht fehl, macht falsch', Lith. *slidùs* 'glatt', *slýstu* 'gleite', Lett. *slaids* 'abschüssig', OE, *slīdan* 'slide, glide' *slidrian* 'slip' (cf. Uhlenbeck, Ai. Wb.)' Lat. *lībra* 'pound' <**slīdhrā* 'a hanging down, weight, pondus'.

8. Base *slei-da*^{u}-: MHG. *slīzen* 'abstreifen, abschälen; abnutzen, zerreissen, aufbrauchen, hinbringen', refl. 'zerreissen, sich lösen, abstreifen', intr. 'spalten, reissen, zerreisen', *sleizen* 'zerreissen, spalten; die rinde abstreifen; zerstören', refl. 'zu grunde gehen, verfallen', ON. *slīta* 'abnutzen, zerreissen', *sleita* 'streit; arglistigkeit, ränke; schlaffheit, trägheit', OE. *slītan* 'tear, rend, destroy, irritate, slander', Dan. *slide* 'zerren, reissen; schleissen, abnutzen', *slid* 'abnutzung: anstrengung, mühe', Lat. *laedō* 'strike, damage, vex, annoy', Gk. λαιδρός 'bold, impudent', λοίδορος 'abusive, reviling'. Compare OHG. *slīfan* 'gleiten; schleifen': Lat. *lĭbō* 'diminish, impair, take away'; Lett. *slīpt* 'gleiten', Lith. *nù-slimpa* 'entschlüpft': OE. *tō-slīfan* 'split', E. *sliver;* Goth. *sliupan* 'schleichen': *afslaupjan* 'abstreifen'.

9. Base *slei-ta*^{u}-: OE. *slīpe* 'painful, severe, dangerous', *slīpan* 'injure', Goth. *sleips* 'schädlich, schlimm', *ga-sleipjan* 'schädigen', *sleipa* 'detrimentum', *sleipei* 'gefahr', etc. These evidently come from the primary meaning 'slip off, strip off, wear away' as in Lat. *lībō*; OE. *tō-slīfan;* *slītan;* Goth. *slaupjan*. Compare also Lat. *terō*, *trīvī* 'rub, rub to pieces, wear out', *dē-trimentum* 'a rubbing off: loss, damage'; *mordeō* 'bite', primarily 'rub off, gnaw', OE. *smeart* 'causing pain', Gk. σμερδαλέος 'dreadful, fearful', root *smer-* 'rub', from which also OHG. *smero* 'schmeer, fett' <**smerq*^{u}*ó-*, with which compare NHG. *schmirgel* 'schleimiger absatz im pfeifenrohr', Ch.Sl. *smrŭkŭ* 'rotz', Lith. *smarkata* 'schleim, rotz', and also *smarkùs* 'heftig, grausam', *smerkti* 'in not zu versetzen suchen', NHG. dial. *schmorgen* 'darben, not leiden' (cf. Zupitza, Germ. Gutt. 137).

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10. Base *slei-ĝ*a*-: ChSl. *lězą* 'schreite', Lat. *ligō* 'umschlingen, umwinden, bind up, bandage, bind', OHG. *slīhhan* 'schleichen', MHG. *slīch* 'schlamm, schlick', *slich* 'leise gleitender gang; spur; list', OE. *slīc* 'cunning', MHG. *slichen, slicken* 'schlingen, schlucken', ON. *sleikja* 'lick', Gk. λίγδην 'scraping, grazing', Lat. *ligō* 'hoe, grub-ax', i. e. 'scraper', OE. *slicc* 'hammer', LG. *slīken* 'schleichen, (v. monde) abnehmen', Dan. *slik* 'kleinigkeit', Gk. λιγύς 'thin, sharp, shrill' (sound), λιγυρός 'pliant, flexible; sharp, shrill'.

11. Base *slei-q̑*a*-: Lith. *slėkas* 'regenwurm', OE. *slā-wyrm* 'blind-schleiche', OHG. *slēha* 'schlehe', primarily 'gummy tree' (cf. *slei-ɥa*- above), Lat. *ob-liquus* 'slanting, awry', *liqueō* 'be fluid', *liquor* 'flow, dissolve.'

12. Base *slei-ka*-: Lat. *licium* 'leash, thread', *licinus* 'bent upward', Gk. λικμός 'winnowing fan', λίκνον 'wicker fan; basket; cradle', λικριφίς 'cross-wise', λικνίζω 'swing, rock; winnow', λαικάς 'prostitute', ἕλιξ 'twisted, bent, winding'; 'a twist, whirl, eddy; tendril; curl; bowels; spiral line', ἑλικός 'eddying', ἑλίκη 'a winding, twisting; willow, ἑλίσσω 'turn, roll, wind, wrap, bend, twist, twine; whirl, spin, move quickly, run to and fro', ἕλιγμα 'fold of a garment, wrapping; curl, ringlet', Lat. *salix* 'willow'.

13. Base *slei-gha*-: Gk. λαιχήν 'flechte an bäumen und auf der haut', ON. *sliga* 'overburden', i. e. 'cause to bend', *sligask* 'bend under burden', Lith. *slykstu* (*slygau*) 'schlummere'.

14. Base *slei-ra*-: Dan. *slire* 'gleiten', Norw. *slire* 'scheide' (compare OE. *slīdan* 'gleiten': ON. *slīðr* 'scheide'), Gk. λῖρός 'bold, shameless'.

III.

1. Base *sele-ɥo-*, *sole-ɥo-*, *sleu-*: Lat. *solvō* 'loose, loosen, separate, relax, release', Lith. *sėlavà*, *salavà* 'muräne' (compare Gk. μύρον 'salbe': μύραινα 'muräne'), E. *slue* 'twist, turn', perhaps from OE. **slēowian*, Goth. *slawan* 'schweigen', OE. *slūma* 'slumber', ON. *sleyma* 'dummkopf', Sw. dial. *slummen* 'sehr mager, schwach', Norw. dial. *sløyma* 'dünn werden' (cf. Persson Bezz. Beitr. XIX, 262). These are all from the underlying meaning 'fall away, slip away', also in MHG. *slūn* 'das faulenzen', Sw. *slynig* 'flegelhaft', *slyna* 'dumme Liese'. Here belongs Germ. *salwa*- 'faded': OE. *salo* 'dark-colored', E. *sallow* 'bleich, fahl', etc., with which compare Gk. ἑλειός (<**seleuio-s*?) 'kind of mouse; kind of falcon'.

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2. Base *sleu-ra*-: E. *slur* 'slide over', Du. *sleuren*, *sloren* 'schleppen', MHG. *slūr* 'das schleudern, der stoss; das herumstreifen, faulenzen; faulenzer', *slier* 'lehm, schlamm', *sliere* 'geschwür, beule', perhaps Gk. λαύρα 'narrow passage, lane, defile', Lat. *lūra* 'mouth of a skin or leathern bag' (cf. MHG. *slouf*e), though these may be from the root *leu-*.

3. Base *sleu-ba*-: Lat. *lūbricus* 'slippery', Lith. *slubnas* 'schwach, matt', Goth. *sliupan* 'schlüpfen, schleichen', *afslaupjan* 'abstreifen', OHG. *sloufen* 'schlüpfen lassen; einhüllen, kleiden in', *sliofan* 'schliefen, schlüpfen', MHG. *slouf*e 'öffnung, kreis; bekleidung', OE. *ofer-slop* 'surplice', *slūpan* 'glide', *slyppe* 'slime, paste', ON. *slupra* 'schlürfen', MHG. *slüpfen* 'schlüpfen; schlürfen,' E. *slop* 'überlaufen; besudeln'.

4. Base *sleu-pa*-: Lett. *schlàups* 'schräg', *schlàupstît* 'abschrägen', OE. *slīefan* 'slip on' (dress), *slīefe-scōh* 'slipper', *slīefe* 'sleeve', ODu. *slōve* 'velum, tegmen, folliculus', LG. *slūve* 'hülse, schote', NHG. *schlaube* 'hülse', *schlofen* 'twist slightly', (wool), E. *slub* 'draw out and twist slightly', *sloven* 'ein schlotteriger, schlumpiger mensch', Lat. *lupa* 'prostitute'.

5. Base *sleu-ga*-,-*ga*-: Lith. *slaužiu* 'krieche auf der erde': *slùkstu* (*slùgau*) 'nehme ab, werde kleiner' (von einer geschwulst), MHG. (LRh.) *sliechen* 'schleichen', *slūch* 'abgestreifte haut; schlauch; schlund', *slücke* 'öffnung, lücke', *slucken* 'schlucken; sluchzen', *slūchen*, 'schlucken', *sluhtisch* 'träge, faul', late MHG. *slucke* 'faltenrock der weiber', E. *slouch* 'schlaff niederhangen; sich schwerfällig vorwärts bewegen' <OE. **slūcian*, ON. *slauka* 'slump through', *slok* 'gutter', *sloka* 'swallow', Sw. *sloka* 'schlaff hangen', LG. *slukk* 'low-spirited, sad'. Here also may belong Gk. λευγαλέος 'traurig', Lat. *lūgeō* 'trauere', though another explanation is possible (cf. Prellwitz, Et. Wb.).

6. Base *sleu-qa*-: Lith. *slùkau* 'schleiche, faulenze', Lett. *schlùkt* 'glitschen', *nů-slauka* 'woran man etwas abwischt', *paslauka* 'abschaum', Gk. λαυκανίη 'schlund, kehle', E. *slough* 'abgestreifte haut', *slug*, *sluggish*, ON. *slȳ* 'slimy water-plant.'

6*a*. Here probably, rather than to *sele-qa-*, belong ME. *sli*, *sly* (from OE. **slȳh*), E. *sly* 'nimble, skillful, dexterous; artful, cunning, wily', Sw. *slug* 'schlau, klug', Dan. *slu* (*slug*) 'verschmitzt, verschlagen, listig', Du. *sluw*, LG. *slū* 'schlau', NHG. *schlau*, Bav. *schlauch* 'schlau'. The last forms point to a MHG. **slūch*, **slūher*, OHG. **slūh*, from which come the double forms *schlau*, *schlauch* corresponding to *rauh*, *rauch* from MHG. *rūch*, *rūher*.

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The meaning 'sly' probably developed the same as in ON. *slœgr* and *slunginn* (see I, 7). Or it may come from the closely allied signification 'moving secretly', as in MHG. *slich* 'leise gleitender gang, schleichweg: list', OE. *slīc* 'cunning'. Compare Czech. *lísati* 'streicheln', MHG. *leise* 'spur, geleise', *lîse* 'leise, langsam', i. e. 'schleichend', OE. *ge-lîsian* 'slip, glide': *list*, Goth. *lists* 'list.'

7. Base *sleu-ta*ᵉ-: ON. *sloðra* 'sich hinschleppen', *slyðra* 'mattigkeit, unthätigkeit', Sw. *sludder* 'nachlässigkeit', *sluddra* 'nachlässig sein', Dan. *sludder* 'gewäsch', *sludre* 'schwatzen, faseln', MHG. *slûder-affe* 'müssiggänger' (not the same as *slûr-affe* but formed with a synonymous *slûder*), *slûder* 'schleuder', *slûdern* 'schleudern, schlenkern', NHG. *schleudern* 'move irregularly, shamble, swing; sling, throw, toss, hurl' (cf. MHG. *slenkern* 'schwingen, schleudern', NHG. *schlenkern* 'swing, dangle, roll: fling, toss'), MHG. *slotern* 'schlottern, zittern; klappern; schwatzen', *sloten* 'zittern, klappern', *slote* 'schlamm', Scotch *slud* 'schmutz', Lat. *lutum* 'mire, mud', *lustrum* 'swamp, bog', MHG. *sliude* 'schwertscheide' (cf. OE. *slîdan* 'slide': ON. *slîðr* 'scheide'; Dan. *slire* 'gleiten': Norw. *slire* 'scheide').

Here belong, as was long ago recognized, Goth. *afslaupjan* 'in bestürzung versetzen, ängstigen', *afslaupnan* 'in bestürzung geraten, staunen' (cf. Schade, Wb.). These are from an adj. **slaups* 'slipping, falling; fallen, cast down, distressed, bestürzt'. Compare OE. *slincan* 'creep, slink', *slacian* 'relax efforts, slacken': Lith. *slėgiu* 'bedrücke', *slogus* 'beschwerlich, schwierig'; Lith. *pri-slaudžiu* 'krieche heran': *slaudžiu* 'drücke, dränge, belästige', ON. *slûta* 'herabhangen'.

8. Base *sleu-da*ᵉ-: ChSl. *sludy* 'abhang', *sludĭnŭ* 'abhängig', Lith. *pri-slaudžiu* 'krieche heran', *slaudžiu* 'drücke, dränge, belästige', ON. *slûta* 'hang down, slouch', *slota* 'hang down, be limp; slacken, become calm, still', *slot* 'calm', *slytti* 'anything limp', *slyttinn* 'weak, indolent, lazy', Sw. *slutta* 'schief sein, sich neigen, sich senken, abfallen, sich abdachen', E. *slot* 'the track of a deer, track; a narrow depression or aperture, esp., one for the reception of a piece fitting or sliding in it', *slut* 'an untidy woman, slattern', *sleet* 'hail or snow, mingled with rain', Dan. *slud* 'regen und schnee, nasskalte witterung', *slud-fuld* 'regnicht, nasskalt', MHG. *slôz*, *slôze* 'hagelkorn, schlosse'. Compare MHG. *slach* 'schlaff, welk': NHG. *schlack* 'mischung von regen und schnee'; ON. *slasask* 'come to harm': Sw. *slask*

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'geschlampe, schmutz', E. *slush*; MHG. *slampen* 'schlaff herabhangen': *slump* 'schlumpig', etc.

Here also belong MHG. *slŏz* 'band, fessel, riegel, schloss, burg', OHG. *sloz* 'riegel, schloss', MHG. *sliezen* 'fügen, zusammenfügen, an einander befestigen; umfassen, begreifen; schliessen, verschliessen', OHG. *sliozan*, OLG. *bi-sliotan* 'schliessen, verschliessen', OFries. *slūta*, MLG., MDu. *slūten* 'schliessen', Sw. *slūta* 'zuthun, schliessen; beendigen, vollenden; schliessen, enden', prov. E. *slot* 'zuschmeissen'. The primary meaning of Germ. *slūtan*, *sleutan* is 'zufallen lassen, zudrücken, zusammenfügen, befestigen', etc., which is the causative use of ON. *slūta* 'herabhangen', and but slightly different in meaning from Lith. *slaudžiu* 'drücke, dränge'. Compare MHG. *slampen* 'schlaff herabhangen', Sw. *slumpa* 'schleudern': NHG. *schlimpe* 'schliesskrampe', Gk. λαβίς 'schnalle, haken'.

IV.

The growth of the root *selo-* through the addition of suffixes may be illustrated as follows:

1. *Selo+*: Lith. *selù*, *sėlėti* 'schleichen', *sėlà* 'schwachheit'; Gk. σλέγη 'wicker basket' < **selenā* 'a twisting, twining', ON. *slen* 'trägheit', Lith. *selomis eiti* 'schleichen', Skt. *srāmá* 'hinkend'; Lat. *lābor* 'slip', *labō* 'totter, sink', ON. *slapa*, MHG. *slampen* 'los hangen'; ON. *slafask* 'nachlassen', Lith. *sùlpnas* 'schwach', *slepiu* 'verberge'; OE. *slæc* 'schlaff', *ā-seolcan* 'languescere', *slincan* 'schleichen, langsam vergehen'; Lith. *slenkù*, OE. *slingan* 'schleichen', OHG. *slingan* 'winden, flechten, schwingen'; Gk. σλάκω 'schleppe', ON. *slaga* 'schief gehen', Goth. *slahan* 'schlagen'; early LRh. *slenden* 'gleiten', Lith. *slatau* 'ducke mich'; Lith. *slėdnas* 'abschüssig', Dan. *slat* 'schlaff, lose, schlotternd', Sw. *slinta* 'gleiten, ausgleiten'; Skt. *sráṁsatē* 'fällt ab, erschlafft', ON. *slasask* 'zu schaden kommen'; ON. *slōra* 'dawdle', Sw. *slarfva* 'nachlässig sein', MHG. *slerfen* 'die füsse schleppend einhergehen'.

2. *Sele-io+*: Gk. σλί-τροχος 'whirling the wheel'; σλινος 'tendril'; Lith. *selejimas* 'das schleichen', OHG. *slīm* 'schleim'; Skt. *srēváyati* 'lenkt aus der bahn', OHG. *slēo* 'kraftlos, träge'; *slīfan* 'gleiten, ausgleiten', Gk. λείβω 'pour forth'; Lett. *slīpt* 'gleiten, schief werden', prov. E. *slive* 'schleichen'; Lith. *slidùs* 'glatt', OE. *slīdan* 'gleiten'; ON. *sleita* 'ränke, arglistigkeit; schlaffheit, trägheit', MHG. *slīzen* 'abstreifen; zerreissen'; Goth.

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sleipa 'detrimentum'; OHG. *slīhhan* 'schleichen', ChSl. *lězǫ* 'schreite', Lat. *ligō* 'umschlinge, umwinde, binde'; Lett. *slaika* 'art schlitten', Lith. *slėkas* 'regenwurm'; Gk. ἑλιξ 'twisted, winding; twist, whirl', ἑλίσσω 'turn, roll, wind, wrap'; ON. *sliga* 'überlasten', Lith. *slykstu* (*slygau*) 'schlummere'; Dan. *slire* 'gleiten', Norw. *slire* 'scheide'.

3. *Sele-u̯o+*: Lat. *solvō* 'loose, loosen, relax', E. *slue* 'wenden', Goth. *slawan* 'schweigen'; ON. *sleyma* 'dummkopf', Sw. dial. *slummen* 'sehr mager, schwach'; *slyna* 'dumme Liese', MHG. *slūn* 'das faulenzen'; *slūr* 'das faulenzen', Du. *sleuren* 'schleppen'; Lith. *slubnas* 'schwach', Goth. *sliupan* 'schlüpfen, schleichen'; Lett. *schlàups* 'schräg', OE. *slūfan* 'slip on'; Lith. *slaužiu* 'krieche', ON. *slauka* 'slump through'; Lith. *slúkstu* (*slúgau*) 'werde kleiner'; *slúkau* 'schleiche, faulenze', E. *slug*; ON. *sloðra* 'sich hinschleppen', *slyðra* 'mattigkeit', MHG. *slotern* 'schlottern'; ON. *slūta* 'herabhangen', Sw. *slutta* 'schief sein, sich neigen', ChSl. *sludy* 'abhang'.

4. Throughout the group of words coming from the root *selo-* we find such terms as 'slime, slop, slaver, slush', etc. In some cases the underlying idea is 'slippery' or 'sliding, gliding'; in others, 'slack, loose, dripping'.

Lith. *selù* 'schleiche': Skt. *salilá* 'fliessend', Lith. *selė* 'holzfloss', *salà* 'insel', Lat. *in-sula* (compare Goth. *ahwa* 'wasser', MHG. *ouwe* 'wasser, strom: wasserland, insel', OE. *ēeg* 'island'; Skt. *srāva* 'fluss': ChSl. *o-strovŭ* 'insel').—MHG. *slampen* 'schlaff herabhangen': *slump* 'schlumpig', NHG. *schlempe* 'slop', prov. E. *slump* 'boggy place'.—Lith. *sìlpnas* 'schwach', ON. *slefa* 'geifern', E. *slaver*, NHG. *schlabbern*, Gk. λάπη 'phlegm, filth', λάμπη 'scum', ChSl. *slěpati* 'sprudeln' (or this to Lith. *szlāpias* 'nass'), Skt. *sarpi* 'schmalz', OHG. *salba* 'salbe'; Gk. λέμφος 'schleim, rotz', MHG. *slam(m)* 'schlamm'.—MHG. *slach* 'schlaff, welk': NHG. *schlack* 'slush', *schlacker* 'slushy or sloppy weather', *schlackern* 'rain heavily'; OE. *ā-seolcan* 'become languid, droop': Sw. *solk* 'schmutz', MHG. *selken* 'tröpfelnd niederfallen, sich niedersenken' (von wolken).—Gk. ἑλκω 'schleppe', ON. *slaga* 'schiefgehen', *slagna* 'niederfallen: feucht werden', Dan. *slagne* 'feucht werden', OE. *slagu* 'slag, dross', *slōh* 'slough, mire'.—Early LRh. *slenden* 'gleiten', ON. *slōð* 'spurweg', *slōði* 'schleppe': MHG. *sluot* 'schlamm', Lat. *latex* 'liquid, fluid'.—Skt. *srâṁsatē* 'fällt ab, senkt sich, erschlafft, zerfällt', ON. *slasask* 'come to harm': Gk. ἕλος 'niederung,

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sumpf', Skt. *sáras* 'teich, see', Sw. *slask* 'geschlampe, schmutz', *slaska* 'sudeln, manschen; schlackern', *slusk* 'unsauberer mensch', E. *slush*.—MHG. *slerfen* 'die füsse schleppend einhergehen', NHG. *schlarfen*, *schlürfen*, *schlürpfen*: Scotch *slorp* 'snivel; slobber; slump', Du. *slurpen* 'schlürfen, sip'.—Lat. *līma* 'file': *limus*, OHG. *slīm* 'slime'.—OHG. *slīfan* 'gleiten', MHG. *sleif* 'schlüpfrig, glatt': NHG. Swab. *schleif* 'schleimig', OE. *slipig* 'slimy', Gk. λείβω 'drip', λιβρός 'dripping, wet; dark, gloomy'.—Prov. E. *slive* 'schleichen', Lett. *slīpt* 'gleiten, schief werden': Lat. *lippus* 'dropping; blear-eyed, dim-sighted', ChSl. *slĕpŭ* 'blind'.—OHG. *slēo* 'kraftlos, matt, welk': Lat. *saliva* 'slime, spittle'.—OHG. *slīhhan* 'schleichen': MHG. *slīch* 'schlamm, schlick', MLFr. *slijc* 'sumpf, schlamm'.—Lett. *slaiks* 'gefügig', *slaika* 'art schlitten', Lith. *slėkas* 'regenwurm': Lat. *liqueō* 'be fluid', *liquor* 'flow, dissolve'.—Du. *sleuren*, *sloren* 'schleppen', MHG. *slūr* 'das faulenzen': *slier* 'lehm, schlamm', ON. *slor* 'slim af fisk'.—ON. *sloðra* 'sich hinschleppen': MHG. *slote* 'schlamm', Lat. *lutum* 'mud, mire', *lustrum* 'slough, bog'.—ChSl. *sludy* 'abhang', Lith. *pri-slaudžiu* 'krieche heran', ON. *slūta* 'herabhangen', E. *slut* 'schmutziges frauenzimmer, schlumpe', *sleet* 'regen und schnee untereinander', Dan. *slud* 'regen und schnee; nasskalte witterung', MHG. *slōz*, *slōze* 'hagelkorn, schlosse'.—OE. *slūpan* 'glide': *slīepa*, *slyppe* 'paste, slime', ON. *slupra*, Dan. *slubre* 'schlürfen', MHG. *slüpfen* 'schlüpfen: schlürfen', E. *slop*.—Lith. *slaužiu* 'krieche auf der erde', ON. *slauka* 'sich hinüberschleppen' (bog, swamp): *slok* 'rinne', *slokr* 'skum fra munden paa dyr', Gk. λῡγαῖος 'dark, gloomy', primarily 'dripping' as in λιβρός 'dripping: dark, gloomy'.

4*a*. Compare the similar development in meaning in the following:

Lith. *sūbóju* 'schaukele, wiege mich', *svaĩbalas* 'was hangend baumelt, bleilot', NHG. *schwappen* 'sich zitternd hin- und herbewegen' (von flüssigkeiten und weichen massen), E. *swap* 'fall suddenly, flap', *swoop* 'fall upon, seize', OE. **swōpian*, ON. *sōpa* 'sweep' from **swōp-* (cf. Noreen, Urg. Lautlehre, 212): MHG. *sumpf*, E. *swamp* 'sumpf', Sw. *svamp* 'pilz'.—MHG. *swanken* 'schwanken', Scotch *swank* 'schwank, behende: sumpf', *swanky* 'sumpfig'.—Goth. *siggan* 'sinken', ON. *søkk* 'sinken, höhle', E. *sink* 'drain; low place in land, where waters sink and are lost': Sw. *sank* 'sumpfig'.—Skt. *lōlati* 'bewegt sich hin und her'

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Lith. *liuleti* 'sich geleerartig bewegen': *liulýnas* 'moorgrund'.—Dan. *logre*, Lith. *liunginti* 'mit dem schwanze wedeln: *liūgas* 'morast', *liūgùs* 'sumpfig, kotig'.

5. From 'sway, totter, slip; slip away, fall away' come words for 'slack, loose, lazy, weak, sick' and 'thin, slender, hollow, empty: cleft, cavern, abyss, gorge, gullet, throat'. These ideas are so closely connected that they will be given under one head.

Lith. *sėlà* 'schwachheit, ohnmacht'; ON. *slen* 'trägheit'; Skt. *srâma* 'lahmheit, siechtum'; ChSl. *slabŭ*, Lith. *slābnas* 'schwach', OHG. *slaf* 'schlaff, träge', *slāf* 'schläfe', ON. *slāpr* 'schlaffer mensch'; Lith. *sìlpnas* 'schwach', *slẽpsna*, Gk. λαπάρα 'dünnung, weichen', λαπαρός 'slack, loose', E. *slab* 'thin piece'; MHG. *slanc* 'schlank, mager', E. *slinky* 'thin, lank', Dan. *slunken* 'schlaff, schlotterig, leer', OE. *slæc* 'slack', Gk. λαγαρός 'slack, hollow, sunken', λαγών 'empty space, cleft, cave: flank'; Lat. *lacūna* 'hollow, opening, cleft,' *lacūnar*, *laquear* 'fretted or paneled ceiling', MHG. *slinc*, *slunc*, *-ges* 'schlund', *slinc-vahs* 'mit losen, sich slängelnden haaren versehen'; ODu. *slinder*, E. *slender* 'schlank', OSw. *slind* 'seite', Lat. *latus* 'side, flank', MHG. *slunt* 'kluft, abgrund, schlund, kehle, hals', *slint* 'schlund'; Lith. *slėdnas* 'steep', OE. *slæd* 'dell', MHG. *slāt*, *slōt* 'ofenloch, schlot'; Dan. *slat*, *slatten*, E. *slattern* 'schlaff, schlotternd', MHG. *slenzic* 'träge, müssig'; Dan. *slark* 'taugenichts', MHG. *slurc*, Gk. λάρυγξ 'schlund'; Sw. *slarf* 'nachlässigkeit'.—OHG. *slēo* 'kraftlos, träge, matt'; ON. *sleita* 'schlaffheit, trägheit'; LG. *slīken* 'schleichen; (vom monde) abnehmen', Dan. *slik* 'kleinigkeit', Gk. λιγύς 'thin, sharp, shrill' (sound).—ON. *sleyma* 'dummkopf', Sw. *slummen* 'sehr mager, schwach'; MHG. *slūn* 'das faulenzen', Sw. *slyna* 'dumme Liese', MHG. *slūr* 'das faulenzen', Gk. λαύρα 'narrow passage, defile', Lat. *lūra* 'mouth of a leathern bag'; Lith. *slubnas* 'schwach, matt', MHG. *sloufe* 'öffnung'; E. *sloven* 'schlotteriger, schlumpiger mensch'; MHG. *slūch* 'schlund', *slücke* 'öffnung, lücke', *sluhtisch* 'träge, faul', NHG. *schlucht* 'chasm', E. *slouch* 'schlotteriger mensch, tölpel'; Gk. λαυκανίη 'schlund, kehle', E. *sluggish* 'träge, faul'; ON. *slyðra* 'mattigkeit,' Sw. *sludder* 'nachlässigkeit', MHG. *slūder-affe* 'müssiggänger'; ON. *slyttinn* 'träge, faul', E. *slut* 'schlumpe', *slot* 'narrow aperture'.

5*a*. In the above are several words for 'flank, side' from 'bending; sunken; hollow', etc. Compare the following: MHG. *weich* 'weich, biegsam, schwach': NHG. *die weichen*.—MHG. *dünne* 'dünn': *daz dünne* 'die weiche', NHG. *dünnung*.—MHG.

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linc 'link', OE. *hlinc* 'slope, hill', *hlanc* 'lank, lean': OHG. *hlanca* 'hüfte, lende'.—OE. *hlinian* 'lean, recline', *hlip* 'slope, hill': ON. *hlið* 'side'.—Lith. *lendù* 'krieche', *lindynė* 'versteck', Pruss. *lindan* 'thal'; Lat. *lumbus*, OHG. *lentin* 'lende'.—Gk. πλάγιος 'quer, schief': τὰ πλάγια 'seiten, flanken'. Here perhaps also Germ. **flanka* 'flank'.

6. Closely allied to these are words denoting that which may be slipped off or on or into, hence 'hull, shell; slough, skin; garment; hiding-place', etc.

Lith. *sėlenà* 'schlaube, schale'; Sw. *slang* 'schlauch'; MHG. *slieme* 'dünne haut'; OE. *ofer-slop* 'surplice', MHG. *sloufe* 'bekleidung', *sluf*, *slupf-loch* 'schlupfwinkel'; OE. *slēve* 'sleeve', ODu. *slōve* 'velum, tegmen, folliculus', LG. *slūve* 'hülse, schote', NHG. *schlaube* 'hülse'; MHG. *slūch* 'abgestreifte haut, schlauch'; ME. *slogh*, *slouh*, E. *slough* 'abgestreifte haut, schorf', OE. **slūh* (: Lett. *schlùkt* 'glitschen'); MHG. *sliude*, *slūde* 'schwertscheide'; ON. *slīðr* 'scheide'; Norw. *slire* 'scheide'.

7. Of similar development are words for 'slip off, peel off, scrape (make smooth, whet), slit, sliver'.

Lat. *līma* 'file', *līmō* 'rub, file, polish'; OHG. *slīfan* 'gleiten: schleifen, glätten, schärfen', Lat. *lābō* 'take away, diminish, impair', OE. *tō-slīfan* 'split' E. *sliver* 'splinter'; MHG. *slīzen* 'abstreifen, abschälen, zerreissen', OE. *slītan* 'tear, rend', Lat. *laedō* 'damage, injure'; OE. *slīpan* 'injure', Goth. *ga-sleipjan* 'schädigen'; ON. *slīkr* 'glatt', OHG. *slihten* 'glatt machen, glätten', Lat. *ligō* 'hoe'; Goth. *afslaupjan* 'abstreifen'.

8. From the derived meaning 'gorge, gullet, throat' come several words for 'swallow'.

MHG. *slint* 'schlund: schlinger', *slunt* 'kluft, abgrund, schlund, kehle: schluck, schwelgerei, trunkenheit; schwelger, schlemmer', *slinden* 'schlucken, schlingen', Goth. *fra-slindan* 'verschlingen'. —MHG. *slinc*, *slunc*, *-ges* 'schlund': NHG. *schlingen*. This implies a MHG. **slingen* 'swallow' which must have existed by the side of *slinden*, corresponding to *slint*, *slunt*: *slinc*, *slunc*.—Gk. λάρυγξ 'gullet, throat', MHG. *slurc* 'schlund': *slurc-hart* 'schlemmer', *slurken* 'schlucken'.—MHG. *slūch* 'schlund, kehle, gurgel: schwelger, säufer, fresser', *slūchen*, *slucken* 'schlingen, schlucken', ON. *sloka* 'drikke i store drag, nedsvælge', Sw. *sluka*, Dan. *sluge* 'verschlingen', *slugen* 'gefrässig, gierig'.

Compare MHG. *swalch* 'schlund': OHG. *swelgan* 'verschlucken, saufen'.

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9. In other cases words for 'swallow' imply a careless eating or drinking, a slopping, slobbering.

MHG. *slampen* 'schlaff herabhangen', *slump* 'schlumpig': *slamp* 'gelage', *slampieren* 'unmässig essen', NHG. *schlampen*, *-pfen* 'schlemmen'.—Lith. *sìlpnas* 'schwach': ON. *slefa* 'geifern', E. *slaver* 'drivel', *slabber*, NHG. *schlabbern* 'schlürfen, so dass das eingeschlürfte zum teil wieder herausfällt'.—MHG. *slam* 'schlamm': *slemmen* 'schlemmen, prassen', i. e. 'slop, slobber'.—Sw. *slarfva* 'nachlässig sein': Du. *slurpen*, Dan. *slurpe* 'schlürfen', Scotch *slorp* 'auf unsaubere art, mit schnüffeln und schluchzen weinen; in unreinlicher weise mit patschen und schmatzen essen'.—ON. *sloðra* 'sich hinschleppen', Sw. *sluddra* 'nachlässig sein': Scotch *sludder* 'unreinlich essen'.—ON. *slota* 'hang down, be limp', E. *slut* 'schlampe': OE. *slota* 'morsel', Scotch *slutter* 'beim essen patschen, sabbern'.—OE. *slūpan* 'gleiten', *slyppe* 'schleim': ON. *slupra*, Dan. *slubre* 'schlürfen', MHG. *slüpfen* 'schlüpfen: schlürfen', E. *slop* 'begiessen, beschütten, besudeln: hastig, gierig trinken'.

10. In a few instances words for 'taste, lick' come from 'scrape, graze, touch', a signification that is derived from 'slide over'. But in no case, so far as I have found in this group of words, does 'swallow, slobber, sip' come directly from 'slide, slip' but from some intermediate idea.

OHG. *slīfan* 'gleiten; schleifen', Lat. *lībō* 'touch, lessen, diminish (i. e. 'scrape off'): 'taste, sip, crop'.—OHG. *slīhhan* 'schleichen': ON. *sleikja*, Sw. *slicka* 'lecken', MHG. *slichen*, *slicken* 'zupfen: schlucken, schlingen', *slic* 'bissen, trunk, schluck; fresser.'

Sanskrit.

lámbatē I, 4
lōlati IV, 4*a*
sáras IV, 4
sarpí IV, 4
salilá IV, 4
sr̥ká I, 9
sr̥ṇí I, 2
srámsatē I, 11; IV, 1, 4
srāmá I, 3; IV, 1, 5
srēdhati II, 7
srēman II, 3
srēváyati II, 4; IV, 2

Greek.

ἅλομαι I, 1
ἑλεῖν I, 1
ἑλειός III, 1
ἑλένη I, 2; IV, 1
ἑλίκη II, 12
ἕλινος II, 2; IV, 2

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ἕλιξ II, 12; IV, 2
ἑλίσσω II, 12; IV, 2
ἑλίτροχος II, 1; IV, 2
ἕλκω I, 9; IV, 1, 4
ἕλος IV, 4
λαβίς I, 4
λάβρος I, 4
λαγαρός I, 6; IV, 5
λαγών I, 6; IV, 5
λαιδρός II, 8
λαικάς II, 12
λαιός II, 4
λαμβάνω I, 4
λάμπη IV, 4
λανθάνω I, 10
λαπάρα I, 5; IV, 5
λαπαρός I, 5, 8; IV, 5
λάπη IV, 4
λάρυγξ I, 12; IV, 5, 8
λαρύνω I, 12
λαυκανίη IV, 5
λαύρα III, 2; IV, 5
λείβω II, 5; IV, 2, 4
λειχηνίζω II, 12
λειμών II, 3
λειχήν II, 13
λέμφος I, 5; IV, 4
λήγω I, 6
λῆρος I, 12
λίγδην II, 10
λιγυρός II, 10
λιγύς II, 10; IV, 5
λικμός II, 12
λικριφίς II, 12
λτρός II, 14
λοίδορος II, 8
λῦγαῖος IV, 4
ὁλκός I, 9

Latin.

insula IV, 4
labo I, 4; IV, 1
labor I, 4; IV, 1
lacit I, 9
lacuna I, 8; IV, 5
lacunar I, 8; IV, 5
laedo II, 8; IV, 7
laevus II, 4
langueo I, 6
largus I, 12
lateo I, 10; IV, 5
latex IV, 4
latus I, 10
laquear I, 8; IV, 5
laqueus I, 8
lax I, 9
lenis I, 2
liber II, 5
libo II, 5; IV, 7, 10
libra II, 7
licinus II, 12
licium II, 12
ligo 'bind' II, 10; IV, 2
ligo 'hoe' II, 10; IV, 7
lima II, 3; IV, 4, 7
limen II, 3
limes II, 3
limus II, 3; IV, 4
lippus II, 6; IV, 4
liqueo II, 11; IV, 4
lubricus III, 3
lugeo III, 5
lumbus IV, 5*a*
lupa III, 4
lura IV, 5
lurco I, 12
lustrum III, 7; IV, 4
lutum III, 7; IV, 4
obliquus II, 11
salebra I, 1

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salio I, 1
saliva II, 4; IV, 4
salix II, 12
solari I, 1
solvo III, 1; IV, 3
sulcus I, 9

Gothic.

lists III, 6*a*
saljan I, 1
saldra I, 1
sēls I, 1
slahan I, 9; IV, 1
-slaupjan III, 3; IV, 7
-slaupjan III, 7
slawan III, 1; IV, 3
sleipa II, 9; IV, 2
-sleipjan II, 9; IV, 7
slēpan I, 4
-slindan I, 10; IV, 8
sliupan III, 3; IV, 3

Old, Middle and New High German.

hlanca IV, 5*a*
lentin IV, 5*a*
linc IV, 5*a*
salaha I, 9
salba IV, 4
sālig I, 1
selken IV, 4
schlabbern I, 5; IV, 4, 9
schlack IV, 4
schlackern IV, 4
slaf I, 4; IV, 5
slāf I, 4; IV, 5
slah I, 6; IV, 4
slahta I, 7
slam I, 5; IV, 4, 9
slamp IV, 9
slampen I, 4; IV, 1, 4, 9
schlampen, -pfen IV, 9
slampieren IV, 9
slanc I, 6; IV, 5
slango I, 7
slarfe I, 12
slāt, slōt IV, 5
schlau III, 6*a*
schlaube III, 4; IV, 6
slēha II, 11
sleif II, 5; IV, 4
schleif IV, 4
slemen I, 3
slemmen IV, 9
slenken I, 6
schlenzen I, 10
slenzic I, 10; IV, 5
slēo II, 4; IV, 2, 4, 5
slerfen I, 12; IV, 1, 4
slich II, 10; IV, 4
slicken II, 10; IV, 10
sliechen III, 5
slieme IV, 6
slier III, 2; IV, 4
slīfan II, 5; IV, 2, 4, 7
slīhhan II, 10; IV, 2
slihten IV, 7
slīm IV, 2, 4
slimp I, 5
schlimpe II, 5
slinc I, 6; IV, 5, 8
slingan I, 6; IV, 1
schlingen IV, 8
slint I, 10; IV, 5, 8
slīo II, 4
sliofan III, 3

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sliozan III, 8
sliude III, 7; IV, 6
slīzen II, 8; IV, 2, 7
schlofen III, 4
slouſe III, 3; IV, 5, 6
slouſen III, 3
slole III, 7; IV, 4
sloten III, 7
slotern III, 7; IV, 3
slōze III, 8; IV, 4
slūch III, 5; IV, 5, 8
slūchen III, 5; IV, 8
slucken III, 5; IV, 8
slūder III, 7
slūder-affe III, 7; IV, 5
sluf IV, 6
sluhtisch III, 5; IV, 5
slump I, 4; IV, 4, 9
slūn III, 1; IV, 3, 5
slunt I, 10; IV, 5, 8
schlunzen I, 10
sluot IV, 4
slüpfen III, 3; IV, 4, 9
slupfloch IV, 6
slūr III, 2; IV, 3, 4, 5
slurc I, 12; IV, 5, 8
schlürfen IV, 4
slurken I, 12; IV, 8
sumpf IV, 4*a*
swalch IV, 8
schwappen IV, 4*a*
swelgan IV, 8
verschlagen I, 9

Old and New Dutch.

sleuren III, 2; IV, 3, 4
slinder I, 10; IV, 5
slinderen I, 10
slōve III, 4; IV, 6
slurpen I, 12; IV, 49

Old English.

hlanc IV, 5*a*
hlinc IV, 5*a*
-līsian III, 6*a*
list III, 6*a*
ofer-slop IV, 6
sāl I, 1
salo III, 1
-seolcan I, 6; IV, 1, 4
slæc I, 6; IV, 1, 5
slæd I, 10; IV, 5
slagu IV, 4
slā-wyrm II, 11
slīc II, 10
slicc II, 10
slīdan II, 7; IV, 2
slīefan III, 4; IV, 3
slīefe III, 4; IV, 6
slīepa IV, 4
-slīfan II, 6; IV, 7
slīm II, 3
slincan I, 6; IV, 1
slipig IV, 4
slōh IV, 4
slota IV, 9
slūma III, 1
slūpan III, 3; IV, 4, 9
sulh I, 9

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Mod. English and Dialects.

sallow III, 1
slab IV, 5
slant I, 10
slash I, 11
slattern I, 10; IV, 5
slaver IV, 4, 9
sleet III, 8; IV, 4
slive II, 6; IV, 2, 4
sliver II, 6; IV, 7
slop IV, 4, 9
slot III, 8; IV, 5
slouch III, 5; IV, 5
slough III, 6; IV, 6
sloven III, 4; IV, 5
slub III, 4
sludder IV, 9
slue III, 1; IV, 3
slug III, 6; IV, 3
slump I, 4; IV, 4
slur III, 2
slush I, 11; IV, 4
slut III, 8; IV, 4, 5, 9
slutter IV, 9
sly III, 6*a*
swamp IV, 4*a*
swank IV, 4*a*
swanky IV, 4*a*
swap IV, 4*a*
swoop IV, 4*a*

Old Norse.

slafask I, 5; IV, 1
slafr I, 5
slaga I, 9; IV, 1, 4
slagna IV, 4
slamra I, 3
slapa I, 4; IV, 1
slāpr I, 4; IV, 5
slasask I, 11; IV, 1, 4
slauka III, 5; IV, 3, 4
slefa I, 5; IV, 4, 9
sleif II, 6
sleikja II, 10; IV, 10
sleita II, 8; IV, 2, 5
slen I, 2; IV, 1, 5
slepja I, 4
sleppa I, 4
sleyma III, 1; IV, 3, 5
slīðr IV, 6
sliga II, 13; IV, 2
slīkr IV, 7
slinni I, 2
slíta II, 8
slōð I, 10; IV, 4
sloðra III, 7; IV, 3, 4, 9
slok III, 5; IV, 4
sloka III, 5; IV, 8
slokr IV, 4
slor IV, 4
slōra I, 12; IV, 1
slota III, 8; IV, 9
slunginn I, 7
slupra III, 3; IV, 4, 9
slūta III, 8; IV, 3, 4
slȳ III, 6
slyðra III, 7; IV, 3
slyngr I, 7
slyngva I, 7
slytlinn III, 8, IV, 5
slǿða I, 10
slǿgr I, 9
slǿma I, 3

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Dano-Norwegian.

logre IV, 4*a*
slark I, 12; IV, 5
slarke I, 12
slat I, 10; IV, 1, 5
slire II, 14; IV, 2, 6
slud III, 8; IV, 4
slunken I, 6
slurk I, 12
slægt I, 7
slæng I, 7

Swedish.

sank IV, 4*a*
slang IV, 6
slankig I, 6
slarf IV, 5
slarfva I, 12; IV, 1, 9
slask I, 11; IV, 4
slind OSw. I, 10; IV, 5
slinka I, 6
slinta I, 10; IV, 1
sloka III, 5
sluddra III, 7; IV, 9
slug I, 9; III, 6*a*
slummen III, 1; IV, 3, 5
slump I, 4
slumpa I, 4
slusk I, 11; IV, 4
sluta III, 8
slutta III, 8; IV, 3
slyna III, 1; IV, 3, 5
slyngel I, 7
slå I, 9
slända I, 10
slängd I, 7
solk IV, 4
svamp IV, 4*a*

Lithuanian.

lendù IV, 5*a*
lìndynė IV, 5*a*
liūgas IV, 4*a*
liulėti IV, 4*a*
liulýnas IV, 4*a*
liunginti IV, 4*a*
sala IV, 4
sėlà I, 1; IV, 1, 5
sėlava III, 1
sėlė IV, 4
sėlenà IV, 6
selejimas II, 3; IV, 2
sčlinu I, 2
selù I, 1; IV, 1, 4
sėlůju I, 1
sìlpnas I, 5; IV, 1, 4, 5
sìlpti I, 5
slābnas I, 4; IV, 5
slankė I, 7
slapùs I, 5
slardau I, 12
slatau I, 10; IV, 1
slaudžiu III, 8; IV, 4
slaužiu III, 5; IV, 3, 4
slėdnas I, 10; IV, 1, 5
slėgiu I, 6
slenkù I, 7; IV, 1
slepiu I, 5; IV, 1
slėpsna I, 5; IV, 5
slėkas II, 10; IV, 2, 4
slidus II, 7; IV, 2
slykstu II, 13; IV, 2
-slimpa II, 6
slýstu II, 7
slývas II, 4
slogus I, 6
slubnas III, 3; IV, 3, 5
slukau III, 6
slúkstu III, 5; IV, 3

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Lettic.

slaids II, 7
slaika IV, 2, 4
slaiks IV, 4
slēpt I, 5
slpt II, 6; IV, 2, 4
schl'aups III, 4; IV, 3
schl'ukt III, 6

Church Slavonic.

lězą II, 10; IV, 2
sląkŭ I, 6
slězpati IV, 4
slězpŭ II, 6; IV, 4
sliva II, 4
sludy III, 8; IV, 3, 4
sŭlati I, 1

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IV.—LATIN ETYMOLOGIES.

I Vestibulum.

Testimonia.

a) Plautus, Most. 817: uiden uestibulum ante aedis hoc?

b) Varro, L. L. 7. 81: dicitur qui exit in vestibulum, quod est ante domum, prodire et procedere.

c) Vergil, Aen. 2. 469, sq.: vestibulum ante ipsum primoque in limine Pyrrhus exultat ... limina perrumpit ... apparet domus intus et atria longa patescunt.

ib. 7. 180: Saturnusque senex Ianique bifrontis imago vestibulo adstabant.

d) Livy, 5. 41. 2: curules magistratus ... quae augustissima vestis est ... ea vestiti medio aedium eburneis sellis sedere [vestibulum = quasi 'vestitorum locus'].

— — 8: adeo haud secus quam venerabundi intuebantur (sc. Galli) in aedium vestibulis sedentes viros (i. e. curules magistratus) praeter ornatum habitumque humano augustiorem, maiestate etiam ... simillimos dis.

e) *ib.* 2. 48. 10: consul e curia egressus comitante Fabiorum agmine, qui in vestibulo curiae ... expectantes steterant, domum redit.

ib. 2. 49. 3: consul paludatus egrediens in vestibulo gentem omnem suam ... videt.

f) Ovid, Fasti, 6. 301, sq.:

> At focus a flammis et quod fovet omnia dictus;
> Qui tamen in primis aedibus ante fuit.
> Hinc quoque vestibulum dici reor: inde precando
> Praefamur Vestam, quae loca prima tenet
> [vestibulum: quasi 'Vesta-stabulum'].

g) Tacitus, Ann. 11. 35: patefieri domum ... atqui illuc deduci imperatorem iubet; ac primum in vestibulo effigiem patris Silii consulto senatus abolitam demonstrat, tum quidquid avitum Neronibus et Drusis in pretium probri cessisse.

h) Gellius 16. 5. 2: animadverti enim, quosdam hautquaquam indoctos viros opinari vestibulum esse partem domus primorem quam vulgus atrium vocat.

i) *ib.* 3: Aelius Gallus 'vestibulum' esse dicit non in ipsis aedibus neque partem aedium sed locum ante ianuam domus vacuum, per quem a via aditus accessusque ad aedis est [quasi 'viā stabulum remotum'].

j) *ib.* 5: 5 Sulpicium autem Apollinarem memini dicere ... 'Ve' particula sicuti quaedam alia, tum intentionem significat, tum minutionem. Nam 'vetus' et 'vehemens', alterum ab aetatis magnitudine compositum elisumque est [quasi vetus from 've-aetas'], alterum a mentis vi atque impetu [quasi 'vi-mens'] dicitur ... 10. ab illa ergo grandis loci consistione et quasi quadam

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stabulatione vestibula appellata sunt spatia ... grandia ante fores aedium relicta [quasi 'lata stabulatio'].

k) Nonius Marcellus, p. 53: vestibula quidam putant sub ea proprietate distincta quod in primis ingressibus et in spatiis domorum Vestae hoc est arae ac foci soleant haberi.

l) Servius ad Aen. 2. 469: dictum autem vestibulum, vel quod ianuam vestiat, ut videmus cameram duabus sustentatam columnis, vel quoniam Vestae consecratum est.

m) Ancient gloss (Goetz): vestibulum ante ostium ubi velum ponitur [quasi, 'vestis (awning) stabulum'].

General Modern References: Göll, in Becker's Gallus, II, p. 224 sq.; Marquardt-Mau's Privatleben der Römer, p. 224 sq.

The more comprehensive modern discussions of the *vestibulum* have located it solely in front of the house, before the entrance-door. To do so they have made the testimony of Gellius (h), echoed by Nonius (k), refer to a late period, and have accordingly so interpreted Livy's testimony (d)—in which they are followed by the great edition of Weissenborn—as to call in question the natural interpretation that *medio aedium sedere* is repeated by *in aedium vestibulis sedentes*. But not only does Livy seem to confirm the statement of Gellius that *vestibulum* = *atrium*, but so does Tacitus (g), as Nipperdey thinks. Ladewig interprets also two passages of the Aeneid (c) by locating the *vestibulum* behind the entrance-door, though the passages do not seem to me to prove this past doubt. The bulk of the evidence certainly goes to show that the *vestibulum* was before the door, a *πρόθυρον*. Cicero used *vestibulum* in the metaphorical sense of 'entrance, beginning', and therefore it can hardly be questioned that a sporadic usage of *vestibulum* = *atrium* has the advantages of a *lectio difficilior*. The authorities cited by Gellius for *vestibulum* = *atrium* were so full of the notion of 'entrance' as to commit themselves to the implicit assertion that the *atrium* was the *pars primoris* of the house. But the difficulty here is perhaps chiefly verbal: what if the signification of *vestibulum* became fixed as 'entrance' or 'lobby' when the *atrium* of the ancient Roman house had but the entrance-door between it and the street? It must have been a mere matter of subsequent adaptation whether the term 'entrance' (*vestibulum*) was applied to the rear of the door (entrance-hall or court), or to the front (porch).

In the testimonia above cited the following etymologies stand expressed or lie implicit.

1) Livy (d), Servius (l), and a glossist (m) connect *vestibulum* with *vestis* or *vestire*.

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2) Ovid (f) and Nonius (k) explain *vestibulum* as 'Vestae locus', quasi 'Vesta-stabulum'.

3) Aelius Gallus (i) explains *vestibulum* as '(a) viā locus (= stabulum) remotus'.

4) Sulpicius Apollinaris (j) explained *vestibulum* as 'lata stabulatio'.

Nearly all of these ancient explanations recur, in one authority or another, in modern phonetic transcription.

Among others, Stowasser follows Aelius Gallus (i) and defines *vestibulum* (printed with a gratuitous *ē*) by 'Strassenplatz' deriving it from *vē-* (contracted from *vea* = *via*) + *stabulum*.

Marquardt interprets *vestibulum* as originally the 'farm yard', thus echoing, with a difference, Sulpicius (j).

Other modern scholars, e. g. Goell, still explain *vestibulum* from *vē* + *stabulum*, but they define *vē-* as 'outside of', and not in the sense of Sulpicius. This doctrine of the prefix *ve-*, adequately represented in a somewhat old fashioned way, is found set forth in Harpers' Latin Dictionary. In Wharton, the particle *ve-* is given the diminishing force noted by Sulpicius, wherefore *vestibulum* appears as an 'inferior building'. This sense will reappear in the testimonium from Ovid cited on p. 67. But the prefix *ve-* has lately been called in question by Niedermann,[1] and I cheerfully endorse his contention that from *vē-mens*, the 'allegro' form of *vehemens*, a prefix *vē*, was abstracted, then made use of in *vecors* and *vesanus*, nearly synonymous with *vemens*, and afterwards extended to one or two words—not including Veiovis—less obviously related with this semantic group, e. g. *vegrandis*.[1]

Ovid's explanation of *vestibulum* as quasi *Vesta-stabulum* seems to have met with no great favor among the moderns, though there is much to content oneself with in this etymology. The testimony of Nonius can hardly seem a mere attempt to back up an etymological theory like Ovid's. Pindar locates the Greek household gods in the *πρόθυρον*, and if the *Vestibulum* did not get its name from the sacred fire, it may have done so from the placing of an *aedicula* of Vesta in proximity, whether behind or before, to the entrance-door. In at least one Pompeian house, behind the door,

[1] Apropos of Niedermann's definition of *vegrandis* 'very big' (and 'very small') by 'abnorm in Bezug auf seine Grösse', I permit myself to observe that the semantic bridge between *vē-sanus* and *vē-grandis* may be found in *insanus*: *insanus* is a synonym of *vesanus* 'male sanus', and *insanus* means 'crazily big' (see my note on Plautus' Mostellaria, 761).

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but in the entrance-hall, I have seen a small *aedicula* of stucco. In others such *aediculae* are found in the *atrium*, or in rooms surrounding the peristyle.

Purely modern is the derivation of *vestibulum*, defined by 'dwelling', from WES (: Skr. *vasati* 'dwells'), and this derivation finds the approval of nearly all the general works on etymology. Demonstrably false it is not, but the vagueness of the definition is not to its advantage.

Mommsen, whose astonishing etymological ingenuity—though one may wonder if he had not unconsciously absorbed the suggestion in this case from Livy (d)—is often as instructive semantically as it is likely to be, judged by the subsequent phonetic standards of to-day, phonetically faulty, derived *vestĭbulum* from *vestīre* 'to clothe' and pictured the primitive Roman as cloaking himself before the door of his hut.

I recognize the phonetic difficulty arising from the variant quantity of the *i*'s, but it does not seem to me, as it has seemed to some others, insuperable, inasmuch as *vestĭbulum* quasi 'cloak room', may have replaced in consciousness **vestĭbulum*, quasi 'cloaking room'; to say nothing of the possible effect of *prostĭbulum* on **vestĭbulum*.

We can not render a decisive verdict against this etymology. The custom assumed for primitive times is certainly plausible.

None of these explanations, whether ancient or modern, can be regarded as entirely satisfactory,—in this statement I but echo Schrader—and I may therefore be permitted to add a different and perhaps, to those not satisfied by one of the existing etymologies, a more convincing explanation of *vestibulum* that suggested itself to me as I stood in a Pompeian door-way during the past summer. The house in which I stood had possessed a door-way abutting on the street, with wings opening into the house. Behind this door-way, some four or five feet, a second door-way had stood, the wings of which had opened toward the street. On the right wall between the two large and heavy door-ways had stood a small door. Professor Mau's interpretation of the facts was as follows: 'the inner of the two large door-ways, opening outwards, was the original state entrance to the house; the small door in the side wall was the easy every day entrance; the foremost door, opening inwards, was of subsequent construction in response to a police regulation that front doors should not open toward the street'.

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Now it is obvious that the space between the two door-ways was the place in which the heavy wings of the doors stood. The suggestion that came to me was this: to derive *vestibulum* from **verstabulum* 'the standing-place of the (open) doors, door-stead'.

The applicability of this definition does not depend on any temporal accident that might affect the Pompeian door-way. On the contrary, if the *vestibulum* is the space through which the door swung in opening and shutting, we can explain how it was now in the *atrium;* now in the *fauces*, but behind the door; now before the door, but still in the *fauces;* and lastly in the open air, i. e. a part of the entrance-porch. The first and last of these positions got their name of *vestibulum* according as the door swung in or out prior to the development of the *fauces* as an architectural motif in the Roman house; the other positions bore the name *vestibulum* in the period subsequent to the development of the *fauces*.

As to the form, I would derive *vestibulum* from **verstabulum*, earlier **vero-stabulum*. The stem *vero-* 'door, gate' is well known in the Italic dialects, but has hitherto not been found in Latin save in the compound verbs *aperit* 'opens the door', and *operit* 'closes the door'.

As thus interpreted, *vestibulum*, a derivative (=compound) of **vero-* 'door', has had much the same development as *porticus* 'porch' (:*porta* 'door').

We may further note from the law of the Twelve Tables: forum, id est vestibulum sepulchri, inferring for *vestibulum* a semantic development corresponding to that of *forum* (:*foris* 'door').

Special References: Fay, The Mostellaria of Plautus; Goetz, Thesaurus Glossarum Emendatarum; Harpers' Latin Dictionary; Mommsen, Römische Geschichte I, 327; Niedermann in Indogerm. Forschungen, 10, 247 sq.; Pindar, Pyth., 3, 139; Schrader, Reallexikon der Indogerm. Altertumskunde, 341; Stowasser, Lateinisch-Deutsches Schulwörterbuch; Wharton, Etyma Latina.

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II Veiovis.

Testimonia.

(a) Cicero, Nat. Deor. 3, 62: in enodandis autem nominibus, quod miserandum sit, laboratis. Saturnus, quia se saturat annis: Mavors, quia magna vertit: Minerva, quia minuit, aut quia minatur: Venus,[1] quia venit ad omnia: Ceres, a gerendo. Quam periculosa consuetudo! In multis enim nominibus haerebitis. Quid Veiovi facies? quid Vulcano? Quamquam quoniam Neptunum a nando appellatum putas, nullum erit nomen, quod non possis una littera explicare, unde ductum sit. In quo quidem magis tu mihi natare visus es, quam ipse Neptunus.

(b) Ovid, Fasti, 3, 445:

nunc vocor ad nomen. vegrandia farra colonae
quae male creverunt, vescaque parva vocant.
vis ea si verbi est, cur non ego Vediovis aedem
aedem non magni suspicer esse Iovis?

(c) *ib.* 430: templa ... lucos Vediovis ante duos.

(d) Gellius, 5. 12: in antiquis precationibus nomina haec deorum inesse animadvertimus: 'Diovis' et 'Vediovis', ... cum Iovem igitur et Diovem a iuvando nominassent ... 'Vediovem' appellaverunt, dempta atque detracta invandi facultate, 'Ve' enim particula ... et augendae rei et minuendae valet ... veluti 'vescum', 'vemens' et 'vegrande'..... 'vesani' autem et 'vecordes' una tantum parte dicti, quae privativa est.

(e) Gellius, 16. 5. 5 = (j) on p. 62.

(f) Ancient gloss: (Goetz) Vidius *Ἀπόλλων νόμιος.*

General Reference: Preller, Römische Mythologie, I, 262, sq.; 306.

In a consideration of the word *Veiovis* the skeptical etymologist must note that Cicero either did not know, or passed over with the silence of contempt, the definition of *Veiovis* as a 'parvus Juppiter' (Ovid), or as an 'anti-Jove', a 'malus Juppiter' (Gellius). The skeptical etymologist can not away with a particle *ve-* 'little' abstracted from *vesca*, or *ve-* 'great' abstracted from *vetus;* and, on observing the narrow range of use of this prefix he will call in question whether the *Ve-* of *Veiovis* has any connection with the *vē-* of *vē-mens* and its synonyms (see above p. 64). The assumption of an anti-Jove foists a dualistic religious conception on the Romans that is not in general well authenticated, and this should give the careful etymologist pause in his consideration of *Veiovis.*

[1] Curiously enough Browning apostrophizes love with the words "come then, complete incompletion, O comer" etc. (Jocoseria): cf. also from Meredith's The Tragic Comedians, ch. 1: dressed, to delight him, in Prince Marko's colors, the care she bestowed on her dressing was for the one absent, the shrouded comer (= lover yet to come).

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There must also be some hesitation in respect of the two spellings, *Vediovis* and *Veiovis*. The former spelling is probably genuinely the older, but it may be only an archaizing spelling. If *Vediovis* is the older spelling, literary usage can not determine the length of the *e*, and almost any conceivable epigraphic usage, in view of the obvious interest felt by the Romans in the etymology of the word, would be liable to impeachment as of conscious etymological purport.

If suspicion attach to the interpretation of the name as *Ve-Diovis*, the sanguine modern etymologist might venture on an interpretation as *Ved-iovis*. Appealing to the Umbrian appellatives of deities, transcribed in Latin as *Grabovius* and *Fisovius*, but also, in some of their case-forms, subject to transcription as *Grabovis* and *Fisovis*[4], he would interpret the *-(i)ovis* of *Vediovis* as suffixal, and undertake to explain *Vediovis* as an original appellative raised, by virtue of being an apparent compound of *Ve+Diovis*, to rank as an independent deity, an Anti-Jove.

Let us suppose the sanguine modern etymologist further to map out the various phonetic sources from which *Ved-* might have arisen, viz.: *v* from W or U, and *d* from D or DH, while *e* may be either long or short.

Before proceeding to search for extra Italic cognates it were well to state what is known of *Vediovis* from evidence purely literary and archaeological, as interpreted by Preller.

1) *Vediovis* was judged by the Romans to have Apolline characteristics, and his worship was crowded out by Apollo's: cf. also the gloss (f) above, *Vidius*, interpreted by Buecheler as *Vediovis*.

2) The statue of *Vediovis* represented him as a youthful Jupiter, with a bundle of arrows. The arrows are interpreted as sunrays, particularly of sunrays as breeders of pestilence.

3) A temple of *Vediovis* stood in the shallow depression between the two crests of the Capitoline, and perhaps a second temple on the island in the Tiber.

Supposing the sanguine etymologist to limit his search for cognates to Sanskrit, and there, to the very carefully sifted material registered by Uhlenbeck, the following words might attract his attention:

1) a) *vádati* 'sings'; b) *gádati* 'speaks'. If cognate with either of these, *Ved-iovis* has a general sense like 'oracular', suitable to the Apolline character of the deity.

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2) a) *vadh-* 'to strike, beat', cf. *vádhar* 'weapon', *vádha-s* 'slayer'; b) *gadā* 'club'; c) *gada-s* 'sickness'. If cognate with any of this group, *Vediovis* means 'weapon-bearer' or 'pestilence-breeder', and this accords with the bundle of arrows with which his statue was provided.

3) *gādhá-s* 'shallow', *gādhá-m* 'a ford, a shallow'. If *Vediovis* is cognate with these words, we must think of the location of his temples, the one in the shallow depression between two crests of a hill, and the other at the end of a ford across the Tiber.

The skeptical etymologist, Cicero, supposing him to comprehend these attempts at explanation, might still retort: quid mihi, malum, explicationum offers? Multae pro nullis sint explicationibus. Quid Veiovi facies?

But the skeptical etymologist may himself have gone too far in rejecting the Ovidian division into Ve + Diovis. Therefore, the sanguine etymologist might reply, still rejecting the notion of an anti-Jove, as follows:

(1) *Veiovis* might come from *Veio-iovis*, a Jupiter brought from Veii, and Pliny tells us that a Veian made the first statue of Jupiter for the Capitolium. Livy records that the goddess Juno was solemnly transferred from Veii to Rome. But there is no literary evidence to confirm any such notion of a Veian Jove, and probably no Latin compound of this sort; though it might be possible to regard *Veiovis* as a derivative of *Veii* rather than a compound.

(2) Possibly *Ve-* may be a 'prefix' of a 'ghost-word' sort. Gellius (d) tells us that *Diovis* and *Vediovis* were names found in ancient prayers—alas, without recording the formulae. If we bear in mind that the Romans were exceedingly anxious to utter the names of their deities in correct ritual form, and to give to each his proper appellatives (cf. Smith's note to Horace's *Carm. Saec.* 15), we might permit ourselves to surmise that, at a time when *Iovis* had nearly ousted the older form *Diovis*, a (spoken) formula ran *Iovisvediovisve*, and was ultimately misdivided *Iovis Vediovisve*. More than a surmise this suggestion could never be, unless indeed such a formula might one day turn up. Meantime, we may compare the inscription "to an unknown God": SEI · DEO · SEI · DEIVAE · SAC(rum), etc., and the further citations of Middleton. [See postscript on p. 74].

In submitting these explanations I beg to make none of them my own, but rather still to say with Cicero: quid Veiovi facies?

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Query: Ought not the passage about to be cited to be added to the ancient testimonia for Veiovis? It is not cited by Preller, nor does Ladewig explain its bearings in his notes to the Aeneid. The ancient commentators, Macrobius and Servius, are also silent as to its interpretation. The passage occurs in the Aeneid, where Evander is explaining to Aeneas the ancient religious rites and places, and describes a sacred grove upon the Capitoline (Aen. 8, 351):

> 'hoc nemus, hunc', inquit, 'frondoso vertice collem,
> quis deus incertum est, habitat deus; Arcades ipsum
> credunt se vidisse Iovem, cum saepe nigrantem
> aegida concuteret dextra nimbosque cieret'.

The applicability of this description to what we know of *Veiovis* is obvious.

Special References: Goetz, see reference on p. 66. Livy, 5. 22; Middleton, The Remains of Ancient Rome, I, pp. 174–5, footnotes. Von Planta, Grammatik der Oskisch-Umbrisch. Dialekte II, § 275; Pliny, N. H. 35, 157; Smith, The Odes and Epodes of Horace.

III VADA 'SHALLOWS'; VĀDIT 'GOES'.

It is customary to connect these words with English *wade*. But *vādo* looks very much like *vā-* extended by the *d* or *dh* suffix common in verb formations. It is therefore possible to find in *vado* the same root ϕA recognized for Gr. *ἴ-βα*, Skr. *a-gā-t*. As for *vāda*, its cognation with Skr. *gādhám* 'ford', mentioned above presents no difficulties. The difference in vowel quantities is a thing to note, but it does not invalidate the cognation. Of course, if *vada* and *gādhám* are cognate, the suggestion (p. 69) that *gādhám* is phonetically reconcilable with *Vediovis* falls under great suspicion.

English *wade* cannot, to the best of my knowledge, be a cognate of Skr. *gā-dhám*—whose derivation from ϕĀ I cannot doubt—but if *wade* and *vādo* are cognates, the Aryan base was WĂDH-. The question suggests itself what we are to do with pairs like the following:

(1) Skr. *gad-* 'speak': *vad-* 'speak'.

(2) Skr. *gadā* 'club': *vádhar*, *vadhánā* 'weapon' (with a variation of *d* and *dh*).

(3) Skr. *gādhám* 'ford': Lat. *vada* 'shallows' if *vada* belongs with Eng. *wade*.

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These pairs can be resolved by supposing a dialect variation in the primitive period, by which ɸ was labialized to w. A vastly greater quantity of evidence than is here put together would be needed, however, before any such supposition might be proved.

IV Vemens and Clemens.

In agreeing (p. 64) with Niedermann's explanation of *vemens*, as the allegro form of *vehemens*, I would not be understood as accepting the derivation of *vehemens* from a participle **vehemenos*. Terence, if we may trust the Westerhov index, uses *vehemens* and *vehementer* only of the emotions or what rouses the emotions. Plautus, who uses the adjective but twice (Rud. 70–71: nam Arcturus signum sum omnium acerrimum; vehemens sum exoriens, cum occidor vehementior) uses it as explanatory of *acerrimus*, and the sense is certainly not more definite than our 'violent'. He uses more frequently the adverb *vehementer*, and I herewith submit the examples in the order of semantic extension as I conceive it:

Merc. 923: mater irata est patri vehementer.
Truc. 545: vehementer nunc mi est irata.
Epid. 276: quasique ames vehementer tu illam.
Curc. 724: ego te vehementer perire cupio.
Curc. 568: vapulare ego te vehementer iubeo.
Capt. 667: adstringite isti sultis vehementer manus.
Bacch. 1158: tactus sum vehementer visco.
Mil. 205: ita vehementer icit (sc. femur).
Rud. 903: ita fluctuare video vehementer mare.

In these passages the sense is 'violently', 'mightily', not 'speedily, quickly'.

The evidence submitted to explain *-mens* as syncopated from *-menos* is extremely weak, viz.: the two adjectives *vehemens* and *clemens*, which have gone entirely over to the inflexional type of *mens* and must undoubtedly have been, to the Romans, compounds of *mens*.

Not to find compounds of *mens* in Latin would be surprising. In the Rig-Veda twelve compounds of *matí-s* 'mind' are indexed by Grassmann and eleven of *mánas* 'mind, thought'. To the latter correspond perfectly the Greek compounds εὐμενής, δυσμενής. Generally cognate with the Sanskrit *-mati-* compounds is αὐτόματος, and perhaps πολύμητις. Other synonyms of 'mind' occur in

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ταλαί-φρων, with the contrasting meanings 'patient of mind' and 'daring', τλή-θῡμος 'stout-hearted'.

Similar compounds I find in Latin *vehemens* and *clemens*. The formative type that occurs in *vehemens* is the type of Greek μενε-δήιος 'awaiting the enemy', 'brave'; μενε-πτόλεμος 'persistent in battle'; μενε-χάρμης 'staunch in battle'; δακέ-θῡμος 'eating the heart'; ταλα-πενθής 'enduring woe'. So I would define *vehemens* as 'moving (rousing) the mind', though *mens* may have a force in this compound like Greek μένος 'might, rage', compared with Skr. *mánas* 'mind, will'. This type of compound is occasionally found in Latin, e. g. in *Verti-cordia*, *flexanimus*, *posci-nummius*, etc., but the type is rare: it is the more noteworthy that two of the examples contain synonyms of *mens* in their final member.

As to *clemens*, Osthoff's derivation from Skr. *çrayamānas* 'leaning', supporting Bréal's derivation from *clivus* 'slope', *inclinat* 'leans', seems to me utterly without cogency on the semantic side, to say nothing of the general objections already made to throwing over the apparent cognation of *clemens* with *mens*. There can hardly be any question but that *clemens* means 'gentle', and Bréal's argument that Tacitus writes collis clementer assurgens and iuga clementius adirentur can mean nothing to an American who talks of 'gentle' slopes and 'easy' approaches.

To explain *clemens*, I resort to Greek ταλαί-φρων and τλή-θῡμος, cited already (cf. also ταλα-πενθής, ταλα-εργός ταλα-κάρδιος, ταλα-πείριος, etc.), and derive *clemens* from **tlē-mens* 'patient of mind, gentle'; *tlē-* is a reduced form to a 'base' TELĒ 'bear': at least this, and not TELĀ, is the 'base' recognized by Hirt (Indogerm. Ablaut, 279). It may well be that *tlē-* would normally yield *lē-* in Latin (cf. *latus* from **tlatus*), but in the compound, *inclementer*, *-cle* is normal.

Query: In view of the well-known Romance adverbial suffix derived from Latin *mente*, and foreshadowed by *furiata mente* 'full of fury' (Aeneid, 2. 407, 588), *memori mente* 'mindful' (Horace, Serm. 2. 6. 31); in view of the Greek compound αὐτόματος 'self-willed'—or should we explain as αὐτό-ματ-ος 'of self will', gen.-ablv., raised to a nominative, as Latin *penitus* 'from within' becomes *penitus* 'inner'?—; may we not seek for the Sanskrit possessive compounds in *-mat-* a derivation from the stem *man-t-*? Cf. *manyu-mát-* 'furious-minded, full of fury' *mantu-mat-* 'counsel-minded, full of counsel'.

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The development of the sense of numerousness in the Skr. suffix *-mant-* 'rich in' may be illustrated by the signification of Gr. *μίνος* 'force' (:Skr. *mánas* 'mind, will'), for the notion 'force' suggests that of number very naturally, as we may see from Latin *vis* = *multitudo*, and English *force* 'a troop of soldiers'.

V QUINTUS: QUINCTUS.

The issue whether *-nct-* is the normal or an analogical form in these words has long since been joined, and the handbooks adequately represent the discussion. The whole issue seems to me to have been created by the old over-insistence on the blindness of the phonetic laws. Now that the blindness is a little less of a shibboleth, methodologically considered, it may well be that the phonetic questions touching the greater or less compression of awkward consonant groups may be left to settlement by the principle of relative speed of utterance in the *allegro* and *lento* dialects,—which hardly differs in this problem from saying the relative distinctness of utterance in individuals.

My present purpose, however, is not to go into deep questions of method in phonetics, but humbly to call attention to the Plautine passages:

quincto quoque sulco (Trin. 524, *A*)

and

quincto anno quoque (Merc. 66, *B.* quicto, *alii* quinto)

in contrast with *quinto-* in all the other Plautine passages, so far as Leo's apparatus and the Lemaire index furnish a means of control. Is it not likely that *quincto quoque* owes its phonetic peculiarity to an alliterative or rhythmic impulse?

The common occurrence of the name-forms of which Quinctius may be taken as the sample may suggest another, and now a social, impulse to preserve the group *-nct-*, viz., the conservative spelling of proper names; cf. the names *Johnston* and *Campbell*, sometimes pronounced (chiefly by persons enjoying these names) in accordance with the orthography.

VI CULPA, CULTER.

I propose to connect *culpa* with the verbs *scalpit*, *sculpat* 'scratches, marks, cuts', and to define by 'blemish', 'stigma'; cf. *nota* 'mark', 'reproach', 'disgrace'.

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The explanation of *culter* from a stem **certro-* (: κείρει 'shears') is an excellent suggestion of Skutsch's. Another admissible explanation may, however, be presented, viz.: from a stem **sculptro-*, with loss of *p* in the heavy consonant group.

It can hardly be decided from Capt. 266, ad cultros adtinet 'he's reaching for the shears', that 'shears' was the original sense of *culter;* rather is it a special sense of the plural of *culter* 'knife' (six times in Plautus), cf. *habenae* 'reins': *habena* 'strap'.

VIII Populus, Populari.

The following suggestion as to the etymology of *populus* and *populari* will perhaps satisfy those who do not feel attracted by the 'dialectic' explanation that derives *populus* from **quoqlo-:* Sk. *cakrá-* 'wheel', a wheel-shaped formation of the army: cf., for the signification only, *corona* 'audience', but also a circular military formation.

Altogether the safest definition to adopt for *populus* seems to me to be 'army' (cf. *magister populi*), but 'army' as a 'fighting division', a 'detachment'. So the German word *Schar*, originally a division of an army, has come to mean in general 'multitudo'. I would therefore derive *populus* from *po-* (cf. *pono, po-lio*) and *pello* 'drive', whence *populus* = 'driving off',—a raiding party: cf. *populari* 'to raid'. For *populus* as a subdivision of *gens* cf. Livy, 6. 12. 4: simile veri est . . . aut non ex iisdem semper populis exercitus scriptos, quanquam eadem semper gens bellum intulerit, aut etc.; cf. also Aen. 10. 200 sq.

Postscript: The Editor of this Journal calls my attention to the British giant pair, Gog and Magog, which seems to have geminated from Gogmagog. Statues in Guildhall, known as Gog and Magog, are now understood to be statues of Gogmagog and Corineus. The name, Gogmagog, in turn, seems to owe its origin to "Gog of the land of Magog" (Ezekiel, 38. 2).

University of Texas, Austin, Texas. Edwin W. Fay.

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REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES.

Religion und Kultus der Römer, von GEORG WISSOWA, Ord. Professor an der Universität Halle. Pp. xii, 534. München, 1902. Beck.

In a field of study in which there has been manifested for the past century a constantly increasing interest, and which has been, especially of late years (for it is only within comparatively recent years that the spirit of scholarship has with any measure of success searched the deep things of the Roman gods) the subject of so rapid a development, it is only natural that no work can long remain authority. Marquardt's Religion der Römer, first published in 1878, had been in use but a scant half dozen years when a revision became necessary; and the second edition of that work had hardly appeared when it became manifest that a new statement of the whole subject would soon be demanded. August Reifferscheid was looked to for the performance of the task, but his death occurring before the work had been begun, Georg Wissowa, who had been the reviser of Marquardt's work, and who had since 1882 shown a brilliant and productive activity in the field of Roman religion, entered in 1887 upon the preparation of the desired work, which has at length appeared, after a space of fifteen years, as Vol. V 4 of Müllers Handbuch der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, under the title of Die Religion und Kultus der Römer.

The knowledge that so long a period of time has been devoted to one work by a scholar who, even at the beginning of his undertaking, was already *spectatissimus*, justly arouses great expectations. It is sufficient praise for the author to say that these expectations are met by his work and that the conviction that the work was needed has been fully justified. Wissowa has brought to the performance of his task a thorough command of ancient sources, both literary, epigraphic, and monumental, as thorough a familiarity with the results of modern scholarship, and, above all, a measure of enthusiasm and devotion which has made it impossible for him to slight any part of his arduous undertaking; and the result is a work which is clear, comprehensive, and conservative, which is as nearly up-to-date as it is possible for a work to be in this field, and which shows a degree of scholarly ability of which even a nation of scholars may be proud.

In the arrangement of his matter, Wissowa is not only logical and orderly, but original. After an introduction, in which he touches on (1) the difficulties of investigation in the field of

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Roman religion, obscured as it is not only by lack of positive evidence, but much more by the superimposed strata of foreign religions, (2) the ancient sources, and (3) the history of modern investigation in the subject, he enters upon the body of his work. He devotes Part I to an Ueberblick über den Entwicklungsgang der römischen Religion, dividing it into four sections, each treating a single well-defined period: (1) the most ancient time, extending up to the construction of the Capitoline temple; (2) to the second Punic war; (3) to the end of the Republic; (4) the Empire.

Part II, Die Götter der römischen Staatsreligion, is divided into sections on (1) *Di indigetes*, (2) *Di novensides* of Italian origin, (3) *Di novensides* of Greek origin, (4) Neugeschaffene Gottheiten, and (5) *Sacra peregrina*. If we find grouped under *Di novensides* of Italian provenience such deities as Castor and Pollux and Hercules, it is because the author makes his basis of division not the original home of the cult, but the language and geographic identity of the city whence it is brought to Rome. Under Neugeschaffene Gottheiten are included such peculiarly Roman creations as Honos, Fides, and other personifications of abstract ideas, Dea Roma, and the Divi Imperatores. In the section on *Sacra peregrina*, it is to be noted that The Great Mother of the Gods is excluded from the list of Oriental divinities because of her having been adopted by the State immediately upon her arrival in 204.

Part III, Die Formen der Götterverehrung, is in ten subdivisions: (1) Sacralrechtliche Grundlagen, treating of the relations between deity and man and the forms by which these relations were to be kept in proper balance; (2) Die gottesdienstlichen Handlungen: the sacrifice and attendant ceremonies, the *lectisternium*, the *supplicatio*, the procession, the *saeculum* and its festivities; (3) Die Festzeiten: the *feriae* and their dates, *dies nefasti*, *fasti*, *religiosi*, anniversaries of days important in the lives of Julius and Augustus; (4) Die Spiele; (5) Die Oertlichkeiten des Kultus: *fana*, *profana*; (6) Die Priesterordnung; (7) Das Pontificalcollegium; (8) Die Augures; (9) Die *Quindecimviri sacris faciundis* und die Haruspices; (10) Die priesterlichen Sodalitäten.

Appended is a table giving the Roman Festkalender, another giving a list of the Roman State temples, an index of names and subject matter, and finally an index of passages and inscriptions to which the author has called special attention by emendation or explanation.

The most striking difference between the plan adopted by Wissowa and that employed in the work of Marquardt lies in the former's treatment of individual deities. Instead of presenting them briefly and more or less imperfectly in the course of his narrative, Wissowa has given a special place to each deity, devoting over two-fifths of his whole work to this phase of the

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subject. More than this, by his grouping of deities according to their provenience, he has distinguished clearly between those features native to Rome and those which were the effect of outside influence.

Apart from the matter of arrangement, there is naturally a second difference lying in the greater completeness with which the whole subject is presented. By reason of the great advance in the knowledge of Roman religion in recent years, it has been made possible for Wissowa not only to present with great fullness of detail the deities and their worship, but to set forth with the greatest clearness the steps in the historic process of their rise, development, and decay.

Clearness is the distinctive feature of Wissowa's presentation, both in whole and in part. By treating the deities of the Roman world separately under *di indigetes* and *di novensides*, and by still further dividing the latter into gods of Italian, Greek, late-Roman, and Oriental provenience, he has given us a presentation in which the deities representing the various elements in Roman religion stand out in bold and clear relief. For the first time[1] we see set forth in all distinctness the native divinities of the old-Roman world before outside influence made them unrecognizable. The exceeding Romanness of Roman gods is made plain to him that runs.

It is above all in his Ueberblick über den Entwicklungsgang der römischen Religion (Part I) that Wissowa displays his ability to present his material in clear, logical, and orderly succession. To the student interested in the development of human ideas the following of this narrative as it conducts us by consecutive and clearly defined steps from the earliest known beginnings, mingled with the mists of prehistoric times, down through the whole religious history of Rome, cannot be other than fascinating; while to the specialist it affords a solid, up-to-date foundation on which to base his work of research. While but few years since it seemed impossible to see a regular process in the history of the Roman religion, it is now possible to trace its development without missing a link in the chain. A brief abstract will show the excellence of this part of the work, both as to the method of the author and the results now at our disposal in this field of study:

I. Aelteste Zeit. 3. Die *di indigetes*. The *di indigetes* formed at the beginning of history a definite and unalterable circle of native divinities, as to whose identity we are only partially able to inform ourselves by using with circumspectness as aids fragments of ancient ritual, the names of priesthoods descended from prehistoric times, and, most important of all, the *Fasti anni Romani*. An incomplete circle of thirty-two native deities can be reconstructed in this manner. Several characteristics may be deter-

[1] The less ambitious but excellent work of Emil Aust, Münster i. W. 1899, was inspired by Wissowa, and owes its method to him.

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mined: grouping by pairs, such as Consus and Ops, Janus and Vesta; the subordination of certain gods, *famuli divi*; the existence of rank among the chief deities.

4. Allgemeiner Charakter der alt-römischen Religion. The native Roman deities were worshipped by a simple, hard-working, agricultural and pastoral people who saw in the objects of their reverence neither the direct forces of nature nor the embodiment of ethical ideals. No traces existed as yet of the personification of abstract ideas. The old-Roman deities were practical beings who presided over every act of the daily life of every member of the community—his life at his hearth and in his field, in peace and in war, his going forth and his coming in, his downsitting and his uprising. The tendency to specialization already existed: Jupiter's province was especially the heavens, Tellus was embodied in the earth tilled by the farmer, war fell to Mars, Janus was guardian of the door, Vesta of the hearth and home. So minute became the division of activities that the number of gods was as great as the number of acts of daily life. Hence the *indigitamenta*. There were no genealogies, as among the Greek gods; rank depended only upon the time of creation or the greatness of service. Neither were there marriages among the gods. They were not represented in human form. Agriculture, cattle-raising, and war were the occupations of their subjects. Portunus shows that the Tiber was used, but neither the sea, nor commerce, nor politics had yet entered into the life of the people.

5. Alter und Entstehung der ältesten Götterordnung. Simple and primitive as was the religion of that time, it was the result of a long historic process whose earliest stages will forever remain unknown to us, since even the most authoritative of ancient writers are as lacking in trustworthiness in their accounts of religious as of political history. Nor is it less difficult to determine what deities were of purely Roman or Latin origin and what were of Italic origin. The original *Fasti*, however, must have come into existence sometime after the Romans became distinct from the Latin tribes, for those festivals which are peculiarly Roman occupy the most prominent positions. The growth of the city can also be followed in such ceremonies as the Lupercalia and the Septimontium. The *terminus post quem* of the *Fasti* is indicated by the absence of Diana and the Capitoline Trinity. For the sake of something formal, then, we may follow ancient writers and take the name of Numa as representing the origin of the system in the *Fasti*.

6. Die Formen der ältesten Götterverehrung. The oft-quoted statement that for over one hundred and seventy years the Romans possessed no cult-statues is confirmed by the character of the deities themselves, who were inseparable from those objects in which they manifested their activities. None but those deities who were less easily comprehended ever had even a symbol to denote them, as, e. g., the flint for Jupiter, the spear for Mars;

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and these symbols were of the nature of priestly equipment, and not objects in which the gods were worshipped. But few of these ancient deities were represented in human form even at a later period, and that only under Greek influence. The temple, too, in the form of human habitation, came only in the train of the deity in human guise; for the grove and the cave were the Roman god's first temples. Private worship was but a simpler form of public worship, performed for the most part without priestly intervention. All forms of worship were characterized by extreme simplicity as far as equipment was concerned. Bloodless offerings, especially cakes, were the most prominent at first, though animals were sacrificed as early as Numa's time. The ritualistic dance, the sacred race, and the procession were frequent accompaniments of the sacrifice. But together with extreme simplicity of equipment went extreme complexity and difficulty of ceremonial. The Roman god was a jealous god, and the slightest error in ritual, even a mispronounced word, vitiated the whole, and necessitated the repetition of the entire ceremony. The ritual as it existed was in its final form and remained the same *per omnia saecula saeculorum;* hence it was that formulae in use at a late period, notably those of the Salii and Fratres Arvales, had become so antiquated as to be incomprehensible even to men of learning. The same effort at accuracy is to be seen in such phrases as *sive deus sive dea, di deaeque omnes*, etc.

II. Bis zum zweiten punischen Kriege. 7. Die Gründung des capitolinischen Heiligtumes und die gleichzeitigen Neuerungen. The growth of Rome in size and importance and her altered political relations are clearly to be seen in the religious field. The establishment of the Diana cult on the Aventine as a worship common to all Latins, the creation or renewal of the festival on the Alban Mount and the building in the same place of the temple of Jupiter Latiaris, the displacement of the ancient trinity of Jupiter, Mars, and Quirinus by the Capitoline trinity, the construction of the Capitoline temple, the introduction of the Sibylline Books, the institution of the *duumviri sacris faciundis* are all manifestations of a great change. The absolute sway of the *di indigetes* has been broken; deities from non-Roman parts of the peninsula have found their way into the Roman system, and even the period of the *di novensides* of extra-Italian provenience has begun. Hellenic influence is beginning to operate strongly. The time of this movement corresponds roughly with the time indicated by tradition, which vaguely places a great religious change at the end of the regal period—during the reign of the Tarquinii.

8. Die Erweiterung des Kreises der römischen Staatsgötter. In proportion as Rome extended her territory and influence she increased the number of her gods. Through conquest, *evocatio*, trade-relations, and adoption of cults already existing in strength among foreign communities within the city, the roll of her deities rapidly increased. Foreign gods of Italian provenience were

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admitted to the State system with facility, well known and understood as they were; but with deities from without the borders of Italy the practice was different. Recognizing the danger arising from the admission of cults representing morals and practices differing from her own, the State gave the matter into the charge of a special commission, and such cults as were admitted to the State religion were kept under priests native to the cult itself, which was denied admission to the area within the pomerium, at least to the end of this period. But the multiplication of deities was the result not only of admission from without; it was also the result of increase from within. The tendency to specialization in divine functions resulted in such multiplications as Jupiter Stator, Jupiter Feretrius, Juno Lucina, Juno Moneta, etc. Abstractions began to be deified, as Fides, Bellona. The large list of temples founded from the beginning of the Republic on is evidence of the throng of new deities arising, and at the same time of the dying out of many of the old cults; for but few of the ancient native deities who had possessed merely shrines now received temples, and the ignorance of them displayed by Roman authorities shows plainly that they sank fromsight in remote antiquity.

9. Die Aufnahme italischer und griechischer Gottheiten. The reception of Diana from Aricia was the forerunner of many similar admissions of Italian cults: the Dioscuri from Tusculum, Hercules from Tibur, etc. The numerous admissions of Greek deities during the first decades of the Republic indicate a strong tide of Hellenic influence at the period of the transition from the regal to the Republican form of government. After this period it is not until 300 that other Greek deities gain admission. The influence exercised by them is shown by the fact that they are known by double names, after the style of Mercurius-Hermes, or are actually identified with the native deities.

10. Vermehrung der Götter durch Spaltung und durch Vergöttlichung abstrakter Begriffe. The multiplication of deities through specialization of their activities had its origin partly in the fact that they were susceptible of being regarded in many different aspects and partly in the fact that many a deity who existed in various neighboring communities under the same name but with widely different character found a home at Rome and was worshipped there under each aspect. Juno, for example, was Quiritis at Falerii, Lucina in Latium, Moneta on the Arx, and Regina at Veii. The rise of abstract deities is accounted for by the fact that many deities possessed strong virtues and activities which were regarded as worthy of embodiment as deities themselves. As a consequence independent virtues which were highly prized were treated in the same way, and there arose Spes, Concordia, Pudicitia, Pietas, etc. Occasionally cults arose as a consequence of vows made in critical moments, as those of Febris and Tempestas, or from thankfulness for warning and danger averted, as that of Aius Locutius or Deus Rediculus.

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11. Die äusseren Formen des Staatskultus. The change in the outward forms of religion is great. Temples, with cult statues, take the place of unpretentious shrines and altars. Many cults begin to play a political role: the temple of Saturn contains the treasury, the temples of Ceres and Castor and Pollux stand for the plebs and the equites respectively, the guild of merchants has Mercury as its patron. Public daily life thus becomes closely connected with the public religion. Public participation in the forms of religion is also greater. The games, the ceremonies of the *sellisternia*, *lectisternia*, and *supplicatio* are shared by the body of the citizens either as spectators or as actual participants. The State itself even orders participation on the part of the public on occasions, as in the decreeing of fasts. Of necessity the religious morale of the people is weakened. Games and sacred processions become secularized in the minds of the populace, who look upon them as merely entertainment. At the end of this period, too, the consulting of Etruscan haruspices regarding prodigies and expiatory offerings occurs with increasing frequency. The sacrifice of human beings—*Gallus et Galla*, *Graecus et Graeca*, *Argei*—is first performed during this period, in obedience to Greek oracular direction, and Greek mysteries find their way to Rome.

III. Bis zum Ausgange der Republik. 12. Die Hellenisierung des Kultus. The year 217 marks an epoch: Hellenic influence, at work for centuries, at last becomes supreme. In the lectisternium of this year Jupiter and Juno, Neptune and Minerva, Mars and Venus, Apollo and Diana, Vulcan and Vesta, Mercury and Ceres are the deities honored—a twelve corresponding to the Greek twelve, forming a new Roman circle grouped not with reference to origin but according to Greek myth and Greek cult relations. The line between *di indigetes* and *di novensides* is no longer drawn, and these twelve deities are given official recognition and receive the name of *di consentes*. In the same year Venus Erycina and Mars are admitted to the Capitol, and the line of the pomerium is thus crossed for the first time by deities of foreign origin. Accompanying Greek deities came Greek literature and philosophy, Greek morals and Greek art. Whenever possible, Greek cult statues were used to represent Hellenized Roman deities, often with the result of confusing the identity of their gods in the mind of the Romans; for though statues of Hermes and Zeus might represent with reasonable accuracy Mercury and Jupiter, the representation of Dius Fidius by a statue of Apollo or of the Penates by the statues of the Dioscuri could result only in confusion. The results of Hellenic influence began to be manifest in the general decrease in importance and the falling away of the ancient deities and their simple and unexciting rites. The gaudy and emotional rites of the new régime took their place. But elements other than Hellenic find their way to Rome. The Great Mother of the Gods is admitted

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in 204, uniting in her cult the sensuality of the Greek with the orgiastic tendencies of the Orient. The danger threatened by her worship was not less because it was admitted as a Greek cult, established on the Palatine, within the pomerium, as a State cult, and favored by patrician and plebeian alike. In her wake came other Eastern deities of the same nature. The suppression of the Bacchanalia and the banishment of the Chaldaei are indications as to the tendencies of the time. So familiar had the people become with the strangely attractive rites and doctrines of the East that Mithras, Ma, and Isis could find ready entrance in their time.

13. Litteratur und Wissenschaft. Yet the Hellenization of Roman religion would be incomprehensible did we not take into account the part played by Greek literature and science. The poet, historian, and antiquary transfer Greek names to Roman deities, and Greek myths are naturalized on Latin soil. Very slight resemblances sufficed for the identification of Greek and Roman deities, and Varro, who finally embodied in his Antiquitates Rerum Divinarum the results of the science of religion, was apparently successful in making clear to the Roman mind the identity of the gods of the two nations.

After literature came philosophy to rob the gods of Rome of their title to reverence. Besides the names, genealogies, and myths which he learned from the Greek, the Roman also learned from the same source how to conceive of natural forces behind the forms of his gods. The danger felt from this source is indicated by the suppression in 181 of the so-called books of Numa, probably Pythagorean, and the banishment of philosophers in 173, 161, and 155. But the tide could not be stemmed, and cosmic philosophy, Euhemerism, Epicureanism, and especially Stoicism entered into a rich inheritance among the Romans.

14. Verfall der Staatsreligion. The inevitable result followed: the transfer of Hellenic names and qualities to the impersonal and abstract native Roman gods confused the vision and corrupted the faith of the masses; while science and philosophy undermined the belief of the cultured classes, with the result that the incumbents of the priestly offices approached the performance of their duties with anything but the proper spirit. From the Gracchi on the whole national cult, public and private, rapidly decays. The reform of Augustus might better be called an actual construction at first hand than a restoration.

IV. Die Religion der Kaiserzeit. 15. Die religiösen Reformen des Augustus. Vigorous and far-reaching as the reforms of Augustus were, they nevertheless resulted in the establishment of worship on Greek rather than Roman lines. The most significant of his reforms were the taking to himself of the office of Pontifex Maximus, the restoration of Vesta and the Lares to a high place, and the grouping of the public worship about the Genius Augusti in like manner as private worship centered about the Genius of the master of the house. The most important cults

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in his eyes were those of Apollo, Vesta Augusta, Mars Ultor, and the imperial cult in the Aedes Divi Iulii.

16. Die religiösen Verhältnisse in den beiden ersten Jahrhunderten der Kaiserzeit. Two distinct movements characterized the Roman religion in this period. First, the elaboration of the imperial cult as it had begun in the cult of Julius and of the Genius Augusti. The number of State deities was increased by a long list of Divi Imperatores, and the State religion developed into something like a court religion. Second, as a result of military and commercial life, the gods of Rome find their way into all parts of the world. But it is to be noted that the gods of the provinces were not fully identical with the gods at Rome; for the Roman, willingly seeing in the barbarous gods of the provinces his own gods, combined them with his own, with the result that though the same deity might be known under one name and worship throughout the Roman world, he might nevertheless vary widely in character. A national religion therefore existed only in form.

17. Die Zeit der Auflösung seit der Antoninen. The beginning of the final downfall was occasioned by the entrance of the Egyptian and Oriental religions. Existing at first as private, and excluded from the pomerium, they nevertheless developed such strength as to be prominent objects of either love or hatred to different Emperors. Caracalla finally admitted Isis within the walls and made her a State deity. And then came the deluge. It now became possible to say in all truth that other peoples had their own gods, but that the Roman people worshipped the gods of all the world. Ma-Bellona, Dolichenus, Atargatis, Deus Sol Elagabal, Sol Invictus, and especially Mithras, with a host of less important deities from the East, spring into prominence. All have in common the tendency to mysticism, and all insist that the truth is theirs alone, and that all other religions are included in their own. The old gods of the State are submerged, and even the deification of Emperors is so common as to be no longer of great importance. Emperors began to associate themselves with particular deities, and the claim of actual divinity by living Emperors would have resulted had not the struggle with Christianity interfered.

18. Das Ende der römischen Religion. The claim of infallibility and completeness on the part of every one of the Eastern religions was incompatible with the existence of the State system. Christianity, however, opposing them both, forced both to unite in a deadly struggle with itself. Three generations from the edict of 311 sufficed for the downfall of Paganism. Rome was its strongest fortress. The refusal of Gratian in 375 to accept the time-honored title of Pontifex Maximus; the confiscation of temple property in 382; the heroic opposition of the Roman nobility; the restoration and final overthrow under Eugenius—are all steps in the gallant but unsuccessful contest. The opening of

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the fifth century found it possible for Stilicho to burn the Sibylline Books. The remnants of the old régime still existed, but only in private worship and in out of the way places. Certain ceremonies lingered on in Spain up to the end of the sixth century, but the last example of Pagan rites in Italy was the worship of Apollo at Casinum, which in 529 met a violent end at the hands of Saint Benedict.

The clearness and orderliness of Wissowa's presentation will appeal to everyone. This is of course not the first time that the progress of Roman religion has been sketched; but it is the first time it has been set forth with such admirable precision and completeness. The clearness with which each set of conditions in the progression is seen to emerge from the complexity of preceding conditions and to lose itself in the shifting which brings in the succeeding set is unparalleled in the treatment of this subject. So closely related are the various movements seen to be that any division of the religious history of Rome into epochs seems arbitrary.

It is inevitable, in a work of such dimensions, and in one which embodies the results of so many detailed investigations, that some conclusions will be disputed. The statement (p. 354) that human sacrifice first made its appearance as a result of Greek influence will not be accepted by everyone. Mommsen regards the introduction of the Magna Mater in 204 as an event "making in fact an epoch in the world's history," while Wissowa makes the *lectisternium* of 217 the beginning of an epoch. Cumont is now of the opinion that the *taurobolium* was primitively connected with the cult of Bellona in Asia (Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature religieuses VI, 2 (1901)), while he is quoted by Wissowa as conjecturing in 1888 that its origin lay in the worship of Persian Anahita.

Wissowa, however, foresees that criticism of his work will be rather the consequence of what he has omitted than of what he has said: "Viele werden enttäuscht sein wenn sie in diesem Buche so manches nicht finden was sie erwarteten." He is thinking especially of the study of religion by the comparative method, from which he refrains throughout, on the ground that it is a dangerous method to employ in dealing with so complex a phenomenon as Roman religion, and that, while it has proven effective in master hands, in the majority of cases it has only led to error, because the time for its use was not yet ripe. Wissowa's aim has been to supply the need of a solid foundation on which to base all special attempts to illuminate the religious history of Rome, and it is in this spirit that we must take his work. Some will miss the fullness of citation from ancient authors which characterizes Marquardt. Many would have been glad to find a fuller treatment of the period of transition from Hellenic to Oriental predominance, and from Paganism to Christianity. Others would have liked more emphasis on the part of the Oriental religions in making straight the way for Christianity. It would have

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been interesting to be told of the survival of Pagan elements in the new religion; but Dr. Wissowa has consistently withheld his hand and has not allowed himself to be tempted to seek after strange gods. He has kept constantly in view the character of his work, excluded whatever was unessential, and left it for its own proper time and place. He displays a well-balanced conservatism.

We suspect that what we have said regarding clearness will be appreciated less by the ordinary American reader than by those to whom Wissowa's tongue is native. The learned author has taken advantage of the genius of his language to compress his ideas and present them tightly packed together in the most concentrated form, and most of our countrymen who attempt to dash across a page of his work will find themselves inclined to agree at first sight with the sentiment of Lowell: "Aber potztausend Donnerwetter! What a language it is! With sentences in which one sets sail like an admiral with sealed orders, not knowing where the devil he is going to till he is in mid-ocean!" or with another American gentleman who declares that "the Germans dive down deeper, stay under longer, and come up muddier" than any other nationality in the world. But it is true, nevertheless, that Wissowa's work is a model of orderly, clear, and unequivocal presentation to the nationality for which it is intended. Such harmony is in immortal souls.

The outlook for the study of Roman religion has been made distinctly brighter by Wissowa's work. By so effectively separating the native Roman from the Hellenic element he has brought into relief the individuality of the Roman religion. The Roman is coming into his own. Wissowa's work will prove one of the most powerful factors in correcting the shallow view according to which Roman religion, literature, and art were all only "pale reflexes" of the religion, literature, and art of Greece, with no individuality of their own.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. GRANT SHOWERMAN.

A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles. Edited by J. A. H. MURRAY and HENRY BRADLEY. Vol. III, Letter D, Vol. IV, Letters F and G, Vol. V, Letters H, I, J, K and Vol. VI, L-Lock. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1894–1903.

The recent receipt of Parts 1–4 of Volume VI, L-Lock, the fourth dated January 1, 1903, of Part 1, Vol. VII, O-Onomastic, and Part 1, Vol. VIII, all of Q, dated July 1 and Oct. 1, 1902, of the New English Dictionary, reminds me that some years have elapsed since this great work was noticed in the Journal. The Part Crouchmas-Czech, completing Vol. II, was noticed in Vol. XV, pp. 82–85, 1894, and the Part Everybody-Ezod, completing the letter E, in Vol. XVI, pp. 97–99, 1895. The letter D was

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subsequently issued, the Parts extending from Oct. 1, 1894 to July 1, 1897, and with E forming Vol. III; the Parts of the letter F extended from Jan. 1, 1895 to Jan. 1, 1898, and of the letter G from Jan. 1, 1898 to Jan. 1, 1901, together forming Vol. IV; the Parts comprising the letters H, I, J and K extended from April 1, 1898 to Oct. 1, 1901, and form Vol. V, and four Parts, L-Lock, April 1, 1901 to January 1, 1903, of Vol. VI, which will comprise L-N, have also appeared. Two other Parts, 1 of Vol. VII, and 1 of Vol. VIII, have recently been received, as mentioned above.

By some unfortunate mishap, doubtless chargeable to the mails, the Part of the letter G from Germanizing to Glass-Coach, and that of the letter H from Hod to Horizontality, which should have come to hand in 1899, have never reached the Journal, hence our copy is incomplete to that extent.

The enlisting of Mr. Henry Bradley as active editor has hastened the completion of the letters, and we are informed that "the remainder of the work, to the end of the alphabet, is in an advanced state of preparation." This is good news, and as the rate of issue of the several Parts has been accelerated, we trust that a kind Providence may spare us to see the end of the work, which has now been in course of publication since 1884.

The plan of the work is familiar to all readers of this Journal. As an illustration of the encyclopaedic character of the volumes, we find it stated in a prefatory note to the Part L to Lap that in this thin Part of 64 pages 2160 words are recorded, whereas Johnson has but 176, Cassell, 959, the Century, 1169, and the Standard, 1323; 1783 of these words are illustrated by 7576 quotations, whereas Richardson has but 411.

The historical character of the work leads us to look for the oldest use of a word in the first quotations. It is therefore surprising to find under 'Dyspepsia' 1657 as the first date, and that from a Dictionary, whereas Phillips, 1701, is the first writer that appears to have used the word. Even the alternative 'Dyspepsy' is not traced further back than 1656. Is it possible that our Elizabethan ancestors were strangers to this common ill to which flesh is heir in these modern days? If not so, what did they call it? Even 'Disury' ('Disuria') is traced back to Trevisa, 1398. We might have expected to find both words in Chaucer, but Professor Skeat's Glossary fails to substantiate our expectations, and even Stratmann deserts us also, as does Macaulay's Glossary to Gower. The common derivation of *dig* from O. E. *dīcian* is rejected on account both of the quantity of the root-vowel and the final consonant of the root. It is probably from Old French *diguer*, and both may go back to the same Teutonic root. It is not traced beyond the early 14th century. No earlier example of 'Diphtheria' is given than 1857, French *diphthérie*, substituted by Bretonneau for his earlier term *diphthérite*, first used by him in 1821 in a paper before the French Academy, and taken into English and German medical literature.

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It is gratifying to know that nearly six volumes have been completed, extending almost through L, and a beginning made of volumes VII and VIII, O and Q, although we have not received any Part of the letters M and N, which have been entrusted to Mr. Bradley, nor of the letter P, which will be treated by Dr. Murray. A third collaborator has been enlisted, Mr. W. A. Craigie, M. A., who has completed Q in the last Part received of Vol. VIII and will treat R and S, also included in Vol. VIII. "Volumes IX and X will contain the later portion of the letter S, and the letters T-Z," so we can at last see daylight.

The space to which this long-delayed notice must be limited will permit but few illustrations. There are examples of the use of *Kaiser* (*Keiser*) from the late Old English (Hatton Gospels, 1160) on, but the modern form is directly adopted from the German, where it represents "the normal *Keiser* of the 17th century." Carlyle's influence is distinctly seen in the common use of this word. His erroneous etymology of *King* as the "able-man" is not, however, endorsed, even though it has been perpetuated in a book on Rhetoric to illustrate "how important or significant the origin and history of a word may become in the writer's usage." Carlyle was not an etymologist and writers on Rhetoric should recognize that fact. *King* (O. E. *cyning*) is from 'Kin' (O. E. *cynn*), and = "scion of the kin, race, or tribe," or, as some prefer, "son or descendant of one of (noble) birth," Hence it should no longer do duty as the "able-man," however *able* a king may be. Examples of the use of *King* extend from A. D. 855 on; it was already shortened from *cyning* in Old English times, A. D. 971. 'Kickshaw(s)' (French *quelque chose*) is not traced back earlier than Shakspere. We find its original sense, "A fancy dish in cookery," in 2 Henry IV, vi, 1, 29, and its more general use, "a toy, trifle," in Twelfth Night, i, 3, 122; Florio (1598) uses the form *quelque chose*, and Cotgrave (1611) *quelkchoses*, which distinctly show its etymology, and prove that Shakspere picked up this new word "to adorn a tale," as did Fletcher also. *Lie*, substantive and verb, with its affixes fills sixteen columns, and furnishes an excellent example of the thoroughness of Mr. Bradley's work, from Beowulf—as to the date of which poem he does not risk a conjecture, although he gives several examples from it—to 1899, quoting from The Nation: "If McKinley would *lie off* for the next four years, he might make a very good free-trade candidate for the Presidency in 1904."

It is very interesting to trace the forms and uses of *Lief*, especially in its two main idiomatic uses, the impersonal with *be* and the personal with *have*, from Aelfric (A. D. 1000) to William Browne (1614), although I doubt not that the idiom with *be* may be traced later. Aelfric has "*Leofre me is þaet*," etc., and Browne "*Lever me were be slaine*, etc." Mr. Bradley says: "In *I'd*, *you'd*, *he'd* (etc.) *as lief*, the ambiguous contraction is probably taken to represent *would* rather than *had*. . . . Actual instances with *had*

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might still occur, but only as archaic or dialectic." This seems to me questionable, for we find several examples with *have* and none with *will*, so that analogy is against this view. The South English Legendary (1290) has "ich habbe leouere þat" and "hadde ich leouere" etc. So King Alexander, "hadde lever," and William of Palerne (1350), "I have lever;" Scottish Legends of Saints (1375) "He had als lef be ded" etc. Examples from Chaucer and Gower occur, as (1386) Chaucer, Merchant's Tale, "Leuere ich hadde to dyen etc.," and Monk's Prologue "I hadde leuere than a barel ale that etc."; the idiom with *have* has survived to the present day. Examples of the use of *would* are found under the adverb *Lief*. Mr. Bradley says: "The adverb use originated chiefly from the misinterpretation of phrases like "I had as lief, I had liever, in which *would* appears instead of *had* as early as the 13th century." One of the earliest examples is from the Mirrour of our Ladye 29 (1450–1530): "They that wolde leuer be in the quier;" so 1598, R. Bernard, tr. Terence 213: "Now see whether of these two conditions you would leaver have;" 1814, Jefferson, Writings (1830) IV, 223: I would as lieve not have to encounter." Here the proximity of *have* might have influenced the change to *would*, but we find in 1766, Mrs. F. Sheridan, Sidney Biddulph, IV, 311: "I had as lief have let it alone." Thackeray has, 1852, Esmond, 1, vi, "I would as lief go there as anywhere," but Tennyson, 1876, Queen Mary, iii, 1; "Far liefer had I in my country hall been reading some old book," perhaps in imitation of Elizabethan diction. The last example we have is from the Pall Mall Magazine, 1898, June, 220 . . . "than which she would liefer have died;" here again the proximity of *have* may have influenced the usage. When we find 'I'd,' 'I had liefer' explain it as 'I had;' if it is 'I'ld,' 'I would liefer' resolve it into the later 'I would,' so, as both are used, we may take our choice.

In the first Part of Vol. VII, O-Onomastic, the remarks on the pronunciation of O deserve attention. No less than eight variations of O are noted. Dr. Murray says that M. E. close *ō* (O. E. *ó*) "about the end of the M. E., or beginning of the Mod. Eng., period passed into the sound of (*ū*), usually with the spelling *oo*, though sometimes with the simple *o* spelling, as in the words *do, to, lose;*" so Dr. Murray agrees with some other orthoepists in pronouncing *to* as *do*, but shorter, phonetically "*tu dū*," but in this country, especially in the South, "the normal sound of long ō, as in *no, toe, bone*," is given to *to* also; this must have been the sound of O. E. *tō*—not *tō*. This long sound of *ō* after *r* "in London and the South of England ... is usually identified with *ǭ*,"—"not, however, in the educated speech of the country as a whole, *nor in America*," italics mine. In a review of Storm's Englische Philologie in this Journal (II 488) some years ago, I had occasion to comment on this difference of pronunciation, *vs.* Sweet, for here 'mourn' is never confounded with 'morn,' and I am glad to be sustained by Dr. Murray's authority. Under *One*

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(O. E. *án*) we find that this sound "became in south. and midl. dial. *ôn*, exemplified before 1200. By 15th c. *ôn*, *oon*, in s. w. and west., had developed an initial *w*, which only occasionally appears in the spelling, but is now the standard pronunciation. The first orthoepist to refer to it was apparently Jones, 1701: earlier grammarians, down to Cooper, 1685, give to 'one' the sound that it has in 'alone', 'atone,' and 'only'; Dyche in 1710 has *ọn* beside *wọn*." Therefore, we have been writing *one* and saying *wun* for only two hundred years, according to the orthoepists, but the examples of the spelling 'won' go back to 1420, the time at which Dr. Murray says that the initial *w* was developed—another illustration of a blunder that has established itself in pronunciation in our phonetically irregular speech. It deserves remark in passing that we find no notice taken of the pronunciation 'ọnly,' as in *on* (for *ōnly*, as in *alone*), heard so often nowadays, hence it must be relegated to incorrect speech. We note that in this Part there are 3565 words to 2086 in the "Standard" and 1965 in the "Century", of which number 2911 are illustrated by quotations to 181 in the "Standard" and 621 in the "Century," the quotations numbering in all 14,276 to 244 only in the "Standard" and 1938 in the "Century," so the New English Dictionary continues to maintain its preëminence as a thesaurus of the language.

The whole of the letter Q is comprised in Part 1, Vol. VIII, prepared by Mr. Craigie, and it comprises 2729 words to 971 in the "Standard" and 1058 in the "Century;" 2253 are illustrated by quotations, which number 9480 in all. Nearly all of these are of foreign origin, but there are some notable exceptions, as Queen, O. E. *cwēn*, Quick, O. E. *cwic*(*u*) and some others. Mr. Craigie tells us that "by the end of the 13th century *cw-* was entirely discontinued, and *qu* (or its variants *qv-*, *qw-*) was the established spelling for all cases of the sound (kw), whether of English, French or Latin origin." Examples however, of *quen*, *quene*, are given from Layamon, 1205, alongside of *cweane*, 1275. From the earliest times the word denoted "a king's wife or consort." From the sense of *living*, *Quick* seems to have been applied to the qualities of living things, and especially to the energy and activity, the speed and rapidity, characteristic of them. The adjective and adverb are treated at length in nine columns. The college use of 'Quiz' as a noun is traced back only to 1891 in the Century Dictionary, and as a verb to 1886, and both are marked "U. S.," but almost any American college student can supply earlier dates than these.

BALTIMORE, MD. JAMES M. GARNETT.

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REPORTS.

PHILOLOGUS, LIX (1900), N. F. Band XIII.

I, pp. 1–8. F. Skutsch. Der Prolog zum Hautontimorumenos des Terenz. In vs. 6 *duplex* goes with the relative clause. Ter. then states that the play was 'contaminated.' But traces of it do not appear in the play.

II, pp. 9–20. A. Müller. Scenisches zur römischen Komödie. 1. Right and left. Against the view of Reisch (Reisch-Dörpfeld, Gr. Theat. p. 256) M. argues that in the plays of Plautus, with the exception of the Rudens, the city and the harbor are always thought of as on the same side of the scene. As this in the Rudens is quite different from the usual city street of the New Comedy, the exception does not impair the rule. 2. Angiportus. This term sometimes refers to alley-ways between houses, sometimes to passages opening on the stage and giving access to the garden (Merc. 1009, Persa 440 ff.). The various dramatic uses, for concealment etc., are discussed.

III, pp. 21–41. W. H. Roscher. Die Bedeutung des E zu Delphi und die übrigen γράμματα Δελφικά. The sayings are reconstructed (p. 38) as follows in hexameters:

Εἶ. Θεῷ ἦρα. Νόμοις πείθου. Φείδου τε χρόνοιο.
Γνῶθι σεαυτόν. Μηδὲν ἄγαν. Ἐγγύα, πάρα δ' ἄτη.

I. The first word is taken to be the imperative of εἶμι = ἴθι (p. 25) = come here, welcome. II. Reconstruction of the verses.

IV, pp. 42–45. O. Hoffmann. Zum äolischen Dialekt. 1. Alkaios 5 and the dative in -αις. p. 44 "of two datives in -αισι standing in juxtaposition one could be shortened." 2. τέρρητον = trireme (sc. πλοῖον). Note on a gloss of Hesychius.

V, pp. 46–57. W. Nestle. Anklänge an Euripides in der Apostelgeschichte. Echoes of the Bacchae are found in Acts 5, 39 (B. 45 et passim), 26, 14 (B. 795), 9, 3; 22, 6 (B. 1078-85), 16, 23 ff.; 12, 7 (B. 447-450, 585 ff.) 17, 16 ff. (B. 216, 219, 256, 272, 467, 650) 17, 22-24 (Eurip. fr. 1116 N.). Other apparent reminiscences of Greek writers are quoted and proposed.

VI, pp. 58–63. S. Eitrem. De Ovidio Nicandri imitatore. The myths in the Ovidian Metamorphoses cannot be referred to the sources from which those of Antoninus Liberalis were taken and Antoninus himself did not copy Nicander of Colophon.

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VII, pp. 64–89. J. Zahlfleisch. Variae Lectiones zur Physik E-Z des Aristoteles bei Simplikios.

VIII, pp. 90–135. L. Gurlitt. Exegetisches und Kritisches zu Ciceros Briefen ad Atticum. Discussion of 23 passages enumerated on p. 135.

IX, pp. 136–147. J. Dietze. Zum Märchen von Amor und Psyche. The tale, originally localized in Miletus, was later at the end of the first century B. C. combined with allegory and assumed the style of the love-story of the Hellenistic erotic type. Apuleius is responsible for certain Roman allusions.

Miscellen.—1. pp. 148-151. Fr. Susemihl. Die Aspasia des Antisthenes. Antisthenes seems to have held up the relation of Pericles and Aspasia as a warning against the evil consequences of a too ardent and dominating passion.

2. pp. 151–153. T. Büttner-Wobst. Polybios als Astronom. Although his method (IX 15) would lead to great error, we cannot say that he had "only a superficial knowledge of the subject." His knowledge, such as it was, was the best to be had at that time.

3. pp. 153–154. M. Petschenig. Zu Maximian und Ammian. Three conjectures.

4. pp. 154–155. K. Ohlert. Petroniana. Notes on Nos. 101, 112, 126, 130, 137.

5. pp. 155–158. A. Frederking. Zu Ciceros Briefen. 11 critical notes.

6. pp. 158–160. W. Heraeus. Zur Kritik und Erklärung von Porfyrios Horazscholien. Cont'd pp. 317, 477, 630.

7. p. 160. H. Weber. Aristoteles *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία* VII 4 suggests that *ἵππος ἐκ μαρμάρου τυκτή, ὡς* would heal the text.

X, pp. 161–185. L. Radermacher. Analecta. (1) The first verse of the couplet cited by Suidas v. *εὐφημία* from Aelian is assigned to Ariston the Stoic. (2) On a rhetorical fr. in Cramer IV, Anecdota Oxon. p. 153– a product of the Byz. period consisting of corrupted excerpts and based on Ps. Dionys. p. 24, 15 ff. Us. (3) On the book of Henoch. (4) Achil. Tatius and Dio Chrys. (5) Dion. of H. in de Demosth. cites Dem. from an abbreviated text. The testimony of his readings is to be taken as against S. (Parisinus). In de Thuc. his method of citation is different. Perhaps he quoted brief passages from memory, (6) Dio Cass. XXXVI, 20, 1.

XI, pp. 186–200. K. Lincke. Miscellanea. In Aesch. Prom. 801 reads *φροίμιον*. Notes on Herod. I 138, VII 104; Thuc. III

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38, 5; IV 23, 2; VII 39, 2; Xen. Anab. I 7, 10–12; Hellen. V 38; Mem. I 1, 2; 6; Plato Phaedr. 251 C; Phaed. 59 A; Crito 53 E; Aristot. poet. c. 11 p. 1452 a 24; Cic. Rosc. 34, 96. Caes. b. G. I 16; 47; IV 33. Sen. de const. sap. 12. 1 and 3. Evang. Marc. 4. 10; I 23–27, Origen contra Cels. IV 83; VI 51.

XII, pp. 201–205. O. Hoffmann. Zwei neue arkadische Inschriften. No. 21 and 22 of the new Attic imprecatory tablets in the Nat'l Mus. at Athens publ. by Ziebart in Nachr. d. Gött. Gesell. d. Wiss. 1899, p. 105 ff.

XIII, pp. 206–237. M. Groeger. Die Kirke-Dichtung in der Odyssee. Conclusions summarized on p. 237 that in form and content it is later than ω, δ, ε, ι, and the beginning of κ; perhaps also later than the Θρινακίη scene of μ. On the other hand the prooemium, η 246–255, and the greatest part of μ should be later, as they presuppose a previous divine admonition. The condensed survey ψ 300 ff. is also later, but that does not mean by another writer.

XIV, pp. 238–255. P. Egenolff. Zu Lentz' Herodian. In the καθολικὴ προσῳδία Lentz relied on the MS basis laid by his predecessors, and that was inadequate. Some results of a collation of the Dindorf text with the Vienna MS are given. II. Supplementary notes on things omitted by Lentz, etc.

XV, pp. 256–271. Eb. Nestle. Zur neuen Philo-Ausgabe. Criticism of the method, and notes on the biblical quotations.

XVI, pp. 272–304. W. Sternkopf. Ueber die "Verbesserung" des Clodianischen Gesetzentwurfes de exilio Ciceronis. The *correctio* consisted in setting the same penalty as Cicero's on any one receiving him inside the limits set. The 500 miles was reckoned from the Italian frontier, not from Rome. The text of ad Att. III 4 should be changed to quingenta to agree with Dio Cass. XXXVIII 17, 7 and Plut. Cic. 32 (p. 304) Clodius' lex provocationis was passed March 20, 58 B. C. About March 25, the tribune promulgated the rogatio de exilio Ciceronis. About April 3, he introduced the proposition in changed form, which was accepted about April 24 (Cf. L. Gurlitt, p. 478 *infra*.).

XVII, pp. 305–311. J. Ziehen. Archäologisch-Textkritische Bemerkungen zur Salmasianusanthologie. Continuation of an article in the Festschrift für Otto Benndorf S. 49 ff. A contribution towards a much-needed annotated edition of the Salmasian Anthology. 11 Notes.

Miscellen.—8. p. 312. Eb. Nestle. Ein moabitischer Stadtname in den griechischen Wörterbüchern. κειράς in Passow, Pape and others should be Κειράδας or better Κειρ-Ἀδας (קיר חדש). Cf. Καρχηδών Carthago, "New City."

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9. pp. 313–315. H. Jurenka. Der Mythus in Pindars erster olympischer Ode und Bakchylides III. While the court-poets would not refer to the death of their patron, and so could not say that after death he would attain to the honors of a hero, still he and the public would surely understand this from the myth.

10. pp. 315–316. O. Cr. Com. adesp. 410 p. 485 Kock. Not a comic fragment at all.

11. pp. 316–317. G. Helmreich. Zu Galen Περὶ τῶν ἑαυτῷ δοκούντων. Frag. from cod. Paris. 634 suppl. gr. containing some Byz. scholia quoting the work.

12. pp. 317–320. W. Heraeus. Zur Kritik und Erklärung von Porfyrios Horazscholien; II. Zu den Episteln; III. Zu den Satiren.

P. 320 Fr. Studniczka. Petron. 126, Suppl. to p. 155. The conjecture Dionam (-em) can be found in Bücheler's ed. maj.

XVIII, pp. 321–328. K. Wernicke. Apollon Stroganoff und Apollon vom Belvedere. W. agrees with G. Kieseritzky (Athen. Mitth. XXIV (1899) S. 468 ff.) that the Stroganoff Apollo is of ancient origin; but he holds that as the left arm is an addition from some statue of Mercury it does not help us in the interpretation of the Ap. Belvedere. The latter is to be thought of as in the moment of triumph, having just hit some opponent with an arrow.

XIX, pp. 329–343. A. Müller. Noch einmal die Sehverhältnisse im Dionysostheater. Continuation of the subject from Philol. Suppl. Bd. VII pp. 108–112 that the later high stage described by Vitruvius was introduced so as to enable some of the spectators more easily to see the actors. To this Doerpfeld (Athen. Mitth. 1899, S. 310 ff. had protested that the assumed difficulty to which certain spectators were liable, did not actually occur. Müller still maintains (p. 342–3) that for many spectators in the third story a high stage would give a better view without seriously encroaching on the occupants of the proedriae.

XX, pp. 344–361. R. Holland. Mythographische Beiträge. 1. Der Typhoeuskampf. H. compares Antonin. Lib. 28 and Nonnus I–II as illustrating Robert's assumption of a poem as the basis of Apollod. I 39 ff. Typhoeus may be regarded as the winter-giant, the going of the gods to the south as the migration of the birds. Other metamorphoses of the gods are given. 2. Hermochares and Ktesylla. The tale (Antonin. Lib. I after Nicand. III) has been put in the background by the similar romance of Akontios and Kydippe, by Kallimachos. The throwing of the apple is necessary to the plot and not borrowed from the latter. 3. The burial of Alkmene. In Anton. Lib. 33 by putting in parenthesis φέκουν—Ἡρακλῆς and ending the sentence with <θάψοντες> topographical difficulties are removed.

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XXI, pp. 362–399. H. Steiger. Warum schrieb Euripides seine Troerinnen? Summary on p. 398–399. Eurip. intended to warn his countrymen against undertaking a war against Syracuse for conquest, by showing up the war against Ilion, stripped of all poetic ornament.

XXII, pp. 400–405. R. Foerster. Eine Fälschung in Libanios. The entire close of the speech περὶ δουλείας is, in the Paris ed. of Morel (1627, Tom. II, p. 659, 19 f.) a forgery. Perhaps the original ending had been lost on the way to the printer's; the beginning he restored by means of his own Latin translation. As this was badly written, and as he took too little time and also knew too little Greek, the attempt was very imperfect. The last part for some reason he failed to complete.

XXIII, pp. 406–415. Fr. Reuss. Zu Valerius Flaccus, Argon. V–VIII. Emendations.

XXIV, pp. 416–440. W. Heraeus. Neue Beiträge zur Kritik des Valerius Maximus und Nepotianus.

XXV, pp. 441–465. M. Rothstein. Nachträgliches zu Properz. A spirited reply to Fr. Leo's review of R.'s Propertius (Gött. G. Anz. 1898, 722–750) which criticized his method of treating the Greek originals.

Miscellen.—13. pp. 466–469. H. Lucas. Die Neunzahl bei Horaz und Verwandtes. *Nono mense* Sat. I 6, 61 is to be understood as a round-number, a popular expression for 'some months'.

14. pp. 469–471. Fr. Susemihl. Noch einmal die Aspasia des Antisthenes. Continued from p. 148. Though the chief support of his argument falls, as Athen. XIII 589 e is not to be assigned to Antisthenes, still S. does not give up his former view.

15. pp. 471–473. R. Ellis. Ad Ciceronis Epistulas, quae in Tyrrello-Purserianae ed. vol. VI continentur.

16. pp. 474–476. F. Münzer. Eine Pliniusvita von 1496. This life published in the Brescia and Venice edd. of the N. H. in 1496 is really of modern origin, based on Pliny and other writers and a Veronese inscription which has nothing to do with Pliny.

17. pp. 476–477. Eb. Nestle. Zu den griechischen Namen der Buchstaben. A book of 1538 shows that even then the theory that the names of the Greek alphabet came from the Aramaic, as they end in *a*, had been advocated.

18. pp. 477–480. W. Heraeus. Zur Kritik und Erklärung von Porfyrios Horazscholien.

XXVI, pp. 481–504. F. Skutsch. Zur lateinischen Wortgeschichte und plautinischen Versmessung. Among other things

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concludes that *em* is from *eme* (emo) p. 498 ff. The *-ius* of the pron. gen. can be one syllable. II. For *iurgium* in Persa. 797 read *iurigium;* for *audax* in Amph. 985 read avidax; for *olfactare* in Men. 167 read *olēfactare*

XXVII, pp. 505–520. J. Jessen. Zu Juvenal. Critical and exegetical notes.

XXVIII, pp. 521–531. L. Cohn. Zur neuen Philo-Ausgabe. Reply to Nestle (p. 256 ff.). Pp. 532–536 Paul Wendland replies to Nestle's criticism of his share of the joint work.

XXIX, pp. 537–544. Fr. Susemihl. Die Zeit des Historikers Kratippos. He lived between Polemon and Zopyros on the one hand and Dionysios on the other, and is not the peripatetic of Cicero's time.

XXIX, (sic) pp. 545–559. H. Weber. Zu der Schrift *περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων* (MSS. MV.-A).

XXX, pp. 560–573. T. Büttner-Wobst. Studien zu Polybios. (1) Arrangement of some excerpts of Book 21.

XXXI, pp. 574–577. G. Lehnert. Eine rhetorische Quelle für Boetius' Commentare zu Aristoteles *περὶ ἑρμηνείας*. The choice of Ter. Cic. and Verg. and the use to enliven the commentary of citations from these school favorites point to some one original grammatical work, showing peripatetic influence.

XXXII, pp. 578–583. L. Gurlitt. Lex Clodia de exilio Ciceronis. Continues Sternkopf's discussion (Philol. LIX (1900) 272 ff.). G. compares Buning's conclusions (Prg. Cösfeld 1894). G. believes the *correctio* (1) meant a lightening of Cicero's punishment. (2) In the first form Cic. was banished from the whole Rom. empire. This was afterwards changed to 400 miles from Italy. As the Rom. wrote D for 500, Sternkopf's emendation CCCC to CCCCC in ad Att. III 4 is wrong.

XXXIII, pp. 584–591. H. Blümner. Neue Fragmente des Edictum Diocletiani. Discussion of the fragments found on the site of ancient Aigeira in Achaia and publ. by Stais in *Ἐφημ. ἀρχαιολ.* 1899, 147 ff.

XXXIV, pp. 592–597. L. Radermacher. Griechischer Sprachgebrauch. *ὡς οὐδέν* in Aristoph. Frogs 738 ff. and Ps.-Aristeas § 211, p. 58 Wendl. is compared with German 'das ist mir wie Nichts', and is a popular idiom. Notes on *αὖ*; *πάλιν*; *τίς ἰδών* = a man; *οὐδὲν οὐδενί* (Isaeus XIII 8), also a colloquial idiom and hence rare in literature; *πάναλκις* for *πανάλκης* Sophronius Mir. Cyr. et Joannis I 3425 C/D.

XXXV, pp. 598–604. R. Helm. De Prooemio Apuleianae, quae est de deo Socratis orationis. H. thinks that Apuleius being

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compelled to speak extempore began with a Gr. exordium but when objections were made by some in the audience, he gave a new beginning which has been preserved. Both fragments are genuine and to be accepted as belonging to the speech.

XXXVI, pp. 605–609. M. Maas. Zur heronischen Frage. M. places Heron of Alexandreia in the time of Ptolemaeus IX Euergetes II.

XXXVII, pp. 610–614. A. Dyroff. Abaris. Supplemental to Bethe's article in the Pauly-Wissowa Realencycl. The idealizing of Abaris took place in the pre-stoic times.

Miscellen.—19. pp. 615–618. Fr. Susemihl. Epikritisches zu Heliodoros dem Periegeten. Caecilius is the medium through which the decrees in the Ps. Plut. lives of the ten orators were directly obtained.

20. pp. 618–620. P. Egenolff. Zu Anakreon. In fr. 49 B⁴ read ὡρικήν for θρηικίην.

21. pp. 620–621. J. Koehm. Soph. Elekt. 47 reads ὄγκῳ for ὄρκῳ.

22. pp. 621–622. G. Helmreich. Zu Oreibasios emendations to II 28, II 32, III 1, p. 187, 4.

23. pp. 622–625. L. Gurlitt. Cic. ep. ad fam. IX 10, 2, read: oblitusne es igitur fungorum illorum, quos apud Niciam et ingentium cum σοφίας epitome (or ἐπιτομῇ)?

24. pp. 625–627. R. Ehwald. Tacitus ab excessu d. Aug. I 10, reads: nec domesticis abstinebatur: abducta Neroni uxor et consulti . . . pontifices, an . . . nuberet; Q. Ventidii et Vedii Pollionis luxus; postremo Livia . . . noverca.

25. pp. 627–630. R. Ehwald. Eutropius. The Gotha MS (saec. IX), cod. membr. I 101 contains the first half of a Murbach codex which passed into the possession of Maugérard.

26. pp. 630–633. W. Heraeus. Zur Kritik und Erklärung von Porfyrios Horazscholien.

Indices.

YALE UNIVERSITY. GEORGE DWIGHT KELLOGG.

BEITRÄGE ZUR ASSYRIOLOGIE UND SEMITISCHEN SPRACHWISSENSCHAFT, herausgegeben von FRIEDRICH DELITZSCH und PAUL HAUPT. Vierter Band. Heft 4, pp. 423-587. Leipzig, J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1902.[1]

The fourth and last Heft of the fourth volume of the Beiträge contains nine articles.

[1] For review of BA. IV. Heft 3, see A. J. P. XXII 461 foll.

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J. Kohler, who collaborated with Peiser in "Aus dem babylonischen Rechtsleben," Teile i-iv, comments on a number of interesting points connected with the later Babylonian law (pp. 423 430). For example, he shows that the brother of the founder of the well known business house of Egibi in Babylon was still living in Cyrus's sixth reign-year. Kohler shows also that the last trace of the ancient custom of wife purchase appears in the days of Nebuchadnezzar. After that king's time the practice died out entirely. On the other hand, the father had absolute control over the marriages of such of his daughters as were living in the paternal home. Kohler's allusions to Babylonian mortgages are highly interesting (p. 427). It seems that the interest on a mortgage might be guaranteed by presenting to the money-lender a slave or slaves whose work should be regarded as equivalent to the payment of interest. Thus, in one case a mother and daughter were given, both as security for the entire loan, in this instance 1 mina, 10 shekels, and as interest payers on the loan. We have, moreover, a record which proves the legality of *a purchase on trial.* A rich man bought in this way a valuable jug and bowl for four minas and nine shekels, but he stipulated that before payment he should have the opportunity to judge whether the ornament harmonized with his apartments! He accordingly contracted either to pay for or to return the piece by a certain date. These legal records are very valuable as an evidence of the extensive compass of the later Babylonian transactions. As Kohler remarks, they shed a flood of light on the management of affairs, which, although they are twenty-five hundred years old, bear the closest resemblance to modern banking operations. The Babylonians were really the founders of the world's business methods which have been transmitted to us through Greece and Rome. The history of human commerce can certainly not be written without extensive mention of ancient Babylonia.

Ferdinand Bork contributes a linguistic note on the Elamitic (pp. 431-433). He contends that in this language the divine determinative sign had not the value *an*, as Weissbach believes, but *nap*. There can be little doubt that the Elamitic system of writing developed on quite different lines to the Assyro-Babylonian cuneiform. As Bork points out, the Elamites had no ancient characters behind them, as was the case with the Babylonians, and were therefore freer to develop their system independently.

Gottfried Nagel in "Hammurâbi's Letters to Sin-Idinnam," pp. 434-483, supplements L. W. King's work "The Letters and Inscriptions of Hammurâbi," vol. i. 1898. King has not yet published his second volume, no doubt owing to the many difficulties presented by these texts, whose vocabulary, dating as it does from 2250 B. C., is often very obscure and whose signs are frequently excessively difficult to differentiate. Thus, the pairs *ga* and *bi*, *ša* and *ta*, *ki* and *di*, etc. show an extraordinary and

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confusing resemblance. Nagel accordingly makes here an independent attempt to edit forty-six of these letters which King had already treated. I will merely call attention to the fact that in nr. 45, Scheil and Hommel read the name *Ku-dur-nu-ux-ga-mar* and believed that they had found the name of the biblical Chedor-Laomer. It is evident now, however, as Nagel shows (p. 473), that the correct reading is *I-nu-ux-sa-mar*, a rendering which detracts considerably from the historic interest of the passage. It would seem then that this was a premature "discovery," not so unusual among our eager Assyriologists! About half of these letters deal with legal conditions and show how astonishingly far advanced the Babylonians of Hammurâbi's time were in matters connected with litigation. Six letters have to do with building operations of various sorts which were carried out by Sin-Idinnam at the command of his king. A few of the letters are concerned with the trade conditions which then obtained between northern and southern Babylonia. It is highly interesting to notice how even at this early date the use of the precious metals as a standard of exchange had begun to take the place of the more primitive barter. A few of the letters inform us concerning some of Hammurâbi's war-like operations, unfortunately not the same as those undertaken by that ancient king in conjunction with the Elamite Chedorlaomer, Arioch of Larsa (Bible: Ellasar) and Tidal of Goi (Bible: "Nations") against the rulers of Sodom and Gomorrah, mentioned Gen. xiv. Amraphel of Shinar in that chapter has long been recognized as Hammurâbi. Nagel calls attention to two very characteristic letters, one containing commands regarding the transportation of the goddesses of Emutbal to Babylon and the other a decree directing a leap-month to be inserted in the calendar of the current year, in order to equalize the difference between the official and the actual year. These letters contain much that is valuable for the history of ancient Babylonian culture as it existed four thousand years ago and are therefore a highly important addition to our knowledge.

Nagel adds a brief grammatical and lexicographical commentary (pp. 474-483) which is most instructively supplemented by Friedrich Delitzsch's "Remarks" (pp. 483-500.) Delitzsch adds (pp. 490-500) a short sketch of the culture conditions obtaining during Hammurâbi's reign. He was the first ancient Babylonian king to establish a definite system of military service from which were exempt, on the one hand, only certain ancient families dedicated to the temple service or acting as prominent government officials and, on the other hand, shepherd lads. In this way the king guarded the interests both of the nobility and of the agricultural classes.

Cornelis Van Gelderen (pp. 501-545) transliterates and translates with commentary twenty-one Assyro-Babylonian letters selected from various sources and dealing with a number of different subjects. The word *asû* "physician" (p. 507, line 12 f),

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regarding whose origin Van Gelderen expresses uncertainty is probably a Sumerian loanword in Semitic. The original form is *azu*, i. e. "father of knowledge" (*a=abu*, V R. 21, 63 c). That "father" is used here in the sense "possessor," very much as it is employed in modern Arabic, is evident, although this usage is not common in Assyrian. It is certainly found, however, in the expression *aban abi abni*, K. 240, rev. 2–4 "the father of stones" applied to a necklace of strung jewels. Sumerian *azu* is equivalent also to *barû* "seer," AL.[3] 313 and to *dupšarru* "scribe," Str. 5427. The evidence then is all in favour of a Sumerian origin for this combination and we must regard Assyrian *asû* as a mere loanword which later passed over into the Aramaic (see BA. i., p. 219). The Semitic form *isaû* which Nagel considers in a possible connection with *asû* must be a derivative of √אסה. It probably has no relation to a supposed stem √*asû*. Nagel's work is purely that of a philological editor. He makes no comments on the contents of the letters themselves.

Friedrich Hrozny (pp. 546-550) calls attention to a few curious facts regarding the later Babylonian and Persian system of currency. The Babylonian money really never lost its original character as a marketable ware. Thus, it was not sufficient to give in a contract the *name* of a piece of money, but the *quality* of its metal had to be described as well. We find in this way a shekel described as a shekel of refined metal, *piçû* and *qalû*; as a shekel of full weight *ša ginni*; of current value *ša nadânu u maxâri*, etc. It is perfectly clear that the Babylonian coins were frequently clipped or rubbed down, just as is the case in the modern East, which necessitated these legal specifications. The business world of Babylonia, therefore, took cognizance only of the weight and not of the number of coins in a payment. Indeed, in the reign of Darius, full weight coins were the exception rather than the rule.

Edward Kotalla (pp. 551-574) gives transliterations and translations of fifty Babylonian legal and government records taken from H. V. Hilprecht's IX volume of the Babylonian Expedition of the University of Penn., Series A. In these, we find interesting examples of Babylonian forms of proper names which occur in the O. T., especially in Ezra, Neh. and Esther. Thus Abda=עַבְדָּא; Yaxu-natânu=יְהוֹנָתָן; Ili-zabadu=אֶלְיָדָד, etc. (see pp. 552-3). From these names we learn, 1) that Heb. ע is frequently equivalent to Bab. *x* and 2) that in the Hebrew names compounded with יה (the short form of יהוה), the full form of the divine name; viz., *Yahveh*, *Yahvah*, must have been pronounced. Such Babylonian forms as *Piliava*, *Padava*, *Igdaliava* would otherwise have been impossible. *This is the most important point brought forward in this volume of the Beiträge, as it establishes the pronunciation Yahve / a for the Tetragrammaton* יהוה.

Budgett Meakin (pp. 575–582) has supplemented Talcott Williams's article in BA. iii. pp. 561–587, on the spoken Arabic

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of Morocco. Meakin is the author of a text-book now in use for the English missionary examinations in the Arabic of Morocco: "Introduction to the Arabic of Morocco," London. In this article in the Beiträge, he corrects Williams in a number of important points. For example, the form *Muḥ* for *Muḥammed* is never used in speech except by Rîfi Berbers, but is occasionally employed in writing in much the same manner as the unpleasant Xt. for Christ. *Darri* does not mean "dog," but ordinarily "a lad." I should add that this is a derivative from $\sqrt{dry}$ and appears in Egyptian Arabic only in the form *zurriye* and *durriye* "posterity." *Kanûn*, the word given by Meakin for "small oven," is Egyptian Arabic for "stove, hearth, fire-place" (pl. *kawanyn*). *Akḥal* "black" does not appear in Egyptian Arabic; only *kuḥl* "*collyrium*, black dye for the eyes," and the denominative adjective *kuḥly* "light black" are in common use.

Paul Haupt closes the volume (pp. 583-7) with a most learned and instructive treatise on the Hebrew term שלישׁ. This is an abstract of a paper read before the Society for Biblical Literature in 1899 (JBL. xix. p. iii.). He shows conclusively that in every passage where the reading is certain, save 1 S. 18, 6, this word denotes originally "the *third* man in the chariot," i. e. "the armour bearer" or "shield bearer." The derivation of the Assyrian equivalent *kiṣû* "*Schildknappe*" is not known. I have shown in Cheyne's Encyclopedia Biblica, iii. col. 3228, nr. 3., the unlikelihood that שלישׁ in 1 S. 18, 6 means "a triangular harp," as the context in that passage leads us to suppose that the שלשים were instruments of percussion. The only objection to this view is that there is no direct proof of the existence in the ancient East of *triangular* instruments of percussion. On the other hand, according to Athenaeus (Deipn. 4, 175), instruments for *shaking* like the *sistra* came to Greece from Syria. It is very probable that the word שלישׁ in 1 S. 18, 6 denotes an instrument of this character.

The contents of vols. i-iv. are given pp. 588-9.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY. J. DYNELEY PRINCE.

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BRIEF MENTION.

In his excellent *Essai sur la rhétorique grecque* M. Navarre makes a strong plea for the rehabilitation of rhetoric, which, according to his report, is fallen into unmerited neglect in Modern France (A. J. P. XXI 472). A similar plea was made some years ago by M. d' Haussonville in a critique of George Sand quoted in my *Essays and Studies* (p. 50): Les préceptes de rhétorique, he says, qui ont cours dans nos écoles ne diffèrent pas de ceux que la jeunesse studieuse recueillait autrefois sous les portiques d'Athènes et de Rome. Celui qui fait un jeu de ces préceptes et qui ne sait discerner l'éternelle vérité cachée sous leurs formules arides pourra peut-être surprendre un succès d'un jour; mais il s'exposera à voir couler tôt ou tard sa réputation fragile, comme un édifice dont l'architecte aura embelli la façade sans en asseoir la base d'après les lois de l'équilibre géométrique. No one can be surprised at these pleas, these warnings, who knows how much the sanity of French prose is due to rhetorical studies. With the new era the old charm will disappear. On the one hand, we shall have, nay, we have, utter carelessness, on the other, sublimated symbolism. And if rhetoric is neglected in France, what shall we say of the scant attention it has received in Anglo-Saxon countries? In the classical domain Mr. Sandys has done some good work, and it is to me a welcome sign of the times that Mr. ROBERTS has attracted so much attention and gained so much reputation by his admirable editions of the περὶ ὕψους (A. J. P. XX 228), and of the *Three Literary Letters of Dionysius of Halicarnassus*, to which he has now added *Demetrius On Style* (Cambridge University Press). To be sure, the author of the περὶ ὕψους, the so-called Longinus, has never lost his hold on the modern world. He is a critic of exceptional delicacy of feeling and breadth of sympathy; and while the work may be rooted in antique rhetoric, its foliage and its flowers seem to belong to our world, and we can hardly realize that we are separated from him by the whole width of the Christian centuries. Dionysios, on the other hand, is no sooner set up than he is bowled over. Blass, who has done so much to bring him back into notice, has actually suffered by reason of his championship; and almost everybody that deals with him seems to be afraid of being suspected of spiritual affinity with the schoolmasterly critic. Usener classes him among the *magistelli* and Norden vilipends him, so that I am glad to see how stoutly Mr. ROBERTS stands by him with Mr. Saintsbury as an ἔφεδρος in time of need. For my part, Dionysios

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accompanies me during three out of the four years of my cycle, and, while he is not exactly the man of my counsel, he is assuredly indispensable for any serious study of Attic oratory. If he is narrowminded in his judgment of Plato and Thukydides, that very narrowness shows us how potent rhetoric was in every sphere of antique literature; and in the matter of Thukydides, I am free to confess that I would rather consider the great historian a perverse genius, as Dionysios has done, than look upon him as a Laokoon, struggling with the twin serpents of diction and syntax, which had not yet been tamed to the docility of Aesculapian snakes (A. J. P. XIV 397, Shorey, Tr. A. P. A. XXIV, 1893, p. 82.)

As for Demetrios, nothing could be more timely than the revival of his admirable manual; for though Mr. ROBERTS is kind enough to say that rhetoric is not neglected in the United States of America, the cultivation of it must be very recent. It is not so very long since James Russell Lowell said: 'If I have attained to any clearness of style, I think it is partly due to my having had to lecture twenty years as a professor at Harvard. It was always present to my consciousness that whatever I said must be understood at once by my hearers or never. Out of this, I, almost without knowing it, formulated the rule that every sentence must be clear in itself and never too long to be carried, without risk of losing its balance, on a single breath of the speaker'. In other words, he formulated a rule that he might have learned in advance from Cicero,[1] from Dionysios,[2] who gives the πνεῦμα τέλειον ἀνδρός as the measure of the period. No wonder that one hails with satisfaction the prospect of a new edition of the *De Compositione* by so competent a hand as Mr. ROBERTS, if indeed we may construe his suggestion as a promise. So, too, if Oliver Wendell Holmes, that other great light of American literature, had read Dionysios, he would not have written in so tentative a fashion of 'the pneumatic or rather pneumonic character of rhythm'. *Homo mensura* is written all over our tables of weights and measures; the lungs are the windgauge of style. But Lowell and Holmes are classics and Apollo saved them. But Apollo will not always save. If there is an elementary rule in what the ancients called composition, it is that prose rhythm and poetical rhythm must be kept apart. All classical scholars know the rule. All French stylists insist on it. Everybody remembers how absurd Buffon made himself with his quatrain on the horse; though perhaps everyone that quotes 'un poète mort jeune à qui l'homme survit' does not remember the gentle rebuke that De Musset gave Ste.-Beuve. 'Tu l'as bien dit, ami, mais tu l'as trop bien dit'. Dryden's prose is admirable, but, as Mr.

[1] E. g. De Oratore III 182. [2] De Compositione c. 23, p. 171 (R.)

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Pater says, he will fall into verse, whereas Wordsworth never does, according to the same authority, and Dickens's bad blank verse is a stock illustration. And yet, despite this simple rule, a much-admired American writer of our day has actually reeled off hundreds, if not thousands of more or less perfect decasyllabic verses under the delusion that he was translating Homer into rhythmical prose. And sometimes I cannot help thinking that it would be better if our classical scholars themselves had read something more of Quintilian than the first chapter of the Tenth Book, to which most of them seem to confine their attention. Perhaps we might have been spared the theory that every Latin sentence is constructed on the principle of a *diminuendo* toot; perhaps we might have been spared the revolt against Quintilian's doctrine (Inst. Or. IX 4, 26) that makes the verb the file-closer. In this whole range of studies, we must be content still to acknowledge the ancients as our masters. There is no appeal from the ear.

Mr. ROBERTS'S Introduction gives us a sketch of the Greek study of style. To one who knows his Rhetores Graeci, his Gerber, his Blass, his Norden, the sketch seems rather too sketchy, but Mr. ROBERTS dedicates his book 'Iuventuti lucide scribendi ac venuste studiosae', and his *χειραγωγία* is meant for those who have yet to learn that there is such a thing as a serious study of style. And even those who are more or less familiar with the subject will be delighted with the skill and the grace of the exposition. As a translator, Mr. ROBERTS has gained high repute by his previous renderings but in the matter of translation I am prone to be a devil's advocate; and as I have not compared Mr. ROBERTS'S version with the original word for word, I am not prepared to say that he has solved all the problems that the translation of any Greek work on rhetoric brings up. The task, as I know from experience, is one of great difficulty. The ordinary dictionaries are of little help, and the special vocabularies often leave one in the lurch. The latest guide is not always the most trustworthy, and old Ernesti is frequently better than more recent Volkmann. This lack of lexical resource lends especial value to the Glossary which Mr. ROBERTS has appended and which has enabled him to reduce the volume of his notes. An important feature of these notes is the number of illustrations drawn from English literature; for nothing is better calculated to carry conviction to the mind of the student than just such cogent exemplifications of the universality of rhetorical canons. For these illustrations Mr. ROBERTS acknowledges his obligations to Mr. WAY, who has won such renown by his poetical rendering of Euripides; and it is to Mr. WAY that Mr. ROBERTS owes also the versions of the poetical

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citations and a number of valuable suggestions in the translation of the text.[1]

This notice has already run beyond the bounds of *Brief Mention*, and yet I have said little about the original text, about the 'goldene Schrift des Demetrios *περὶ ἑρμηνείας*', as Wilamowitz justly calls it. As Milton puts 'Phalereus' next to Plato and Aristotle, I am content to leave him at the bidding of so excellent a judge in such excellent company. The book might be called a Rhetorical Testament, and a certain Biblical authority has been given to it by the short paragraphs into which it has been cut up by the old editor Victorius; and I am not surprised that Mr. ROBERTS recalls, by way of contrast, a like performance attributed to Robert Estienne. The canons of Demetrios are sharp, clear, sensible. The illustrative passages are really illustrative and have saved for us many gems from the lost literature. In one of his commandments Demetrios warns against the multiplication of metaphor lest 'we find ourselves writing dithyrambic poetry instead of prose'. This is what we always tell other people. This is what we think very fine in Paul Louis Courier's 'Dieu, délivre nous du malin et du langage figuré'. But for all that, Demetrios is not averse to figurative language. The rhetoricians were teachers, and being teachers, knew the value of metaphor and simile, which lend wings to the seeds of doctrine, and which plant them in the field of the ear, if I may use a figure that underlies the *purgatas aures* of that 'crabbed coxcomb', Persius.

[1] As I go to press I see that in the last number of the *Classical Review* (Feb. 1903), Dr. RUTHERFORD has made a savage assault on Mr. ROBERTS's edition. Dr. RUTHERFORD's peculiar acerbity always stirs sympathy with the victim of his taws. How different the tone of Henri Weil's review of Dr. RUTHERFORD's *Herondas* in the *Journal des Savants* for Nov., 1891. It is quite as effective as Dr. RUTHERFORD's scolding and yet it is radiant with the charm of a *iucunda senectus*. But instead of imitating the *mite ingenium* of the dean of French Hellenists, the critic seems to have had his perfervid genius still further heated by the example of Roemer's review of his *Scholia Aristophanica;* and Mr. ROBERTS has suffered in consequence. Why, if I were disposed to make trouble, I myself might air one grievance I have against Mr. ROBERTS. In c. 213 Mr. ROBERTS translates the *δι' ἐμὲ ἐσώθης* of Ktesias by 'You were saved through me', and this is the very example that I selected in my S. C. G. § 163 for the rendering 'Thanks to'. But I recognize the fact that it is hard to get rid of the equation *διά* c. acc. = *διά* c. gen., nay, impossible to quell *τὴν ἀμφίκρανον καὶ παλμβλαστῆ κίνα* (A. J. P. XI 372). Dem. 6, 45: *δι' οὓς* is not *δι' ὧν*, despite Sandys, and Lys. 26, 9: *δι' οὓς* is 'Thanks to whom'. Even in such Greek as the Life of Aesop, which Wilamowitz has actually used for his 'Lesebuch', to the horror of straitlaced Hellenists, the distinction is carefully observed. Cf. Vit. Aesop. c. 12 (p. 259 Eberh.), *οὕτως ἐμεινεν ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκίας δι' Αἰσώπου ὡς καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνον ἀπῆρε.*

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RADERMACHER'S *Demetrius περὶ ἑρμηνείας* (Teubner) was published only a few months before ROBERTS'S, and the English editor's work was virtually finished, so that he could make little use of his predecessor. But the Demetrios of Bangor and the Demetrios of Bonn are constructed on very different lines. ROBERTS writes for the general student; RADERMACHER, the able adjutant of USENER in his work on Dionysios, has the professional in view, and the two editions supplement each other. Both editors agree in rejecting the authorship of Demetrius Phalereus, which has few supporters nowadays, but ROBERTS gives a wider margin than RADERMACHER and takes in the first century before and the first century after Christ. RADERMACHER finds a terminus in the word *σκαφίτης* (c. 97), which occurs for the first and only time in Strabo, XVII, p. 817; and he thinks it impossible that Demetrios should be earlier than the first century after Christ. Demetrios, according to him, is untouched by the puristic spirit, and in language he is nearer to Plutarch than he is to Lucian. At my time of life I do not believe in impressionistic criticism, but I should not be grieved if someone shall make out a strong case for a somewhat earlier date. But to tell the truth, Demetrios's use of Aristotle pulls me one way, his admiration of Xenophon another.

RADERMACHER gives more scope to syntactical observations than does ROBERTS, and as I took RADERMACHER in hand after I read ROBERTS, I am naturally pleased to note here and there coincidences of judgment. So I was much surprised to find that ROBERTS was superstitious enough to retain, c. 269, the MS reading *εἰ συναφθῇ*. Any attentive reader must have noticed that Demetrios has a way of using *εἰ* + optative in the protasis and the future in the apodosis, and RADERMACHER has rightly put *εἰ συναφθείη* in the text. The optative was doomed, but it made a brave fight before it died, and though the ideal condition is very steady in classical times, the future indicative is occasionally found in apodosis from Homer, Il. 10, 222, down. Another *εἰ* with subjunctive occurs in c. 76, *οὐδὲν οὖν θαυμαστόν, εἰ . . . γένηται*, where both editors follow the MS, but as *θαυμαστόν . . . εἰ* normally takes the indicative, I should write without much hesitation *γίνεται*, though Roshdestwenski's *γενήσεται* is sufficiently plausible. In c. 5, ROBERTS follows Victorius and the other editors in reading *οὐκ ἂν . . . γράψειεν* instead of *οὐκ ἂν . . . γράψει ἐν*, which RADERMACHER defends. Now, as I have said, S. C. G., § 432, the future indicative with *ἄν* is theoretically a legitimate construction and is not to be excluded from later Greek, but in my judgment Demetrios is not late enough for that. As for the combination of aorist and perfect, on which RADERMACHER has a long note (p. 84) *à propos* of *ἔσχεν . . . καὶ*

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μεμίμηται (c. 72), I cannot grant that the earlier usage gave any real hold to the later Latinism; and there is considerable confusion in the other long note on the periphrastic use of the present participle (p. 116). See my S. C. G., §§ 191, 291. Both editors read, c. 170, μόλις ἂν ἀναγνῷ. This ἀναγνῷ Jannaris (p. 564) takes to be subjunctive for optative. RADERMACHER (p. 68) says that ἄν is for ἐάν, but the translation is exceedingly awkward, and I should read ἀναγνοίη with as little hesitation as he reads c. 215, < ἂν > αὐτὸν καλοίη, where ROBERTS sticks to the MS. There is great confusion in later times between certain forms of subjunctive and optative.

But not to dwell unduly on these minor matters, there is one point that deserves development. In c. 155: πείθων δωρεῖσθαι Ξενίθει ὅ < τι > τις ἔχοι there is really no difficulty, as πείθων carries with it the notion of ἔπειθε; but this leads RADERMACHER to the further discussion of the optative in combination with the generic present; and that is a subject about which I wish to say a few words. In my S. C. G., § 400, I call attention to the parallelism of the optative with the infinitive, and emphasize the use of the optative in complementary clauses. Leaving out ὅς (ὅστις) with the indicative, which is either particular or generic, to use the accepted terms, there are three forms of the generic relative used in combination with the universal present, which is really the thing that makes them generic, ὅς with subjunctive, which is the regular epic use, ὅς ἄν, which is the regular prose use, and ὅς with the optative, which belongs to an early period of the language and goes with the infinitive as its complement. The examples in poetry are too numerous not to have attracted attention long ago. The classical instance is So. Antig. 666: ἀλλ' ὃν πόλις στήσειε, τοῦδε χρὴ κλύειν, which Sophokles puts into the mouth of the Tory Kreon, the stickler for the rights of the throne, for the doctrine of implicit obedience to the head of the state. The tone is that of a proverb or a quotation from the Bible. In prose Xenophon seems to be the only author that is much given to it, but that is not surprising, for Xenophon has preserved many old-fashioned things. It is nearly fifty years since my attention was called to this special point by Hertlein's edition of the Cyropaedeia (1853), in which he emphasizes the matter at 1, 6, 19; and Goodwin's Xenophontean examples, MT. § 555, coincide largely with what Hertlein has in his edition of 1859. No example seems to occur in the Anabasis, and the construction is rare, after all, among the classics outside of Xenophon. Plato, Lysis, 207 E, cited by Radermacher, is in my collection. Gorgias, 482 B, is not squarely met by the commentators, and the Ps.-Platonic Riv., 133 B, while clear enough, will not be allowed to count as a classical example. But how are we to explain the construction?

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Goodwin accounts for the deviation from the standard prose use on the ground of an equivalence of the leading verb and the infinitive to optative and ἄν. So in the Sophoklean passage, if χρὴ κλύειν = κλύοις ἄν, or, as Goodwin puts it, δικαίως ἂν κλύοι τις, then στήσειε ceases to be irregular. The explanation is ingenious and has, I believe, found wide acceptance, and yet to me it is not convincing. It is more like a mathematical formula than a linguistic process. χρή + infinitive = imperative, but optative + ἄν = imperative, ∴ χρή + infinitive = optative + ἄν. Optative + ἄν = imperative takes the subjunctive sequence (A. J. P. VI 69). χρή + infinitive = imperative = optative + ἄν takes the optative sequence. 'A fair exchange is no robbery'. Q. E. D. But language is eminently unfair, and while optative + ἄν is often felt as imperative, the imperative is not so readily felt as optative + ἄν. Jebb says, 'The optative puts the case in the most general way. Hence <it> suits proverbs'. But wherein is it more general than ὃς ἂν στήσῃ? Humphreys calls it the ideal condition. True, but that is only saying that it is an optative. It is used in proverbs, not because it is generic, because the generic element is represented by the leading verb, but because it is archaic, as Earle correctly says in his O. T., 314. There is, as I have stated in my S. C. G. (§ 399), a certain affinity between ἡ ἀπαρέμφατος ἔγκλισις, as the Greek calls it, and ἡ εὐκτική, between the pure idea of the verb and the pure ideal of the mood. Where we find it in classic Greek this particular optative is atavistic, and when the later Greek was holding grimly on to the optative, no wonder that he was delighted to follow such a model as Xenophon, and the construction was considered not a Latinism but a lovely Atticism (cf. A. J. P. IV 428, XXIII 130).

One more note before I tear myself away from fascinating Demetrios and his fascinating editors. In c. 302 we read: ὁ τῆς Τιμάνδρας κατηγορῶν ὡς πεπορνευκυίας, τὴν λεκανίδα καὶ τοὺς ὀβολοὺς καὶ τὴν ψίαθον καὶ πολλήν τινα τοιαύτην δυσφημίαν ἑταιρῶν κατήρασεν τοῦ δικαστηρίου. For ὀβολούς Wilamowitz, *lepidum caput*, writes ὀλίσβους, and at first I was disposed to surrender. But something is to be said for ὀβολούς. The ὄλισβος, the βανβών of Herondas 6, 18, was a σκυτίνη ἐπικουρία, a 'leathern conveniency', as I have ventured to translate it after Mrs. Centlivre (A. J. P. XIV 261), and belonged to the *mundus muliebris* of grass widows and lone females (Ar., Lys., 109, 110), rather than to the apparatus of a πόρνη. Now Timandra was a grand lady among the hetaerae, as anyone can see for himself by consulting the dictionaries; and her unknown assailant is reducing her to the rank of a common strumpet, of whom Philemon says: εἰς ὀβολός· εἰσπηδησάτω. The λεκανίς I take to be the basin for collecting tribute, and the ψίαθος is only too familiar from Ar., Lys., 921, 925. The subject is not

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a dainty one, but Wilamowitz has no more reason to blush for his conjecture than the Rev. Dr. Bentley had to blush for some of his, e. g. Philemon fr. 4, 12 (4, 4 M); and I hope that I shall be forgiven in my turn for upholding, however feebly, the more decent tradition.

The limited space of the Journal precludes a systematic review of schoolbook literature, and I do not purpose to give a detailed account of the *Collezione di classici greci e latini con note italiane*, published by LOESCHER of Turin. But I hold it to be of importance to the Anglo-Saxon mind that we look on things through what is called nowadays the 'Romanic' medium; and apart from the substantial value of the work itself, which is not to be underrated, the recent development of Greek scholarship in Italy is an interesting phenomenon. Even the Germans are beginning to find that their Ausonian as well as their American disciples are putting forth an independent life that must be reckoned with. The Italians have learned from the Germans the cult of the 'literature', so-called. An Italian book, published in 1902, incorporates, if possible, everything up to the end of 1901. And their commentaries are modern. There is a refreshing absence for the most part of references to grammars. There is no unnecessary display of erudition. Difficulties are solved by translations, too frequently, as it would seem to old-fashioned teachers, but one must recognize the spirit of the times; and I repent me of what I said of REITER'S *Iphigenie auf Tauris* (XXI 112), my notice of which was one of the few discords in the chorus of praises. The editors of this Italian series are well equipped for the work and some of them are known everywhere. No student of Pindar but respects FRACCAROLI, and FRACCAROLI has contributed to the series a revision of FERRARI'S *Lisia*. It is a pleasant coincidence that Rauchenstein, the editor of Lysias, was a lover of Pindar and taught others to love him. No wonder. The contrast enhances the joy. ZURETTI, another contributor, is an Homeric scholar, who has made himself felt; but it would be invidious to select names from the long list of editors, and my chief object in this *Brief Mention* is to emphasize my pleasure that the land to which we owe the renascence of Greek studies is asserting itself again, *ἄγχι καρποφόροις ἀρούραισιν αἴτ' ἀμειβόμεναι | τόκα μὲν ὧν βίον ἀνδράσιν ἐπηετανὸν ἐκ πεδίων ἔδοσαν, | τόκα δ' αὖτ' ἀναπαυσάμεναι σθένος ἔμαρψαν.*

It is always invidious to quote from oneself but I cannot forbear recalling with a certain patriotic satisfaction that a quarter of a century ago, I urged as one of the needs of the time for classical study 'a resolute purpose to make an honorable position for the

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American people in this department of thought and culture as in others' (*Essays and Studies* p. 84). That resolute purpose has not been lacking. What we have accomplished during the last twenty-five years in the realm of linguistics and philology, this is not the place to record, but surely what we have done in archaeology has been a surprise even to those who have wished the best things and hoped the best things for American initiative; and no one can read Professor SEYMOUR'S account of the *First Twenty Years of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* without rejoicing that we have so much to our credit. Of three most important archaeological works on the editor's table two are due to the American Institute, one to American munificence. The first is the *Argive Heraeum* by CHARLES WALDSTEIN, with the coöperation of CHASE, DE COU, HERMANCE, HOPPIN, LYTHGOE, NORTON, RICHARDSON and WHEELER. The second is the long promised work on the *Investigations at Assos.* Neither of these works is complete and the editor has not yet succeeded in securing a competent reviewer for the *Argive Heraeum* outside of the inner circle. A *Selbstanzeige* is not a popular form of criticism in America. A competent reviewer has been found for the Assos volume, but the eminent scholar who has promised his help has promised it on the condition that the review, which is to be a thorough one, take in the whole work. The wheels of the Assos archaeologists move slowly and the review may be one of the glories of the Journal when the present editor has ceased from troubling readers and contributors. Of the *Tebtunis Papyri* Part I ed. by GRENFELL, HUNT and SMYLY which is called by the other name *University of California Publications, Graeco-Roman Archaeology*, Vol. I, something ought to be said beyond the recognition of Mrs. Hearst's liberality and something adequate will be said, I trust, ere long.

There are to be three volumes of the *Tebtunis Papyri.* The present volume deals with the papyri from the mummies of crocodiles, which belong to the end of the second or to the early part of the first century before Christ. The sheets in which the crocodiles were wrapped had to be of great size, smaller documents being used for padding. The Egyptologist may congratulate himself on the wealth of new information provided regarding the internal history of Egypt under the later Ptolemies. But to the average man, one might say the average scholar, there is a sad lack of human interest in that formidable array of documents, which remind one of nothing so much as the German mania for reports of every kind. Only two per cent of the crocodiles yielded papyri. Not two per cent of the papyri yield anything that vies remotely in interest with the famous Erotic Fragment that is ever to be associated with the name

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of Grenfell. To be sure, there is a cry of Helen, forsaken of Menelaos, that gives a new phase of her story, and strikes the old passionate erotic note of entreaty. ὦ φανεὶς χάρμα μοι haunts one like 'Da mihi hoc, mel meum'. There is a long descriptive passage of warbling birds and busy bees, such as would have roused the merriment of Aristophanes. There are one or two reflections on love, not remarkable for novelty, and there is the legacy of a bardash, which the editors have rendered into Latin, a language that does not blush. One of the four epigrams is already extant and the papyrus gives a better reading. Of the others we can barely guess at the drift, and there is not much to be got out of the lacunose fragment of the second book of the Iliad, though there is something, as Mr. ALLEN has shown (Cl. R., Feb., 1903). But there are Royal Ordinances. There is Official Correspondence, one of the choice bits of which conveys minute instructions for the entertainment of a Roman Senator. There are Petitions. There is an elaborate Land Survey, a Tax List, and a number of Contracts, the most interesting of which is a marriage contract, in which the man seems to be tied up tighter than the woman. Most of the petitions are addressed to an ungrammatical komogrammateus, Menches by name, and charges of assault and robbery seem to have been rife in the crocodile nome. Of the accounts, the one that attracts the modern soul most is that of a dining club. 'The cost per head was 100 drachmae exclusive of wine, which is reckoned separately, as are also bread and garlands'. The corpse must have had a fine περίδειπνον. In all these Tebtunis documents there is comparatively little wine to an intolerable deal of artabae of wheat. And though the Egyptians were much given to beer, beer does not figure to any extent. This suppression of beer destroys the likeness to Germany, evoked by the 'Akten' and the 'Dorfschulze'.

The delay in the transmission of proofs has brought the issue of the present number into the Easter holidays; and this Easter reminds me of an Easter fifty years ago when I found my master and friend, Schneidewin, rejoicing over the resurrection of Hypereides. 'Ex longo tempore', he says, 'nullum diem laetiorem mihi vide<o>r egisse quam eum quo praeclarum hoc Attici eloquii exemplum in manus sumere et plenis haustibus combibere licuit.' In like manner our American Easter of 1903 has been made memorable to Cis-Atlantic Hellenists by the arrival of WILAMOWITZ'S *Perser des Timotheos* (Lemcke and Büchner). There are only 250 verses, it is true; but, as WILAMOWITZ observes, 'historically the 250 verses of Timotheos are worth a hundred times more than 250 new verses of Pindar or Sophokles, no matter how far below the latter they may be in absolute value.'

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We have now for the first time a clear conception not only of the character of the poet but of the class of poetry. The cynic may remark that it would have been better for the fame of Timotheos, if he had not been brought to life without his lyre, but the historian of literature is greatly the gainer, and the gain is indefinitely enhanced by the illuminating comment of the eminent editor. It is a pity that he cannot enlighten without scorching. Nothing seems to abate the strenuousness with which he wields that 'horribile flagellum' which has fallen for so many years impartially on the backs of great and small in the world of scholars. Of course, in a provisional edition like this there must be abundant room for reconsideration, to say nothing of typographical errors and incredible hastinesses. But the main features stand out with absolute distinctness and it is a pleasure to study this strange monument, undisturbed by the avalanche of conjecture and commentary that will be precipitated on us before long.

W. P. M.: The Tennyson Memoir, vol. I, p. 7, quotes a remark made by the poet in his later years with reference to his school-days at Louth: "How I did hate that school! The only good I ever got from it was the memory of the words 'sonus desilientis aquae', and of an old wall covered with wild weeds opposite the school windows." It is not easy to find this Latin phrase in any classical author. Probably it is merely an inaccurate quotation from memory from Ovid's story of the Rape of Persephone, Fasti, IV 428:

> Valle sub umbrosa locus est aspergine multa
> Uvidus ex alto desilientis aquae.

From the preceding page of the Memoir we know that Tennyson studied Ovid while he was at Louth, and it is very likely that his school edition included this passage. In support of this guess I may add that in two other passages of the Memoir we find the late Laureate misquoting from memory the classics which he knew so well (II 239, and I 140). In a letter to Mr. Gladstone (1880) he speaks of the lovely lines of Catullus, "Multas per terras et multa per aequora vectus," etc., meaning, of course, the "Multas per gentes," etc., of ci 1. And in a letter to James Spedding (1834) he misquotes what Dionysius of Halicarnassus had to say about the qualities of Alcaeus: "I have written several things since I saw you, some emulative of the ἡδὺ καὶ βραχὺ καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὲς of Alcaeus," etc. What Dionysius actually wrote was τὸ μεγαλοφυὲς καὶ βραχὺ καὶ ἡδὺ μετὰ δεινότητος (ed. Reiske, vol. V, p. 421).

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K. F. S.: Just because memory is such a saucy trickster explains, no doubt, why one is so eager to discover her devious ways, even at one's own peril. So, as one reads Professor Mustard's first comment, one is tempted to follow still further the line of thought suggested. The passage from Ovid appears to betray the fact that all Tennyson really remembered of his 'sonus desilientis aquae' was the last two words. But 'desilientis aquae' is not self-supporting, it needs an associate. The promotion of 'sonus' to that position might have been expected from the author of 'The Brook'. Indeed, it is not without interest to observe that the association is one which belongs to humanity in general. In all periods, the majority of us have been quite as deeply impressed by the sound of running water as by the sight of it. The familiar lines of Theokritos (I, 7–8) were well-known to Tennyson himself and had been especially noted by Leigh Hunt ("Jar of Honey"). The idea of them recurs again and again in antique literature. Compare Vergil, E. V, 83–4; Culex, 17; Horace, Epod., XVI, 48; Od. III, 13, 15–16, etc. Moreover, 'sonus' is a natural inference from the Ovidian lines, and Ovid himself recurs, elsewhere, to the same association of ideas. Compare Amor., III 5, 5,

> Area gramineo suberat viridissima prato
> Umida de guttis lene sonantis aquae.

The same cadence returns in Fasti, II 704 and VI 340. See also III 18. 'Sonus', itself, is nowhere found. Perhaps, as Professor Gildersleeve suggests, Tennyson's choice of the word was prompted by a distant echo of Tibullus, I 2, 78,

> Nec sonitus placidae ducere posset aquae.

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AMERICAN

JOURNAL OF PHILO

VOL. XXIV, 2. WH

I.—UNPUBLISHED LETTERS OF W MÜLLER.

A peculiar youthful freshness has given the poe Müller (born October 7, 1794; died Septembe definite place in German literature, which, after th a century, gives good promise of being perma greatest service was doubtless that of demonstratir example how the materials of older popular poetry upon to enliven and enrich the lyric of more Heine, in his well-known letter of June 7, 1826, co gations to Müller in terms which could hardly be m he frankly admits that the metrical form of his well as their artless singing quality, were borrowe our poet:

Ich bin gross genug, Ihnen offen zu bekennen, da "Intermezzo"-Metrum nicht bloss zufällige Ihrem gewöhnlichen Metrum hat, sondern dass lich seinen geheimsten Tonfall Ihren Liedern verd die lieben Müllerschen Lieder waren, die ich zu kennen lernte, als ich das "Intermezzo" schrieb. früh schon das deutsche Volkslied auf mich ein . . . . . aber ich glaube erst in Ihren Liedern de und die wahre Einfachheit, wonach ich immer st zu haben. Wie rein, wie klar sind Ihre Lieder sind es Volkslieder. In meinen Gedichten hinge Form einigermassen volkstümlich, der Inhalt g ventionellen Gesellschaft. Ja, ich bin gross g bestimmt zu wiederholen, und Sie werden es ausgesprochen finden, dass mir durch die Le Gedichte zuerst klar geworden, wie man aus

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handenen Volksliederformen neue Formen bilden kann, die ebenfalls volkstümlich sind, ohne dass man nötig hat, die alten Sprachholperigkeiten und Unbeholfenheiten nachzuahmen. Im zweiten Teile Ihrer Gedichte fand ich die Form noch reiner, noch durchsichtig klarer—doch, was spreche ich viel von Formwesen, es drängt mich mehr, Ihnen zu sagen, dass ich keinen Liederdichter ausser Goethe so sehr liebe, wie Sie.

The total destruction of the poet's library by fire almost eliminated the usual sources of biography, and the rather meagre sketches by Gustav Schwab (1827) Karl Goedeke, and Professor Max Müller, the son of the poet (in the Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie), remained for many years the only important contributions to our information. After the death of Max Müller (October 28, 1900), his widow entrusted to Mr. Philip Allen and the present writer a very interesting private diary and twenty-four unpublished letters (mostly addressed to the poet's wife), which have lately appeared in the University of Chicago Press (Diary and Letters of Wilhelm Müller, 1903).

During the summer of 1902 I succeeded in finding the fifteen letters which are here printed. All but two are in possession of the manuscript department of the Royal Library in Berlin. Number 8 is in the well-known private collection of Herr Alexander Meyer Cohn in Berlin, Number 13 belongs to the Ducal Library at Gotha (Cod. Goth. chart. A. 1311, N. 7.). To Professor Stern, of the Berlin Royal Library, Professor Rudolf Ehwald, Librarian at Gotha, Professor Ludwig Geiger, and Herr Meyer Cohn I beg to express my thanks for their generous and cordial assistance.

In the Deutsche Rundschau for March, 1902, I attempted to give an estimate of the poet, viewed in the light of more recently discovered materials. To that portrait the present correspondence lends no new essential traits, though it offers in some degree a more favorable view of Müller's strenuousness in literary and scholarly work. In both of these fields we find him constantly busy and productive, even though we must deplore a too easy conception of the responsibility which such activity imposes.

1. To Friedrich August Wolf.

Wien den 12ten Oktober 1817.

Verehrter Herr Geheimerath,

Ich halte es für meine Pflicht, Ihnen meine Erkenntlichkeit für die freundlichen Empfehlungen, die Sie mir nach Wien

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gegeben haben, zu bezeigen. Wenn mein zweimonatlicher Aufenthalt in dieser Stadt nicht allein angenehm, sondern auch für die Fortsetzung meiner Reise von dem besten Nutzen war, so bin ich Ihnen zunächst dafür verbunden. Denn, obschon Anthimus Gazes nicht in Wien ist, sondern die Stadt, (abgesehn von seinem gelehrten Rufe) nicht mit dem besten Rufe verlassen und sich nach Odessa begeben hat,—ferner Alexander Basilii als Türkischer Konsul in Triest wohnt—so war mir doch der Name Ihres Schülers Empfehlung genug bei allen Griechen. Der Nachfolger des Gazes, Theocletus, Mitherausgeber des Hermes Logius, übernahm die Besorgung Ihres Briefes an Alexander Basilii und schon in 8 Tagen hatte ich von letzterem eine Menge offener Empfehlungsbriefe nach allen Gegenden Griechenlands und Kleinasiens in Händen.

Derselbe Theocletus, so wie der andere Herausgeber des Hermes, Kokinakis, erboten sich mir zu Lehrern in der Romaïschen Sprache. Ich habe keinen Tag versäumt, von ihrem Anerbieten Gebrauch zu machen: da die Geschäfte dieser Herren aber sehr gross sind, so haben sie mir einen dritten griechischen Gelehrten zum professor ordinarius gegeben, (Doctor Athanasius Bogorides) während ich bei den beiden andern nur zuweilen hospitire.—Wenn die Aussprache des Romaïschen und die Accentherrschaft nur nicht wären, so würde es mit meinen Fortschritten schneller gehn.

Die Pest in Constantinopel hat übrigens unsren Reiseplan umgekehrt. Wir reisen Ende dieses Monats nach Italien ab—u so wird der Rath, den Sie mir gegeben, (Italien eher als Griechenland zu sehn) durch das Schicksal ausgeführt. Ich werde dann Alexander Basilii in Triest sehen und ihm persönlich für seine Freundlichkeit danken. Wir denken uns in Neapel oder Tarent einzuschiffen, nach Corfu und von da nach Epirus zu gehn.

Ich freue mich, Ihnen in den Überbringern dieses Briefes zwei englische Reisende vorzustellen, deren Bekanntschaft Ihnen nicht uninteressant sein wird. Der eine, Mr. Legh, wird Ihnen aus seiner Reise (Narrative of a Journey through Egypt pp) bekannt sein. Der andere, Dr. Macmichael war sein Begleiter auf einer Reise durch Griechenland, im Jahre 1812. Sie waren beide bei der Auffindung des bekannten Friezes in Phigalia und haben ausserdem in Athen nicht unbedeutende Alterthümer ausgegraben. Auch können Sie von ihnen manches über die Reise von Stackelnberg, Haller, Link pp erfahren, mit denen sie eine Zeit lang Gemeinschaft gemacht haben.

Mit inniger Hochachtung
Ihr
dankbarer Schüler
WILHELM MÜLLER.

Der HE Baron von Sack, der durch ein Missverständniss (er glaubte Sie nach Rügen abgereist, während es Ihr Namens-

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bruder, Professor am Joachimsthal war) das Vergnügen Ihrer persönlichen Bekanntschaft versäumt hat, empfiehlt sich Ihnen.

In August, 1817, after having completed his studies at the University of Berlin, Wilhelm Müller received a very gratifying honor from the Royal Academy of Sciences. That body had been requested by the Prussian Baron von Sack, a rich dilettante, who was about to undertake a semi-scholastic journey to Greece, Asia Minor, and Egypt, to appoint a suitable young scholar to be his companion. The Academy, doubtless on recommendation of Wolf, to whom Müller stood in very close relations as a favorite disciple, nominated the poet. A commission from the historical-philological section of the Academy, dated August 20, 1817, and signed by Buttmann, is extant. It authorizes Müller to collect inscriptions in Greece, Asia, etc., and to introduce himself to the learned native societies in Corfu, Chios, and Athens. The foregoing letter gives the first explanation of the interruption of the trip at Vienna, which has hitherto been accounted for by the very suspicious theory of Müller's own solicitations, prompted by his yearning for Italy.

Müller's enthusiastic study of classical antiquity is shown to be the medium through which he came to acquire his keen interest in modern Greece. His vigorous two-months' work upon the language in Constantinople at this time is an important step in the process which brought him to be the poet and prophet of the Greek War of Liberation. His passionate zeal for the cause of Greek independence was no ephemeral conceit, but was based upon solid acquaintance with the movement and its leaders. Anthimus Gazes (or Gazis) was one of the first promoters of Greek independence, and in 1816 travelled through Greece in order to gain adherents to the "Hetaireia" movement. Kok(k)inakis had made himself a name in the literature of his native tongue, more particularly by his translations of modern European dramas. The Λόγιος Ἑρμῆς was a successful modern Greek literary journal published in Vienna, but given up on the outbreak of the revolution.

It is not without significance that Müller sends this letter by English acquaintances: the young poet's deep interest in the English nation and national literature had already shown itself in various ways, and was to bear further fruit in a translation of Marlowe's Doctor Faustus, a biography of Byron, and a long series of publications upon British writers. This predilection

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sheds some light, as well, upon the unique position which Professor Max Müller, the German, occupied as a typical member of English society. Thomas Legh's Narrative of a Journey in Egypt and the Country beyond the Cataracts had appeared in London in the preceding year, and was republished in Philadelphia as early as 1817.

2. To Helmina von Chézy.

Berlin den (Geniale Leute schreiben
keinen Datum über die Briefe.)

Es sollen heute drei Briefe von dreien Freunden an drei Freunde geschrieben werden, oder um grammatischer zu sprechen, an eine Freundinn u zwei Freunde, u wir fangen an mit dem Ihrigen, weil Einer von uns in Rom erfahren haben will, dass das schicklich sei. Übrigens bin ich von Dessau nach Berlin gekommen, bloss um zwei faule Briefschreiber, deren einen ich schon die Ehre gehabt habe zu nennen,* zu ermuntern, nicht länger zu zögern, Ihnen zu sagen, was Sie in der Folge lesen werden. Dass ich selbst aber Ihnen nicht früher geschrieben habe, das hat den sehr zarten Grund, Sie, werthe Freundinn, nicht durch die Erinnerung an mich an den schrecklichen Augenblick unsers Abschiedes in Dresden zu erinnern. Nunmehr hoffe ich ist die Wunde verharscht, die Ihnen der Tod Ihres lieben Vogels geschlagen hatte, dessen unschuldiger Zeuge ich sein musste u der unsren Abschied eben so erschrecklich rührend machte, und ich darf es wagen, mich bei Ihrem Gedächtnisse wieder zu melden.[1] . . .

Ich habe vor Kurzem in den Zeitungen gelesen, dass jetzt eine Taubenpost zwischen Antwerpen u London angelegt worden ist, u zwar mit bestem Erfolge. Ob die sich wohl dazu gebrauchen liessen, die Poste restante Briefe für Sie aus dem Gedankenbüreau meines Freundes abzuholen? Dann wäre es wünschenswerth, dass recht bald eine solche Post auch zwischen Dresden u Berlin angelegt würde, die N. B. über Dessau passiren müsste.— Es ist eine erschreckliche Hitze, Atterbom klagt mich an, dass ich ihn zu Grunde richte mit Briefschreiben, Hensel will baden, und ich kann nicht fort.—O weh, o weh, da hab' ich die ganze Bescheerung verrathen, nun aber radire ich keinen Buchstaben wieder aus.

Ich weiss nicht, ob Sie schon wissen, dass ich jetzt nur zum Besuche in Berlin bin u zugleich in Angelegenheiten der oben erwähnten[2] unsterblichen Reisebeschreibung, die gegen Weihnachten, unter dem Titel *Rom, Römer u Römerinnen* bei Duncker

* Aber ich habe den Namen wieder auskratzen müssen, damit Sie rathen sollen, wer es ist.

[1] Here follow the passages by Atterbom and Hensel.

[2] In Atterbom's part of the letter.

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u Humblot erscheinen wird. In Dessau stelle ich Bücher auf, meublire meine Stuben aus u teutonisire gelegentlich die Jugend in einigen vaterländischen Geschichtsstunden. Zum neuen Jahre soll ich ein Journal herausgeben; wenn der Buchhändler mich noch dazu überredet, so werde ich meine Redaktionspflicht damit beginnen, Sie u unsre Freunde in Dresden zur fleissigen Theilnahme daran zu überreden. Ich bin in Dessau nicht unzufrieden: der Ort ist, wie Sie wissen werden, nicht unfreundlich, wenigstens giebt es vor den Thoren grüne Bäume u in den Thoren rothe Backen: das überrascht schon angenehm, wenn man aus Berlins Sandwüsten u Bleichsuchtlazarethen kömmt. Mein Italien trage ich aber in mir. *Luise Brachmann* ist jetzt in Berlin u hat mich wegen meiner Rezension ihrer Erzählung im *Erzähler* niederträchtig gemacht. Wir haben uns aber wieder versöhnt, u ich will nun keine Dame wieder recensiren.

The above is an undated, unsigned letter written jointly by Wilhelm Müller, the Swedish poet Atterbom[1] (who from 1817 to 1819 travelled in Germany and Italy), and Müller's most intimate friend, the artist Wilhelm Hensel, later the husband of Fanny Mendelssohn. Internal evidence shows that the letter belongs to the end of the summer of 1819. It is addressed to the remarkably gifted, and no less "terrible" Frau Helmina von Chézy, of whose brilliant circle Müller had been a regular member during her sojourn in Berlin in 1816 and 1817. Müller first mentions her in his diary for May 23, 1816. In October 1817 she had moved to Dresden, where Müller had probably seen her at the close of 1818, on his return from Italy. Her intense temperament doubtless made the incident of the death of the bird a highly tragic one,—if we may judge from similar scenes recorded in the memoirs of her son Wilhelm.

Rom, Römer und Römerinnen, two volumes of familiar letters from Italy, appeared early in 1820. The "Teutonizing" of German youth was a peculiarly congenial occupation to one who had been conspicuous among that group of younger Romanticists in Berlin, which was chiefly bound together by common enthusiasm for the glories of medieval Germany, and for all the wealth of its coloring. The members of this set went about the streets of Berlin in long hair, velvet barrets, and broad collars, worshipped the old painters of the Cologne school and thoroughly despised French narrowness and the delusion of cosmopolitanism.

The fate of the "journal" (Askania) is mentioned in connection with the following letter.

[1] 1790–1855.

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The above letter gives the only known indication of Müller's acquaintance with Luise Brachmann, the ill-starred "Sappho" of Dresden.

3. Circular Letter.

Ew. Hochwohlgeboren

zeige ich ergebenst an, dass ich vom ersten Januar nächsten Jahres an eine Zeitschrift unter dem Titel:

Askania,
oder
Anhaltische Blätter für Leben, Litteratur und Kunst

herausgeben werde. Die Namen *Askania* und *Anhalt* wollen nur den Ort ihrer Erscheinung bezeichnen und keines Weges ein Provinzialblatt ankündigen. Die *Askania* wird sich bestreben in der Fluth eleganter Zeitschriften eine freie Eigenthümlichkeit zu behaupten und statt eitlen buntscheckigen Zeitvertreibes gefälligen Stoff geistiger Bildung dar zu bieten. Daher werden ihr Abhandlungen über jedweden Gegenstand des Lebens, der Litteratur und der Kunst, Rezensionen beurtheilswerther Bücher, Auszüge aus nicht genug bekannt gewordenen oder zu früh vergessenen u. s. w. willkommener sein, als Erzählungen oder Gedichte; und Theaterkorrespondenzeleien, Anekdotenkrämereien und miszellanische Lückenbüssereien sollen gänzlich von ihr ausgeschlossen bleiben. Eine strenge Auswahl und das Verfolgen eines festen Zieles, das ich nicht näher anzudeuten brauche, indem ich Ew. Hochwohlgeboren zur Theilnahme an der Askania einlade, ist sie den würdigen Freunden schuldig, die ihre gütige Unterstützung theils bereits versprochen haben, theils mit Zuversicht hoffen lassen, und sie wird vorläufig nur zwei Blätter wöchentlich, jedes von einem halben Bogen, ausgeben, um sich auf keine Weise in der Befolgung ihrer kritischen Grundsätze gehemmt zu fühlen.

Ich ersuche Ew. Hochwohlgeboren ergebenst, unsre Zeitschrift mit Ihren schätzbaren Beiträgen zu beehren und Ihre erste Sendung wo möglich noch vor dem Schlusse des laufenden Jahres an die Verlagshandlung zu befördern, welche das Honorar, das vorläufig auf zehn Thaler für den gedruckten Bogen festgesetzt worden ist, drei Monate nach dem Abdrucke der Handschrift auszahlen wird.

In Erwartung einer baldigen Gewährung meiner Bitte habe ich die Ehre mich mit hoher Achtung zu empfehlen.

Dessau, am 1ten September 1819.

Wilhelm Müller.

Enclosed in Number 4; a printed invitation to contributors. The words "Hochwohlgeboren" and the final signature are written in ink.

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The first copy of Askania appeared in January, 1820; after six numbers had been printed, the journal went the way of the honorable host of similar literary and aesthetic ventures. A number of well-known writers, such as Jakob Grimm, Kalckreuth, Karl Förster, and Achim von Arnim contributed to it, but on June 15, 1820, Müller writes to Karl Förster of the complete failure of the enterprise. The reading public totally ignored it, so that, on the average, less than 150 copies had been sold each month.

4. To Helmina von Chézy.

Dessau, den 14ten September 19.

Nicht umsonst habe ich Sie neulich von Berlin aus anonymiter mit der Einladung zu einem Journale *bedroht!* Sehn Sie, wie fest mein Vertrauen auf Ihre Güte ist, dass ich damit drohen durfte, als wäre eine abschlägige Antwort gar nicht möglich. Nun möchte ich Ihnen Vieles von den schönen, erhabenen Plänen sagen, die ich mir bei der Herausgabe meiner Blätter vorgesetzt habe z. B. dass ich selbst keine Silbe daran schreiben will, und dass ich grössere Aufsätze ununterbrochen durch mehrere Nummern hindurch führen werde, und dass ich das Journal mit einem Gedichte von Helmina von Chézy eröffnen will—aber da fällt mir ein, dass das noch zu früh ist.

Ich habe an HE v. Malsburg, Karl Förster, Friedrich Kuhn Einladungsbriefe geschickt. Wenn Sie die Herren sehen, grüssen Sie sie von mir und legen eine Fürbitte ein, besonders bei HE von Malsburg. Den Brief an Graf Löben habe ich eingelegt, weil ich nicht weiss, ob er noch in Dresden ist. Den Brief an Gebauer bitte ich ebenfalls durch Buchhändlergelegenheit zu besorgen, da ich selbst nicht weiss, wo er ist. Noch nicht genug! Sie erhalten noch zwei Wohlgeborene Briefe und zwei Hochwohlgeborene ohne Addressen: wenn Sie ein paar Wohlgeborene und ein paar Hochwohlgeborene Dichter oder Prosaiker wissen, die durch Ihre gütige Fürsprache für mich zu gewinnen wären, so setzen Sie Addressen darauf u schicken sie fort.

Da ich nun einmal unverschämt gewesen bin, so will ich's nun mit einem Male abthun. Ich möchte mir nemlich Diess u Jenes bei Ihnen für mein Journal bestellen z. B. eine recht *lange* Rezension von Malsburgs Kalderon, ein paar Legenden ppp

Unser lieber Atterbom ist nun schon über dem Meere. Ich habe in Berlin noch einige recht herrliche Stunden mit ihm zugebracht: ich reiste eigentlich bloss seinetwegen dorthin. Sonst widersteht mir Berlin. Bei Hensel erfreute mich Ihr heitres Bild: es ist ein Meisterstück.

Nächsten Sommer komm' ich gewiss einmal nach Dresden—dann bin ich schon ein berühmter Mann, von wegen der Redaktion und der vortrefflichen Römischen Reisebeschreibung,

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die zu Weihnachten in die Welt läuft. *Duncker u Humblot* haben gut honorirt und das Werk wird jetzt unter meinen Augen in Dessau gedruckt.

Schreiben Sie mir bald. Sie sind mir schuldig

1 anonymen Brief aus Berlin, wozu ich hier einen Namen setze: W. Müller.

1 gedruckten Brief: ist wenigstens zwei geschriebene werth.

1 geschriebenen Brief.

Von Herzen der Ihrige

WILHELM MÜLLER.

All of the authors mentioned in the second paragraph (as well as Frau von Chézy herself) responded favorably, and are represented by contributions in the pages of Askania, although the success of Müller's persuasions did not prevent the early shipwreck of the project.

Frau von Chézy had co-operated with Baron von der Malsburg in translating various plays of Calderon.

The picture mentioned, a pencil-drawing by Wilhelm Hensel (who left a very large collection of portraits of celebrities of his time), is preserved—along with the rest of the collection—by the granddaughter of the artist, Frau Professor Friedrich Leo of Göttingen.

5. To ACHIM VON ARNIM.

Dessau den 16ten April 20.

Ew Hochwohlgeboren

Sage ich den verbindlichsten Dank für Ihren Beitrag zur Askania, den ich sogleich in das 4te Heft aufgenommen habe. Möchte jede Aufnahme mir so viel Freude u Befriedigung verschaffen, als diese! Sie werden ein Exemplar aller Hefte der Askania erhalten und fortgehend jede Lieferung nach Erscheinung zugeschickt bekommen.

Sie haben früherhin kurze Beurtheilungen in den Gesellschafter geliefert. Jetzt finde ich Ihren Namen nicht mehr darin. Ich darf also wohl, ohne zu fürchten, dem *Gubitz* etwas zu rauben, Sie ersuchen, Beiträge solcher Art für die Askania zu schreiben, wenn Ihre Zeit es erlaubt. Überhaupt aber ersuche ich Sie nochmals dazu beizutragen, dass ich der Zeitschrift den Character zu geben vermöge, der sich, nur als Wunsch, in dem Vorworte (von W. v. Schütz) ausgesprochen hat. Bis jetzt läuft freilich noch Manches Schwache u Schiefe mit unter, aus Mangel an Besserem und noch mehr aus Verhältnissen der Freundschaft u Höflichkeit. Mit der Zeit hoffe ich Besseres u Unvermischteres zu geben. Freuen wird es mich, wenn Sie in meiner Redaktion wenigstens ein gutes Streben entdecken, und Ihr Gedicht auf den

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seligen *Hermes*, dem ich auch Vieles verdanke, Ihnen nicht durch die Nachbarschaft entweihet erscheine.

Mit der aufrichtigsten Hochachtung
Ew Hochwohlgeboren
ergebenster Diener
W. MÜLLER.

Haben Sie nicht über die Mskrpte Ihres Schwagers Brentano zu disponiren? Ich sollte meinen, dass, wenn er in Berlin wäre, er mir seine Theilnahme nicht abschlagen würde.

N. B. Ich bin nicht *Professor*, sondern nur *Bibliothekar*. Diess um in einer kleinen Stadt kein Ärgerniss zu geben.

These statements do not seem to agree fully with Müller's letter to Karl Förster,[1] in which he declares, after the failure of the journal had become complete, that he gave almost nothing to Askania except his name upon the title-page. It is evident that he had hoped to parallel the great success of the leading literary and aesthetic journal of Berlin, Gubitz's Gesellschafter, oder Blätter für Geist und Herz, which appeared four times a week from 1817 to 1848, and which commanded the support of the whole group of the Berlin Romanticists, as well as such outsiders as Houwald and Wilhelm Müller, Goethe and Heine. Wilhelm von Schütz was one of the large number of nobly-born aspirants to literary distinction who make so characteristic a feature of the history of the later part of the Romantic movement. The subject of Arnim's memorial poem was Julius Gottfried Hermes, pastor of the Gertraudtenkirche (popularly known as the "Spitalkirche") in Berlin, born September 29, 1740, died December 30, 1818. His portrait is to be found in the Hensel collection, III, 33. Müller was a constant attendant upon his spiritual ministrations while studying in Berlin during 1815 and 1816.

Clemens Brentano, whom Müller came to know in March, 1816, had, along with Müller, been a member of the large band of unsuccessful suitors for the hand of the adorable Luise Hensel. The older and younger poet, as well as Wilhelm and Luise Hensel, Arnim, Frau von Chézy, Hedwig von Stägemann, Max Schenkendorf, Chamisso and Count von Loeben, had been closely associated in 1816 in producing the aesthetic annual, Die Sängerfahrt, edited by Friedrich Förster, and forming one of the most significant documents of the entire Romantic movement.

[1] Diary and Letters of Wilhelm Müller, Chicago, 1903. Page 96.

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6. To Friedrich August Wolf.

Dessau, den 4ten Juny 1820.

Hochgeehrtester Herr Geheimerath,

Die Versicherung Ihres freundlichen Andenkens, die ich vor einiger Zeit durch Herrn von Loen erhielt, hätte früher meinen erwiedernden Dank verdient. Das Buch, das Sie mit diesem Briefe empfangen, war die Ursache der Verzögerung. Ich wollte es Ihnen gern mit meinem Schreiben, als einen schwachen Beweis meiner Dankbarkeit überschicken. Das Interesse an der Stadt, die ich zu schildern versucht habe und die Nachsicht gegen einen Schüler wird Ihnen die Lektüre vielleicht erträglich machen.

Dass ich seit etwa 6 Monaten Bibliothekar geworden bin, wird Ihnen vielleicht schon bekannt sein; doch bin ich Ihnen die Anzeige schuldig. Der Direktor der Gelehrten-Schule, Stadelmann, ehemals Conrektor in Plauen im Voigtlande, ein Schüler Hermanns, war auch zum Bibliothekar berufen worden, trat aber bald ab, theils wegen zu vieler Arbeit, theils wegen Mangels an litterarischer Übersicht, da er sich ganz auf die beiden alten Sprachen und in ihnen auch wohl nur auf die Mechanischen Zweige der Philologie beschränkt. Die Schule scheint durch ihn nicht gewonnen zu haben: lateinisch und griechisch soll er gründlich, aber geschmacklos, lehren, im Vortrage der Geschichte aber, und überhaupt, wo er nicht Geistlosigkeit und Mangel an Urtheil mit lateinischen Phrasen zudecken kann, ist er unerträglich. Dazu fehlt es ihm gänzlich an Autorität. Meine Schulstunden sind jetzt weniger und angenehmer: ich lehre in Secunda der Gelehrten-Schule Griechisch u lateinisch: in diesem Halbjahre habe ich die Odyssee zu erklären angefangen und im Lateinischen lese ich den Sallust, Cicero de Senect. und Amicit. und Pompon. Mela, verbunden mit dem Vortrage über alte Geographie. Meine Schüler zeigen Eifer und Liebe zu meinem Unterricht u meiner Person und das macht mir die Arbeit leicht.

Die Bibliothek besitzt manche Schätze in alten Ausgaben. Auch Handschriften haben sich gefunden. Ausser den zwei von Jani gebrauchten Handschriften des Horaz eine dritte, so viel ich weiss, noch ganz unbekannte, von den Satiren und Episteln. Ferner ein Paar Mskr. des Ovid, eins des Lucan, des Statius. Der Herzog giebt jährlich 600 Rthlr. zur Anschaffung von Büchern und kauft ausserdem selbst noch manches kostbare Werk. Die Auswahl mache ich, ohne Beschränkung von einer Behörde, da ich in allen Bibliotheksangelegenheit[en] unmittelbar unter dem Herzog stehe und auch dem Kabinet meine Rechnungen vorlege.

Wie sehr freuen würde ich mich, wenn Sie, verehrtester Herr Geheimerath, diesen Sommer auf einer Badereise unser Dessau berührten! Zu Michael benutze ich vielleicht die Ferien zu

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einer Reise nach Berlin und habe dort das Vergnügen, Sie zu sehen.

Hochachtungsvoll
Ihr
dankbarer Schüler
W. MÜLLER.

The book which the young poet herewith sends to his venerated teacher is the Rom, Römer und Römerinnen mentioned in Number 2.

The characteristically summary way in which Müller passes condemnation upon his predecessor as librarian is to be interpreted in the light of other categorical judgments which he pronounced in his days of immaturity, as upon Goethe, and notably upon Wolf himself.

Schnell fertig ist die Jugend mit dem Wort,
Das schwer sich handhabt, wie des Messers Schneide.

Christian Friedrich Stadelmann, director of the Ducal Gelehrtenschule in Dessau, was born in 1786, and contributed a number of solid and meritorious works in the fields of classical studies and pedagogy.

7. To HELMINA VON CHÉZY.

Dessau, den 13ten Juny 21.

Verehrte Freundin,

Dass ich Ihnen, Ihrem Verlangen gemäss, meinen Hochzeittag nicht gemeldet habe, bedaure ich jetzt, da ich Ihren lieben Brief, unter vielen andern noch zu beantwortenden, wieder durchlese. Denn anstatt dass ich Ihnen heute ein Hochzeitgedicht schicke, hätte ich gewiss ein viel schöneres von Ihnen vor drei Wochen empfangen. Nun, es ist meine Schuld!

Von meinen Dresdner Freunden habe ich erst vor Kurzem erfahren, dass die enthusiastiche Anzeige meiner Lieder von Ihnen herrühre. Was soll ich Ihnen zum Dank, zur Antwort sagen? Wenn etwas hier genügen kann, so sei es das, dass diese Anzeige mich noch 100 mal so sehr erfreut u erwärmt haben würde, wenn ich gewusst hätte, dass sie von Ihnen käme, obgleich die Beurtheilung eines unpartheiischen Fremdlings den Stolz des Dichters hätte in Anspruch nehmen müssen. Aber die Theilnahme meiner Freunde gilt mir mehr, als öffentliches Lob.

Ihre unangenehmen Verhältnisse mit Kalckreuth betrüben mich, besonders da ich zum Ausbruche der Zwistigkeiten unschuldigen Anlass gegeben habe. Jedoch verzweifle ich schriftlich bei Kalckreuth in dieser Sache wirken zu können. Wenigstens

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hat er meine Anfragen u Vorschläge sehr decidirt verneint. Mündlich möchte sich ehr etwas thun lassen, vielleicht noch diesen Sommer, wo ich Dresden u meine dortigen Freunde mit meiner Frau zu begrüssen gedenke.

Meine Lieder sind bald vergriffen u ich denke Ihnen noch in diesem Jahre eine zweite Auflage zuzuschicken.

Ihr Freund

W. MÜLLER.

On May 21, 1821, had occurred Müller's marriage with Adelheid von Basedow, daughter of the Ducal Regierungsrath Ludwig von Basedow, and granddaughter of the celebrated pedagogic authority. He sends with the letter a copy of the verses he wrote for the occasion (Cf. Gedichte, 1868, I, 111), which was also the silver wedding of the bride's parents.

Sieben und siebzig Gedichte aus den hinterlassenen Papieren eines reisenden Waldhornisten, Müller's first volume of collected poems, had appeared in Dessau in the autumn of 1820. It met with a fairly good sale.

Frau von Chézy's differences with the young poet, Count von Kalckreuth (son of the famous field-marshal, and a poetical associate of Müller's) are not recorded elsewhere, but they belong to a catalogue so long that it would be a thankless task to extend it.

8. To F. A. BROCKHAUS.

Dessau den 26ten Februar 1823.

Ihre Materialiensendung, verehrter und geliebter Freund, habe ich erhalten und werde ich nach besten Kräften benutzen. Die ersten Arbeiten sende ich gleich hierbei ein:

Ueber Moore's Loves of the Angels

3 Nummern litt. Bemerk., die hoffentlich den alten *Beck* nicht kopfscheu machen werden.

Auch erhalten Sie Ihrem Wunsche gemäss zurück

die ersten drei schon benutzten Hefte der Lit. Gaz. Nouv. Messéniennes.

Das Trauerspiel des jungen Grosse habe ich gelesen, mit Neugier und Aufmerksamkeit. Der Dichter dauert mich, denn es wird ihm viel schaden. Es tritt mit *gewaltigen* Ansprüchen auf, u leistet, wenn wir das Ganze ins Auge fassen, sehr wenig. Einzelne Blitze kräftigen Genies besonders in den prosaischen, populären Scenen: übrigens durchaus keine dramatische Sprache u kein dramatischer Geist. Ueberall blickt die Nachahmung zweier Unnachahmlicher, Göthes u Shakespeare's durch, aber

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freilich ist Alles was nachgeahmt wird, überboten u überspannt. Wäre Grosse seinen eigenen Weg bescheiden gegangen, er hätte etwas geleistet, denn eine *poetische Natur* ist er gewiss.

Ich hielt es für meine Pflicht, Ihnen diese meine allgemeine Ansicht vorher mitzutheilen, da es scheint dass Sie Interesse für das Stück haben. Wünschen Sie also eine lobende Rezension—der Wunsch ist *jedem* erlaubt—so übergeben Sie das Stück einem Andern. Ich kann wenig daran loben, aber ich würde mit Nachsicht u selbst aufmunternd tadeln.

Wekherlin wird diese Woche fertig. *Fritzsche* hat zum zweiten Male den Schwabenstreich gemacht, keine Bogen für mich zurückzubehalten. Ich muss Sie also wieder um die Uebersendung von 50 Ex. bitten, wenn das Ganze in Ihren Händen ist.

Dass vor der Michaelismesse kein neuer Band kommen soll, ist mir sehr erwünscht; So bleibt mir für diesen Sommer Raum zu anderen Arbeiten, die ich schon lange habe vornehmen wollen.

Ich habe die Hoffnung bald recht viel Musse zu gewinnen, da ich meine Stunden in der hiesigen Gelehrten-Schule los zu werden denke. Alsdann will ich thätiger für Ihre Institute sein.

? *Wann* müssen Sie spätestens den Aufsatz über Tasso haben, wenn er in das *nächste* Heft des Hermes (? ?) kommen soll? Ich bin fast zu Ende damit.

Nun zu etwas Anderem u Wichtigerem.

Ich habe Ihnen, glaube ich, schon vor einem Jahre, als ich bei Ihnen war, gesagt, dass ich damit umginge eine Sammlung meiner Gedichte zu veranstalten. Die 77 Waldhornistenlieder sind Kommissionsartikel u mein Eigenthum u da sie bis auf wenige Ex. (circa 50) vergriffen sind, so will ich diese an mich nehmen: denn solche Restanten besonders, wenn es Kommissionsartikel sind, kommen selten aus dem Laden.

Natürlich denke ich bei dieser neuen Unternehmung zuerst an Sie, da ich überhaupt wünsche, Alles, was ich als Schriftsteller besitze, in Ihren Verlag zu bringen. Die neue Sammlung würde aus circa 60 Bogen gedruckt bestehen, wobei ich etwa Rückerts Rosen als Norm der Lettern, Spatia u des Formats annehme. Das gäbe 2 mächtige Theile, wovon der erste in diesem Jahre (womöglich noch im Sommer) erscheinen sollte, der andere zur Ostermesse 1824.

Ausser dem, was Ihnen von meinen Gedichten bekannt ist (also die 77 mit ihren Ergänzungen, die Griechenlieder) würde diese Sammlung eine Anzahl Gesellschaftslieder (zum Theil politische Chansons aber ohne Censuranstoss) Epigramme, erotische Spiele, Satyren etc. enthalten. Die Griechenlieder, deren erste beiden Hefte Sie oder ich von Ackermann entnehme, würden zum zweiten Theil geschlagen werden u könnten einzeln auch verkauft werden. Bis 1824 sind sie sicherlich in den ersten Auflagen vergriffen und wegen der zwey Hefte die Sie nur als zweite Auflage zu honoriren brauchen, treffen wir dann eine besondere Abmachung, ohne jetzt darüber das *Ganze* zu stören. Ich weiss,

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dass Gedichte eine schlechte Buchhändlerwaare sind u ohne etwas über den wirklichen poetischen Werth der meinigen selbstlobend beizubringen, beschränke ich mich auf das, was ich von ihrem merkantilischen Werthe sagen kann. Diess ist:

Die 77 sind zu einer Zeit, wo ich so gut als ohne Namen in der deutschen Litteratur war, als Kommissionsartikel, in einer Handlung die den Vertrieb schlecht versteht u wenig ausgebreitete Verbindung hat, erschienen und doch in ca. zwei Jahren so gut wie vergriffen worden. Die Auflage war 500 Ex. wovon ich wohl über 50 selbst verschenkt habe. Nehmen wir also 400 verkaufte.

Wie die Griechenlieder sich verkaufen, können Sie jetzt selbst beurtheilen. Ich weiss es nur von den ersten beiden Heften.

Nun ist wohl einzusehen, dass das politische Interesse hier einwirkt, und dieses Interesse hat doch das Gute für die ganze Sammlung, dass es meinen Namen mit weit verbreitet hat.

Soviel zu Gunsten meiner Gedichte Sie wissen, dass ich es nicht übel nehme, wenn Sie mir zeigen dass ich mich in den Voraussetzungen irre, die ich aus diesen Umständen für den Verkauf der grösseren Sammlung mache, und wissen auch dass ich fern bin, bei einer solchen Sache Anspruch auf die freundschaftlichen Verhältnisse zu machen, in denen ich die Ehre habe mit Ihnen zu stehen. Wir dürfen und wollen hier bloss als ein Paar Kaufleute agiren, die sich nicht persönlich kennen.

Ich frage also:

Haben Sie Lust zu der Unternehmung? und

Was ist Ihnen mein Name werth?

Ich schlage mehrere Bedingungen vor,

1) Sie machen zuerst eine kleine Auflage von 500 bis 600 Ex. und bestimmen danach das Honorar, so, dass ich bei der zweiten Auflage von eben so viel Exempl. die Hälfte des ersten Honorars erhalte u so fort bei *jeder Auflage.*

2) Sie machen gleich *eine* sehr grosse Auflage, so viel Ex. Sie wollen u können u behalten den Verlag auf eine bestimmte Anzahl Jahre, nach deren Ablaufe die Gedichte mir wieder zufallen, jedoch so, dass Sie das Verkaufsrecht behalten.

3) Sie kaufen mir die Waare ein für allemal u für immer ab, u können dann damit machen, was Sie wollen—versteht sich, ohne daran etwas zu aendern.

Natürlich würde ich in diesem letzten Falle meine Bedingungen *hoch* stellen müssen, da ich die Waare für das Beste halte was ich besitze. Omnia mea mecum porto.

Diese drei Vorschläge sind aus meinem Kopfe entsprungen u da wir Poeten schlechte Geschäftskenner sind, so ist es leicht möglich, dass keiner davon recht praktisch ist. Dafür habe ich denn auch die pekuniären Bedingungen nicht bestimmt. Es wird mir am liebsten sein, wenn Sie sich erst für einen *dieser* Vorschläge oder eine von Ihnen zu bestimmende Art des Contrakts entscheiden. Alsdann will ich meine pekuniären Bedingungen hinzufügen, oder überlasse es auch Ihnen, zu sagen, was Sie geben wollen oder können.

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Nur in einer Hinsicht nehme ich Ihre Freundschaft in Anspruch, nehmlich, dass Sie sich bald entscheiden. Ich habe nehmlich Ursach zu wünschen, dass der erste Theil der Sammlung wenigstens in diesem Jahre, am liebsten noch in diesem Sommer erscheine. Als Norm der Bogenbestimmung wollen Sie Rückerts Rosen wählen.

Schreiben Sie mir ja keinen so langen Brief wie ich Ihnen. Ich würde mir ein Gewissen daraus machen, Ihnen dazu Veranlassung gegeben zu haben, da Sie noch nicht ganz wieder Herr Ihrer Thätigkeit sind.

Mit unveränderlichen Gesinnungen der Freundschaft
Ihr
treu ergebener
W. MÜLLER.

The copy of this letter kindly furnished by its owner contains no address, but it is evidently directed to the eminent Leipzig publisher, for whom Müller began the publication of the Bibliothek deutscher Dichter des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts in 1822 (See Number 14). The fourth volume, containing Weckherlin, appeared in 1823.

The reviews and notices which Müller sends are probably for the Litterarisches Konversationsblatt which Brockhaus founded in 1820. The essay on Moore's Loves of the Angels is reprinted in Müller's Vermischte Schriften, 1830, V, 236 ff.

"Der alte Beck" seems to refer to Professor Christian Daniel Beck (1757–1832), philologist and historian of literature in Leipzig, who edited at this time the Allgemeines Repertorium der neuesten in- und ausländischen Litteratur.

"Das Trauerspiel" is Ernst Grosse's (born 1803) tragedy, Graf Gordo, 1822. It was printed by the publisher Hahn in Hanover, in order to furnish the young man with his first means for beginning a university education. Hahn's attention had been arrested by a note annexed by Adolf Müllner to certain of Grosse's poems in the Morgenblatt, in which it was stated that the young author, who had high aspirations toward literature and art, had no means of prosecuting his studies.

Hermes, oder kritisches Jahrbuch der Litteratur, began to be published by Brockhaus in 1819.

For some reason Brockhaus seems not to have been attracted by any of the various plans proposed by the poet, for the next volume of Müller's poems, like the "77 Lieder", was printed by Ackermann in Dessau. Perhaps the matter was broken off by

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the death of Brockhaus, which occurred on August 20 of the year of this letter. The Leipzig firm subsequently published Müller's Homerische Vorschule in 1824, and his collected works after his death.

9. To Varnhagen von Ense.

Dessau, den 22ten Juni 24.

Ew Hochwohlgeboren

geehrtes vom 8ten Dieses ist mir ein sehr angenehmes Pfand Ihrer gütigen Erinnerung an meinen, leider für mich so flüchtigen Besuch bei Ihnen, und ich eile dasselbe unter mehreren Briefen, die ich bei meiner Rückkehr aus Dresden vorfinde, zuerst zu beantworten.

In Dessau finden sich allerdings noch manche mündliche Traditionen von dem alten *Schnurrbart*, (so nennt ihn das Volk) aber freilich kann ich für die Reinheit derselben nicht haften. Ich werde Ihnen, was sich auftreiben lässt, sammeln. Handschriftliches habe ich nichts in der Bibliothek, was Ihnen zu Ihrem Plane dienlich sein könnte. Was im Archive ist, hat *Beckmann* benutzt, nach ihm *Lenz;* und *Bertram* nebst seinem Fortsetzer *Krause* haben Sie wohl auch in Händen. Einige von *Leopold* benutze Pläne, Dispositionen u dergleichen militärischen Apparat haben wir in der Bibliothek, doch werden Sie wohl nicht so pünktlich in dem Militärischen der Biographie sein, dass dies Sie interessiren könnte. Auch ist's wohl an u für sich unwichtig. Was die fatale Begebenheit in der Liebschaft betrifft, so finden Sie darüber Aufschluss in der von *Samuel Baur* gegebenen Biographie *Leopolds*. (Interessante Lebensgemälde. 7ter B. S. 96). Überhaupt giebt Ihnen diese flüchtige Arbeit eines Vielschreibers doch vielleicht einige Notizen. Anekdoten von *Leopold* sind, so viel ich weiss, in keiner eigenen Sammlung gedruckt. Aber es circuliren viele in Dessau u ich hoffe Ihnen bald einige mittheilen zu können. Kennen Sie z. B. die Geschichte des Dessauer Marsches? Eine bedeutende Anzahl solcher Anekdoten findet sich in dem ersten oder zweiten Jahrgange des *Morgenblatts*, wenn ich nicht irre, von *Spieker* in *Frankfurt a. d. Oder* mitgetheilt, welcher damals in *Dessau* lebte. Es wird Ihnen nicht schwer werden, diese aufzusuchen.

So viel für heute. Die Resultate meiner Anekdotenjagd können Sie erst in circa 4 Wochen erwarten, da ich Ende dieser Woche wieder verreise, nach *Quedlinburg* zu *Klopstocks* Säkularfeier, wobei ich denn den Harz ein wenig durchstreifen werde. Ich bin so aufrichtig gewesen, Ihnen zu erkennen zu geben, dass in den Dessauer Archiven nichts für Sie zu finden sei. Das ist mir schwer geworden, u ich hätte mich beinahe von meinem Wunsche, Sie hier zu sehn, verleiten lassen, Ihnen reiche Ausbeute hier zu verheissen. Ich danke für die Nachricht über *Wolfs* Wohlsein. Ich erhalte in diesen Tagen meine *Homer-*

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ische Vorschule vom Verleger. Könnten Sie mir nicht mit Rath u That behülflich sein, *Wolfen* ein Exemplar davon auf sicherm Wege zukommen zu lassen?

Den Lord *Byron* habe ich im Grablied gesungen, das Sie nächstens lesen werden. Vielleicht finden Sie darin einen leisen Nachklang von dem mir mitgetheilten Gedanken *Chamisso's*.

Empfangen Sie die Versicherung meiner aufrichtigsten Ergebenheit, mit der ich die Ehre habe mich zu nennen

Ew Hochwohlgeboren

gehorsamster

W. MÜLLER.

In May and June, 1824, Müller had spent weeks of unmixed delight and refreshment at the Villa Grassi near Dresden, the summer residence of his friend, Count von Kalckreuth (cf. Number 7). The above letter, written soon after his return, was in response to Varnhagen's request to Müller, as court librarian, for materials for a biographical sketch of Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau, which appeared in the second volume of his Biographische Denkmale, 1825. Prominent among his sources the author mentions "Handschriftliche Mittheilungen von Herrn Hofrath und Bibliothekar Wilhelm Müller in Dessau."

Klopstock's hundredth birthday was celebrated with much ceremony at Quedlinburg in the first days of July, 1824; Carl Maria von Weber directed the musical part of the festivities, and Wilhelm Müller's gifted wife sang the alto solos in the chief compositions rendered.

The Homerische Vorschule (Leipzig, 1824; second edition, with introduction and notes by Baumgarten-Crusius, 1836), shows Müller as a devoted pupil of Wolf; he attempts, in a fresh and independent way, to make the ideas of his teacher known to a larger circle of readers.

The poem Byron appeared as a supplement to the second edition of the Lieder der Griechen, 1825. See Gedichte, 1868, II, 123.

10. To Varnhagen von Ense.

Dessau, den 14ten September 24.

Ew Hochwohlgeboren

übersende ich anbei einige Früchte meiner Nachsuchungen für Ihre Biographie unsres Fürsten Leopold.

Die Memoiren haben sich im hiesigen Hausarchiv unter dem Nachlasse des Fürsten Leopold Maximilian gefunden, auf dessen Befehl sie also wohl, bald nach Leopolds Tode (im Jahre 1751,

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wie der Titel besagt) aufgesetzt worden sind. Über den Verfasser derselben habe ich keine Muthmassung, jedoch sind sie gewiss nach den sichersten Quellen u mit Benutzung aller Urkunden gearbeitet. Wenn Sie selbst Zeit hätten, einige Wochen hier zu sein, so würde Ihnen das Hausarchiv, dessen Benutzung keine Schwierigkeit findet, eine *grosse, sehr grosse* Menge von Briefen, Berichten, Verordnungen, pp Leopolds liefern, grösstentheils eigenhändige Dokumente. Aber ich wüsste in der That nicht, wo anfangen, da ich nicht weiss, wo es Ihnen fehlt u wo etwas Neues zu finden ist.

Die Memoiren hat Se. Durchlaucht der Herzog für Sie kopiren lassen u sendet sie Ihnen durch mich zur beliebigen Benutzung. Wenn Sie sie nicht mehr brauchen, schicken Sie mir das Manuskript zurück. Vielleicht richten Sie ein Paar Zeilen des Dankes gelegentlich an den Herzog, dem es vielleicht Freude machen würde, Sie auf diese Weise kennen zu lernen.

Ich selbst schicke Ihnen einige Notizen u werde wohl gelegentlich mehr nachfolgen lassen.

Die Nachricht von dem Tode unsres Freundes Wolf hat mich tief erschüttert. Ich kann mir den Lebensvollen gar nicht todt denken. Ihre Worte zu seinem Andenken bei Göthe's Geburtstage haben mich herzlich angesprochen, u ich möchte Ihnen die Hand dafür drücken. Denkt denn noch Niemand an eine Biographie des grossen Mannes? Ich dächte Sie wären der Mann dazu.

Mich beschäftigt jetzt eine deutsche Übersetzung der Neugriechischen Volkslieder, welche Fauriel gesammelt hat, u zwar so sehr, dass ich Ihnen heute diesen sehr flüchtigen Brief schreiben muss. Entschuldigen Sie das u sein Sie versichert der hochachtungsvollen Gesinnungen

Ihres
ergebensten Dieners

W. MÜLLER.

This letter is without an address, but is evidently a continuation of the preceding correspondence with Varnhagen.

Friedrich August Wolf had died at Marseilles on August 8, 1824. Müller's reverence and piety toward the memory of his great master in the classics found admirable expression in his Einige Worte über Friedrich August Wolf, 1825 (reprinted in the Vermischte Schriften, IV, 163 ff.), in which he calls him the "greatest philologist of our fatherland, one of the greatest men of the century". The study is particularly valuable because of the vivid and happy characterization from one who had viewed its subject from near at hand. Müller emphasizes the vital element, the "living word" in Wolf's personality, whereby he

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was able to revive antiquity, and became himself, for the time, a Grecian or Roman. He is pictured as being a man of the world, able to associate with practical men in other fields of activity, and as being totally free from bondage to the dead letter of his science. His attractive personality and the charm of his social nature are also touched upon.

Wolf's objectivity in estimating his own achievements, as well as those of others, had not tallied with Müller's ready-made canons in his student days, but appeared to him "conceit and envy", and we read in his boyish diary of November 26, 1815:

Sonst sprach er fast nur von sich und seinem Ruhme: Alles andere wurde zu Boden getreten: Böckh, Buttmann, Schleiermacher pp. Ich hätte ihm immer zurufen mögen: O du Alleszermalmer! (Diary and Letters, p. 51).

In the period of his maturity, Müller confesses that Wolf's critical faculty, his Socratic irony, were usually misunderstood as *malice d'esprit*, but that their possessor was always more ready to turn these engines upon his own services and claims than upon those of any of his contemporaries.

The translation of Modern Greek Volkslieder appeared (with accompanying Greek text and Fauriel's notes) in 1825. Bernhard Klein set a number of them to music.

11. To Friedrich von Raumer.

[Dessau 20 Okt. 24][1]

Hochverehrter Herr,

Die Aufmerksamkeit und Theilnahme, welche Sie meinem Buche über die Homerischen Gedichte schenken, ehrt u erfreut mich sehr, und die Bemerkungen u Einwürfe, welche Sie mir über einzelne Ansichten, die ich dort dargelegt habe, machen, ist mir der liebste Beweis des Beifalls, den Sie dem Buche im Allgemeinen geben.

Erlauben Sie mir also, als Dank für Ihre Mittheilung vom 9ten Oktober hier sogleich Einiges als Beantwortung Ihrer Zweifel u Bedenklichkeiten über den vielköpfigen Homer zu sagen. Nehmen Sie es als eine Konversation, die ich mündlich lieber machen würde, wenn ich jetzt das Vergnügen hätte, bei Ihnen zu sein. Mündlich hat so etwas weniger anmassliches Ansehn. Dem Schreiber muss man den Lehrton schon vergeben, auch wenn er an Jemand schreibt, von dem er nur lernen kann.

Die Einheit der homerischen Poesie in dem Geiste und der

[1] Added by another hand in pencil.

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Form des Ganzen, und wenn wir über Einzelnes hinwegsehn, was spätere Einfüger hinzugethan haben, erkenne ich mit Ihnen an. Aber ich trenne diese *innere Einheit* bestimmt von dem *äussern Zusammenhange* eines grossen Gedichts. Die Gründe, warum dieser äussere Zusammenhang in der Ilias u Odyssee nicht ist u nicht sein kann, glaube ich ziemlich erschöpfend in dem Buche selbst vorgetragen zu haben. Die *innere Einheit* aber bringt den Totaleindruck hervor, freilich auch mit Hülfe der durch Vorurtheile, die wir aus unserm Knabenalter mitbringen, bestätigten Einheit oder Vereinigung der später aufgedrungenen Form der Epopöe. Aber ohne die *innere Einheit* hätte der *gemachte* Zusammenhang niemals als ein *unsprünglicher* u *natürlicher* erscheinen können. Wollen wir auch bei den einzelnen Gesängen Zusammenhang suchen, so gebe ich ihn in so weit zu, dass z. B. der Sänger der Irrfahrtenerzählung des Odysseus bei den Phäaken allerdings wohl daran dachte, sich an die *Gesänge von den Reisen des Telemach* erzählend anzuschliessen, oder umgekehrt. Aber ein solches erzählendes, episches Anschliessen ist kein *formeller* Zusammenhang einer Epopöe.

An ein ursprüngliches zusammenhängendes Episches Ganzes der Ilias u Odyssee kann ich also durchaus nicht glauben, ja, ich kann es mir nicht einmal vorstellen. *Einen* Dichter als Verfasser der beiden Gedichte oder auch nur eines derselben anzunehmen, erlauben die inneren u äusseren Widersprüche in denselben nicht. Aber einen *Homer* sich als Vereiniger oder Diaskeuasten in der Zeit des Gesanges selbst zu denken, der also Fremdes u Eigenes zu zwei grossen Ganzen zusammengeschmolzen hätte, widerspricht eben so sehr jenem naturschöpferischen Zeitalter, wie auch der Natur des grossen Schöpfers. Für die *kleinen Leute*, um mich Ihres Ausdrucks zu bedienen, ist ein solches Nacharbeiten u Nachhelfen recht eigentlich eine passende Arbeit.

Ich habe von *innern* u *äussern* Widersprüchen in den beiden Gedichten geredet. Mein Buch handelt aber fast nur von den äussern, ich meine denen, die im Stoffe liegen (Personenverwechselung, Zeitwirrwar pp). Die *innern* habe ich nur angedeutet, und nur in so weit sie die poetische Behandlung angehn, etwas näher ausgeführt. Es fehlt der Abschnitt, welcher aus der *Sprache* der Ilias u Odyssee diese Verschiedenheit der Sänger u Gesänge darthun sollte. Diese Lücke ist theils absichtlich, indem diese Untersuchung vor ein anderes Publikum gehört, als die übrigen Abhandlungen, theils bin ich auch mit dieser sehr weitläufigen u schwierigen Sache selbst noch nicht fertig, um damit aufzutreten, wohl aber so weit fertig, um die Resultate derselben darlegen zu können.

Die grosse Menge von Versen u Stellen, welche die Alexandriner als unhomerisch verworfen haben—gleichsam den Homer aus dem Homer herauswerfend,—ist ein guter Vorgang für diese Untersuchung. Die meisten dieser Auswürfe lassen sich halten, wenn man verschiedene Sänger u Gesänge der beiden grossen

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Conglobationen annimmt, sonst nicht. Denn, wenn diese auch alle, als aus einer Schule, etwas Gemeinschaftliches und Gleichförmiges in der Weise u Sprache hätten, so kann das Individuum, als solches, sich doch in seinem Schaffen nie ganz verleugnen. In sprachlicher Hinsicht hatten aber die Alexandrianer eine sehr scharfe Nase. Endlich ist durch Spohns Untersuchung über den Schluss der Odyssee auch die grammatische und sprachliche Unmögligkeit überhaupt mit der grössten Evidenz dargethan worden, dass dieses Schlussstück nicht aus dem Munde u aus dem Zeitalter des Sängers der übrigen Theile der Odyssee herrühren kann. Dass die *Doloneia* nicht zur Ilias gehört, behauptet fast das ganze gelehrte Alterthum. Wie viel werden wir also ohne alle Rettung aus dem Homer herauswerfen müssen—*bloss der Sprache wegen*—wenn wir *einen* Homer als Verfasser der beiden oder auch zwei Homere als zwei Verfasser derselben annehmen! Und was für eine Einheit der Form des Zusammenhanges kann das sein, die solche Herauswerfungen erträgt u doch Einheit bleibt?

Aber das ist bei Weitem nicht Alles. Wir haben unsre homerische Sprache, Phraseologie, Formenwesen pp auf der Schule als ein geschlossenes Ganzes kennen gelernt, und es giebt dafür eigene Lexica, Grammatiken pp. Aber ist denn das Ding auch so geschlossen? Wenn wir nur einen Schüler, der im Griechischen etwas mehr Fortschritte gemacht hat, als man gewöhnlich zur Lesung des Homers erfordert, zu der Ilias bringen u das Gedicht schnell u in Zusammenhang mit ihm durchgehn, so wird er, bei der Gleichförmigkeit der Sprache u Poesie, nach fleissigem Durchlesen u Durchpräpariren u Repetiren der ersten beiden Gesänge, in der Folge mit Leichtigkeit u ohne viel nachschlagen zu dürfen, eine lange Reihe der Gesänge weg lesen. Aber dann kommen Absätze, da hapert's. Da kömmt ein Gesang, in dem er sich fast so fremd fühlt, wie bei dem Anfang der Lektüre im ersten Gesange: neue Wörter, Formen, Wendungen, Verbindungen pp. Dieser Eindruck ist bei uns schwächer, die wir den Homer langsam u mit Zwischenräumen erst auf der Schule, dann auf der Universität durchgenommen haben. Dennoch fühlt ein jeder diese Anstösse, wenn er die Ilias von Anfang bis zu Ende ohne Pausen durchliest—etwa in einigen Wochen, oder, wenn's geht, in einer. Wolf hat mir diese Methode einmal empfohlen, und ich verdanke diesem Versuch viel. Wolf hatte mir die Punkte, wo die neuen Anstösse anfingen, nicht gesagt, und ich notirte mir beim Lesen meine Erfahrungen, und sie trafen fast überall mit Wolf zusammen. Das *konnte* keine Täuschung sein.

An die Sprache schliesst sich die epische Weise an, besonders in den oft vorkommenden Refräns. Welchen Grund sollen wir z. B. annehmen, warum ein u derselbe Sänger in einem u demselben Gedicht erst sechs acht oder zehn Gesänge lang die Refräns: *er sprach, er ass u trank, die Sonne ging auf, unter,*

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sie *versammelten sich* pp unverändert mit einem u demselben Verse in epischer umständlicher Weise ausdrückt, und dann einmal drei oder vier Gesänge lang keinen von diesen Versen gebraucht, sondern dasselbe durch eine andre epische Umschreibung ausdrückt? Das ist doch kein Suchen nach Mannigfaltigkeit im Sinne der Neuern?

Sie sehn also, dass mein Buch noch manches nachzutragen u weiter auszuführen übrig lässt. Wann ich aber dazu kommen werde, kann ich nicht bestimmen; das hängt von meiner Musse ab, die, wie Sie wissen, theils durch das Schulmeistern, theils durch die Schriftstellerei, die schnell arbeitet u schnell bezahlt wird, sehr bedrängt ist. Eine solche Untersuchung will ausschliessliche Beschränkung auf den *einen* Gegenstand. Ausserdem fehlt auch noch die Nachweisung, was die homerische Sage für einen Gang zu den asiatischen Ionern genommen hat. Über diesen letzten Gegenstand so wie über manches Verwandte finden Sie—wenn es Sie interessirt—einen Aufsatz von mir in einem der letzten Hefte der Hallischen Literaturzeitung—vielleicht ist's noch nicht einmal da—bei Gelegenheit einer Rezension zweier Broschüren von Bernhard Thiersch (dem Bruder des Münchener).

Doch ich sehe, mein Bogen ist zu Ende und kaum noch Platz zu einer anständigen Unterschrift. Ihre freundliche Erinnerung an unser Zusammensein in meinem Hause, wird von mir u meiner Frau dankbar erkannt. Wir beide hoffen noch diesen Winter Berlin und Sie zu sehn. Empfehlen Sie mich Ihrer Frau Gemahlin, der ich mit Hochachtung u Verehrung mich nenne

Ihren

ergebensten Diener

W. MÜLLER.

An exposition of Wolf's Homeric theory, as expounded in Müller's Homerische Vorschule (see Number 9).

Friedrich von Raumer, the historian, was, like Müller, a native of Anhalt, having been born at Wörlitz on May 14, 1781. In 1819 he had been called from Breslau to the chair of political economy and history at the University of Berlin; in 1822 he was chosen Rector. The new, ruthless school of criticism which had come into vogue with Wolf and Niebuhr was never sympathetic to his conciliatory and humane spirit, and it is perhaps on this account that he never gathered a "school" of younger men about him. He died June 14, 1873.

12. To VARNHAGEN VON ENSE.

Dessau, den 4ten Januar 1825.

Verehrtester Herr,

Ihrem Wunsche in Hinsicht des Dessauer Marsches kann ich mit folgender Notiz, die ich aus unsres Herzogs eigenem Munde habe, genügen:

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Fürst Leopold erhielt den berühmten Marsch nach der gewonnenen Schlacht bei Cassano von den dortigen Landseinwohnern dedicirt, wahrscheinlich von den Einwohnern von Cassano selbst. Bei einer Parade-Feierlichkeit, die zu Ehren dieses Sieges gehalten wurde, spielte man den Marsch zuerst, der sowohl dem Fürsten als den Truppen sehr gefiel, dass er seit der Zeit Lieblingsmarsch u mit passenden Worten zu Ehren des Fürsten Leopold begleitet wurde.

Ich freue mich, dass die Memoiren Ihnen einige Dienste geleistet haben, u sehe, nicht bloss als Anhaltiner, mit gespannter Theilnahme der Erscheinung des 2^ten^ Theiles Ihrer Biogr. Denkm. entgegen.

Ad vocem Biogr. fällt mir ein, dass der Herausgeber des Neuen Nekrologs der Deutschen (Superintendent Schmidt in Ilmenau) mich seit lange um eine Biographie Wolfs angeht. Wie gern ich die liefern möchte, wenn ich nur einiger Massen im Stande wäre, etwas Würdiges zu leisten, brauche ich Sie wohl nicht zu versichern. Aber eine armselige Kompilation kann ich u will ich nicht geben. Bei *Körte* ist nun wohl auch nichts zu erhalten, da er selbst an eine Biographie denkt. Haben Sie vielleicht etwas von Notizen über das Geschichtliche von Wolf's Leben? Oder könnten Sie das Institut dieses Nekrologs vielleicht selbst mit einer kurzen Biographie des Verewigten beglücken? In bessere Hände, als in die Ihrigen, könnte die Arbeit nicht kommen.

Meine Neugriechischen Volkslieder sind bald fertig gedruckt (bei Voss in Leipzig); u auch meine Biogr. *Byron's* erscheint wohl in einigen Wochen.

Unsre Reise nach Berlin ist allerdings nur aufgeschoben, nicht aufgehoben, aber der abgesagte Karneval berührt uns nicht, da wir doch wohl erst gegen Ostern kommen.

Ihre schönen Hoffnungen für etwas, das von Seiten der Könige u Fürsten von der Sanktität zum Besten der Griechen geschehen möchte, kann ich nicht theilen. *Selbst!*—oder niemals. Das bleibt mein Wahlspruch. Sollte der grossartige Kampf der Christenheit u Menschheit gegen das Heidenthum u die Barbarei in eine Kabinetsverhandlung endigen?

Empfehlen Sie mich dem geneigten Andenken Ihrer Frau Gemahlin und empfangen Sie die Versicherung der hochachtungsvollen Ergebenheit, mit der ich bin

Ihr

gehorsamster

W. MÜLLER.

Without address: a continuation of Numbers 9 and 10.

The battle of Cassano (August 16, 1705) between Vendôme and Prince Eugene was the fiercest combat on Italian soil during the War of the Spanish Succession. Leopold, who led the

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Prussians, encouraged his troops to deeds of desperate valor which are still the boast of the Prussian army.

Dr. Körte, of Halberstadt, Wolf's son-in-law, published the latter's Life and Studies in two volumes, 1833.

The Life of Byron appeared in Zeitgenossen, Leipzig, 1825, Heft 41 (reprinted in Vermischte Schriften, III, 277).

13. To Adolf Müllner.

Dessau, den 17. Jan. 1826.

Ew. Wohlgeboren

wollen den langen Aufschub meiner Antwort auf Ihre mir sehr ehrenvolle Einladung zur Theilnahme an dem Mitternachtsblatte ja nicht als eine Geringachtung jener Einladung deuten. Ich hätte Ihnen früher einen Entschuldigungsbrief mit ungewissen Versprechungen schicken müssen, und so denke ich, wenn ich heute wenigstens etwas, wenn auch unbedeutende Kleinigkeiten, bringe, Ihnen dadurch meinen guten Willen besser zu bekunden, als durch eine umgehende Antwort ohne Beilage geschehen sein würde. Aufrichtig, Ihre Einladung ist mir nicht allein als solche, zu einem tüchtigen und gewiss zu schönem Gedeihen bestimmten Unternehmen, erfreulich, sondern ganz vorzüglich als ein Beweis, dass die unseligen Missverständnisse, in denen wir eine Zeit lang gestanden haben, Ihnen ebenso so sehr in Vergessenheit gekommen sind, wie mir. Ich bleibe Ihrem freundlichen Entgegenkommen nicht zurück, und versichere Sie, dass bei mir keine Arriere pensée aus Studentenzeiten statt findet.

Wenn die kleinen Gedichte Ihrem Blatte zusagen, so lasse ich gelegentlich wohl mehr folgen. Eine wesentliche und regelmässige Theilnahme kann ich Ihrem Journal aber leider jetzt nicht zusagen, da die Uebernahme eines Theils der Redaktion der grossen Gleditschischen Encyclopädie fast alle meine Mussestunden in Beschlag nimmt, wenigstens für die erste Zeit, ehe ich mich in das neue Geschäft gefunden habe.

Die Honorarbestimmung überlasse ich Ihnen. Bei den Kleinigkeiten, die ich liefere, ist der Punkt nicht von Bedeutung. Eine Mittelzahl meines Journalhonorars ist 3 Louisdor.

Empfangen Sie die Versicherung meiner aufrichtigen Hochachtung, mit der ich die Ehre habe, mich zu nennen

Ew. Wohlgeboren

ergebensten Diener

W. Müller.

Wilhelm Müller had had a youthful admiration for the author of Die Schuld, but as early as 1817 came into a long-drawn-out controversy with Müllner in the Gesellschafter, on the subject of the theater and opera in Berlin. The dispute dragged its

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weary length through the unedifying phases of "Einige Bemerkungen," "Genugthuung für die Oper," "Genugthuung für Herrn Hofrath Müllner," "Nothwendige Erklärungen," "Antworten," and "Verzicht."

Müllner's Mitternachtblatt für gebildete Stände, edited by him from 1826 until his death in 1829, was published in Brunswick.

At the beginning of 1826 Müller joined with Professor G. Hassel, of Weimar, in taking up the editing of Ersch and Gruber's enormous Allgemeine Encyclopädie der Wissenschaften und Künste, published at Leipzig by Johann Friedrich Gleditsch. They undertook the section H—N (see the following letter). Müller's signed contributions are chiefly upon classical and old-Germanic subjects and personages in English literature. The second part of this section (1828) still bears Müller's name, and a number of articles by him. His contributions are also found in the third part (1828). The fifth part (1829) has as frontispiece a large engraving of the deceased poet.

14. To K. H. G. von Meusebach.

Dessau, den 22ten Jan. 1826.

Verehrtester Herr Geheimerath,

Indem ich Ihnen den 8ten Band meiner Bibl. d. D. übergebe, bringe ich Ihnen nur im Auszuge zurück, was Sie mir massenweise aus Ihrer reichen Sammlung zur Benutzung überlassen haben. Was ich in der Vorrede dieses Bandes *bekenne*, ist kein Kompliment für Sie, sondern ein aufrichtiges *Bekenntniss*.

Ich nehme Ihre Güte für den 9ten Band wieder in Anspruch u bitte Sie für mich bei Seite zu legen (durch die erste sichere Gelegenheit lasse ich das Päckchen in Empfang nehmen):

1) Die Sammlungen der *Pegnesis* (oder *Pegnitia?*), worin sich Gedichte von Harsdörfer u Klai befinden.
2) Harsdörfers Frauenzimmergespräche.
3) Desselben Sontagsandachten.
4) Desselb. Nathan, Jotham u Simson.

Von Klai sollen die meisten Gedichte im 1ten Th. der Pegnesis stehn. Was Sie sonst noch einzelnes von ihm besitzen, legen Sie wohl bei. So z. B. das geistl. Lied: Ich habe einen guten Kampf gekämpfet.

Wahrscheinlich werden Harsdörfer u Klai keinen ganzen Band füllem, u ich denke dann Angelus Sil. noch hinzuzufügen. Auch um die beiden Sammlungen von diesem bitte ich Sie dann hernach. Oder wollen Sie sie gleich beilegen, wenn das Päckchen nicht zu gross geworden ist?

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~~Ich bin diese~~ Weihnachten in Dresden gewesen u habe dort Ebert in seinen heimathlichen Bibliothekshallen wieder begrüsst. Auch von Ihnen haben wir da viel gesprochen, von Wolfenbüttel u Ihrem Besuche. Meine Reise war eine halbe Geschäftsreise bei Übernahme eines Theils der Redaktion der grossen Encykl. von Ersch u Gruber, die diese nur bis zu G fortführen. Hassel in Weimar u ich redigiren gleichzeitig die zweite Sektion von H bis N. So ist doch ein Ende abzusehn.

Empfangen Sie die Versicherung meiner aufrichtigen dankbaren Hochachtung u Ergebenheit, mit der ich mich nenne

Ew Hochwohlgeboren

gehorsamsten Diener

W. MÜLLER.

Müller's editing of the popular and successful series, Bibliothek deutscher Dichter des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts, for F. A. Brockhaus (see Number 8), was hardly more than a commercial enterprise, which he carried out with culpable superficiality, publishing ten volumes from 1822 to 1827. The series proved, however, of real value, and is of interest to Americans as being the probable source of Longfellow's translations from Dach and Logau.

Von Meusebach, an aristocratic amateur of philological studies, was indisputably a superior connoisseur of the German literature of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as well as a passionate collector of books in this field. His chief legacy to posterity was his invaluable library, now incorporated in the Royal Library at Berlin. He was a close friend of Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm, and gave a hearty welcome to Hofmann von Fallersleben when the latter came to Berlin as an aspiring and impecunious young scholar. Von Meusebach had made large preparations for an edition of poets of the seventeenth century, precisely those edited by Müller: he had spent no end of work, time, and money on the project, was in possession of the best collection of original materials in existence, and had made extensive and often exhaustive researches upon various matters connected with the subject. One can only wonder at his magnanimity in placing his materials at the disposal of a man who, without special preparation, had assumed his own task.

The eighth volume of the Bibliothek contains the following acknowledgment:

"Die Materialien zu der Auswahl der *Ristischen* Gedichte verdanke ich sämmtlich der reichen Sammlung des Herrn von *Meusebach* in Berlin, dessen gefällige Bereitwilligkeit gegen

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mich um so höher anzuschlagen ist, da mein Unternehmen, die Dichter des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts auszugsweise herauszugeben, einen Plan dieses gelehrten und unermüdlichen Sammlers leider gekreuzt hat. Leider, sage ich; denn das Publikum hat sich darüber gewiss mehr zu beklagen, als der, dessen Markt ich dadurch verdorben habe."

15. To K. H. G. von Meusebach.

Dessau, 17ten März 1827.

Hochverehrtester Herr Geheimerath,

Als Ankündigungsprogramm meines Besuches—ich komme nach Berlin um Palmarum u bleibe wohl ein paar Wochen da—erlauben Sie mir eine Frage u eine Bitte.

Der nächste Band meiner Bibl. d. D. enthält Günther. Von dessen Gedichten giebt es 6 Ausgaben. Ich besitze nur die 5te u habe daraus meine Auswahl gemacht. Nun frage ich: enthalten die sechs Ausgaben bedeutende Varianten, u welche Ausgabe scheint Ihnen in diesem Falle die vorzüglichste?

Daran knüpft sich die Bitte, mir mit nächster Post—denn der Druck soll beginnen—die Ausgabe oder die Ausgaben zu schicken, welche neben der zu Grunde gelegten 5ten besondre Berücksichtigung verdienen.

Reicht aber die 5te für meine Arbeit hin—deren Oberflächlichkeit Ihnen besser bekannt ist, als mir selbst—so bedarf es weder einer Sendung, noch einer Antwort.

Mit Vergnügen sehe ich dem Augenblicke entgegen, wo ich Ihnen persönlich werde sagen können, mit welcher aufrichtigen Hochachtung u Liebe ich bin

Ihr

ganz ergebenster

W. Müller.

The plan of a visit to Berlin in the spring of 1827 seems not to have been carried out: the sickness and weakness which were to end the poet's life had already fallen upon him. At the end of July he made his tour to the Rhine and South Germany, and died on September 30 at Dessau.

Günther made the tenth volume of the Bibliothek (1827), the last one edited by Müller. The series was continued by his friend Karl Förster of Dresden.

Northwestern University. James Taft Hatfield.

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II.—THE ORDER OF CONDITIONAL THOUGHT.

II.

5.

An Application to Latin and Greek.

Much interest has been shown in the question of the two-clause stage of conditional speaking (parataxis) from which it is assumed that *si*- and *εἰ*-clauses have arisen. Much the larger share of attention has been centered on those *si*- and *εἰ*-clauses which refer to the future and have their verb in the subjunctive and optative moods; the burning question has been, What was the nature of the paratactic subjunctive and optative clauses from which these are sprung? With some minor differences of detail, the current answers to this question are the same, namely that these paratactic clauses were expressions of exhortation, will and the like; thus the presence of the subjunctive and optative in the hypotactic clause is explained. This eager haste to account for the presence of the subjunctive and optative in *si*- and *εἰ*-clauses, taken in connection with the general silence about the indicative so used, seems to betray a feeling that the indicative is a normal expression for a conditioning concept-group, and hence needs no explanation when it appears in a hypotactic conditioning clause, whereas the other two moods in question are not natural expressions for that class of thought, and therefore their use in *si*- and *εἰ*-clauses must be explained on other grounds. The fact that the present battle ground lies further on has distracted attention from the carelessness of this assumption that it is the subjunctive and optative that need explanation most when they appear as the expression of a conditioning group, and also from the difficulties of the further assumption that conditioning clauses develop out of hortatory and like expressions. I say that the present battle ground lies further on; for each investigator, taking for granted that the method above outlined is correct, spends his energy in trying to determine the exact nature (hortatory, volitive, optative, and the like) of the expressions from which the *si*- and *εἰ*-clauses are derived, often making the further attempt to square everything

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to his own theory of the original force of the moods in general.[1] Putting aside these vexed questions, I would examine the validity of the underlying method so generally assumed to be correct.[2]

The fundamental difficulty of the assumption that protases with verbs in the subjunctive and optative moods are to be referred to hortatory and like origins is that a hypotactic conditional sentence is evolved from collocations of which the following may be taken as an example,

"Let us give him food; he will go away".

But (cf. the case cited in section 4) the first clause in this combination is a bona fide exhortation—nothing more or less; the words "he will go away" are the one-clause expression of a Consequence Period. For the speaker does not will that the person in question be given food *until* he apprehends that such action will get rid of him. No matter how swift the process of thought may be, the order is unquestionably,

"If we give him food, he will go away; let us give it".

It is doubtless true that sentences of the type,

"Let us give him food; he will go away",

stood side by side with paratactic conditional speaking, just as they now stand beside it and hypotactic conditional speaking as well; but there is no evidence that they influenced the mood of protasis, and, least of all, that any form of protasis is evolved from them. Indeed, the analysis of the thought in the example above shows the extreme difficulty of such an evolution. If that demonstration is not wholly convincing, the argument from the negative can hardly fail to complete the proof. Thus Schmalz (Lat. Gramm.[3] § 338) notes that *ne*=*ni*, in this way quite consistently providing for the evolution of a negative condition from a prohibition. But complete such a collocation; e. g.;

"Don't do it; you will be hurt".

[1] An interesting example of this is Hale's paper on The Origin of Subjunctive and Optative Conditions in Greek and Latin, Harvard Studies in Clas. Phil., Vol., XII (1901) p. 109 ff., and the review of the same by Dittmar, Berl. Phil. Woch. Vol. XXII, Nos. 11 and 12 (Mch. 15 and 22, 1902).

[2] This method I outline as it is generally understood. If I do injustice to any, a restatement is in order. It will then be possible to measure the same by the considerations noted in this paper.

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According to the theory discussed this should yield,

"If you don't do it, you will be hurt".

This of course is impossible—it just reverses the speaker's meaning; his thought and its order are,

"If you do that, you will be hurt; don't do it".

The difficulty may be more patent in this example, but it is just as real in the other, and it throws a heavy burden of proof on those who maintain that subjunctive and optative *si-* and *ei-*clauses are evolved from hortatory, volitive, and like expressions.

In the second place, with reference to the assumption that the subjunctive and optative moods are a less natural expression for a conditioning concept-group than is the indicative. We may perhaps judge of this best by taking a concrete example; suppose a mother sees her child standing before the fire, apparently deliberating whether to touch it or not; her thought will instantly leap to the result of such a course of action, and she might express herself paratactically,

"Touch fire, burn hand".

The underlying thought is a Consequence Period, and the words "Touch fire" are the expression of a conditioning concept-group. Now what mood would be most naturally used in this conditioning clause? When the mother utters the words she does not know nor does she express an opinion as to whether the act in question will or will not happen; but if the matter be pressed along those lines, we can say no more than that the speaker apprehends that the act *may perhaps* happen. Is the indicative the mood of all moods to fit situations of this sort? The very fact that the speaker is not asserting that an act will take place, and is simply naming a possibility suggested to her mind by the action of another, ought, it seems to me, to raise a very serious doubt about the correctness of the assumption that the indicative is any more suited to be the expression of a conditioning concept-group than are the subjunctive and optative moods.[1] May I not

[1] It is possible that my point of view in this paragraph may be misunderstood. In calling attention to the fact that a conditioning clause is not an assertion, I mean to merely bring out the fact that a conditioning concept-group has no more affinity for the usual range of meaning assigned to the indicative than for that assigned to the subjunctive or optative—not meaning,

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go a step further and say that when the question is considered (as here) with reference simply to the nature of the thought to be expressed, it seems altogether probable that all three moods stood originally in paratactic protasis *on their own merits*, i. e., that the range of meaning attached to these various mood forms was wide enough to include, in each case, the expression of this peculiar kind of intellection we call a conditioning concept-group.

It is possible to pass judgment on this question without introducing any prejudice arising from individual views as to the original meaning of the moods. For those who hold that mood forms had originally fixed and differentiated meanings, will, I think, find that the range of meanings assigned by them to subjunctive and optative forms would easily include the expression of a conditioning concept-group—if anything, more easily than would the range of meaning assigned to the indicative. Those, on the other hand, who hold to the theory that the meaning attached to early mood forms was vague and shifting will find still less difficulty in conceiving of a conditioning concept-group as finding expression in different moods; on their hypothesis such a variety of expression would be the thing to be expected. If we once grant that all three moods may have stood in paratactic protasis on their own merits, the presence of these moods in hypotactic *si* and *ei-* clauses obviously no longer forces us to shoulder the very serious difficulty which (as shown above) is involved in the assumption that these hypotactic clauses are an evolution from hortatory, volitive and like expressions.[1]

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of course, that it coincides with any of the ordinarily recognized functions of these two last named moods; for a conditioning concept-group is *sui generis*, and its verbal expression is therefore a sui generis use of whatever mood is employed. My contention is merely that the thought of a conditioning clause shows enough affinity for the meanings usually assigned to the subjunctive and optative to make it just as natural to suppose that it in some cases used these moods as it is to suppose that the indicative was so used in others. In passing judgment on this point I must ask the reader to exclude anything that would come under the head of general "conditions"; for the thought there involved differs in a very important particular from that in a pure conditioning clause.

[1] One of the reasons that led to this assumption originally was doubtless the conception of parataxis referred to in footnote, p. 37, namely, that, in reconstructing a parataxis, we should not assume a use of a mood not found in independent sentences. From this point of view it was quite natural to look to hortatory, optative and like expressions as a source from which to develop

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In view of the nature of conditional thought as described in this this paper, and with further illumination from the discussion of the current view of the genesis of *si*- and *εἰ*-clauses in this section, we might thus write a chapter in the history of Latin and Greek conditional speaking. At one time pairs of clauses (with the aid of various defining elements, such as the tone of voice and the general circumstances under which the words were spoken) were a common means for the expression of conditional thought-periods. Inasmuch as the thought formed a *period* there was an inner connection of meaning between the clauses, but the function of conveying this meaning had not yet been delegated to a single word. In the clause that gave expression to the conditioning group sometimes one, sometimes another mood was found, the different moods being used on their own merits as natural expressions for the peculiar kind of thought to be conveyed. Taking for granted (as is very possibly the case) that *si*- and *εἰ*-clauses are not the result of substitution (the fourth stage described in section 4), it only remained for the forms which we know as *si* and *εἰ* to become the felt verbal expression of the inner connection of meaning existing between the clauses in the paratactic combinations in order to produce the hypotactic periods of historical times.[1]

To complete the presentation of my theory as to the nature of subjunctive and optative uses in the paratactic stage of Latin and Greek conditional speaking, it is necessary to consider two forms of expression that are found in Latin alongside of the *si*-clause. One is the conditional clause "with *si* omitted", the

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si- and *ei*- clauses. Strangely enough, it was not noticed that the use of the indicative in a conditioning clause is sui generis—it cannot be paralleled in independent sentences, and for the simple reason that a conditioning concept-group torn away from a conditioned group at once ceases to be such. Admitting the sui generis use of the indicative in parataxis, there is no bar to supposing a similar use of the other moods. Perhaps we should not be surprised at the failure to recognize that the meaning of the indicative in protasis is a peculiar and distinctive one, for even yet it is no rarity to find in Latin grammars a statement to the effect that the indicative "states the condition as a fact".

[1] It will be noted that no attempt is here made to determine the process by which *si* and *ei* became attached to conditioning clauses; that question may perhaps be solved by reconstruction. The origin of the use of the subjunctive and optative in protasis I conceive to be too remote to be reached in that way; I therefore *con*struct it from the nature of conditional thought itself.

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other is a sort of emasculated volitive subjunctive. This last may be illustrated by such a passage as—

Juv. Sat. XVI, 29 ff.;

> Da testem, iudex cum dixerit, *audeat* ille
> Nescio quis, pugnos qui vidit, dicere Vidi,
> *Et* credam dignum barba dignumque capillis
> Maiorum.

Here the coordinating conjunction *Et* shows that *audeat* means "Let him dare" and not "Should he dare". There is a use of the imperative quite parallel to this; e. g.—

Pers. Sat. I, 48 ff.;

> Sed recti finemque extremumque esse recuso
> Euge tuum et belle. Nam belle hoc *excute* totum;
> Quid non intus habet?

It is not always possible to decide whether we are dealing with this emasculated use of the volitive subjunctive or with a simple paratactic conditioning clause. On the written page our feeling is influenced by the punctuation. This may be seen by reading the following passages from Juvenal, first with a semicolon, then with a comma—

Sat. III, 78;

> Graeculus esuriens in caelum *iusseris;* ibit.

Sat. VI, 331 ff.;

> *Abstuleris* spem
> Servorum; venit et conductus aquarius.

Sat. VI, 627 ff.;

> Oderunt natos de paelice; nemo *repugnet,*
> Nemo *vetet;* iam iam privignum occidere fas est.

Sat. XIII, 214 ff.;

> Albani veteris pretiosa senectus
> Displicet; *ostendas* melius; densissima ruga
> Cogitur in frontem velut acri ducta Falerno.

Read with a semicolon each of these passages appear to have the weakened volitive force sometimes shown by the subjunctive.

The other form of expression to which I have referred—the conditional clause "with *si* omitted"—perhaps represents an unbroken tradition from a time when paratactic conditional speak-

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ing was the rule. Here if anywhere is to be found the recourse to parataxis (Schmalz, Lat. Gramm.[3] §335) that may instruct us as to the nature of early paratactic speaking. E. g.—

Hor. Sat. II. 5. 74 ff.;

> Scribet mala carmina vecors,
> Laudato.

Here is an example of the indicative in its sui generis use as the expression of a conditioning concept-group. Lane (Lat. Gram. 1701) cites another interesting case of the same kind—

Plaut. Ps. 863;

> si iste ibit, ito; stabit, astato simul.

It is harder to find examples of the subjunctive that all will admit are used in just this way. For, as noted above, we have only to strengthen the punctuation in many cases to suggest to the reader the emasculated volitive use of the mood. However Lane (Lat. Gram. 1574) vouches for the fact that the parallel weakened use of the imperative appears but *once* in early Latin. In view of that statement we ought not to assume a large use of the weakened volitive subjunctive as early as Plautus at any rate, for the two uses seem equally rhetorical; the weaker punctuation (comma) would in most cases probably be a truer guide to the writer's thought. But, aside from any such consideration, there are clear cases enough. E. g.—

Cic. in Verr. II. 5. 65. 168;

> *cognosceret* hominen, aliquid de summo supplicio remitteres;
> si ignoraret, tum . . . hoc iuris in omnes constitueres.

In view of *si ignoraret* it is hard to escape the conclusion that, to Cicero, *cognosceret* meant "should he recognize the man," i. e., that it is the simple and direct expression of a conditioning concept-group. There is no need to multiply examples, for this use of the subjunctive is generally recognized. But some emphasis does need to be laid on the probable frequency of its occurrence in Latin, and on its peculiar claim to recognition as a living descendant of ancient paratactic conditional speaking.[1]

[1] Despite its rhetorical character and apparently late development, Hale (Harvard Studies, XII, p. 116) proposes to make the emasculated volitive use a step in the development of *si-* and *ei*-clauses. He accepts as correct the method which evolves these from volitive and like expressions, but feels the

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The customary treatment of this subject will lead the reader to expect that something will be said about the negative in paratactic protasis. In attacking that question one should put aside any prejudice arising from a theory concerning the negative used with early hortatory, optative or like expressions, for according to the theory here proposed these do not figure in the evolution

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difficulty (pointed out earlier in this section) in passing from e. g., an exhortation to a hypotactic conditioning clause. He proposes that we make the emasculated use of the volitive subjunctive which grows out of a genuine volitive use an intermediate step. This is looking in the right direction in so far as it is an attempt to get rid of the troublesome element of will that is so conspicuously absent from the *si-* and *ei-*clauses; but it does not bridge the chasm to the latter. For the emasculated volitive subjunctive is no more ripe for a change to hypotaxis than is the weakened imperative (see above, Pers. Sat. I. 48 ff.) In these weakened uses the force of the two moods is practically identical, and the subjunctive as little as the imperative could be forced, grammatically speaking, into a subordinate clause. But waiving this consideration, there still remains another difficulty. If we accept Hale's view, we are asked to suppose that subjunctive and optative uses in independent sentences became fixed much as they are in the historical period, that (presumably much later) weakened uses corresponding to the literal meanings sprang up, and that, after some further development, these moods appeared as the direct and unqualified expression of a conditioning concept-group. One feels moved to ask: Was there no such thing as a simple, pure conditioning clause containing any mood except the indicative until the meanings of subjunctive and optative forms passed through this long process of development?

The necessity of shouldering such difficulties at once vanishes if we but admit that the subjunctive and the optative are as natural an expression for a conditioning concept-group as is the indicative. Then we are free to suppose that any of these moods may have stood in the conditioning clauses of sentences of the type: "Touch fire, burn hand." On that hypothesis the presence of all three mood forms in *si-* and *ei-*clauses calls for no explanation or apology; in fact it is just the thing to be expected. Further, this hypothesis does not compel us to assume a paratactic form from which it is difficult to evolve a hypotactic conditional sentence, for sentences of the type "Touch fire, burn hand," are the expression of conditional thought-periods pure and simple—a process of thought that is in all essential particulars identical with that which finds expression in the hypotactic conditional sentence. At the time when paratactic speaking was the rule we may well suppose that, *alongside of* the two-clause conditional sentence there stood the one-clause type with exhortation or prohibition prefixed (e. g., "Let us give him food; he will go away," and "Don't do it; you will be hurt"), the exhortation or prohibition in these expressions affecting not at all the mood of paratactic protasis. As for the emasculated volitive use of the subjunctive, we may say that it seems to be a late and rhetorical use occasionally employed as a sort of mechanical substitute for a hypotactic conditioning clause.

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of the hypotactic conditional clause. Taking up the problem without any preconceived notion, the fact that the exclusive negative for εἰ-clauses is μή, whereas in Latin the corresponding form *ne* does not appear in hypotactic conditioning clauses (except perchance in a disguised form) though *non* is used quite freely, inclines one to believe that the early use of negatives in paratactic protasis was not very discriminating. The somewhat unsettled use of negatives in general even as late as Plautus makes such a supposition less difficult. In Greek a similar question may be raised with reference to the presence of κέ and ἄν in paratactic protasis. Here we are not left to conjecture. For, as late as Homer, hypotactic protases containing either future indicative, subjunctive or optative forms, may or may not have κέ or ἄν with their verb (Goodwin, Greek Moods and Tenses, § 460). The same, or even a more, unsettled use is doubtless to be assumed for an earlier period. However, it is doubtful whether this question should be raised at all with reference to the very remote period under discussion.

6.

Before leaving this subject one other point should be touched upon, namely, the syntactical form in which conditional thought finds expression, e. g., in the interrogative conditional sentence. The interrogative form has two varieties, distinguished in Latin as Sentence and Quis Questions. Conditional thought in the Consequence order finds natural expression in the Sentence Question. E. g., take the thought which underlies the sentence used in section 2 as an expression of a Consequence Period:

"If we do that (i. e., take out the prop), the wall will fall".

In a course of thought otherwise just like this, the speaker may not be absolutely sure that the coming to pass of one event entails the coming to pass of another, though he sees that such a relation is probably to be assumed. If, in such a case, he feels called upon to express his thought to those whom he knows to be less well informed than himself about the matter in question, he will be apt to qualify his presentation by "perhaps" or the like:

"If we take out the prop, *perhaps* the wall will fall".

On the other hand, if conscious that the hearers are better

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informed than himself, the same Consequence Period might lead him to ask,

"If we take out the prop, will the wall fall?"

A simple Proviso Period uninfluenced by preceding groups cannot call for expression in this interrogative form. For if we take the sentence used in section 3 as an illustration of thought in the Proviso order,

"He will come—that is, if it does not rain",

and add an element of uncertainty that might lead the speaker to ask,

"Will he come—that is, if it does not rain?"

this uncertainty no longer concerns (as above) the relation between the conditioning and the conditioned groups, but the fact that "Will he come?" is a question shows that the group *is already contingent* before the conditioning group appears in the mind; later it is again modified by this conditioning group. The fact that the (ultimately) conditioned group of every simple Proviso Period does not become contingent until the possible hindering circumstance, on the converse of which the conditioning clause is based, rises in consciousness, seems to preclude this order of conditional thought from finding a natural expression in the type of conditional sentence now under discussion.

The Quis Question may appear when a speaker apprehends that the coming to pass of one event entails something, the exact nature of which he does not know, e. g.,

"If we take out the prop, *what* will happen?"

Both Consequence and Proviso Periods may find expression in this type of conditional sentence.

In a discussion of the order of conditional thought the other syntactical forms seem to offer little of interest, the two orders apparently finding expression in them with equal facility. E. g., the apodosis may be an expression of will or the like:

"If he pulls out the prop, run".
"Come—that is, if it does not rain".

The same is true of the negative, whether it appears in protasis or apodosis, as the reader may readily see for himself by manipu-

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lating the examples already given as illustrations of Consequence and Proviso Periods. The main point of interest here, perhaps, is the fondness of the Proviso Period for expression in sentences using as the negative for the conditioning clause "unless" (*nisi*), e. g.,

> "He will come—that is, unless it rains".
> "He will not come—that is, unless he is obliged".

7.

In drawing to a close the discussion of the order of conditional thought, it would perhaps be well to state again the point of view of this paper and sum up its results. The point of departure in the investigation is conditional *thought*—meaning by that term, not the process by which words are chosen for the expression of that thought, but *the thought itself*, this last often being so rapid that it may be completed before the speaker can single out the first word for its expression. First has been considered the difference in this "scheme of thought" according to the order of the conditioning and conditioned groups. Then follows a description of the verbal forms through which conditional thought finds expression (sections 4 and 6), with a concrete application to the problem of Latin and Greek conditional speaking.

Syntax will now come forward with a pile of written hypotactic conditional sentences, asking a very different question from those raised above, namely, whether we may classify sentences according as the speaker's thought is a Consequence or a Proviso Period, and if so, how. In attacking this problem, it may be first noted that the thought which finds expression in the conditional *sentence* varies widely; at least three categories may be recognized. In the first place, many conditional sentences are the expression of Consequence and Proviso Periods that flash through the speaker's mind simply and naturally, suggested by the surroundings in which he is. A second class of conditional sentences are those which express a more artificial type of conditional thought; e. g., a person who is writing a careful and studied composition may lean back in his chair with a long course of thought mapped out in his mind, considering what form of words will produce the most desirable effect on the hearer; as a train of words suggests itself to his mind, he accepts

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it or rejects it solely from this point of view. If in this train of *words* there chances to occur a conditional sentence, I suppose some conditional thought accompanies them, but it certainly lacks the spontaneous character of that in the first class mentioned. A more striking illustration of this artificial type of conditional thought is seen when a person "thinks up" a conditional sentence that does not express his real sentiment at all, that he may use it as a means of deceiving the hearer as to his own state of mind.[1] The third category contains those conditional sentences which are not the expression of conditional thought at all really. We may even question whether we should not include in this class such stock expressions as,

"I would not do that, if I were you".

When a mother says this to her child, does she really put herself in the child's place and forecast her own action under the circumstances? I doubt it, in the great majority of cases; she is probably merely repeating a form of words she has fallen into a way of using when she wishes to discourage a certain line of action—the sentence is really the expression of a mild prohibition.[2]

In trying to classify sentences according to the thought order, sentences of this third class must be counted out, for they provide no conditional thought for us to classify. As for the sentences that fall within the other two categories, it should be noted that the order of *clauses* in the hypotactic sentence is altogether unreliable as an indication of the speaker's thought order. Often the variation between the two is the result of a

[1] In some ways similar to these situations and yet different from them is the case of a person who *repeats*, either exactly or in substance, a conditional sentence that has been spoken in his hearing or that he has read. This must happen very often, e. g., in the writing of history.

[2] Another example of the same kind is afforded by sentences of the type "If I know anything, I know this"; such a sentence is only an artificial way of saying "I am very certain of this". Even the spontaneous diction of Plautus goes thus far:

Amph. 271 ff.:

Certe edepol, si quicquamst aliud quod credam aut certo sciam,
Credo ego hac noctu Nocturnum obdormivisse ebrium.

This type of sentence is very common later; see Cic. ad Att. I. 16. 1, ad Fam. VI. 14. 1, XV. 4. 13.

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wholly natural tendency to leave unexpressed or relegate to second place what will be readily understood, presenting only or first the new idea. Thus, in the example of a Consequence Period used in section 2, when A says to B "Let us take out this prop", B's order of thought is faithfully represented by "If we do that, the wall will fall". However, the idea "our taking out the prop" is already present in the minds of both speakers; in B's mind it becomes a conditioning concept-group, as it suggests to him the outcome of the projected action. If B should choose to give full verbal expression to his last thought only, and say "The wall will fall", A would probably catch his meaning because he knows the starting point of the thought. Wishing to make himself perfectly clear, B might add as a tag to the words above, "if we do that", the whole sentence, "The wall will fall, if we do that", thus, by a wholly natural process, using in its clauses an order just the reverse of that of the thought. Similarly in the Proviso Period the new thought (in this case the conditioning group) may find expression in the prior clause. To use the same example as in section 3, when A says to B, "I want C to come over to my house this afternoon. Do you think he will come?" B's thought order is faithfully represented by "He will come, if it does not rain". But he would be perfectly well understood if he should say simply, "If it does not rain;" or, if he chose, he might add to this the further clause, "he will come", i. e., "If it does not rain, he will come", thus again naturally enough using an order of clauses the reverse of that of the thought.

Our main reliance in determining the thought order is the ability to detect the presence or the absence of the implication (e. g., "otherwise not") that goes with the Proviso Period (see section 3). Wherever we feel this implication to be a part of the speaker's thought or of the thought he wishes to suggest to the hearer, we may classify the sentence under the Proviso category, there being no objection to extending the use of this name to cover the sentence by which this order of conditional thought is conveyed. The tone and manner of the speaker are potent factors in suggesting to the hearer the Proviso implication, and this puts us somewhat at a disadvantage in dealing with the written page. But our understanding of the general situation in which the words are spoken helps to a conclusion as to the presence or the absence of the implication, as, for instance, in dealing

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with the language of a spirited dialogue such as may be found in Plautus; in such cases we can also sometimes see how the words of one speaker suggest a concept-group to the mind of another, and we can determine with almost absolute certainty the order of the latter's thought according as this group finds expression in the protasis or the apodosis of his reply. I leave the matter with these few suggestions, the present discussion being one of general principles merely.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. H. C. NUTTING.

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III.—THE IMPERFECT INDICATIVE IN EARLY LATIN.

1. Introductory.

It is the purpose of this paper to define and differentiate the various uses of the imperfect indicative, to discover if possible their origin and trace their interrelations, to outline in fact the history of the tense in early Latin. The term 'early Latin' is used somewhat elastically as including not only all the remains of the language down to about the time of Sulla, but also the first volume of inscriptions (to 44 B. C.) and the works of Varro, for Varro belongs distinctly to the older school of writers in spite of the fact that the Rerum rusticarum libri were written as late as 37 B. C. But exact chronological periods are of little meaning in matters of this sort, and the present outline, being but a fragment of a more complete history of the tense, may stop at this point as well as another.

Before proceeding to the investigation of the cases of the imperfect occurring in early Latin it is necessary to describe briefly the system by which these cases have been classified. In the first place all cases of the same verb have been placed together so that the individual verb forms the basis of classification.[1] Then verbs of similar meanings have been combined to form larger groups. There result three main groups (and some subdivisions) which for the better understanding of this paper may be tabulated thus:

I. Verbs of physical action or state.
   1. Motion of the whole of a body, e. g. *eo*, *curro*.
   2. Action of a part of a body, e. g. *do*, *iacio*.
   3. Verbal communication, e. g. *dico*, *promitto*.
   4. Rest or state, e. g. *sum*, *sto*, *sedeo*.

II. Verbs of psychic action or state.
   1. Thought, e. g. *puto*, *scio*, *spero*.
   2. Feeling, e. g. *metuo*, *amo*.
   3. Will, e. g. *volo*, *nolo*.

[1] Cf. Trans. Am. Philolog. Ass., XXX, 1899, pp. 14-15.

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III. Auxiliary verbs, i. e. verbs which represent such English words as *could, should, might*, &c., &c., e. g. *possum, oportet, decet.*

Such a system has, of course, many inconsistencies. The verb *ago*, for instance, may be a verb of action (I. 2) or of verbal communication (I. 3), but since instances of this sort were comparatively rare and affected no important groups of verbs it has seemed best not to separate cases of the same verb.

Again I. 3 is logically a part of I. 2, or the verbs grouped under III might perhaps have been distributed among the different subdivisions of I and II. But the object of the classification, to discover the function of each case, has seemed best attained by grouping the verbs as described. By this system verbs of similar meaning, whose tenses are therefore similarly affected, are brought together and this is the essential point. In a very large collection of cases a stricter subdivision would doubtless prove of advantage.

2. The Facts[1] of Usage.

There are about 1400 cases of the imperfect indicative in the period covered by this investigation. Of these, however, it has been necessary to exclude[2] from 175 to 180 leaving 1226 from a consideration of which the results have been obtained. The tense appears, therefore, not to have been a favorite, and its comparative infrequency which I have noted already for Plautus and Terence[3] may here be asserted for the whole period of early Latin. About three-quarters of the total number of cases are supplied by Plautus, Terence, and Varro (see Table I).

A study of these 1226 cases reveals three general uses of the imperfect indicative:

I. The progressive or true imperfect.

II. The aoristic imperfect.

III. The 'shifted' imperfect.

Let us consider these in order.

[1] In the following pages I have made an effort to state and illustrate the facts, reserving theory and discussion for the third section of this paper.

[2] These are cases doubtful for one reason or another, chiefly because of textual corruption or insufficient context. For the latter reason perhaps too many cases have been excluded, but I have chosen to err in this direction since so much of the material consists of fragments where one cannot feel absolutely certain of the force of the tense.

[3] Trans. Am. Philolog. Ass., XXX, p. 22.

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The true imperfect shows several subdivisions:

I A. The simple progressive imperfect.

I B. The imperfect of customary past action.

I C. The frequentative imperfect.

Of these I A and I B include several more or less distinct variations, but all three uses together with their subdivisions betray their relationship by the fact that all possess or are immediately derived from the progressive[1] function. This progressive idea, the indication of an act as progressing, going on, taking place, in past time or the indication of a state as vivid, is the true ear-mark of the tense. The time may be in the distant past or at any point between that and the immediate past or it may even in many contexts extend into the present. In duration the time may be so short as to be inappreciable or it may extend over years. The time is, however, not a distinguishing mark of the imperfect. The perfect may be described in the same terms.

The kind of action[2] remains, therefore, the real criterion in the distinction[3] of the imperfect from other past tenses.

I A. The Simple Progressive Imperfect.

Under this heading are included all cases in which the tense indicates simple progressive action, i. e. something in the 'doing', 'being',[4] &c. The idea of progression is present in all the cases, but there are in other respects considerable differences according to which some distinct varieties may be noted. All told there are 680 cases of this usage constituting more than half the total (1226).

[1] I have chosen *progressive* as more expressive than *durative* which seems to emphasize too much the time.

[2] 'Kind of action' will translate the convenient German *Aktionsart* while 'time' or 'period of time' may stand for *Zeitstufe*.

[3] Herbig in his very interesting discussion, Aktionsart und Zeitstufe (I. F. 1896), §107, comes to the conclusion that 'Aktionsart' is older than 'Zeitstufe' and that though many tenses are used timelessly none are used in living speech without 'Aktionsart.'

[4] The progressive effect is also found in the present participle (and in participial adjectives), and indeed the imperfect, especially in subordinate clauses, is often interchangeable with a participial expression, falling naturally into participial form in English also. How close the effect of the imperfect was to that of the present participle is well illustrated by Terence, Heaut. 293-4 *nebat . . . texebat* and 285 *texentem . . . offendimus*. Cf. Varro R. R. III, 2. 2 cited on p. 167.

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Of these 449 are syntactically independent, 231 dependent.[1] In its ordinary form this usage is so well understood that we may content ourselves with a few illustrations extending over the different groups of verbs.

I. 1. Verbs of motion.

Plautus,[2] Aul. 178, Praesagibat mi animus frustra me ire, quom *exibam* domo.

[1] With the principles of formal description as last and best expressed by Morris (On Principles and Methods of Syntax, 1901, pp. 197-8) all syntacticians will, I believe, agree. Nearly all of them will be found well illustrated in the present paper. For purposes of tense study, however, I have been unable to see any essential modification in function resulting from variation of person and number, although some uses have become almost idiomatic in certain persons, e. g. the immediate past usage with first person sing. of verbs of motion (p. 15). Just how far tense function is affected by the kind of sentence in which the tense stands I am not prepared to say. In cases accompanied by a negative or standing in an interrogative sentence the tense function is more difficult to define than in simple affirmative sentences. It is easier also to define the tense function in some forms of dependent clauses, e. g. temporal, causal, than in others. This is an interesting phenomenon, needing for its solution a larger and more varied collection of cases than mine. At present I do not feel that the influence upon the tense of any of these elements is definite enough to call for greater complexity in the system of classification. While, therefore, I have borne these points constantly in mind, the tables show the results rather than the complete method of my work in this respect.

[2] In the citation of cases the following editions are used:

Fragments of the dramatists, O. Ribbeck, Scaenicae Romanorum poesis fragmenta (I & II), Lipsiae 1897-8 (third edition).

Plautus, Goetz and Schoell, T. Macci Plauti comoediae (editio minor), Lipsiae 1892-6.

Terence, Dziatzko, P. Terenti Afri comoediae, Lipsiae 1884.

Orators, H. Meyer, Oratorum romanorum fragmenta, Turici 1842.

Historians, C. Peter, Historicorum Romanorum fragmenta, Lipsiae 1883.

Cato, H. Keil, M. Porci Catonis de agricultura liber, Lipsiae 1895, and H. Jordan, M. Catonis praeter lib. de re rustica quae extant, Lipsiae 1860.

Lucilius, L. Mueller, Leipsic 1872.

Auctor ad Herennium, C. L. Kayser, Cornifici rhetoricorum ad C. Herennium libri tres, Lipsiae 1854.

Inscriptions, Th. Mommsen, C. I. L. I.

Ennius (the Annals), L. Mueller, Q. Enni carminum reliquiae, Petropoli 1884.

Naevius (Bell. poen.), L. Mueller, Q. Enni carminum reliquiae, Petropoli 1884.

Varro, H. Keil, M. Terenti Varronis rerum rusticarum libri tres, Lipsiae 1883.

Varro, A. Spengel, M. Terenti Varronis de lingua latina, Berolini 1885.

Varro, Bücheler, M. Terenti Varronis saturarum Menippearum reliquiae, Lipsiae 1865.

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Id. Amph. 199, Nam quom pugnabant maxume, ego tum *fugiebam* maxume.

Lucilius, Sat., XVI. 12, '*ibat* forte aries' inquit;

I. 2. Verbs of action.

Ex incertis incertorum fabulis (comoed. pall.) p. 137, XXIV. R., sed sibi cum tetulit coronam ob coligandas nuptias,
Tibi *ferebat;* cum simulabat se sibi alacriter dare,
Tum ad te ludibunda docte et delicate detulit.

Plautus, Truc. 198 . . . atque opperimino: iam exibit, nam *lavabat.*

Cf. id. Men. 564 (ferebam), Mil. 1336 (temptabam), Epid. 138 (mittebam); Terence, Andr. 545 (dabam); Auctor ad Herenn. 4, 20, 27 (oppetebat).

I. 3. Verbal communication.

Plautus, Men. 1053, Quin modo
Erupui, homines qui ferebant te . . .
Apud hasce aedis. tu *clamabas* deum fidem,

Ex incert. incert. &c. 282. XXXII. R., Vidi te, Ulixes saxo sternentem Hectora,
Vidi tegentem clipeo classem Doricam:
Ego tunc pudendam trepidus *hortabar* fugam.

I. 4. State.

Plautus, Aul. 376, Atque eo fuerunt cariora, aes non *erat.*

Id. Mil. 181, Sed Philocomasium hicine etiam nunc est? Pe. Quom exibam, hic *erat.*

Varro, R. R. III. 2. 2., ibi Appium Claudium augurem sedentem invenimus . . . *sedebat* ad sinistram ei Cornelius Merula . . .

Cf. also Plautus, Rud. 846, (*sedebant*), Amph. 603 (*stabam*) &c. &c.

II. 1. Verbs of thought.

Hist. frag. p. 70, l. 7, Et tum quo irent *nesciebant*, ilico manserunt.

Plautus, Pseud. 500-1, Non a me *scibas* pistrinum in mundo tibi,
Quom ea muss[c]itabas? Ps. *Scibam.*

Cf. also Plautus, Rud. 1186, (*credebam*); Varro R. R. I. 2. 25. (*ignorabat*), &c.

II. 2. Feeling.

Plautus, Epid. 138, *Desipiebam* mentis, quom illa scripta mittebam tibi.

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Id. Bacch. 683, Bacchidem atque hunc *suspicabar* propter crimen, Chrysale,

II. 3. Will.

Lucilius, Sat. incert. 48, fingere praeterea adferri quod quisque *volebat*:

In these cases the act or state indicated by the tense is always viewed as at some considerable distance in the past even though in reality it may be distant by only a few seconds. The speaker or writer stands aloof, so to speak, and views the event as at some distance and as confined within certain fairly definite limits in the past. If, now, the action be conceived as extending to the immediate past or the present of the speaker, a different effect is produced, although merely the limits within which the action progresses have been extended. This phase of the progressive imperfect we might term the imperfect of the immediate past[1] or the interrupted[2] imperfect, since the action of the verb is often interrupted either by accomplishment or by some other event. A few citations will make these points clearer:

Plautus, Stich. 328, ego quid me velles *visebam*.

Nam mequidem harum *miserebat*. = 'I was coming to see what you wanted of me (when I met you); for I've been pitying (and still pity) these women.' In the first verb the action is interrupted by the meeting; in the second it continues into the present, the closest translation being our English compound progressive perfect, a tense which Latin lacked. The imperfect *ibam* is very common in this usage, cf. Plautus, Truc. 921, At ego ad te *ibam* = I was on my way to see you (when you called me), cf. Varro, R. R. II. 11. 12; Terence, Phorm. 900, Andr. 580.

But the usage is by no means confined to verbs of motion (I. 1) alone. It extends over all the categories:

I. 2. Motion.

Plautus, Aulul. 827 (*apparabas*), cf. Andr. 656.

[1] In Greek the aorist is used of events just past, but of course with no progressive coloring, cf. Brugmann in I. Müller's Handbuch, &c., II², p. 185.

[2] E. Rodenbusch, De temporum usu Plautino quaest. selectae, Argentorati 1888, pp. 11-12, recognizes and correctly explains this usage, adding some examples of similar thoughts expressed by the present, e. g. Plautus, Men. 280 (quaeris), ibid. 675 (quaerit), Amph. 542 (numquid vis, a common leave-taking formula). In such cases the speaker uses imperfect or present according as past or present predominates in his mind, the balance between the two being pretty even.

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I. 3. Verbal communication.

Terence, Eun. 378 (*iocabar*), Heaut. 781 (*dicebam*); Plautus, Trin. 212 (*aibant*).

I. 4. Rest.

Plautus, Cas. 532 (*eram*), cf. Men. 1135. Terence, Eun. 87 (*stabam*), Phorm. 573 (*commorabar*).

II. 1. Thought.

Terence, Phorm. 582 (*scibam*), cf. Heaut. 309. Plautus, Men. 1072 (*censebam*), cf. Bacch. 342, As. 385 &c.

II. 2. Feeling.

Plautus, Stich. 329 (*miserebat*); Turpilius, 107 V R. (*sperabam*).

II. 3. Will.

Plautus, As. 392 and 395 (*volebam*), Most. 9, Poen. 1231.[1]

III. Auxiliary verbs.

Plautus, Epid. 98 (*solebam*), cf. Amph. 711. Terence, Phormio 52 (*conabar*).

In this usage the present or immediate past is in the speaker's mind only less strongly than the point in the past at which the verb's action begins. The pervading influence of the present is evident not only because present events are usually at hand in the context, but also from the occasional use with the imperfect of a temporal particle or expression of the present, cf. Plaut. Merc. 884, Quo *nunc ibas* = 'whither were you (are you) going?' Terence, Andr. 657, immo etiam, quom tu minus scis aerumnas meas,

Haec nuptiae non *adparabantur* mihi,

[1] Rodenbusch (p. 26) labors hard to show that this case is like the preceding and not parallel with the cases of *volui* which he cites on p. 24 with all of which an infinitive of the verb in the main clause is either expressed or to be supplied. Following Bothe, he alters *deicere* to *dice* (which he assigns to Adelphasium) and refers *quod* to the *amabo* and *amplexabor* of 1230 = 'meine Absicht'. But there is no need of this. Infinitives occur with some of the cases cited by Rodenbusch himself on p. 11, e. g. Bacch. 188 (189) *Istuc volebam ... percontarier*, Trin. 195 *Istuc volebam scire*, to which may be added Cas. 674 *Dicere vilicum volebam* and ibid. 702 *illud ... dicere volebam*. It is true that the perfect is more common in such passages, but the imperfect is by no means excluded. The difference is simply one of the speaker's point of view: *quod volui* = 'what I wished' (complete); *quod volebam* = 'what I was and am wishing' (incomplete). As. 212, which also troubles Rodenbusch, is customary past.

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Nec *postulabat nunc* quisquam uxorem dare.

Merc. 197, Equidem me *iam* censebam esse in terra atque in tuto loco:

Verum video . . .

In the last two cases note the accompanying presents, *scis* and *video*.

The immediate past also is indicated by a particle, e. g. Plautus, Cas. 594 ad te hercle *ibam* commodum.

There are in all 207[1] cases of this imperfect of the immediate past. They are distributed pretty evenly over the various groups of verbs as will be seen from the following table:

		No. of Cases.
I. 1	Verbs of motion,	26
I. 2	" " action,	17
I. 3	" " verbal communication,	31
I. 4	" " state,	35
II. 1	" " thought,	36
II. 2	" " feeling,	35
II. 3	" " will,	13
III.	Auxiliary verbs,	14
		207

The verbs proportionately most common in this use are *ibam* and *volebam* which have become idiomatic. The usage is especially common in colloquial Latin, but 16 cases[2] occurring outside the dramatic literature represented chiefly, of course, by Plautus and Terence.

By virtue of its progressive force the imperfect is a vivid tense and as is well known, became a favorite means in the Ciceronian period of enlivening descriptive passages. It was especially used to fill in the details and particulars of a picture (imperfect of situation).[3] This use of the tense appears in early Latin also, but with much less frequency. The choice of the tense for this purpose is a matter of art, whether conscious or unconscious. At times, indeed, there is no apparent reason for the selection of an imperfect rather than a perfect except that the former is more graphic,

[1] Somewhat less than one-third of the total (680) progressive cases.

[2] These cases are Ennius, Ann. 204, C. I. L. I. 201. 11 (3 cases), Varro, L. L. 5. 9 (1 case), and Auctor ad Herenn. 1. 1. 1 (2 cases), 1. 10. 16, 2. 1. 2, 2. 2. 2 (2 cases), 3. 1. 1 (2 cases), 4. 34. 46, 4. 36. 48, 4. 37. 49. All of these are in passages of colloquial coloring, either in speeches or, especially those in auctor ad Herenn., in epistolary passages.

[3] I use this term for all phases of the tense used for graphic purposes.

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and if it were possible to separate in every instance these cases from those in which the imperfect may be said to have been required, we should have a criterion by which we might distinguish this use of the imperfect from others. But since the progressive function of the tense is not altered, such a distinction is not necessary.

Statistics as to the frequency of the imperfect of situation in early Latin are worth little because the chief remains of the language of that period are the dramatists in whom naturally the present is more important than the past. The historians, to whom we should look for the best illustrations of this usage, are for the most part preserved to us in brief fragments. Nevertheless an examination of the comparatively few descriptive passages in early Latin reveals several points of interest.

In Plautus and Terence the imperfect was not a favorite tense in descriptions. Bacch. 258–307, a long descriptive passage of nearly 50 lines, interrupted by unimportant questions, shows only 4 imperfects (1 aoristic) amid over 40 perfects, historical presents, &c. Capt. 497–515, Amph. 203–261, Bacch. 947–970, show but one case each. Stich. 539–554 shows 5 cases of *erat*. In Epid. 207–253 there are 10 cases.

In the descriptive passages of Terence the imperfect is still far from being a favorite tense, though relatively more common than in Plautus, cf. Andr. 48 ff., 74–102, Phorm. 65–135 (containing 11 imperfects). But Eunuch. 564–608 has only 4 and Heaut. 96–150 only 3.

Another very instructive passage is the well-known description by Q. Claudius Quadrigarius of the combat between Manlius and a Gaul (Peter, Hist. rom. fragg., p. 137, 10b). In this passage of 28 lines there are but 2 imperfects. The very similar passage describing the combat between Valerius and a Gaul and cited by Gellius (IX, 11) probably from the same Quadrigarius contains 8 imperfects in 24 lines. Since Gellius is obviously retelling the second story, the presumption is that the passage in its original form was similar in the matter of tenses to the passage about Manlius. In other words Gellius has 'edited' the story of Valerius, and one of his improvements consists in enlivening the tenses a bit. He describes the Manlius passage thus: *Q. Claudius primo annalium purissime atque illustrissime simplicique et incompta orationis antiquae suavitate descripsit.* This *simplex et incompta suavitas* is due in large measure to the fact that

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Quadrigarius has used the simple perfect (19 times), varying it with but few (4) presents and imperfects (2). A closer comparison of the passage with the story of Valerius reveals the difference still more clearly. Quadrigarius uses (not counting subordinate clauses) 19 perfects, 4 presents, 2 imperfects; Gellius, 4 perfects, 9 presents, 8 imperfects. In several instances the same act is expressed by each with a different tense:

Quadrigarius.	Gellius.
processit (bis),	*procedebat*, *progreditur*,
constitit,	*congrediuntur*, *consistunt*,
constituerunt,	*conserebantur manus*,
8 perfects of acts in combat.	5 imperfects of acts of the *corvus*.

Gellius has secured greater vividness at the expense of simplicity and directness.

This choice of tenses was, as has been said, a matter of art, whether conscious or unconscious. The earlier writers seem to have preferred on the whole the barer, simpler perfect even in passages which might seem to be especially adapted to the imperfect, historical present, &c. The perfect, of course, always remained far the commoner tense in narrative, and instances are not lacking in later times of passages[1] in which there is a striking preponderance of perfects. Nevertheless the imperfect, as the language developed, with the growth of the rhetorical tendency and a consequent desire for variety in artistic prose and poetry, seems to have come more and more into vogue.[2]

The fact that the function of a tense is often revealed, defined, and strengthened by the presence in the context of particles of various kinds, subordinate clauses, ablative absolutes, &c., &c.,

[1] E. g. Caesar, B. G. I. 55 and 124–5.

[2] The relative infrequency of the tense in early Latin was pointed out on p. 164. Its growth as a help in artistic prose is further proved by the fact that the fragments of the later and more rhetorical annalists, e. g. Quadrigarius, Sisenna, Tubero, show relatively many more cases than the earliest annalists. This is probably not accident. When compared with the history of the same phenomenon in Greek, where the imperfect, so common in Homer, gave way to the aorist, this increase in use in Latin may be viewed as a revival of a usage popular in Indo-European times. Cf. p. 185, n. 2.

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was pointed out in Trans. Am. Philol. Ass. XXX, pp. 17 ff. What was there[1] said of Plautus and Terence may here be extended to the whole period of early Latin. The words and phrases used in this way are chiefly temporal. Some of those occurring most frequently are: *modo, commodum; tum, tunc; simul; dudum, iam dudum; iam, primo, primulum; nunc; ilico; olim, quondam; semper, saepe; fere, plerumque; ita*,[2] &c., &c. A rough count shows in this class about 120 cases,[3] accompanied by one or more particles or expressions of this sort. Some merely date the tense, e. g., *tum, modo, dudum*, &c. Others, as *saepe, fere, primulum*, have a more intimate connection with the function. Naturally the effect of the latter group is clearest in the imperfects of customary past action, the frequentative, &c., and will be illustrated under those headings. Here I will notice only a few cases with *iam, primulum*, &c., which illustrate very well how close the relation between particle and tense may be. The most striking cases are:

Plautus, Merc. 43, amare valide coepi[t] hic meretricem. *ilico*
Res exulatum ad illam <c>lam *abibat* patris. Cf. Men. 1116, nam tunc dentes mihi *cadebant primulum*.

id. Merc. 197, Equidem me *iam censebam* esse in terra atque in tuto loco:
Verum video . . .

id. Cist. 566, Iam *perducebam* illam ad me suadela mea,
Anus ei <quom> amplexast genua . . .

id. Merc. 212, credet hercle: nam *credebat iam* mihi.

The unquestionably inceptive force of these cases arises from the combination of tense and particle. No inceptive[4] function can be proved for the tense alone, for I find no cases with inceptive force unaccompanied by such a particle.

[1] Cf. also Morris, Syntax, p. 83.

[2] How far the nature of the clause in which it stands may influence the choice of a tense is a question needing investigation. That causal, explanatory, characterizing, and other similar clauses very often seem to require an imperfect is beyond question, but the proportion of imperfects to other tenses in such clauses is unknown. Cf. p. 166, n. 1.

[3] No introductory conjunctions are included in this total, nor are other particles included, unless they are in immediate connection with the tense.

[4] In Trans. Am. Philolog. Ass. XXX, p. 21, I was inclined to take at least Merc. 43 as inceptive. This I now believe to have been an error. The inceptive idea was most commonly expressed by *coepi* + infin. which is very common in Plautus and Varro. We have here the opposite of the phenomenon discussed on p. 177.

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There are a few cases in which the imperfect produces the same effect as the imperfect of the so-called first periphrastic conjugation: Terence, Hec. 172, Interea in Imbro moritur cognatus senex.

Horunc: ea ad hos *redibat* lege hereditas.=reditura erat, English 'was coming', 'was about to revert', cf. Greek μέλλω with infinitive.

Cf. Phorm. 929, Nam non est aequum me propter vos decipi,
Quom ego vostri honoris causa repudium alterae
Remiserim, quae dotis tantundem *dabat*.=datura erat &c.

In these cases the really future event is conceived very vividly as already being realized.

Plautus, Amph. 597 seems to have the effect of the English 'could':

Neque . . . mihi *credebam* primo mihimet Sosiae
Donec Sosia . . . ille . . .

But the 'could' is probably inference from what is a very vivid statement. A Roman would probably not have felt such a shading.[1]

I B. The Imperfect of Customary Past Action.

The imperfect may indicate some act or state at some appreciable distance in the past as customary, usual, habitual &c. The act or state must be at some appreciable distance in the past (and is usually at a great distance) because this function of the tense depends upon the contrast between past and present, a contrast so important that in a large proportion of the cases it is enforced by the use of particles.[2] The act (or state) is conceived as repeated at longer or shorter intervals, for an act does not become customary until it has been repeated. This customary act usually takes place also as a result or necessary concomitant of certain conditions expressed or implied in the context, e. g. *maiores nostri olim* &c., prepares us for a statement of what they used to do. The act may indeed be conceived as occurring only as a result of a certain expressed condition, e. g. Plautus, Men. 484 mulier quidquid dixerat,

[1] Some of the grammars recognize 'could' as a translation, e. g., A. & G. § 277 g.

[2] E. g. *tum*, *tunc*, *olim* &c. with the imperfect, and *nunc* &c. with the contrasted present.

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Idem ego *dicebam* = my words would be uttered only as a result of hers.[1]

There are 462 cases of the customary past usage of which 218 occur in independent sentences, 244 in dependent. This large total, more than one-third of all the cases, is due to the character of Varro's De lingua latina from which 289 cases come. This is veritably a 'customary past' treatise, for it is for the most part a discussion of the customs of the old Romans in matters pertaining to speech. Accordingly nearly all the imperfects fall under this head. Plautus and Terence furnish 112. The remaining 61 are pretty well scattered.

As illustrations of this usage I will cite (arranging the cases according to the classes of verbs):

I. 1. Plautus, Pseud. 1180, Noctu in vigiliam quando *ibat* miles, quom tu *ibas* simul,
Conveniebatne in vaginam tuam machaera militis?

Terence, Hec. 157, Ph. Quid? interea *ibatne* ad Bacchidem? Pa. Cottidie.

Varro, L. L. 5. 180, qui iudicio vicerat, suum sacramentum e sacro auferebat, victi ad aerarium *redibat*.

I. 2. Plautus, Bacch. 429, Saliendo, sese *exercebant* magis quam scorto aut saviis. (cf. the whole passage).

Hist. fragg., p. 83. 27, Cn., inquit, Flavius, patre libertino natus, *scriptum faciebat* (occupation) isque in eo tempore aedili curuli apparebat, . . .

I. 3. Terence, Eun. 398, Vel rex semper maxumas Mihi *agebat* quidquid feceram:

Varro, L. L., 5. 121, Mensa vinaria rotunda *nominabatur* Cilibantum ut etiam *nunc* in castris. Cf. L. L. 7. 36, *appellabant*, 5. 118, 5. 167 &c.

[1] This usage seemed to me formerly sufficiently distinct to deserve a special class and the name 'occasional', since it is occasioned by another act. It is at best, however, only a sub-class of the customary past usage and in the present paper I have not distinguished it in the tables. It is noteworthy that the act is here at its minimum as regards repetition and that it may occur in the immediate past, cf. Rud. 1226, whereas the customary past usage in its pure form is never used of the immediate past. The usages may be approximately distinguished in English by 'used to', 'were in the habit of' &c. (pure customary past), and 'would' (occasional), although 'would' is often a good rendering of the pure customary past. Good cases of the occasional usage are: Plautus, Merc. 216, 217; Poen. 478 ff; Terence, Hec. 804; Hist. fragg. p. 202. 9 (5 cases), ibid. p. 66. 128 (4 cases).

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I. 4. Plautus, Bacch. 421, Eadem ne *erat* haec disciplina tibi, quom tu adulescens eras?

C. I. L. I. 1011.17 Ille meo officio adsiduo *florebat* ad omnis.

II. 1. Auctor ad Herenn. 4. 16. 23, Maiores nostri si quam unius peccati mulierem damnabant, simplici iudicio multorum maleficiorum convictam *putabant*. quo pacto? quam inpudicam iudicarant, ea venefici quoque damnata *existumabatur*.

Cato, De ag., 1, amplissime laudari *existimabatur* qui ita laudabatur.

II. 2. Plautus, Epid. 135, Illam *amabam olim: nunc iam* alia cura impendet pectori.

Varro, R. R. III. 17.8, etenim hac incuria laborare aiebat M. Lucullum ac piscinas eius *despiciebat* quod aestivaria idonea non haberent.

III. 3. Plautus, As. 212, quod *nolebam* ac votueram, de industria

Fugiebatis neque conari id facere *audebatis* prius. Cf. the whole passage.

Varro, L. L. 5. 162, ubi quid conditum esse *volebant*, a celando Cellam appellarunt.

III. Terence, Phorm.[1] 90, Tonstrina erat quaedam: hic *solebamus fere*

Plerumque eam opperiri, . . .

Varro, L. L. 6. 8, Solstitium quod sol eo die sistere *videbatur* . . .

The influence of particles[2] and phrases in these cases is very marked. I count about 110 cases, more than ½ of the total, with which one or more particles appear. Those expressions which emphasize the contrast are most common, e. g. *tum, olim, me puero* with the imperfect, and *nunc, iam* &c. with the contrasted present.

This class also affords excellent illustrations of the reciprocal influence of verb-meaning[3] and tense-function. In Varro there are 50 cases, out of 289, of verbs of naming, calling, &c., which are by nature evidently adapted to the expression of the customary past. Such are *appellabam, nominabam, vocabam, vocitabam*, &c. But the most striking illustration is found in verbs of customary action, e. g. *soleo, adsuesco, consuesco*, which by their

[1] Cf. Trans. Am. Philolog. Ass. XXX, p. 19.

[2] Note as illustrations the italicized particles in the citations, pp. 175-6.

[3] Cf. Morris, Syntax, p. 47, and p. 72, with note.

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meaning possess already the function supplied to other verbs by the tense and context. When a verb of this class occurs in the imperfect of customary past the function is enhanced. Naturally, however, these verbs occur but rarely in the imperfect, for in any tense they express the customary past function.

It is interesting to note the struggle for existence between various expressions of the same thought. A Roman could express the customary past idea in several ways, of which the most noticeable are the imperfect tense, *soleo* or the like with an infinitive, or various periphrases such as *mos erat*. Of these possibilities all are rare save the first, the imperfect tense. There are but 12 cases of *soleo*, *consuesco*, &c., occurring in the imperfect indicative in early Latin. These are all cases of *solebam*, and 9 of them are imperfects of customary past action.[1] One would expect to find in common use the perfect of these verbs with an infinitive, but, although I have no exact statistics on this point, a pretty careful lookout has convinced me that such expressions are by no means common.[2] Periphrases with *mos*, *consuetudo*, &c., are also rare. Comparing these facts with the large number of cases in which the customary past function is expressed by the imperfect, we must conclude that this was the favorite mode of expression already firmly established in the earliest literature.[3]

I C. The Frequentative Imperfect.

In the proper context[4] the imperfect may denote repeated or insistent action in the past. Although resembling the imperfect of customary past action, in which the act is also conceived as

[1] Terence, Phorm. 90; Varro, R. R. I. 2. 1, and II. 7. 1, L. L. 5. 126; Auctor ad Herenn. 4. 54. 67; Lucilius, IV. 2, &c.

[2] A collection of perfects covering 18 plays of Plautus shows but 15 cases of *solitus est*, *consuevit*, &c. My suspicion, based on Plautus and Terence, that these periphrases would prove common has thus been proven groundless.

[3] The variation between imperfect and perfect is well illustrated by Varro, L. L. 5. 162, ubi cenabant, cenaculum *vocitabant*, and id. R. R. I. 17. 2, iique quos obaeratos nostri *vocitarunt*, where the frequentative verb expresses even in the perfect the customary past function.

For the variation between the customary past imperfect and the perfect of statement cf. Varro's L. L. almost anywhere, e. g. 5. 121, mensa . . . rotunda *nominabatur* Clibantum. 5. 36, ab usu salvo saltus *nominarunt*. So compare 5. 124 (*appellarunt*) with R. R. I. 2. 9 (*appellabant*). Cf. also L. L. 5. 35 qua *ibant* . . . iter *appellarunt*; qua id auguste, semita, ut semiter *dictum*.

[4] Cf. Herbig, Aktionsart und Zeitstufe (I. F. 1896, § 59).

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repeated, the frequentative usage differs in that there is no idea of habit or custom, and the act is depicted as repeated at intervals close together and without any conditioning circumstances or contrast with the present. I find only 13 cases of this usage, 7 of which are syntactically independent, 6 dependent. All occur in the first three classes of verbs. The cases are:

Plautus, Pers. 20, miquidem tu iam eras mortuos, quia non *visitabam.*

Ibid. 432, id tibi suscensui,
Quia te *negabas* credere argentum mihi.

Rud. 540, Tibi auscultavi: tu promittebas mihi
Illi esse quaestum maxumum meretricibus:

Capt. 917, Aulas . . . omnis confregit nisi quae modiales erant:
Cocum *percontabatur*, possentne seriae fervescere:

As. 938, *Dicebam*, pater, tibi ne matri consuleres male. Cf. Mil. Gl. 1410 (*dicebat*).

Truc. 506, Quin ubi natust machaeram et clupeum *poscebat* sibi?

Epid. 59, Quia cottidie ipse ad me ab legione epistulas
Mittebat: cf. ibid. 132 (*missiculabas*).

Merc. 631, *Promittebas* te os sublinere meo patri: ego me[t] credidi
Homini docto rem mandar<e>, . . .

Ennius, Ann. 43, haec ecfatu' pater, germana, repente recessit.
Nec sese dedit in conspectum corde cupitus,
quamquam multa manus ad caeli caerula templa
tendebam lacrumans et blanda voce *vocabam.*

Hist. fragg., p. 138. 11 (Q. Claudius Quadrigarius), Ita per sexennium vagati Apuliam atque agrum quod his per militem licebat *expoliabantur.*

This class is so small and many of the cases are so close to the simple progressive and the imperfect of situation that it is tempting to force the cases into those classes.[1] A careful con-

[1] How close the frequentative notion may be to the imperfect of the immediate past is well illustrated by As. 938 (cited above). In this case we have virtually an imperfect of the immediate past in which, however, the frequentative coloring predominates: *dicebam* means not 'I've been telling', but 'I've *kept* telling', &c. Cf. also Pseud. 422 (*dissimulabam*) for another case of the imperfect of the immediate past which is close to the frequentative. In its pure form, however, the frequentative imperfect does not hold in view the present.

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sideration of each case has, however, convinced me that the frequentative function is here clearly predominant. In Plautus, Pers. 20, Epid. 131, Capt. 917, it is impossible to say how much of the frequentative force is due to the tense and how much to the form of the verbs themselves; both are factors in the effect. Verbs like *mitto, promitto, voco,* and even *dico,* are also obviously adapted to the expression of the frequentative function.

It is noteworthy that in this usage a certain emphasis is laid on the tense. In eight of the cases the verb occupies a very emphatic position, in verse often the first position in the line, cf. the definition on p. 177.

I D. The Conative Imperfect.

The imperfect may indicate action as attempted in the past. There must be something in the context, usually the immediate context, to show that the action of the verb is fruitless. There are no certain cases of this usage in early Latin. I cite the only instances, four in number, which may be interpreted as possibly conative:

Plautus, As. 931, Arg. Ego *dissuadebam*, mater. Art. Bellum filium.

Id. Epid. 215, Tum meretricum numerus tantus quantum in urbe omni fuit
Obviam ornatae occurrebant suis quaeque | amatoribus:
Eos *captabant.*

Auctor ad Herenn., 4. 55. 68, ... cum pluribus aliis ire celerius coepit. illi praeco *faciebat* audientiam; hic subsellium, quod erat in foro, calce premens dextera pedem defringit et ...

Hist. fragg., p. 143. 46, Fabius de nocte coepit hostibus castra simulare oppugnare, eum hostem delectare, dum collega id caperet quod *captabat.*

But in the second and fourth cases the verb *capto* itself means to 'strive to take', 'to catch at' &c., and none of the conative force can with certainty be ascribed to the tense. In the first case, again, the verb *dissuadebam* means 'to advise against', not 'to succeed in advising against' (dissuade). Argyrippus says: 'I've been advising against his course, mother', not 'I've been trying, or I tried, to dissuade him'. The imperfect is, therefore, of the common immediate past variety.[1]

[1] Cf. a few lines below (938) *dicebam.*

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In Auct. ad Herenn., 4. 55. 68, the imperfect is part of the very vivid description of the scene attending the death of Tiberius Gracchus. Indeed the whole passage is an illustration of *demonstratio* or vivid description which the author has just defined. The acts of Gracchus and his followers are balanced against those of the fanatical optimates under Scipio Nasica: 'While the herald was silencing[1] the murmurs in the *contio*, Scipio was arming himself' &c. Though it may be true that the act indicated by *faciebat audientiam* was not accomplished, this seems a remote inference and one that cannot be proved from the context.

If my interpretation of these cases is correct, there are no certain[2] instances of the conative imperfect in early Latin.

There is but one case of *conabar* (Terence, Phorm. 52) and one of *temptabam* (Plautus, Mil. gl. 1336). Both of these belong to the immediate past class, the conative idea being wholly in the verb.

II. The Aoristic Imperfect.

The imperfect of certain verbs may indicate an act or state as merely past without any idea of progression. In this usage the kind of action reaches a vanishing point and only the temporal element of the tense remains. The imperfect becomes a mere preterite, cf. the Greek aorist and the Latin aoristic perfect. The verbs to which this use of the imperfect is restricted are, in early Latin, two verbs of saying, *aio* and *dico*, and the verb *sum* with its compounds.

There are 56 cases of the aoristic imperfect in early Latin (see Table II), 48 of which occur in syntactically independent sentences. Some citations follow:

Plautus, Bacch. 268, Quotque innocenti ei dixit contumelias.
Adulterare eum *aibat* rebus ceteris.

Id. Most. 1027, Te velle uxorem *aiebat* tuo gnato dare:
Ideo aedificare hoc velle *aiebat* in tuis.
Th. Hic aedificare volui? Si. Sic dixit mihi.

Id. Poen. 900, Et ille qui eas vendebat dixit se furtivas vendere:
Ingenuas Carthagine *aibat* esse.

[1] *Faciebat audientiam* seems a technical expression, cf. lexicon.

[2] The case cited by Gildersleeve-Lodge, § 233, from Auct. ad Herenn., 2. 1. 2, *ostendebatur* seems to me a simple imperfect and there is nothing in the context to prove a conative force, cf. 3. 15. 26 *demonstrabatur*.

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In these cases note the parallel cases of *dixit*, cf. id. Trin. 1140, Men. 1141 &c., &c.

I note but three cases of *dicebam*:

Terence, Eun. 701, Ph. Unde [igitur] fratrem meum esse
scibas? Do. Parmeno
Dicebat eum esse. Cf. Plautus, Epid. 598 for a perfect used like this.

Varro, R. R. II. 4. 11, In Hispania ulteriore in Lusitania [ulteriore] sus cum esset occisus, Atilius Hispaniensis minime mendax et multarum rerum peritus in doctrina, *dicebat* L. Volumnio senatori missam esse offulam cum duabus costis . . .

Ibid. III. 17. 4, pisces . . . quos sacrificanti tibi, Varro, ad tibicinem [graecum] gregatim venisse *dicebas* ad extremum litus atque aram, quod eos capere auderet nemo, . . .

In these cases the verb *dico* becomes as vague as is *aio* in the preceding citations.

Plautus, Poen. 1069, Nam mihi sobrina Ampsigura tua mater
fuit,
Pater tuos is *erat* frater patruelis meus,
Et is me heredem fecit, . . .

Id. Mil. gl. 1430, Nam illic qui | ob oculum habebat lanam
nauta non *erat*.
Py. Quis *erat* igitur? Sc. Philocomasio amator.

Id. Amph. 1009, Naucratem quem convenire volui in navi
non *erat*,
Neque domi neque in urbe invenio quemquam qui illum
viderit.[1]

Id. Merc. 45, Leno inportunus, dominus eius mulieris,
Vi sum<m>a[t] quicque ut *poterat* rapiebat domum.

In such cases as the last the imperfect has become formulaic, cf. quam maxime *poterat*, &c.

[1] Rodenbusch, pp. 8–10, after asserting that the imperfect of verbs of saying and the like is used in *narratio* like the perfect (aorist), cites a number of illustrations in which (he adds) the imperfect force may still be felt! But a case in which the imperfect force may still be felt does not illustrate the imperfect in simple past statements, if that is what is meant by *narratio*. Only four of R.'s citations are preterital (aoristic), and these are all cases of *aibam* (Plautus, Amph. 807, As. 208, 442, Most. 1002). The same may be said of the citations on p. 9, of which only Eun. 701 is aoristic. J. Schneider (De temporum apud priscos latinos usu quaestiones selectae, program, Glatz, 1888) recognizes the aoristic use of *aibat*, but his statement that the comic poets used perfect and imperfect indiscriminately as aorists cannot be accepted.

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III. The Shifted Imperfect.

In a few cases the imperfect appears shifted from its function as a tense of the past, and is equivalent to (1) a mere present; or (2) an imperfect or pluperfect subjunctive.

The cases equivalent to a present[1] are all in Varro, L. L., and are restricted to verbs of obligation (*oportebat, debebat*): L. L. 8. 74, neque *oportebat* consuetudinem notare alios dicere Boum greges, alios Boverum, et signa alios Iovum, alios Ioverum. Ibid. 8. 47, Nempe esse *oportebat* vocis formas ternas ut in hoc Humanus, Humana, Humanum, sed habent quaedam binas . . . ibid. 9. 85, si esset denarii in recto casu atque infinitam multitudinem significaret, tunc in patrico denariorum dici *oportebat*. Ibid. 8. 65, Sic Graeci nostra senis casibus [quinis non] dicere *debebant*, quod cum non faciunt, non est analogia.[2]

The cases equivalent to the subjunctive are confined to *sat &c.* + *erat* (6 cases), *poteram* (3 cases), *decebat* (1 case), and *sequebatur* (1 case). As illustrations may be cited:

Plautus, Mil. gl. 755, Insanivisti hercle: nam idem hoc hominibus *sat* [a] *era*[n]*t* decem.

Auct. ad Herenn. 2. 22. 34, nam hic *satis erat* dicere, si id modo quod esset satis, curarent poetae. = 'would have been,' cf. ibid. 4. 16. 23 (*iniquom erat*),

Plautus, Mil. gl. 911, Bonus vates *poteras* esse: = 'might be' or 'might have been'.

Id. Merc. 983 b, Vacuum esse istac ted aetate his *decebat* noxiis. Eu. Itidem ut tempus anni, aetate<m> aliam aliud factum condecet.

Varro, L. L. 9. 23, si enim usquequaque non esset analogia, tum *sequebatur* ut in verbis quoque non esset, non, cum esset usquequaque, ut est, non esse in verbis . . . This is a very odd case and I can find no parallel for it.[3]

[1] Varro uses the perfect also of these verbs as equivalent to the present of general statements. Cf. L. L. 8, §§ 72–74, where *debuit* occurs 4 times as equivalent to *debet*, § 48 (*debuerunt* twice), § 50 (*oportuit* = *oportet*). The perfect infinitive is equivalent to the present, e. g. in 8, § 61 and § 66 (*debuisse . . . dici*). The tenses are of very little importance in such verbs.

[2] Note the presents expressed in the second and fourth citations.

[3] The remaining cases are: Plautus, Truc. 511 (*poterat*), id. Rud. 269 (*aequius erat*), Lucilius, Sat. 5. 47 M. (*sat erat*), Auctor ad Herenn. 4. 16. 23 (*iniquom erat*), ibid. 4. 41. 53 (quae separatim dictae . . . *infimae erant*).

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TABLE I.

AUTHORS AND FUNCTIONS.

	Total.	I. True Imperfect.			II. Aoristic.	III. Shifted.
		A. Progressive.	B. Cust. Past.	C. Frequent.		
Plautus.....	427	287	84	10	41	5
Terence.. ...	226	187	28		10	1
Cato[1].....	24	2	22			
Dramatists[2]..	69	60	7	2		
Historians....	52	34	16	1	1	
Orators.....	12	9	3			
Lucilius.....	13	11	1			1
Auctor ad Her.	79	63	11		2	3
Inscriptions..	4	3	1			
Varro...	320	24	289		2	5
	1226	680	462	13	56	15

[1] The fragments of Cato's historical work are included in the historians.
[2] Including the epic fragments of Ennius and Naevius.

TABLE II.

VERBS AND FUNCTIONS.

Classes of Verbs.	Total Cases.	I. True Imperfect.						II. Aoristic.		III. Shifted.	
		A. Progressive.		B. Cust. Past.		C. Frequent.					
		Ind.	Dep.	Ind.	Dep.	Ind.	Dep.	Ind.	Dep.	Ind.	Dep.
I. Physical.											
1. Motion.....	85	40	17	9	17		1			1	
2. Action.....	302	96	45	75	82	1	3				
3. Verbal commun.	233	46	26	64	46	6	2	38	5		
4. Rest, state, &c.. (*eram* 220)	346	138	69	48	75			10		4	2
II. Psychical.											
1. Thought.....	91	46	25	13	7						
2. Feeling.....	90	53	30	6	1						
3. Will.....	19	9	7		3						
III. Auxiliaries.	60	21	12	3	13				3	7	1
	1226	449	231	218	244	7	6	48	8	12	3
			449		218		7		48		12
			680		462		13		56		15

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3. Historical and Theoretical.

The original function of the imperfect seems to have been to indicate action as progressing in the past, the simple progressive imperfect. This is made probable, in the first place, by the fact that this usage is more common than all others combined, including, as it does, 680 out of a total of 1226 cases. This proportion is reduced, as we should remember, by the peculiar character of the literature under examination, which contains relatively so little narrative, and especially by the nature of Varro's De lingua latina in which the cases are chiefly of the customary past variety.[1] Moreover, the customary past usage itself, and also the frequentative and the conative, are to be regarded as offshoots of the progressive usage of which they still retain abundant traces, so that if we include in our figures all the classes in which a trace of the progressive function remains we shall find that 1155 of 1226 cases are true imperfects (see table II).

Another support for the view that the progressive function is original may be drawn from the probable derivation of the tense. Stolz[2] (after Thurneysen) derives the imperfect from the infinitive in -ē and an old aorist of the root **bhu*. The idea of progression was thus originally inherent in the ending *-bam*.

Let us now establish as far as possible the relations subsisting between the various uses of the true imperfect (IA, B, C, D), turning our attention first to the simple progressive (IA) and its variations.

The relation between the progressive imperfect in its pure form and the usage which has been named the imperfect of the immediate past is not far to seek. The progressive function remains essentially unchanged. The only difference lies in the extension of the time up to the immediate past (or present) in the case of the immediate past usage. The transition between:

ibat exulatum[3] = 'he was going into exile' (when

[1] See p. 175.

[2] In I. Müller's Handb. d. kl. Alt. II.,[2] § 113, p. 376. Lindsay, Latin Lang., pp. 489–490, emphasizes the nominal character of the first element in the compound, and suggests a possible I. E. **-bhwām*, *-ās*, &c., as antecedent of Latin *-bam*, *-bās*, *-bat*. He also compares very interestingly the formation of the imperfect in Slavonic, which is exactly analogous to this inferred Latin formation, except that the ending comes from a different root.

[3] Cf. Plautus, Merc. 981.

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I saw him at a more or less definite
point in the past)
and *ibat exulatum* = 'he was going (has been going)
into exile' (but we have just met him)
is plain enough. The difference is one of context. In this imperfect of the immediate past the Romans possessed a substitute for our English compound perfect tense, 'have been doing', &c.[1]

In the imperfect of situation also the function of the tense is not altered. The tense is merely applied in a different way, its progressive function adapted to vivid description, and we have found it already in the earliest[2] literature put to this use. In its extreme form it occurs in passages which would seem to require nothing more graphic than a perfect. Indeed, we must guard against the view that the imperfect is a stronger tense than the perfect; it is as strong, but in a different way, and while the earlier writers preferred in general the perfect,[3] the imperfect grew gradually in favor until in the period marked by the highest development of style the highest art consisted in a happy combination[4] of the two.

The imperfect of customary past action is, as we have seen, already well established in the earliest literature. A glance at Table I would seem to show that it grew to sudden prominence in Varro, but the peculiar nature of Varro's work has already been pointed out, so that the apparent discrepancy between the proportion of cases in Varro and in Plautus and Terence, for instance, means little. It should be remembered also that this discrepancy is still further increased by the nature of the drama, whose action lies chiefly in the present. While, therefore, in Plautus and Terence the proportion of customary pasts is ⅛,

[1] Latin also exhibits some similar compounds, cf. Plautus, Capt. 925, te *carens* dum hic *fui*, Poen. 1038, ut tu *sis sciens*, and Terence, Andr. 508, ut *sis sciens*. Cf. Schmalz in I. Müller's Handb. II², p. 399.

[2] In the Greek literature, which begins not only absolutely but relatively much earlier than the Latin, the imperfect was used to narrate and describe, and Brugmann, indeed, considers this a use which goes back to Indo-European times. Later the imperfect was crowded out to a great extent by the aorist, as in Latin by the (aoristic) perfect. Cf. Brugmann in I. Müller's Handb. II,² p. 183.

[3] Cf. p. 171.

[4] The power of the perfect lies in its simplicity, but when too much used this degenerates into monotony and baldness.

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and in Varro $\frac{6}{8}$, the historians with $\frac{1}{3}$ probably present a juster average.

The relation of this usage to the simple progressive imperfect has already been pointed out,[1] but must be repeated here for the sake of completeness. If we inject into a sentence containing a simple progressive imperfect a strong temporal contrast, e. g., if *facit, sed non faciebat* becomes *nunc facit, olim autem non faciebat*, it is at once evident how the customary past usage has developed. It has been grafted on the tense by the use of such particles and phrases, expressions which were in early Latin still so necessary that they were expressed in more than one-quarter of the cases; or, in other words, it is the outgrowth of certain oft-recurring contexts, and is still largely dependent on the context for its full effect. Transitional cases in which the temporal contrast is to be found, but no customary past coloring, may be cited from Plautus, Rud. 1123, Dudum dimidiam *petebas* partum. Tr. Immo etiam nunc peto. Here the action expressed by *petebas* is too recent to acquire the customary past notion.[2] The progressive function caused the imperfect to lend itself more naturally than other tenses[3] to the expression of this idea.[4]

Although the customary past usage was well established in the language at the period of the earliest literature, and we cannot actually trace its inception and development, I am convinced that it was a relatively late use of the tense by the mere fact that the language possesses such verbs as *soleo, consuesco*, &c., and that even as late as the period of early Latin the function seemed to need definition, cf. the frequent use of particles, &c.

The small number of cases (13) which may be termed frequentative indicates that this function is at once rare and in its infancy in the period of early Latin. The frequentative function is so closely related[5] to the progressive that it is but a slight step from

[1] Trans. Am. Philolog. Ass., Vol. XXX, pp. 18–20.

[2] Cf. Men. 729.

[3] How strong the effect of particles on other tenses may be is to be seen in such cases as Turpilius, p. 113. I (Ribbeck), Quem *olim* oderat, *sectabat* ultro ac detinet.

[4] The process was therefore analogous to that which can be actually traced in cases of the frequentative and conative uses.

[5] Terence, Adel. 332–3, affords a good transitional case: *iurabat* . . . *dicebat* = (almost) 'kept swearing' . . . 'kept saying' &c., cf. p. 47 n. 1. It should

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the latter to the former. Latin[1] seems, however, to have been unwilling to take that step. The vast number of frequentative,[2] desiderative and other secondary endings also prove that the tense was not the favorite means for the expression of the frequentative idea. Nevertheless since the progressive and frequentative notions are so closely related and since frequentative verbs must again and again have been used in the imperfect subject to the influence of the progressive function of particles such as *saepe, etiam atque etiam*, and since finally a simple verb must often have appeared in similar situations, e. g. *poscebat* for *poscitabat*, the tense inevitably acquired at times the frequentative function. We have here, therefore, an excellent illustration of the process by which a secondary function may be grafted on a tense and the frequentative function is dependent to a greater degree than the customary past upon the influence and aid of the context. That it is of later origin is proved by its far greater rarity (see Table II).

If the frequentative imperfect in early Latin is still in its infancy, the conative usage is merely foreshadowed. The fact that there are no certain instances proves that relatively too much importance, at least for early Latin, has been assigned to the conative imperfect by the grammars. Statistics would probably prove it rare at all periods, periphrases with *conor* &c., having sufficed for the expression of the conative function.

The most powerful influence in moulding tense functions is context.[3] In the case of the conative function this becomes all powerful for we must be able to infer from the context that the act indicated by the tense has not been accomplished. The

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also be pointed out that the frequentative imperfect is very closely related to the imperfect of situation. To conceive an act as frequentative necessarily implies a vivid picture of it. (Cf. next note). It is possible, therefore, to interpret as vivid imperfects of situation such cases as Ennius, Ann. 43-4; Plautus, Truc. 506, Capt. 917, but a careful study of these has convinced me that the frequentative idea predominates.

[1] In Greek, however, the imperfect was commonly used with an idea of repetition in the proper context. This use is correctly attributed by Brugmann (I. Müller's Handb. &c. II,[2] p. 184) to the similarity between the progressive and frequentative ideas as well as to the fondness for description of a repeated act.

[2] Acc. to Herbig, § 62 (after Garland?) there were probably no iterative formations in Indo-European.

[3] Cf. Morris, Syntax, pp. 46, 82, &c.

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function thus rests upon inference from the context. The presence in the language of the verbs *conor*, *tempto*, &c., proves that the conative function, like the frequentative, was a secondary growth grafted on the tense in similar fashion, but at a later period, for we have no certain instances in early Latin. This function of the imperfect certainly originates within the period of the written language.

The fact that the preponderance of the aoristic cases occurs in Plautus and Terence (see Table I) indicates that this usage was rather colloquial. This is further supported by the fact that the majority of the cases are instances of *aibam*, a colloquial verb, and of *eram* which in popular language would naturally be confused with *fui*. In this usage, therefore, we have an instance of the colloquial weakening of a function through excessive use in certain situations, a phenomenon which is common in secondary formations, e. g. diminutives. The aoristic function is not original, but originated in the progressive usage and in that application of the progressive usage which is called the imperfect of situation. Chosen originally for graphic effect the tense was used in similar contexts so often that it lost all of this force. All the cases of *aibam*, for instance, are accompanied by an indirect discourse either expressed (38 cases) or understood (2 cases). The statement contained in the indirect discourse is the important thing and *aibam* became a colorless introductory (or inserted) formula losing all tense force.[1] If this was the case with the verb which, in colloquial Latin at least, was preeminently the mark of the indirect discourse it is natural that by analogy *dicebam*, when similarly employed, should have followed suit.[2]

With *eram* the development was similar. The loss of true imperfect force, always weak in such a verb, was undoubtedly due

[1] Cf. Greek ἔλεγε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ &c. and English (vulgar) 'sez I' &c., (graphic present). Brugmann (I. Müller's Handb. &c. II,[2] p. 183) denies that the Greek imperfect ever *in itself* denotes completion, but he cites no cases of verbs of saying. Although one might say that the tense does not denote completion, yet if there was so little difference between imperfect and aorist that in Homer metrical considerations (always a doubtful explanation) decided between them (cf. Brugmann, ibid.), Brugmann seems to go too far in discovering any imperfect force in his examples. The two tenses were, in such cases, practical equivalents and both were colorless pasts.

[2] Rodenbusch, p. 8, assigns as a cause for the frequency of *aibat* in this use the impossibility of telling whether *ait* was present or perfect. This seems improbable.

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to the vague meaning of the verb itself. Indeed it seems probable that *eram* is thus but repeating a process through which the lost imperfect of the root **fu*[1] must have passed. This lost imperfect was doubtless crowded out[2] by the (originally) more vivid *eram* which in turn has in some instances lost its force.

If the aoristic usage is not original, but the product of a colloquial weakening, we should be able to point out some transitional cases and I believe that I can cite several of this character:

Plautus, Merc. 190, Eho ... quin cavisti ne eam videret ...?
Quin, sceleste, <eam> *abstrudebas*, ne eam conspiceret pater?

Id. Epid. 597, Quid, ob eam rem | hanc emisti, quia tuam gnatam es ratus?
Quibus de signis agnoscebas? Pe. Nullis. Phi. Qua re filiam Credidisti nostram?[3]

In these cases the tense is apparently used for vivid effect (imperfect of situation), but it is evident that the progressive function is strained and that if these same verbs were used constantly in such connections, all real imperfect force would in time be lost. This is exactly what has occurred with *aibam*, *dicebam*, and *eram*. The progressive function if employed in this violent fashion simply to give color to a statement, when the verbs themselves (*aibam*, *dicebam*) do not contain the statement or are vague (*eram*), must eventually become worn out just as the diminutive meaning has been worn out of many diminutive endings.

In the shifted cases also the tense is wrenched from its proper sphere. But whereas the aoristic usage displays the tense stripped of its main characteristic, the progressive function, though still in possession of its temporal element as a tense of the past, in the shifted cases both progressive function and past time (in some instances) are taken from the tense. In those cases where the temporal element is not absolutely taken away it becomes very unimportant. This phenomenon is apparently due in the first place to the contrary-to-fact idea which is present in the context of each case, and secondly to the meaning of some of the verbs involved. In many of the cases these two reasons

[1] There was no present of this root acc. to Morris, Syntax, p. 56, but cf. Lindsay, Lat. Lang., p. 490.

[2] Also if **bhwām* <*-bam* was derived from *bhu <*fu-* in *fui* &c., then the fact that it was assuming a new function in composition would help to drive it out of use as an independent form, *eram* (originally **ēsom*) taking its place.

[3] Cf. Terence, Phorm. 298; Adel. 809, Eun. 700. Ennius, Fab. 339.

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are merged into one, for the verbs themselves imply a contrary-to-fact notion, e. g. *debebat*, *oportebat*, *poterat* (the last when representing the English *might*, *could*, &c). In Varro, L. L. 8. 65 the phrase *sic Graeci . . . dicere debebant* implies that the Greeks do not really so speak; so Plautus, Mil. gl., 911 *Bonus vates poteras esse* implies that the person addressed is not a *bonus vates*. In these peculiar verbs, which in recognition of their chief function I have classified as auxiliary verbs,[1] verb-meaning coincides very closely with mode, just as in *soleo*, *conor*, &c., verb-meaning coincides closely with tense. The modal idea is all important, all other elements sink into insignificance, and the force of the tense naturally becomes elusive.[2]

Let us summarize the probable history of the imperfect in early Latin. The simple, progressive imperfect represents the earliest, probably the original, usage. Of the variations of this simple usage the imperfect of the immediate past and the imperfect of situation are most closely related to the parent use. Both of these are early variants, the latter probably Indo-European,[3] and both may be termed rather applications of the progressive function than distinct uses, since the essence of the tense remains unchanged, the immediate past usage arising from a widening of the temporal element, the imperfect of situation from a wider application of the progressive quality. Later than these two variants, but perhaps still pre-literary, arose the customary past usage, the first of the wider variations from the simple progressive. This was due to the application of the tense to customary past actions, aided by the contrast between past and present. Later still and practically within the period of the earliest literature was developed the frequentative usage, due chiefly to the close resemblance between the progressive and frequentative ideas and the consequent transfer of the frequentative function to the tense. Finally appears the conative use, only foreshadowed in early Latin, its real growth falling, so far as the remains of the language permit us to infer, well within the

[1] Cf. Whitney, German Grammar, § 242. 1.

[2] The same power of verb-meaning has shifted, e. g., the English *ought* from a past to a present. Cf. ἐδεῖ, &c. If I understand Tobler, Uebergang zwischen Tempus und Modus (Z. f. Völkerpsych., &c., II. 47), he also considers the imperfect in such verbs as due to the peculiar meaning of the verbs themselves. Cf. Blase, Gesch. des Plusquamperfekts, § 3.

[3] Cf. note.

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Ciceronian period. In all these uses the progressive function is more or less clearly felt, and all alike require the influence of context to bring out clearly the additional notion connected with the tense.

The first real alteration in the essence of the tense appears in the aoristic usage in which the tense lost its progressive function and became a simple preterite. This usage, due to colloquial weakening, is confined in early Latin to three verbs, *aibam*, *dicebam*, and *eram* (with compounds). It is very early, pre-literary in fact, but later than the imperfect of situation, from which it seems to have arisen. A still greater loss of the essential features of the tense is to be seen in the shifted cases in which the temporal element, as well as the progressive, has become insignificant. This complete wrenching of the tense from its proper sphere is confined to a limited number of verbs and some phrases with *eram*, and is due to the influence of the pervading contrary-to-fact coloring often in combination with the meaning of the verb involved.

ARTHUR LESLIE WHEELER.

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IV.—THE VOCATIVE IN HOMER AND HESIOD.

The vocative is used in the Iliad with ὦ 73 times, without ὦ 628 times. The vocative is used in the Odyssey with ὦ 103 times, without ὦ 515 times. [Such a group of vocatives as the following, ὦ φίλοι, Ἀργείων ἡγήτορες ἠδὲ μέδοντες, is counted as but one.] The vocative, when used in prayer or in an address to a deity, never takes ὦ, and no mortal ever uses it in speaking to a god, known to be a god. Odysseus twice addresses the interjection to Athene, vii, 22, ὦ τέκος, and xiii, 228, ὦ φίλ'; but Athene is disguised in the former case as a maiden, in the latter as a young shepherd. Priam in XXIV, 425, addresses ὦ τέκος to Hermes, who is in the form of a young man.

Athene uses the interjection in speaking to Zeus, but only in excitement, impatience, or anger, using this verse, i, 45, 81. xxiv, 473. VIII, 31. ὦ πάτερ ἡμέτερε Κρονίδη, ὕπατε κρειόντων.

The words are changed a little in XXII, 178, but the tone is of great impatience.

Ares once addresses the interjection to Athene, using the highly insulting expression: ὦ κυνάμυια, XXI, 394.

The entire absence of the interjection from a much used sphere of language must be due to the tone of ὦ and not to the metre. Metrical reasons cannot explain the omission of the following phrases: ὦ Ζεῦ, ὦ θεοί, ὦ Κρονίδη, ὦ Δωδωναῖ', ὦ θύγατερ Διός, ὦ Μοῦσαι, ὦ γαιήοχε κυανοχαῖτα, ὦ Θέμι, ὦ Φοῖβ', ὦ ἑκάεργε, ὦ Θέτι. All of these expressions are so well suited to the metre that the tone of the interjection alone explains their complete absence.

Any name of a god used in Homer could be used with ὦ by inserting an adjective or shifting the order. The interjection was omitted, as too familiar to be used in elevated, sacred, or religious expressions.

The interjection is never added directly to a patronymic in the Iliad, and but twice in the Odyssey; xxii, 287, ὦ Πολυθερσείδη φιλοκέρτομε, said in anger [hardly to be classed as a patronymic, except in form], and xxiv, 517, where Athene said in pity to Laertes, ὦ Ἀρκεισιάδη. Neither of these conveys the patronymic tone of dignity or honor. In but three other phrases is the

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interjection even remotely connected with a patronymic; III, 182, ὦ μάκαρ Ἀτρεΐδη, Priam thus speaks of the absent Agamemnon. A more familiar address can be applied to an absent ruler or leader than would be permissible in his presence. [The only time Agamemnon in person is addressed with the interjection is I, 158, where Achilles uses the angry, ὦ μέγ' ἀναιδές.] In the impatient expression used by Athene, ὦ πάτερ ἡμέτερε, Κρονίδη, Κρονίδη is used as metrical ballast. And in the third phrase, ὦ Νέστορ Νηληιάδη, Νηληιάδη is added rather to complete the verse than to confer dignity. Homer does not take Nestor very seriously, as the long inopportune speeches show, but especially the comic mockery of VIII, 78 ff.

> Νέστωρ οἷος ἔμιμνε Γερήνιος, οὖρος Ἀχαιῶν,
> οὔ τι ἑκών, ἀλλ', ἵππος ἐτείρετο, τὸν βάλεν ἰῷ
> δῖος Ἀλέξανδρος.

The practical absence of the interjection from such a large and much used class of words is not a matter of metre, as the following phrases show, each of which would perfectly fit the rhythm:

> ὦ Λαερτιάδη, ὦ Τελαμωνιάδη, ὦ Πηληιάδη, ὦ Καπανηιάδη, ὦ Νηληιάδη, ὦ Κρονίδη, ὦ Τυδεΐδη, – , – ∪ ∪ –

ὦ Λαερτιάδη is in particular recommended by the rhythm, as it would give a caesura in the third foot, which is lacking in the recurring verse, διογενὲς Λαερτιάδη, πολυμήχαν' Ὀδυσσεῦ.

Here, as in the preceding class, the interjection is omitted because of its familiar tone.

Exactly in keeping with this is the fact that no woman uses the interjection in either poem. Woman's attitude was too reserved. It is hardly an exception, that female slaves said to Odysseus, vii, 342, ὦ ξεῖνε.

The poet, in speaking in his own person in addresses to the muse, Menelaus, Patroclus, Melanippus, or Eumaeus never uses ὦ.

The interjection is used in none of the following reserved or dignified scenes; Parting of Hector and Andromache, Visit of Thetis to Hephaestus (vocative is found 19 times in XVIII, always without ὦ), Duel between Hector and Achilles, Priam's visit to the tent of Achilles, Scenes between Hermes and Calypso, and between Calypso and Odysseus, The Nausicaa,

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and the arrival and reception of Odysseus at the palace of Alcinous. Books v–vii have 75 vocatives, and but three interjections; vii, 22, Odysseus says ὦ τέκος in asking the way; vii, 342, servants say to Odysseus ὦ ξεῖνε, and viii, 408, Euryalus uses the same expression. Iliad, XXIV, furnishes a good illustration of the tone of the interjection. When Priam meets Hermes disguised as a young man ὦ is freely spoken, 411, 425, 460; but as soon as Priam enters the presence of Achilles, this familiar tone ceases, and although 16 vocatives are used, ὦ is used with none of them. Of the 73 examples of ὦ in the Iliad, φίλοι, a word of familiarity, is used 21 times, and πέπον, a word of familiarity or impatience, is used 9 times.

Of the remaining, 17 are in marked anger or impatience, I, 158, II, 796, IV, 338, V, 464, VI, 164, VIII, 31, XI, 430, 450, XII, 409, XIII, 222, XIV, 104, XVI, 422, XIX, 216, XXI, 214, 394, XXII, 178, XXIII, 543. And 11 are very familiar, IV, 169, 189, X, 43, XVI, 21, XXIII, 19, 179, XXIV, 300, 411, 425, 460, 683.

All the remaining, except four, belong to the familiar greeting of one Greek warrior by another. There is nothing in the context which prevents familiarity in the address of Antenor to Helen, ὦ γύναι, III, 204, or in the ὦ μάκαρ Ἀτρείδη, III, 182, of Priam.

In Odysseus' address, ὦ Χρύσῃ, I, 442, we have no way of determining the relation of Odysseus to the priest; but it is hardly an exception to the Homeric usage, and may reveal an intimacy which accounts for Odysseus being chosen to restore the maiden.

The only remaining example is where Calchas uses ὦ Ἀχιλεῦ, I, 74. The fact that the seer had such confidence in Achilles, that trusting in him he dared thwart Agamemnon, and the use of this familiar interjection, may argue an intimacy which increased the rage of Agamemnon.

The more familiar tone of the Odyssey gives a freer use of the interjection, so that while in the Iliad but one vocative in ten had ὦ, one in six has it in the Odyssey. The tone is, however, the same.

The familiar tone of the interjection fits it for such scenes as those in the palace of Nestor, and of Menelaus, or of Circe, the hut of Eumaeus, or where Odysseus returns in the guise of a beggar. As in the Iliad, the favorite word with ὦ is φίλοι, occurring 34 times. The first three vocatives used by the Cyclops have the interjection. [Thersites speaks but once in

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the Iliad, but he uses the interjection, while Hector, in all his speaking, never uses it.]

No scene in Homer has so many examples of ὦ as that in the hut of the swineherd, ὦ occurring 8 times in 86 verses, xiv, 80–166.

It is exactly characteristic of the attitude of Odysseus, and the impression he tried to make, that in the presence of Nausicaa and Alcinous, as told in vi, vii, viii, he never uses ὦ. In those scenes he wishes to appear worthy and dignified. On his return to Ithaca he tries to be mean and ignoble, and so he uses freely the interjection. He uses six vocatives, each with ὦ, in xix, 107–382.

In the Odyssey as in the Iliad, in scenes of worship or elevation, the interjection ὦ is never used. [Quintus Smyrnaeus using the same metre as Homer, and almost the same proper names, shows how easily, when the feeling for the interjection had changed, it can be used in hexameter. In less than 125 vocatives he has the interjection 70 times.]

HESIOD.

In Hesiod, as in Homer, no man ever addresses the interjection to a god. Hesiod never uses ὦ except in cases of marked impatience or familiarity.

Theogony. Vocative with ὦ twice, without 12 times. Zeus twice in great impatience addresses ὦ πέπον to Prometheus, 544, 560.

Shield. Vocative with ὦ 4 times, without 4 times. Of the four times used, three are familiar, and one is in anger: familiar, 78, 95, 118; anger, 357.

Works and Days. Vocative with ὦ 6 times, without 7 times. All of the six times used denote impatience or anger. ὦ Πέρση. 27, 213, 274, 611, 641; ὦ βασιλῆες, 248, said to the unjust judges.

In every place in Hesiod, where the interjection is used it is clearly a sign of familiarity or impatience, and no example admits any other explanation.

CONCLUSION.

In early Epic the vocative is regularly used without ὦ. When used, ὦ denotes a throwing off of reserve. The throwing off of reserve gives it a familiar tone, which often becomes angry,

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coarse, or impatient. Hence ὦ is never found in prayer or addresses to the gods, and is entirely absent in passages of dignity and elevation.[1]

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY. JOHN ADAMS SCOTT.

[1] The ἦθος of ὦ had so completely changed in Attic prose that it was seldom omitted, and the vocative without the interjection had a familiar tone.

On the use in Attic prose, and especially in the Orators, see Gildersleeve, Syntax of Classical Greek, 15 ff.; Rehdantz, Index to Demosthenes, under Anrede; Rockel, De Allocutionis Usu, Koenigsberg, 1884.

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V.—THE VOCATIVE IN APOLLONIOS RHODIOS.

The serene atmosphere of the epos is not favorable to the true interjection. ἆ δείλ' is found in Homer but there is no αἰαῖ, no φεῦ, no ὀτοτοῖ. ὤ is found in ὤ μοι and in ὦ πόποι but there is no οἴμοι, and now, according to Professor SCOTT, even the mild ὦ is excluded from the *quietis ordinibus deorum*. This exclusion, this *taboo*, seems to be an inheritance from the dactylic measures of hieratic poetry, beginning, say, with Ζεῦ πάτερ, and it is noteworthy that, opening as they do with a vowel, many of the names of the gods would rebel against ὦ. Outside of dactylic poetry, outside of epic poetry, there is no interdict against the combination of ὦ with the name of a god. Lofty Pindar does not balk at ὦ Ζεῦ, I. 5 (6), 3 or at ὦ Ζεῦ πάτερ, O. 7, 87 and I. 5 (6) 42 and the honey-tongued Keian nightingale has ὦ Ζεῦ κεραυνεγχές 8, 10 (K.) as well as ὦ χρυσαλάκατοι Χάριτες 9, 1. As for the iambic levellers we are not surprised to find in Archilochos ὦ Ζεῦ πάτερ Ζεῦ, σὸν μὲν οὐρανοῦ κράτος or in Hipponax ὦ Ζεῦ πάτερ θεῶν Ὀλυμπίων πάλμυ. So too, the dramatists use ὦ Ζεῦ, without scruple, from the priestly aristocrat Aischylos to the advanced thinker Euripides. In prose ὦ becomes colorless, so colorless that puzzled grammarians looked upon it as a manner of article to the vocative (Apoll. Synt. 1, 18). Cf. Jannaris § 251. Then it was the absence of ὦ that became emotional (S. C. G. § 20), until that emotion also wore itself out, and the vocative without ὦ ceased to thrill (Blass, G. N. T. § 33, 4). These shifts of ἦθος we encounter everywhere in language. The third attributive position means one thing in the epos, another in prose (A. J. P. XXIII 8). οὐ μή loses much of its passion by abuse (A. J. P. XVIII 460). Wilamowitz has called attention to the shifting fortunes of ἐθέλω and θέλω (H. F.[2] II 11) and not without interest in this whole matter is the crushing victory of the religious θέλω in modern Greek over the secular βούλομαι (A. J. P. XVI 525). Thinking it might be worth while to see how far the old epic θεσμός obtained in the artificial epic of a later day, I have examined the Argonautica of Apollonios to this end, and my results have been checked by the keener eyes of my

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friend, Professor MILLER. The outcome is not considerable because the speeches in Apollonios do not take up relatively so much space as the speeches in Homer; and Apollonios does not deal so much with the gods. But there is no passage in which the gods are addressed by ὦ except δ 1411 and 1414 (see below), and ὦ is sparingly used at any rate.

B. L. G.

a. Without ὦ.[1]

α 1 Φοῖβε (3).[2] 411 ἄναξ (1+2). 420 Ἐκηβόλε (3+4). 422 ἄναξ (3+4). β 693 (3+4). δ 1706 Λητοΐδη. α 242 Ζεῦ ἄνα. δ 1673 Ζεῦ πάτερ. α 295 μῆτερ (5). δ 31 μῆτερ ἐμή. α 336 φίλοι (1+2). γ 545 (1+2). 553 (1+2). δ 83 (1+2). 190 (3+4). 1347 (1+2). 1554 (1+2). α 463 Αἰσονίδη. 1092. 1332. β 444. 615. γ 475. 941. δ 355. γ 509 ἥρως Αἰσονίδη. α 476 δαιμόνιε. 1257. γ 711 δαιμονίη. 1120. δ 95. 395 (2+3). α 865 δαιμόνιοι. β 880. α 703 Ἰφινόη (2+3). 793 ξεῖνε. γ 401. δ 33. 89. α 836 Ὑψιπύλη. 900.

β 11 ἀλίπλαγκτοι (1+2+3). 209 Πανελλήνων προφερέστατοι (1+2+3+4). 256 τέκνον (6). 438 Φινεῦ (3+4). 622 Τῖφυ. 869 Αἰακίδη. 886. 1219 ἠθεῖε (2+3). γ 52 ἠθεῖαι.

γ 1 Ἐρατώ (2+3). 11 θύγατερ Διός (Athena) (3+4). 91 Ἥρη Ἀθηναίη τε. 19 Ἥρη. 32. 79 πότνα θεά. 91 (see above). δ 1199 Ἥρη. γ 108 Κυθέρεια (2+3). 129 ἄφατον κακόν (Eros) (3+4). δ 445 σχέτλι' Ἔρως, μέγα πῆμα, μέγα στύγος ἀνθρώποισιν. γ 304 παιδὸς ἐμῆς κοῦροι Φρίξοιό τε. 320 Αἰήτη. 386. 427. 372 λωβητῆρες (5+6). 467 πότνα θεὰ Περσηί (3+4+5). 674 Μήδεια (2+3). δ 739 σχετλίη. γ 688 Χαλκιόπη. 727. δ 32 Χαλκιόπη καὶ πᾶς δόμος (2+3+4). γ 975 παρθενική (2+3). 978 κούρη (6).

δ 1 θεά (3+4) = 2 Μοῦσα (3). 552 θεαί (1+2). 984 Μοῦσαι (6). 757 Ἶρι φίλη. 783 Θέτι δῖα (2+3). 1014 βασίλεια (2+3) = 1026 πότνα. 1047 σχέτλιοι ἀτροπίης καὶ ἀνηλέες. 1073 ναὶ φίλος = 1079 ἄναξ (1+2) = 1086 φίλε (1). 1098 Ἀρήτη. 1318 κάμμορε. 1333 ἐρημονόμοι κυδραὶ θεαί (1+2+3+4). 1485 Κάνθε. 1564 ἥρως (6). 1597 δαῖμον. 1773 ἀριστήων μακάρων γένος (1+2+3+4).

[1] While the list of vocatives here given is not claimed to be exhaustive, it is not likely that the few vocatives that may have escaped observation would materially affect the results of a comparison between Homer's and Apollonios' usage.

[2] The numerals in parentheses designate the foot or feet in which the expression is found. When no numerals follow, the word begins with the first foot.

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b. With ὦ.

α 616 ὦ μέλεαι, ζήλοιό τ' ἐπισμυγερῶς ἀκόρητοι. 657 ὦ φίλαι. γ 891. β 468 ὦ φίλοι. 641. 774. 1200. γ 171. 492. 523. δ 1741 ὦ φίλε (5). α 1337 ὦ πέπον. γ 485. δ 1749. Cf. β 244 ἃ δείλ'. 288 ὦ νιεῖς Βορέω (2+3+4). 341 ὦ μέλεοι. 411 ὦ γέρον. 420 ὦ τέκος. γ 936 ὦ κακόμαντι (2+3). δ 1031 ὦ πέρι δὴ μέγα φέρτατοι (2+3+4). 1383 ὦ πέρι δὴ μέγα φέρτατοι νῖες ἀνάκτων (2+3+4+5+6). 1411 δαίμονες ὦ καλαὶ καὶ εὐφρονες, ἵλατ', ἄνασσαι. 1414 ὦ νύμφαι, ἱερὸν γένος Ὠκεανοῖο (2+3+4+5+6).

It might be interesting to note also the following:

α 290 ὅ μοι ἐμῆς ἄτης. γ 798. γ 674 ὅ μοι ἐγώ. γ 558 ὦ πόποι. δ 1458.

C. W. E. MILLER.

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REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES.

The Eumenides of Aeschylus, with Introduction and Notes by A. SIDGWICK, M. A. Third Edition. Oxford, 1902.

Teachers of the classics are familiar with Mr. Sidgwick's editions of the Orestean trilogy. That these have proved a valuable introduction to the study of Aeschylus, needs neither statement nor argument. Assuming that this series of text-books has a future as well as a past, it may be worth while to offer some remarks, based upon class-room experience, concerning the third edition of the Eumenides.

The editor has done well to omit the asterisks which formerly marked deviations from the manuscript readings and to give in their place adequate critical notes. In the revision of the punctuation, the third edition does not seem to mark an improvement over the second. Cases in point are the insertion of a comma in 690, its omission in 807, the substitution of colon for comma in 408. After 830, the comma does not bear out the interpretation given in the note. The entire absence of punctuation after 1028 is evidently an oversight, as is also the false form *αἱμητηρόν*, 137.

Concerning the notes, the following comments may be made. The expression in vs. 30 is not an abridgment of two constructions but a survival of the ablatival genitive. "Reckoning from my former entrances, may this response be the best." This is an epic construction (Iliad 1, 505, etc.), and is used by Thucydides 1, 1, Soph. Antig. 102, 1212. To translate *ἐφήσω*, 502, "let loose," or with Liddell and Scott, "send upon", is to attribute too much to the Furies. They do not threaten to promote murder, but give warning that if their power is broken murder will take its unchecked course. Their part is permissive. The translation of 503-'5 is lacking in clearness. In 661 Mr. Sidgwick seems to make *ἔρνος* the antecedent of *οἷσι*. The dative case is against this interpretation. The pronoun is a dative of interest, and the logical antecedent is *ὁ θρέψασιν*. A note explaining the prevalence of this theory of parentage would be welcome. The sequence of thought in 826–'8 is not correctly given in the note. There is nothing adversative in these verses. When Athena says, "I have trust in Zeus," she means not in his wisdom and justice but in his power. The chorus had threatened violence. Athena replies: You talk of force. I too have an appeal to force. I know where the thunderbolt of Zeus is kept. But we need not appeal to force.

A general note prefixed to the passage 711–730 would be helpful to the young student. Antithesis is the key to the understanding

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of this balanced debate whose component parts are a word by the chorus and a retort by Apollo. Verses 731–733, spoken by the chorus, mark the conclusion of the debate. The context, then, indicates that the relation between 731 and 732 is something as follows: Since you flout me, I will wait for the decision and have no further words with you.

The verses from 734 to 753 have been a battle ground of interpreters. Mr. Sidgwick adopts the view of Müller, that Athena does not actually vote for Orestes until after the votes of the judges have been counted and found even for condemnation and acquittal. The logic of this position is that the goddess does, essentially, but one thing toward the acquittal. She makes a ruling, vs. 741, to cover the contingency of a tie vote. Her vote does nothing new in principle but merely puts in concrete form the abstract doctrine that the accused goes free, not only if he have a majority but even if he have the same number of votes as are given for conviction. Mr. Sidgwick admits that it appears at first that Athena actually votes. His reasons for accepting the other view are not exegetical but are found in certain general considerations: e. g. "This would make the court an odd number." Yet the number of the judges is nowhere given, and the number 12 for which Müller contends is nothing more than an inference that has never commanded general assent. The theory of the symbolism of this scene has a like foundation. The question is whether the gods, Athena and Zeus, to whom Orestes attributes his deliverance, take no more active part than to ordain that in cases of doubt mercy shall prevail. Against this view are the repeated references to Zeus as the real sponsor both for the act of Orestes and for his acquittal. To the authority of Zeus both Athena and Apollo make appeal: cf. vss. 19, 616 ff., 797 ff., 826 ff. Further, that Athena herself finally takes sides and declares for Orestes appears from the passage now under consideration. In vs. 734 she says that it is her part λοισθίαν κρῖναι δίκην. Then holding up a ballot she announces that she will cast it for Orestes. This declaration is followed by five verses introduced by γάρ. The purpose and content of these verses are of importance. The goddess gives therein her reasons for preferring the cause of Orestes. After this statement comes vs. 741, containing the ruling for the contingency of a tie vote. Müller held that the five explanatory verses lead up to 741 and explain it. He translates 741 accordingly: "Drum siegt Orestes auch bei gleicher Stimmenzahl." But to find causal coordination in δέ is impossible since 736–740 have already been brought into relation to 735 by means of γάρ. In other words, the explanation explains the vote, not the ruling, and the voting and ruling are two distinct things. Moreover the phrase κρῖναι δίκην describes the act of a judge and means, to pass upon the case. The expression is so used in 433, 468 and 682. Athena, then, takes sides and votes. She does for the acquittal of Orestes two distinct things: she votes and she

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rules. Her vote is cast before the count. The objection has been often raised that Athena had declared in vss. 471 f. that she herself might not decide the case. Hermann answered by saying that she might refuse to be the sole judge and yet act as one of a number of judges. It may be added that the declaration of Athena needs to be interpreted in the light of the rest of the play. Mortals actually do pass upon the case, although Athena has said at first that the matter is too great for them; and the goddess actually votes. The institution of a court, divinely appointed and destined for all time, is something new, and transcends the objections which at first seemed to forbid the rendering of any decision at Athens.

The question of a change of scene in a Greek tragedy is one of importance. In the Eumenides that question is not only important but is beset with difficulties. That the scene changes after 234 from Delphi to Athens needs no proof. In a note to 235 Mr. Sidgwick indicates that the temple of Athena Polias on the Acropolis is the place of action. Further, on p. 8 of the introduction and in the notes to vss. 687, 918 and 1024 a second change of scene from the Acropolis to the Areopagus is assumed. Many English works of reference agree with Mr. Sidgwick that the trial takes place on the Areopagus; which is equivalent to saying that there are two changes of scene in the Eumenides. There are, however, certain facts in the play itself which make this hypothesis difficult to accept, and it may fairly be said that recent discussions of the point in question have made the hypothesis untenable. These facts and a summary of these discussions will now be given.

The references to the image and shrine of Athena in vss. 80, 242 and 440 point unmistakably to the Acropolis. If the scene afterwards is the Areopagus, the change must take place between 489 and 566. But in 487-'8, upon her departure to select the judges, Athena says, κρίνασα ... ἥξω; which means that she will return, not that she will proceed with her court to some place of which no hint is given. The continued presence of the chorus must be taken for granted. No pretext for their absence can be found between 489 and the end of the play. This fact raises a presumption against any change. And yet, in vss. 685 ff. the Areopagus is plainly indicated as the scene by the use of the pronouns τόνδ', τήνδ'. From this point to the end of the play, the single passage to which one can appeal is that which describes the escort of the Eumenides to their new home. The reference, in 1024 ff., to the attendants who care for the shrine of the goddess and who are to form a part of the procession is most naturally explained upon the supposition that the scene is still before the temple of Athena on the Acropolis. The situation, then, for the play as a whole is this, that from verse 235 to the end all the facts indicate the Acropolis, excepting only the passage beginning with vs. 685. This isolated passage speaks for the Areopagus.

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The expectation of the modern reader of the play is that when the court of the Areopagus is to be founded, the act of founding will take place on the Areopagus. This isolated passage, reinforced by the reader's natural expectation, has led to the view that there is a second change of scene. This is evidently the view of Mr. Sidgwick, although he nowhere indicates at what point the change occurs.

There is another view that may be thus formulated: this isolated passage which points to the Areopagus may not be used as a standard but must be brought into harmony with its environment. Müller endeavored to attain this end by interpretation. He held that the Areopagus was so represented on one of the periacti that it could be pointed out by the goddess, and that the phrase πόλιν νεόπτολιν τήνδ' referred to the Acropolis. The grammatical impossibility of this interpretation was pointed out by Hermann, and the supposition that periacti were a part of the Aeschylean theatre can no longer be maintained. Weil has held that the trial takes place upon the Acropolis but that the actor steps forward and points to the actual Areopagus. Wecklein cuts the knot by classing the passage with certain others that are, in his judgment, the work of a later hand. The third way of meeting the situation is by emending the two deictic pronouns which are the real seat of the difficulty. Paley and Kirchhoff suggest τῇδ', which makes it possible to refer πόλιν νεόπτολιν to the Areopagus and still to find in the text the needed reference to the Acropolis. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff has taken the next step by reading for τόνδ', οἷδ'. This emendation provides for the accusative πάγον and brings the whole passage into harmony with the rest of the play. It removes the last exegetical reason for saying that the scene changes a second time and that the trial takes place on the Areopagus. It should be observed that cumulative evidence points to this passage as the seat of a textual error. Those who still maintain that the text is sound and that the scene is actually on the Areopagus, are bound to deal with the entire body of evidence which the play presents. Mr. Sidgwick refers in his preface to the Griechische Tragoedien by Wilamowitz-Moellendorff. The German scholar's prior and more important discussion of the Eumenides is to be found where one would not ordinarily seek it, in Vol. II of Aristoteles und Athen, Berlin, 1893. This incisive piece of dramatic criticism, which maintains the essential integrity of the text and proceeds always from a keen interpretation of the text, leaves at the door of every editor of the Eumenides the duty and privilege of rethinking many of the oft-debated questions which this drama suggests.

In conclusion the opinion may be expressed that this series of books is incomplete without some treatment of the metres. The state of the text often makes this a difficult task, but at no one point can the editor more effectively help the teacher.

HAMILTON COLLEGE, CLINTON, N. Y. EDWARD FITCH.

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The Works of John Gower, Edited by G. C. MACAULAY, Vols. I–IV. Clarendon Press. 1899–1902.

A critical edition of the Confessio Amantis of Gower has long been a desideratum to the Middle English student. The Clarendon Press has undertaken not only to supply this want but also to give us an improved text of the Latin and French works, which have been printed only in a form inaccessible to most readers. It has further printed for the first time the long-lost French poem, of which no trace was supposed to be left. This task has been entrusted to the editorial care of Mr. G. C. Macaulay.

The first volume is devoted to the French works of the poet. There can be no doubt that the long didactic poem, Mirour de l'omme, which is still unfinished at the point where the manuscript breaks off with verse 29945, is the work of the "moral Gower". Its title, its general theme, its plan of subdivision, according to its accompanying Table of Contents, all correspond to the description by the author himself of his French work, Speculum Hominis, or, as he afterwards called it, Speculum Meditantis, the name by which the statements of Leland and Bale have caused it to be known. The genealogical arrangement in the treatment of the Vices, the constant use of certain authorities, a vocabulary and language similar to that of his acknowledged French poems, even tricks of expression common to his English and Latin works, and, it must be added, its prolixity, offer more internal evidence of the authorship of the work than can be found in the recently discovered Méliador of Froissart, or the work upon the Athenian constitution of Aristotle.

True, some of these points are not so much emphasized by the editor as they should have been, owing to the fact—for which he apologizes to the specialist—that he has not the equipment incidentally necessary to the editor of an Old French text. For instance, he does not seem to be acquainted with certain works on Old French grammar in general, or on the peculiarities of the dialect in which Gower wrote. The remarks upon the phonology and inflection, written without the aid of such important works as Busch's study of the Anglo-Norman dialect of the fourteenth century, and Stürzinger's introduction to his edition of the Orthographia Gallica, need not be discussed in detail. Enough to say that the change of *ai* into *ei*, which is regarded as exceptional by Mr. Macaulay, is a regular phenomenon in the development of that diphthong into *e*, and that there is no evidence to show that the historical spelling *ai* (not final) had a different pronunciation from the phonetic spelling *e* (pp. xxiii–xxiv). There is no doubt that the diphthong *ue* lost its pronunciation as such at an early period in Anglo-Norman, even if the spellings *oe* and *eo* were retained (pp. xxv–xxvi), and it has been equally well ascertained that *eu* and *ui* were simplified in pronunciation and spelling to *u* (pp. xxviii–xxix). Furthermore, the change in spelling and sound of *ui* to *i* was not an unknown development.

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The editor is quite right in his supposition that the Marriage of the Deadly Sins was not a new idea with Gower. For we have not only the French poem, Li mariage des filles au diable,—cited from a Bodleian manuscript (p. liii), though it is to be found in Jubinal's Nouveau Recueil de Contes, Dits, etc., Vol. I, pp. 283 ff.,—but the same theme appears elsewhere in mediaeval didactic literature (T. F. Crane, Exempla of Jacques de Vitry, pp. 235–6).

The single manuscript of the Mirour does not present any special difficulties to the editor, although it is unfortunate that such words as "de par", "par dehors", etc., have been spelled as single words contrary to the practice of the most competent editors, while "pieça" would have been better written "piec'a". A collation of the only known manuscript of the Balades, and of the several manuscripts of the Traitié, has suggested corrections of a number of readings and emendations found in the editions of the Roxburghe Club and of Stengel.

In the notes, precise and accurate explanations of syntactical constructions could have been given, if more recent discussions than those found in Burguy had been used. For instance, Tobler has treated in full the use of the conditional in place of the imperfect subjunctive in conditional clauses (Mir. 25; Vermischte Beiträge, Vol. III, p. 47), the periphrastic use of "faire" (Mir. 1135; V. M. Vol. I, p. 19), and the substantive use of the infinitive with an accompanying object (Mir. 987; V. B. Vol. II, p. 90). Examples of the frequent interchange of the singular and plural of the second person in verbal forms have been pointed out in Anglo-Norman by Suchier (St. Auban, pp. 8–9), and in continental French by Förster (Richars li Biaus, Note to verse 969).

The Glossary is a fairly complete Index Verborum, but forms of the same word often appear under different headings, while, on the other hand, the accepted meanings of some of the words are omitted. Words which need explanation are listed without comment, as are those which have become modern French and English with a change of meaning. "Claret" is not claret wine, but wine strained through a cloth containing spices, and if both "diamand" (diamond) and "daimant" (loadstone) have their origin in the same word "adamas", their meanings were not confused by mediaeval writers in general, or by Gower (cf. C. A. V. 1333, 1397). The use of "geste" (Mir. 16398, 26832) with the meaning "family, race" is not noted, and the translation of "alie" (clove of garlic) in the common phrase "ne valont une alie", by "alder-berry", reminds one of the origins of Romance Philology, and the Abbé de La Rue's rendering of the same word as "olive". The use of the perfect participles, such as "despit", "contradit", "failli", in an active sense, seems to be quite unknown to the editor, who also fails to call attention to the very rare use of "souvenir" as a reflexive verb, and to the

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examples of nouns with the pejorative suffix "aille" in such words as "pedaille", "ribaudaille".

In editing the English works which form the second and third volume, the editor is working on more familiar ground, and he has given a text of the Confessio Amantis, which must necessarily supersede the other editions on account of the mass of new material that has been collected and the critical use made of it. The Introduction, Notes, and Glossary show an acquaintance with the better known English works in which the results of investigations in Middle English have been gathered together. The editor, throughout the edition, has a way of constantly using such qualifying expressions as "seems to be", "probably the meaning", "the meaning apparently", and criticism of the Glossary is forestalled by the prefatory statement that "in many cases an explanation is given of the meaning of words for the convenience of readers, but no discussion as to their meaning or origin is admitted in the Glossary". It is questionable as to whether "non" is to be rendered "noon", as the editor thinks, or, more fully as "the hour of dinner", which originally came at the ninth canonical hour, or three in the afternoon, but there is no doubt that "prime" was the first hour of the canonical day as "undern" was the third. Yet neither of these words is explained in the Glossary. That "enderday" is to be rendered "the other day", and that the expression "cowthe him thonk" is the English equivalent of the French idiom "savoir gré" may be known to the editor, but not to all his readers. He notes, only to leave unexplained, the common expression "to bere on hond", which means "to beguile, deceive", and when "paindemeine" (panis dominicus, simnel bread) appears as an English word, he does not make amends for his failure to define it in the French Glossary.

Gower's Latin works, which have the advantage of being preserved in original copies, with corrections of the author, are presented in the fourth volume, with a text superior in every way to that found in the former uncritical editions. The Glossary, which is very properly confined to words unclassical in form and usage, would have been made more useful by the inclusion of all proper names. In the Life of Gower, prefatory to the volume, no new details have been added. But re-examination of the original documents has shown the worthlessness of the evidence afforded by some of them which have previously been supposed to bear upon the life of the poet.

Mr. Macaulay emphasizes the encyclopaedic character of Gower's works, and for this reason he should have come to his task with a wide acquaintance with mediaeval literature, both in Latin and the vernacular tongues, and should have been conversant with the results of the more recent investigations. Warton and Morley, in their treatment of Gower, have furnished the basis of the commentary on the Confessio Amantis, and the lack of

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even this slight aid is apparent in the notes to the French and Latin works. But withal, the illustrative notes upon the sources of stories and phrases in the English work show a decided improvement on those in the first volume. The Latin works are treated with less detail of illustration, as they are regarded as historical documents rather than as literary efforts, but the frequent citations of parallel passages from Ovid, and from the poems of Peter Riga and Alexander Neckham, incline one to judge Gower's Latin verse as centos rather than as original compositions.

TRINITY COLLEGE, DURHAM, N. C. GEORGE L. HAMILTON.

Ancient Athens, by ERNEST ARTHUR GARDNER, Yates Professor of Archaeology in University College, London; formerly Director of the British School at Athens; author of A Handbook of Greek Sculpture, etc., etc. Illustrated. New York, 1902. The Macmillan Company. 8°. Pp. XVI, 579.

The need of a new work on Athens, presenting within the covers of a single book a comprehensive and at the same time scholarly treatment of the topography and monuments of the ancient city in the light of recent discoveries, has been growing more and more acute during the past few years. Those who have felt this need will feel grateful to Professor Gardner for his work on Ancient Athens. Its comprehensiveness will be seen from the list of its chapters: I. Situation and Natural Features; II. The Walls of the Acropolis and the Town; III. The Acropolis before the Persian Wars; IV. The Town before the Persian Wars; V. Early Attic Art; VI. The Acropolis in the Fifth Century; VII. The Parthenon; VIII. The Erechtheum and the Temple of Victory; IX. The City in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries; X. The Theseum, the Asclepieum and the Theater; XI. The Ceramicus; XII. Athens in Hellenistic and Roman Times; XIII. Pausanias in Athens; XIV. The Piraeus. The author's method is thus seen to be chronological in the main. The effect of clearness and connectedness resulting from the method is enhanced by the author's gift of clear, orderly, and concise statement.

Although Professor Gardner's aim, according to his publishers, is "to give an adequate and at the same time popular account of ancient Athens", his work can be called popular only in a very limited sense. It is true that its pages are not heavily weighted with references, and that the minutiae of some of the disputed questions are relegated to notes at the ends of chapters; but the employment of long passages of Greek as prefaces to chapters, the frequent quotation of Greek in the text, and the general assumption that the reader is conversant with the topography and monuments of ancient Athens are hardly marks of popular

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treatment. Nor can the author's style be called popular. Pure and clear as it is, it is not characterized by the ease and grace which are naturally expected of one who addresses the wider audience. The author's face is rarely seen in his page, and when it does appear, it is always impassive. It is vain to watch for it to be lighted by a relieving gleam of humor.[1] Professor Gardner keeps to his work; his sober wishes never learned to stray. If the reader is not fascinated by the subject itself, the author's condensed, matter-of-fact, unsmiling style will hardly carry him along in its current.

But these defects exist only when the book is considered as a popular work. When it is considered from the right point of view, the so-called defects are seen to constitute the merits of the work. The fact is that Ancient Athens is a work for an audience of students—not only the close circle of specialists, but the wider circle of all classical students and teachers, especially those whose interest has been stimulated by travel in classic lands. It will be of interest and value to specialists because of its admirably concise, clear and impartial summaries of views on disputed questions, and because Professor Gardner never fails to take a stand of his own and lend the important weight of his own authority to one or the other of the parties to the dispute. He is always fair, and never dogmatic. As might be expected of the author of A Handbook of Greek Sculpture, he is conservative, and avowedly so (p. VI). He holds with Frazer and against Dörpfeld (p. 210) that the early temple of Athena on the Acropolis was not rebuilt after the Persian Wars; he states his own opinion (p. 449) "that the use of the raised proscenium or λογεῖον as a stage for the actors is established by very clear evidence in the case of the later Greek theater, and this analogy would lead one to expect some such platform in the Greek theater of earlier times also"; he agrees with Leake, Curtius, and others of the older school of topographers in holding (pp. 535–8) that in Pausanias I 8, 3 "Enneacrunus was certainly in the bed of the Ilissus", and "that it and the other buildings mentioned with it are inserted here for some reason out of topographical order." He cites the Bologna head, identified by Furtwängler as part of a copy of the Lemnian Athena, "as a concession to a theory admitted by many archaeologists" (p. 255).

But it is to the wider circle of students of Greek literature and art that Professor Gardner's work will be more welcome. For them the work is invaluable as a clear-cut and up-to-date presentation of what students of Greek culture ought to know and desire to know. It can be called popular, then, only in that it will appeal to the larger audience of scholars.

It will be regretted by many that Professor Gardner has not seen fit to give his audience, composed as it will be entirely of

[1] There is a single possible exception, p. 159, foot-note.

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seekers after information, more aid in the form of references to ancient and modern literature. Many who are not fortunate in having the specialist's knowledge would be glad to be referred more often to classical authority. Of still greater service would have been a few more select references to the literature of modern scholarship. Grouped conveniently in one place at the end of chapters, or of sections of chapters treating single monuments or questions, such references would in no way detract from the appearance of the work, and would add greatly to its value to the student.

As to other features of the book, in binding and general make-up, it is a companion to Mau-Kelsey: Pompeii, Its Life and Art. Among its 179 illustrations are eight photogravures and nine maps and plans. The photogravures are as perfect as could be wished. Among maps and plans every one will miss that of the city of Athens, whose insertion seems to have been intended (p. 538), but which one looks for in vain. The photographic illustrations are in the main good, with the exception of some few in which a wide sweep of city or landscape is reduced to so small a space as to confuse and obscure the outlines of individual features (e. g. pp. 2, 8, 12). On pp. 6 and 7 the eye is offended by the projection of the illustrations beyond the edge of the print of the page. The page in this work is not so pleasant and harmonious as that of the Mau-Kelsey volume; the size of the type and the wide spacing are a trifle out of keeping with the serious content of the text, and the effect of type, spacing and margin, especially at the top of the page, is to make one uncomfortable. There are a few typographical errors which will not please Professor Gardner, as for example: p. 149, southwest for southeast; 154, Sparta for Spata; 160, des deutsches Institut; 164, oenochoae.

But thought of the few faults of the work, both literary and mechanical, vanishes from the mind of the reader as he accompanies the author in his admirable presentation of this most fascinating subject. Professor Gardner's Ancient Athens ought to be on the shelf of every student and teacher of the classics, and of every other person who delights in the reconstruction of the home of the most interesting community of the ancient Greek world.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. GRANT SHOWERMAN.

Dante and the Animal Kingdom. By RICHARD THAYER HOLBROOK, Ph. D. New York, The Columbia University Press. 376 pages.

Voltaire says of Dante, 'Few people understand his oracles. He has commentators, which perhaps is another reason for his

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not being understood.' These words are the more interesting in view of the enormous accumulation of literature about the name of Dante during the last hundred years. The incomparable Fiske collection at Cornell, for example, contains more than seven thousand works. Of all this number many, no doubt, deserve the great Frenchman's scorn; but among those which do not it seems fair to place Mr. Holbrook's work on Dante's animals.

The author has devoted a chapter to each species of bird or beast alluded to by Dante, and in two or three prefatory chapters deals more generally with the various orders of life employed by the poet—including both supernatural and monstrous forms—and with the zoological knowledge and theories of later mediæval times. The book is furnished with abundant illustrative material drawn from mediæval writers, or carefully reproduced from carved portal and illuminated page. Had the author been content in many cases with mere citation or concise paraphrase of his authorities, or satisfied to quote his Dante either in Italian or in English, instead of in both, he might have reduced the bulk of his work at least by a fourth and made it more convenient. But, except for certain faults in technique, little may be urged against the book as a work of reference, and as a useful source of information concerning an important element in Dante's art.

The spirit of Mr. Holbrook's work leaves something to be desired. His attitude is on the whole one of amused and superior curiosity. At times he deals in flippant and unbecoming scorn, as when he says that Dante 'would not have introduced an infernal menagerie in any thoroughly orthodox hell,' or calls Minos 'the queerest of Dante's infernal functionaries', adding that 'after thirteen hundred years Minos has grown a tail—the chief justice of the nether world has a tail!—and no ordinary appendage.'

Dante is 'the most wonderful man of the Middle Ages, because he is their most perfect expression', which is faint praise from one who seems, with Gibbon, to regard the poet's time as 'a dark age of false and barbarous science.' Dante is represented as a struggling victim of 'a perverted philosophy,' and there is throughout a manifest tendency to condemn his thought, but praise his poetry. The distinction between thought and poetry is, we fear, too subtle for many of Mr. Holbrook's readers to follow; he reasons as one who attempts to discover the soul and virtue of Gothic architecture in finial, and leaf, and niche, at the same time despising the lofty grandeur of nave and transept as monstrous, or the mystery of the receding choir as mere artifice.

It is to be feared that in the respects just mentioned the work before us represents the character of much so-called appreciation of Dante to-day. We have become fascinated in our time with

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physical science, and blinded with the splendor of our own achievements in this field. Darwin seems much more reasonable and precious to us than Dante. Evolution offers to many an apocalypse of deeper meaning than the vision on Patmos. Mr. Holbrook appears—unconsciously, no doubt—to intimate as much when he says that 'man's true place in nature' is to be discovered 'not in oracles, but in the bosom of the earth,' and betrays his own conviction that 'bestiality' is the 'natural condition of man.'

Dante's thought is that of Thomas Aquinas and Albertus; and they and their forerunners had for some hundreds of years been searching, not indeed in the bosom of the earth, but in higher regions, for the secret of man's true place in nature. To them the words 'man' and 'nature' meant something other—perhaps greater—than they do in the pages before us, illuminated though these pages be with the light of modern science. It seems unreasonable that these men should for centuries have been straining their vision to peer into the mysteries of human life, and of the soul and its relations to the infinite, without discovering some truth, perhaps as necessary to us as any which later generations have wrung from 'the bosom of the earth.'

It is said of Professor Sophocles that when he conversed of certain of the Greek Fathers, he seemed to be speaking of his most intimate friends. By a sort of triumph of learning over the blinding prejudices and limitations of his day, he was able to move familiarly among those ancient priests and teachers, to know them as they were, to understand them even better than their most intimate acquaintances could have done. Thus the true scholar invariably seeks to transcend his own time, and to put himself in a position where he may see in its true values and relations the age which he studies. Of this Voltaire as a critic of Dante furnishes a monitory example. He was a man of his times, and an oracle to most of his contemporaries. He called Dante a madman; to him the Divine Comedy was at best a mere collection of 'plaisanteries,' or, at worst, the product of an imagination 'stupidly extravagant and barbarous.' Absurd as such opinions seem at the end of a hundred and fifty years, is it unreasonable to expect a like fate for careless judgments of Dante informed only by the spirit of our time?

YALE UNIVERSITY. CHARLES G. OSGOOD, JR.

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REPORTS.

REVUE DE PHILOLOGIE, Vol. XXVI.

No. 1.

1. Pp. 5–11. A dedication to Jupiter Dolichenus, by Franz Cumont. Critical discussion of a mutilated inscription used by A. H. Kan in his De Iovis Dolicheni cultu (Corpus III, 1128).

2. Pp. 12–30. The unexpressed in the Satires of Horace, by A. Cartault. A minute analysis of the various ways in which Horace in the Satires leaves it to the reader to supply thought not expressed by the words used.

3. Pp. 30 f. A. Cartault explains Hor. Sat. II. 3. 274 as referring to an affected pronunciation of certain letters.

4. Pp. 32–7. Karl Hude replies to the criticisms of Daniel Serruys on his edition of Thucydides, especially in regard to Laur. LXIX 30.

5. Pp. 38–43. A manuscript of Solinus revealed by Tironian notes, by Émile Chatelain. The MS Vossianus Q. 87 of the library of the University of Leyden contains many notes and corrections in Tironian shorthand. From these Chatelain draws conclusions as to the reading of the MS from which the corrections were taken, and cites many examples.

6. Pp. 44–62. A. Misier classifies the Parisian MSS of Gregory of Nazianzus (the five theological discourses).

7. Pp. 63–97. Critical study of the Appendix of St. Cyprian, by Paul Monceau. It is impossible here to summarize this able article.

8. P. 98. B. Haussoullier calls attention to an inscription that has been overlooked by historians of the Seleucidae.

9. Pp. 99–104. On an inscription of Troezen, by Ph. E. Legrand. Further discussion, with some corrections of previous discussion (Bulletin archéologique, etc., XXIV, pp. 191–9) of an inscription treated also by B. Haussoullier (Rev. de Phil. 1901, pp. 336–8).

10. Pp. 105–125. Metrical laws of Latin prose as exhibited in the Brutus, by Henri Bornecque. The author examines, not merely the close, but every part, of the sentence. He concludes that in the Brutus Cicero applies metrical laws to all parts of the sentence; that these laws are less strict than those employed by

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Pliny the Younger in his Panegyric of Trajan; and that in Cicero these laws are purely negative, and are shaped to prevent any resemblance of prose to poetry.

11. Pp. 125–43. The Milesian islands, by B. Haussoullier. Interesting investigation, by means of inscriptions and other sources, of the relations to Miletus of Leros, Lepsia, Patmos, and the Corsiae.

12. Pp. 143–8. Remarks on the syntax of *cum*, by F. Gaffiot. An attack upon Lebreton's treatment of "cum pour exprimer l'équivalence", which designation, he says, Lebreton got from Hale. He says "cum" always means "when", "at the time that", never "in that".

No. 2.

1. Pp. 149–157. Orientiana, by Louis Havet. Critical notes on many passages of Orientius, a Christian writer of about A. D. 400.

2. P. 157. In Plaut. Men. 1158 Louis Havet reads "praeuidia" for "fundi".

3. Pp. 158–63. Notes on a few passages of the Theaetetus by Louis Laloy.

4. Pp. 164–80. An exhaustive discussion of Catullus 67, by R. Cahen. The article presents what the author considers the minimum of necessary emendations.

5. Pp. 180–81. Ad Oracula Chaldaica, v. 7 f., by J. Bidez. For *οὔ* he reads *οἱ*.

6. Pp. 182–94. Ciceronian Studies, by J. Lebreton. The author had published a work in which he treated *cum* in equivalent or identical propositions. M. Gaffiot in the January number (see above) had attacked his views, maintaining that *cum* is always purely temporal. The present article discusses at length *cum* and *quod* in identical propositions in Cicero.

7. Pp. 195–210. The life of Sextus Empiricus, by Wilhelm Vollgraff. It has been thought that we know practically nothing of the life of Sextus Empiricus; but Vollgraff convincingly identifies him with the Sextus noticed by Suidas, and then by means of this and other sources thus rendered available, restores the great essentials of his life: the place of his birth, the epoch in which he lived, his family, his relations, his career, his philosophy, style, and the chief traits of his character.

8. Pp. 211–12. W. M. Lindsay discusses the provenience of certain MSS of Nonius Marcellus.

9. Pp. 213–15. P. Foucart gives an account of a pedestal found at Rome with an inscription showing that it served for the statue of Pythocles of Elis, the pentathlete, by Polyclitus, the original

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pedestal with the autograph of the sculptor and a later copy of the same having been found at Olympia.

10. Pp. 216–18. P. Foucart, using a notice (Séguier de Saint-Brisson, Notices et Extraits des manuscrits grecs, t. XIV, 2e partie, 1841) of a charge in an oration against one Phryne, shows that there probably was at Athens an explicit law against the introduction of strange divinities, and adds some remarks of interest.

11. Pp. 219–21. R. Poupardin publishes a note on MS G. gg, of the Vallicellian Library in Rome.

12. Pp. 222–3. L. Dautremer discusses an inscription of Timgad, consisting of five hexameters.

13. Pp. 224–8. Franz Cumont, starting out with a rescript of the emperor Julian (Ep. 11), investigates the significance of the title πατρόβουλος, arguing that it was equivalent to *patronus*, and was bestowed with certain privileges in some provinces on the descendants of rich and influential personages who had assumed the hereditary obligation to protect the citizens. But see No. 3, pp. 272–8 and 278 f.

14. Pp. 229–52. Book Notices. 1. Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Griechisches Lesebuch, Berlin, 1902. Noticed jointly by B. Haussoullier and E. Chambry. "That Greek studies are menaced in France, and that we are driven first to defend them and perhaps to sacrifice them to save Latin studies, the last citadel of classical instruction, is a proposition contested by no one". Such is the mournful strain with which Haussoullier introduces his comments, which are directed to showing how this great Reader may be made, even in France, to contribute something to a revival of Hellenic studies. Chambry gives a table of contents of the work, regretting some omissions, but commending the selections. As to the scholarship of the work, of course no remarks were necessary. 2. Beiträge zur alten Geschichte, herausgegeben von C. F. Lehmann, I Band, Leipzig, 1901–2. B. Haussoullier commends this new periodical, gives a table of contents, and makes some remarks on special points. 3. P. Foucart, Les Grands Mystères d'Éleusis. Personnel, Cérémonies, Paris, 1900. Analyzed at some length by B. Haussoullier. 4. Schulwörterbuch zu Homers Ilias und Odyssee, von Christian Harder, Leipzig, 1900. Albert Martin compares this work, published by Freytag, with Autenrieth's lexicon published by Teubner, pointing out wherein it is better, wherein not so good. 5. A. M. mentions favorably three works published by E. Loescher at Turin: Omero, L'Iliade commentata da C. O. Zuretti, vol. III, Libri IX–XII, 1900; Eschilo, I Persiani con note di Vigilio Inama, 1900; Sophocle, Antigone con note di Placido Cesareo. 6. Aristophanis Equites. Cum prolegomenis et commentariis, edidit J. von Leeuwen, Leyden, 1900. A. M. devotes a notice of this work chiefly to arguments against the

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author's theory that Aristophanes was an Aeginetan and as such not allowed to produce plays in his own name in Athens. 7. Thukydides erklärt von J. Classen. Vierter Band. Viertes Buch. Dritte Auflage bearbeitet von J. Steup. Berlin, 1900. Reviewed at length by E. Chambry. The reviewer states that he had not been able to commend previous revisions of Classen by Steup; but this volume he praises highly, enumerating, however, many points on which he is not in accord with him. 8. Longinus on the Sublime. The Greek text with introduction, translation, etc., by W. Rhys Roberts. Cambridge, 1899. By the same: Dionysius of Halicarnassus. The three Literary Letters. The Greek text with translation, etc. Camb., 1902. Noticed very favorably by Albert Martin. The title of the first named work misleads: Roberts holds that all we can say of the author of the περὶ ὕψους is that he lived in the first century of our era. 9. Catalogus Codicum astrologorum Graecorum: III. Codices Mediolanenses descripserunt Aemygdius Martini et Domenicus Bassi. Brussels, 1901. Noticed by A. M. This volume contains the list of the Greek MSS of Milan, thirty-six in number. 10. Bibliothèque Maraslis. N. G. Politis, Μελέται περὶ τοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς γλώσσης τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ λαοῦ. Παροιμίαι. Vol. I, 1899; Vol. II, 1900. Athens. Noticed favorably by A. M. The work relates only to Modern Greek proverbs. It is arranged alphabetically, and these two large volumes, aggregating 1330 pages, exhaust only the letter A. 11. Plautus Captivi, with Introduction, etc., by W. M. Lindsay, London, 1900. Henri Bornecque pronounces this the most complete edition of the Captivi in existence, but points out defects according to his view. 12. V. Cucheval, Cicéron orateur, 1901, Paris.—G. Jacquinet, Extraits et Analyses des principaux discours, Paris.—De la Ville de Mirmont, same title, 1902, Paris.—Julius Wolff, de Clausulis Ciceronianis, 1901, Lipsiae. Noticed by Henri Bornecque. The first of these works the reviewer finds very useful for young pupils and the general public, but lacking in scholarship. The works of Jacquinet and De la Ville de Mirmont have each merits of their own. The work of Wolff contains some new things, but much fewer than the author thinks. 13. W. M. Lindsay, Nonius Marcellus, 1901, Oxford. Briefly mentioned by H. B. "Fundamental work, extremely interesting, and reaching conclusions hard to refute, written by one of the men best acquainted with Nonius Marcellus".

Pp. 252–56. List of Books received.

MILTON W. HUMPHREYS.

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PHILOLOGUS, LX (N. F. Bd. XIV) 1901.

I, pp. 1–16. Th. Zielinski. Marginalien. I. Crit. and exeget. notes to a number of Greek and Latin writers.

II, pp. 17–24. O. Hoffmann. Studien zur griechischen Stammbildung. 1. φίλτερος, φίλτατος und Verwandtes. These are from φιλτός, a participle (cf. φιλτογένης) from the stem φῖλ-. So βέλτερος from a βελτός, φέρτερος from a φερτός. The superlative -ατος is to be compared with μέσ-ατος, νέ(F)-ατος, and the -τατος grew from the forms φίλτατος, etc.

III, pp. 25–80. A. Mommsen. Zur Orientierung über die delphische Chronologie. Deals with the names of the days, months, the solar position of the year, etc., the mythical magistrates, the sporadic material from the sixth cent. on. Pp. 51 ff. take up the periods of the priests, and the archontates comprised in the period of each priest.

IV, pp. 81–101. W. H. Roscher. Weiteres über die Bedeutung des E zu Delphi und die übrigen γράμματα Δελφικά. Continuation of his article in Philol. LIX (1900) p. 21 ff. I. Among other meanings given to E is that of the Pythagoreans, who made it symbolize justice because of its resemblance to a balance. Someone proposed that it was a mason's mark misunderstood and given a deep significance. It means, however, 'come'. II. A remarkable parallelism exists between the Δελφικὰ γράμματα and the ancient Ἐφέσια γράμματα, which were also in hexameter. With Otto Gruppe R. takes the Delphic words in a general sense and applies them to the worshiper as he enters the temple.

V, pp. 102–148. Fr. Reuss. Zur Geschichte des ersten punischen Krieges. The years 255 and 254. The Battle at Panormos. The years 250–248. The fight near the Aegatian Islands. Cato and Polybius. (That P. used C. cannot be inferred from the statement as to the duration of the war.) Polybius and Fabius. Polybius and Philinos. On p. 148 a list of passages where Polybius follows (a) Fabius (b) Philinus.

VI, pp. 149–154. M. Guggenheim. Antisthenes in Platons Politeia. Concludes that Plato, Rep. II. 16 (376 B), intends to hit the cynic. So also in VII. 17 (505 B), 450 A, B, etc.

Miscellen.—1. pp. 155–157. W. Schmid. Kratippos zum dritten Mal. Still holds against Susemihl (Philol. LIX, 537 ff.) that K. was a contemporary of Thucydides.

2. pp. 158–160. P. Groebe. Die Bezeichnung der gewählten Beamten vor dem Amtsantritt. Finds no proof that the term *designatus* could be dispensed with when a magistrate is referred to who has been elected but who has not entered upon his office.

VII, pp. 161–179. Fr. Mie. Die Festordnung der olympischen Spiele. Discussion of the fragment of an Olympian list of victors (no. CCXXII, p. 85 ff.) in Grenfell and Hunt's Oxyrhynchos-Papyri II. Summary on pp. 177–179. After Ol. 78 the festival

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lasted five days. On the first day, as Robert rightly observes, fell the preliminary celebration, the oath of the Hellanodikoi and contestants, the trial of the athletes and horses. On the second day came the boys' contest, on the third, the men's, except the pentathlon, which, along with the horse-racing, fell on the fourth. On the last day there took place the chief procession, the official chief offering at the great altar of Zeus and the banquet in the Prytaneion. The contests of trumpeters and heralds are to be placed on the first day.

VIII, pp. 180–191. Fr. Susemihl. Aphorismen zu Demokritos. 1. The utterances of Demokritos about his great travels and his sojourn in Athens, where nobody knew him, were probably contained in his (Μικρὸς) Διάκοσμος. 2. In the list of the Demokritean writings arranged in tetralogies by Thrasyllos, περὶ φύσιος πρῶτον and περὶ φύσιος ἀνθρώπου β′ are parts of one and the same book. 3. On his journey to Athens. D. may have visited Thebes in 425 and heard the Pythagorean Philolaos, but without receiving a lasting influence. 4. In Laert. Diog. IX 46 the number of books (9) has fallen out after ὑπομνημάτων ἠθικῶν. 5. In l. c. § 47, read perhaps Κανὼν α′ β′ γ′, Περὶ < παν-)τοίων ἀπορημάτων. 6. The ἀσύντακτα in the list is a genuine work of D. Appendix. Die Demokriteer Metrodoros und Nausiphanes. The Isocratic M. is identical with the Demokritean M.

IX, pp. 192–194. R. Foerster. Dialexis Choricii inedita from cod. Matrit. N—101 (= M.)

X, pp. 195–216. A. C. Clark. Anecdota Parisiensia ad libros epistularum ad Atticum Tornaesianum et Crusellinum. 1. De fide Bosiana in lectionibus e codice Tornaesiano afferendis. "Summa religione egisse videtur Bosius". 2. De lectionibus e codice Tornaesiano a Turnebo exscriptis. 3. De curis secundis Bosii et de codice Crusellino.

XI, pp. 217–228. W. M. Lindsay. Die Handschriften von Nonius IV. In book IV we have the same three classes as in I–III. But in the first class beside L′ there is a second preserver of the true form of text, the group H′ Gen. B and the Cambridge MS (Z. *i. e.* Z′).

XII, pp. 229–260. J. Fürst. Untersuchungen zur Ephemeris des Diktys von Kreta. Introduction. History of the relation of the Latin text to a Greek original. In 1892 Patzig's essay in the Byz. Ztschr. I. 135 ff. showed that the source for the Diktys-material among the Byzantines was partly Malalas and partly Johannes Antiochenus. In the chronographic literature there is undoubtedly Diktys-material which we do not find in L. Septimius' Ephemeris. I. Diktys bei Malalas. II. Sisyphos von Kos. III. Die Troika des Johannes Antiochenus. IV. Der Diktysbericht des Georgios Kedrenos.

XIII, pp. 261–270. M. Müller. Ad Senecae tragoedias. 21 critical notes.

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XIV, pp. 271–276. Eb. Nestle. Zur neuen Philo-Ausgabe. Eine Replik zu Band 59, 256–271; 521–536.

XV, pp. 277–281. P. Kretschmer. Spätlateinisches *gamba*. Gamba is the Greek loan-word καμπή. It is the knee-joint of the hind-leg of an animal. Cf. Veget. ars veter. IV, 1.

XVI, pp. 282–306. W. Sternkopf. Ciceros Briefwechsel mit D. Brutus und die Senatssitzung vom 20 Dez. 44. Summary on p. 305. Brutus writes XI 4: request for the supplicatio—September; Lupus brings this letter from Mutina to Rome in six days, Sept.; Cic. replies with XI 6a, in Sept. or beg. Oct.; he leaves Rome, middle of Oct.; Lupus comes to Rome with a new letter from Brutus (not extant) in Nov.; this letter is sent to the absent Cic. Lupus returns after a few days without answer, Nov.; Cic. returns to Rome Dec. 9, and presumably at once writes XI 5. Lupus again comes to Rome and confers with Cic. The latter writes XI 7 in the middle of Dec. (Dec. 12?) A courier brings the edict of Brutus; there is a meeting of the Senate; Cic. writes XI 6b on Dec. 20.

XVII, pp. 307–314. Fr. Luterbacher. Zur Chronologie des Jahres 218 v. Chr. Justifies his own views (as publ. in his ed. of Livy XXI) against those of W. Osiander (Der Hannibalweg, Berlin, 1900). Hannibal crossed the Alps in the second half of October, taking 15 days.

Miscellen.—3. pp. 315–316. G. Kazarow. Die Entstehungszeit des linkspontischen Κοινόν. This federation is older than the Roman rule.

4. pp. 316–318. P. de Winterfeld. Terentianum. In Ter. Eun. IV. 4. 42 conjectures *etiam nunc non credis miseris non esse inrisas modis?*

5. pp. 318–320. M. Manitius. Handschriftliches zur Nux elegia und zu Ov. Am. I, 5. Cod. Dresdensis A 167^a saec. XII fol. 39^c–41^b often agrees alone with the Florentinus, often disagrees, and often offers a tradition differing widely from the other codd. deteriores.

XVIII, pp. 321–329. J. Boehlau. Ein neuer Erosmythus. A small Attic lekythos of the Kassel Mus. represents Eros as Adonis, who appears as an ephebus in the centre of a group. He is fleeing from a wild boar; from his right hand he has dropped a hydria; a maiden in chiton runs to help with outstretched hands; behind runs another in the act of hurling a broken water-jar. To Eros is attributed the fate of Adonis, something which is not supported from other sources, although parallels between them are found in other respects.

XIX, pp. 330–359. J. Fürst. Untersuchungen zur Ephemeris des Diktys von Kreta. (Continued from pp. 229–260.) The Tale of Troy by Kedrenos is combined out of John Malalas and John of Antioch, and a third source, Homer, is not excluded. The Diktys-material in the other Byzantines is then analyzed

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under 13 heads. On p. 344 is a stemma showing the descent of the Byzantine material from Diktys and Sisyphos of Kos. VI. On certain single portions of the Byzantine tradition. 1. The prologue and dedicatory epistles. 2. Hecuba's dream. Oneirokrisia. 3. Paris in Sparta. 4. The ἀπαίτησις of Helen. 5. Achilles' escort to Troy. 6. Expedition against the neighboring Trojan states. 7. Catalogue of the ships. 8. Conquest of Cyprus and Isauria. 9. Homerika. 10. Murder of Palamedes. 11. Priam's request to David and Tautanes for help. 12. Death of Paris and Oenone. 13. Achilles and Polyxena. His death. 14. The wooden horse. Helenus. 15. Mutilation of Deiphobos. 16. The Telegony. 17. Aeneas and Antenor.

XX, pp. 360–373. W. H. Roscher. Zur Bedeutung der Siebenzahl im Kultus und Mythus der Griechen. (Chapter from a larger treatise on the numbers seven and nine in classical antiquity.) 1. The sanctity of the number seven in the cult and myth of Apollo. The seventh month is consecrated to him; the seventh day of the seventh month is his birthday; he was a seven months' child; at his birth the swans are said to have circled about Delos seven times; there were seven events in the Pythian games, and seven mythical competitors entered them; Apollo's lyre had seven strings; at his festival a chorus of seven took part. The tradition of the seven wise men may have originated from the last from the association of wisdom with the oracle at Delphi. 2. The Moirai as inventors of seven letters (Hyg. fab. 277). Roscher conjectures that they were the seven vowels Α Ε Η Ι Ο Υ Ω.

XXI, pp. 374–380. C. Hentze. Die Arbeitsgesänge in den homerischen Gedichten. Homer mentions 2 kinds; 1 Σ 569 ff. the Linos-song of the boys in the vineyard. 2. ε 61 ff.; κ 220 ff., 226 ff., songs sung by Calypso and Circe while weaving. The former is not a work-song in Bücher's sense (Arbeit und Rhythmus. 2 ed., 1899), for it is not limited by its content to a single special kind of work. The songs of Calypso and Circe, on the other hand, are such, and were used by the poet to make known, by an appeal to the sense of hearing, the presence of persons who could not (according to the situation) be visible. Most of the work at which singing would be used was done by female slaves, and so was beneath the notice of the poet and his audience.

XXII, pp. 381–401. O. Hense. Zum Ion des Euripides. Annotations to a number of passages.

XXIII, pp. 402–426. E. Kornemann. Die Caesarische Kolonie Karthago und die Einführung römischen Gemeindeordnung in Africa. From evidence of inscriptions, etc., the following conclusions are reached, p. 423–4: 1. Caesar intended to realize at one stroke the establishment of the provincial administration of the west also, on the basis of community-self-government. In bringing this about he did not shrink from

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making cities with such great territories and such a mass of dependencies that they were no longer ordinary provincial cities but presented true copies of the Hellenistic city-states. 2. He created Latin as well as Roman colonies in the provinces; perhaps also coloniae peregrinae, not only colonies that were autonomous, but also among the non-Romans, colonies incorporated in a greater federation of communities. 3. He adhered to local forms as much as possible. 4. Perhaps he intended to equip all autonomous communities of the west with the Roman or the Latin *ius*.

XXIV, pp. 427–439. P. Egenolff. Handschriftliches zu Plutarchs Moralia. Results of a collation of cod. Pal. Gr. 283 (containing seven essays). Continuation of an article in Berl. phil. Wochs. XIV (1894), which presented a collation of cod. Pal. Gr. 153 (containing five essays).

XXV, pp. 440–445. R. Herzog. Ein Athlet als Schauspieler. Discussion of an inscription in Dittenberger Syll.,[2] No. 700.

XXVI, pp. 446–471. K. Giesen. Plutarchs Quaestiones graecae und Aristoteles' Politien. Summary on p. 471. The contents of Quaestiones 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 14–20, 28, 29, 34, 35, 39, which for the most part deal with political subjects in the broader sense are handled by Aristotle's Politeiai, and Plutarch used that source.

Miscellen.—6. pp. 472–476. E. Kornemann. Die Organisation der africanischen pagi bezw. pagi et civitates. Supplem. to art. XXIII.

7. pp. 476–477. L. Radermacher. Metrische Inschrift. Kaibel I Sic. et Ital. 664 is a short, two-verse dedicatory insc.

8. pp. 478–479. H. Goez. Zu der Aretinischen Gefässform mit Scenen aus der Phaethonsage. Note on an art. by Hartwig in Philologus, 1899.

9. pp. 480. C. Hentze. Zu Odysee τ 524–529.

XXVII, pp. 481–490. A. Wilhelm. Vermuthungen. I. Thuk. IV 118, 5. II. Andokides Myster. 47. III. Josephos A. J. XIV. 8, 5 (149 ff.).

XXVIII, pp. 491–501. L. Radermacher. Griechischer Sprachgebrauch (Cont'd from Philol. N. F. XIII, p. 592). II. On the acc. form σεῖς. The case cited from Papyr. Rein. of the 6th cent. (Wien. Stud. IX. 260) is shown to be a mistake for σὲ ἰς. III. On the chemical papyrus (Lugd. II, p. 12, 12, p. 237, Leeman). IV. On ἕξαλλος and ἐξάνθρωπος. V. In the hymn to Apollo, 97 ff., Callimachus explains λὴ λὴ παιῆον by ἴει βέλος.

XXIX, pp. 502–509. C. Hentze. Zur Darstellung des Landlebens auf dem Achilles-Schild. Σ 541–572. (1) The plowing, the harvest and the vintage scenes show the close of a rather long work-period, of a day or perhaps of the whole piece of work. This last seems especially true of the harvest scene. (2) The laborers in these scenes and the division of labor presupposed are discussed.

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XXX, pp. 510–540. A. Brieger. Epikurs Lehre vom Raum, vom Leeren und vom All und die Lucrezischen Beweise für die Unendlichkeit des Alls, des Raumes und des Stoffes. He disagrees with Giussani's view of *inane* and *spatium*, also with his own former critique of Hoerschelmann's Observationes Lucretianae Alterae (1877) rev. in Jhrbr., 1877, p. 65, and Susemihl (Jen. Litt. Ztg., 1877, nr. 44, p. 635 f.), which were too favorable acc. to his present view.

XXXI, pp. 541–571. K. Lincke. Xenophon's persische Politie. In the Cyropaedia I 2 15–16[a] X. explains his Cyrop. as a manual of the existing Persian constitution as the model state of the time. By comparison with the other works of X. the writer concludes that the Cynegeticus and the attempt at a Persian constitution as the ideal of the present are really the works of Gryllus produced in the school of X. at Scillus. Later they received additions from his grandson Xenophon.

XXXII, pp. 572–578. R. Ehwald. Zu Lygdamus C. I. Textual notes. E. disagrees with Dziatzko in his "Untersuchungen über ausgewählte Capitel des antiken Buchwesens", p. 177 ff.

XXXIII, pp. 579–592. Fr. Wilhelm. Zu Tibullus I 8 and 9. On the relations of these poems to Greek originals.

XXXIV, pp. 593–600. J. Lezius. Comperendinatio bei Cicero pro Flacco? L. concludes that after the Verrine trial, i. e., after the lex Aurelia, we cannot trace with certainty any instance of *comperendinatio* in any criminal process.

XXXV, pp. 601–627. L. Gurlitt. Zu Ciceros Briefen. Critical notes. I. Ad Quint. fr. II. Ad fam. III. Ad Att. IV. Transpositions and losses in the text of epp. ad Att. (ad Att. IV 19; 18).

XXXVI, pp. 628–634. W. M. Lindsay. Die Handschriften von Nonius V–XX.

Miscellen.—10. p. 635. R. Ehwald. Horaz carm. II. 2 and 3. These illustrate Ep. I, 1. 16 ff.

11. p. 636. R. Ehwald. Tac. Agr. c. 10. The expression (*Brit.*) *in orientem Germaniae in occidentem Hispaniae obtenditur*, and c. 24, *Hibernia medio inter Britanniam atque Hispaniam sita* is neither geographically correct nor to be explained by literary parallels, but from cartographic representation such as might have been on a forerunner of the Tabula Peutingeriana, where similar distortions occur.

12. pp. 636–639. A. Frederking. Zu Cicero. Notes on 9 passages in Tusc., De Or., Brut., In Verrem IV. 22. 49.

13. pp. 639–640. G. Knaack. Jordanes Rom. 241. A compilation from Florus (II. 22 = IV. 124), with the addition of the word Teutonios, which is worthless.

Indices.

YALE UNIVERSITY. GEORGE DWIGHT KELLOGG.

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BRIEF MENTION.

The *editio princeps* of the *Persians of Timotheos* (New York, Lemcke and Büchner) is just now a topic of absorbing interest to all Hellenists (A. J. P. XXIV 110) and I will make no apology to the readers of the Journal for postponing to a calmer day other matter intended for the *Brief Mention* of this number. Unless I say what is on my mind now, I shall be shamed out of my impressionism; for I remember what Haussoullier said about the *Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία* (A. J. P. XII 97), and recall my own experience with Herondas and Bakchylides. Three months hence it will be impossible to make the slightest observation about Timotheos, without consulting all the dreary literature, all the journals, all the programmes. Three months hence I shall have lost all desire to say anything about this treasure-trove. The air will be filled with the shouts of scholars claiming recognition *ὀξυπαραυδήτῳ φωνῇ παρακόπῳ τε δόξᾳ φρενῶν* and there will be no room for my obviousnesses. Perhaps I shall repent then of what I have to say now; for *αἱ δεύτεραί πως φροντίδες σοφώτεραι*. But the old saw is only partly true. The first impression made by a work of art is distinctly precious and is often worth more than the results of painful excogitation. The more one meditates, the more one is apt to sophisticate oneself. At all events I am going to set down certain things that forced themselves on me during the early hours of my acquaintance with this remarkable document. Early hours, I say, because little more than a day intervened between my first reading of the text as it appeared in the Independent of April 9, copied from the facsimile edition, and the arrival of the annotated edition, when the potent influence of WILAMOWITZ made itself felt. True, it had made itself felt already in the restorations that had been silently incorporated in the text; and the virginity of the eye was lost forever, *nulla reparabilis arte*. Still in the untroubled interval I had studied the piece for myself and some of those first impressions that have been confirmed by subsequent reflections may be worth the space I shall give them. The *editio princeps* of any such fragment is apt to be an *editio praeceps* and my unfeigned admiration for the learning and insight of the eminent editor has not blinded me to the hastinesses of his edition nor will it prevent me from giving my own interpretation when it diverges from his. For the convenience of my readers I will reproduce here what WILAMOWITZ has made out of the original and, as the text of the Persians in the facsimile edition has incorporated more of the editor's suggestions than has the annotated edition, my friend Professor MILLER has kindly harmonized the two and corrected some slight errors of the press.

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THE ΠΕΡΣΑΙ OF TIMOTHEOS.[1]

[σ]ὶν [ἐμ]βόλοισι γείτ[ονε]ς
.. υ ..... αντίαι
..... πρι. [ἐ]νεχάρα-
[ξα]ν· πο[σ]ὶ δὲ γε[ισό]λογχο[ν ὀγ-
κωμ(α)] ἀμφέθεντ(ο) ὀδόντων.
στ .. αι δὲ κυρτοὶ[σι] κρασὶν [ἀμ-
φεστεμ]μέναι
χεῖρας παρέσυρον ἐλατίνας.
ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν [ἐ]νθένδ(ε) [ἀπροφάσ]ιστος ἐπ[ὶφ]έροιτο πλαγὰ
ῥηξί[ζυγ]ος, πάντες [ἴσ]αν ἐπὶ [δυσμ]ενεῖς ἐνά[ν]ται·
εἰ δ(ὲ) ἀντίτοιχος ἀκτ[ὶς πρ]ος[άι]ξειεμ, πολυκρότο[υ] [ὀιπα ῑ]σι [τάχα]
πεύκας πάλιν ἐφέροντο,
αἳ δὲ [περὶ π]ά[ν]τη γυῖα διαφέρουσα[ι]
[πλ]ευρὰς λι[νο]ζώστους ἐφαινον, τὰς [μελάνδετον πτυχα]ῖς σκηπτ[ὸν] ἐπεμβάλλ[ο]ντες ἀνεχ[α]ίτιζον, αἳ δὲ πρα[νὲς] ἐ-
[κλίνοντο δέμ]ας ἀπηγλαϊσμέναι σιδα[ρέ]ωι κράνει.
ἶσος δὲ πυρὶ δαμ[ασίφως
Ἄρης] ἀγκυλένδετος
μεθίετο χερσίν, ἐν δ' ἐπιπτε γυίοις,
αἰθε[ροφόρητον σ]ῶμα διακραδαίνων.
στερεοπαγῆ δ' ἐφέρετο φόνια [μόλιβα πισσ]ά[εν]τά τε περίβολα πυρὶ φλεγ[όμ]ει(α) ἐν ἀποτομάσι βουδό[ροις.
δφεσι δὲ] βίοτος ἐθύετ[(ο)] ἀδι-
ν[ὸ]ς ὑπὸ τανυπτέροισι χαλκόκρασι νευρε[πεντάτοις].
σμαραγδοχαίτας δὲ πόντος ἅλοκα ναίοις ἐφοινίσσετο σταλα[γμοῖς.]
[κρ]αυγᾶι βοᾶ δὲ [συμ]μιγὴς κατεῖχεν.
ὁμοῦ δὲ νάιος στρατὸς
βάρβαρος ἀμμ[γ(α) αὖτις] ἀντεφέρετ' ἐ[ν ἰχ]θυ[σ]στεφέσι μαρμαροπ[τέρ]ο[ι]ς κόλποισιν [Ἀμφιτρίτ]ας· ἐνθα τοί τ[ις Φρυγιο]πέδιος ἀνήρ, ἀμεροδρόμοιο χώρας ἀναξ
[πλάκ' ὀ]μβρίαν ἀ[ρ]ῶ[ν σκέλεσι]
χ]ερσίν τε παίω[ν ἔ]πλει νησιώτας [ἀνέμοι]ς θεινόμε[νος]
[κυματοπλὴξ] [δ]ιεξόδους μ[ατεύω]ν.
ἰσόρροπά τε παλευο[ν—
— — — — ηλ —
— — — — ων [κ]άλει
θ[αλάσ]σιον θεὸν πατέρα
τ[ε — — νο . . . φι — —
— — — κεπ — —
— — λασσων — —
— σπ .. τε — —
— γαν .. ον — — α Περσᾶν
..... εφασ .. ρ — —
αντεκεκραγ ..... νιν
κελαι[ν] .. [ἀμ]βλὺ δ' ὠ[χ]ρον—
— — — —ς κατεσ-
σφρα[γισμέν] ..... στα—
..... πεπα .. ολλ — —
— — υτεκ .. τος ...
..... νώτου — —
..... ε διαπαλεύων
— — — — που βάσιμον ..
... ν δίοδον .....
ἐσμ[ὸ]ς [ἀπ]ειρος — — —
φιναοιστρυ .... [ἐ]λιχθείς
— — — — υλα — — φον
[πν]εῦμ(α). [ὃ] | τε δὲ τᾶι λείποιεν αὖ-
ραι, τᾶιδ' ἐπεισέπιπτεν ἀφρώδης ἀβαχχίωτος δμβρος, εἰς δὲ τρόφιμον ἄγγος ἐχεῖτ(ο). ἐπεὶ δ(ὲ) ἀμβόλιμος ἅλμα στόματος ὑπερέθυιεν,

[1] Spaced type is used to indicate the restorations found only in the facsimile edition.

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ὀξυπαρυδήτωι
φωνᾶι παρακόπωι
τε δόξαι φρενῶν
κατακορὴς ἀπείλει,
γόμφοις ἐμπρίων
μιμούμενος, λυμεῶ-
νι σώματος θαλάσσαι·
"ἠδὴ θρασεῖα καὶ πάρος
λάβρον αὐχέν(α) ἔσχες ἐμ
πέδαι καταζευχθεῖσα λινοδέτωι
τεόν.
νῦν δέ σ(ε) ἀναταράξει
ἐμὸς ἀναξ, ἐμός,
πεύκαισιν ὀρεγόνοισιν, ἐγ-
κλήισει δὲ πεδία πλόιμα νομάσιν
αὐγαῖς.
οἰστρομανὲς παλεομί-
σημ(α) ἀπιστόν τ(ε) ἀγκάλι-
σμα κλυσιδρομάδος αὔρας."
φάτ(ο) ἀσθματι στρευγόμενος,
βλοσυρὰν δ(ὲ) ἐξέβαλλεν
ἀχναν, ἐπαν(α)ερευγόμενος
στόματι βρύχιον ἅλμαν.
φυγᾶι δὲ πάλιν ἴετο Πέρ-
σης στρατὸς ⟨βάρβαρος⟩ ἐπι-
σπέρχων.
ἄλλα δ(ὲ) ἄλλαν θραῦεν σύρτις,
μακρανχενόπλους
χειρῶν δ(ὲ) ἐγβαλλον ὀρείους
πόδας ναός. στόματος
δ' ἐξήλλοντο μαρμαροφεγ-
γεῖς παῖδες συγκρουόμενοι·
κατάστερος δὲ πόντος
ἐγ λιποπνόης ψυχοστερέσιν
ἐγάργαιρε σώμασιν,
ἐβρίθοντο δ(ὲ) ἀιόνες.
[οἳ] δ' ἐπ' ἀκταῖς ἐνάλοις
ἥμενοι γυμνοπαγεῖς
ἀυτᾶι τε καὶ δακρυ-
σταγεῖ [γ]όω[ι] στερνοκτύποι
γοηταὶ θρηνώδει κατείχοντ' ὀδυρμῶι,
ἅμα δὲ [γᾶν] πατρίαν ἐπανε-
κα[λ]ἐοντ(ο) "ἰὼ Μύσιαι
δενδροέθειραι πτυχαί,
[ῥύσ]ασθέ μ' ἐνθέν[δ](ε), ἵν' ἀή-
ταις φερόμεθ(α)· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ποτ' ἀ-
μὸν [σῶ]μα δέξεται [κόν]ις.

κ[ῦρ]εγ γὰρ χερὶ πα[λ]ε[ο]νυμ-
φαγόνον [ἀβατ]ον ἄντρον
ο ..... διαστακαπε ...
... δονειτεο βαθύ[τ]ερον πόντοιο
τ[έρμ]α.
ἀπεχέ μ', ἀχί μο[ι κ]α[τὰ]
πλόιμον Ἕλλαν εὐ[παγ]ῆ στέγην
ἔδειμε
[τ]ἠ[λετ]ελεσπόρον ἐμὸς
δεσπότης. οὐ γὰρ ἀ[ν Τμῶ]λον οὐδ(ὲ)
ἄστυ Λυδὸν [λι]πὼν Σάρδεων
ἦλθον [Ἕ]λλαν' ἀπέρξων Ἄ[ρη·
νῦν] δὲ πᾶι τις ὑσέκφευκ[τ]ον εὕ-
ρηι | γλυκείαν μόρου καταφυγήν;
Ἰλιοπόρος κακῶν λυαί-
α μόνα γένοιτ' ἄν,
εἰ δυνατὰ πρὸς μελαμπεταλο-
χίτωνα Ματρὸς οὐρεί-
ας δεσπόσυνα γόνατα πεσεῖν,
εὐωλένους τε χεῖρας ἀμφέβαλλον
λῦσον, χρυσοπλόκαμε θεὰ
Μᾶτερ ἱκνοῦμαι,
ἐμὸν ἐμὸν αἰῶνα δυσέκ-
φευκτον, ἐπεί με
αὐτίκα λαιμοτόμωι τις ἀποίσεται
ἐνθάδε μήστορι σιδάρωι,
ἢ κατακυμοτακεῖς ναυσιφθόροι
αὖραι νηκτιπαγεῖ βορέαι διαραίσονται· περὶ γὰρ κλιδῶν
ἀγριος ἀνέρρηξεν ἀπαγ
γυίων εἰδος ὑφαντόν,
ἐνθα κείσομαι οἰκτρὸς ὀρ-
νίθων ἔθνεσιν ὠμοβρῶσι θοινά."
Τοιάδ(ε) ὀδυρόμενοι κατεδάκρυον.
ἐπεὶ δέ τις λαβὼν ἀγοι
πολυβότων Κελαινᾶν
οἰκήτορ(α) ὀρφανὸν μαχᾶν
σιδαρόκωπος Ἕλλαν,
ἄγεγ κόμης ἐπισπάσας,
ὃ δ' ἀμφὶ γόνασι περιπλεκεὶς
ἐλίσσετ(ο) Ἑλλάδ' ἐμπλέκων
Ἀσιάδι φωνᾶι, διάτορον
σφραγῖδα θραύων στόματος,
Ἰάονα γλῶσσαν ἐξιχνεύων.
"ἐγώ μοί σοι κῶς καὶ τί πρᾶγμ(α),
αὐτις οὐδάμ' ἔλθω.
καὶ νῦν ἐμὸς δεσπότης

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δεῦρό μ' ἐνθάδ' ἧξε,
τὰ λοιπὰ δ' οὐκέτι πάτερ, οὐκέτι μάχεσθ' αὐτις ἐνθάδ' ἐρχω,
ἀλλὰ κάθω·
ἐγώ σοι μὴ δεῦρ', ἐγὼ
κεῖσε παρὰ Σάρδι, παρὰ
Σοῦσ(α), 'Αγβάτανα ναίων.
Ἄρτιμις, ἐμὸς μέγας θεός,
παρ' Ἔφεσον φυλάξει."
Οἱ δ' ἐπεὶ παλίμπορον φυ-
γὴν ἔθεντο ταχύπορον,
αὐτίκα μὲν ἀμφιστόμους
ἀκοντας ἐχ χερῶν ἐριπτον, ὁρύπτετο δὲ πρόσωπον ὀνυχι, Περσίδα στολὴν περὶ
στέρνοις ἐρεικον εὐυφῆ,
σύντονος δ(ὲ) ἁρμόζετο
'Ασιὰς οἰμωγά.
πολυστόνωι κτύπει δὲ πᾶσα βασιλέως πανήγυρις
φόβωι, τὸ μέλλον εἰσορώμενοι πάθος.
καὶ παλινπόρευτον ὡς ἐσεῖδε | βασιλεὺς εἰς φυγὴν ὁρμῶντα παμμιγῆ στρατόν,
γοννπετὴς αἰκιζε σῶμα,
φάτο δὲ κυμαίνων τύχαισιν
"Ἰὼ κατασκαφαὶ δόμων
σείριαί τε νᾶες 'Ελλανίδες,
αἳ κατὰ μὲν ἡλικ(α) ὀλέσατ(ε) ἦβαν νέων πολίνανδρον,
νᾶες δὲ — — —
οὐκ(ὶ) ὀπισσοπόρευτον ἀξουσιμ, πυρὸς δ' αἰθαλόεμ
μένος ἀγρίωι σώματι φλέξει, στονόεντα δ(ὲ) ἄλγη
ἔσται Περσίδι χώραι.
ὢ βαρεῖα συμφορά,
ἃ μ' ἐς 'Ελλάδ(α) ἤγαγες.
ἀλλ' ἴτε μηκέτι μέλλετε ζεύγννντε μὲν τετράορον ἵππων
ὀχημ(α), οἱ δ(ὲ) ἀνάριθμον ὅλβον φορεῖτ' ἐπ' ἀπήνας,
πίμπρατε δὲ σκηνάς,
μηδέ τις ἡμετέρου
γένοιτ(ο) ὄνησις αὐτοῖσι πλούτου."

οἱ δὲ τρόπαια στησάμενοι, Διὸς ἀγνότατον τέμενος, Παιᾶνα ἐκελάδησαν, ἰήιον
ἄναπτα, σύμμετροι δ' ἐπεκτύπεσον ποδῶν
ὑψικρότοις χορείαις.
'Αλλ' ὦ χρυσοκίθαριν ἀέξων μοῦσαν νεοτευχῆ
ἐμοῖς ἐλθ(ὲ) ἐπίκουρος ὑμνοις ἰήιε Παιάν·
ὁ γάρ μ' εὐγενέτας μακραίων Σπάρτας μέγας ἀγεμών,
βρύων ἀνθεσιν ἤβας,
δονεῖ λαὸς ἐπιφλέγων
ἐλᾶι τ(ε) αἰθοπι μώμωι,
ὅτι παλαιοτέραν νέοις
ὑμνοις μοῦσαν ἀτιμῶ.
ἐγὼ δ(ὲ) οὔτε νέον τιν(ὰ) οὔτε γεραὸν οὐτ(ε) ἰσήιβαν
εἰργω τῶνδ' ἐκὰς ὑμνων,
τοὺς δὲ μουσοπαλαιολύμας, τούτους δ(ὲ) ἀπερύκω,
λωβητῆρας ἀοιδᾶν
κηρύκων λιγυμακροφώνων τείνοντας ἰυγάς.
πρῶτος ποικιλόμουσον 'Ορφεὺς χέλυν ἐτέκνωσεν,
υἱὸς Καλλιόπας Πιερίας ἐπι.
Τέρπανδρος δ' ἐπὶ τῶι δέκα ζεῦξε μοῦσαν ἐν ὠιδαῖς·
Λέσβος δ(ὲ) Αἰολία νιν 'Αντίσσαι γείνατο κλεινόν·
νὺν δὲ Τιμόθεος μέτροις ῥυθμοῖς τ(ε) ἐνδεκακρουμάτοις κίθαριν ἐξανατέλλει,
θησαυρὸν πολύμνιον οἴξας Μουσᾶν θαλαμευτόν·
Μίλητος δὲ πόλις νιν ἀθρέψασ', ἀ | δυωδεκατειχέος λαοῦ πρωτέος ἐξ 'Αχαιῶν.
'Αλλ' ἑκαταβόλε Πύθι', ἀγνὰν
ἔλθοις τάνδε πόλιν σὺν ὅλβωι, πέμπων ἀπήμονι λαῶι τῶιδ' εἰρήναν
θάλλουσαν εὐνομίαι.

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The description of the Battle of Salamis in the Persians of Timotheos has no historical warrant such as one imagines in the Persians of Aischylos. It is doubtless accommodated to the normal sea-fight of Timotheos' time, the normal sea-fight of the Peloponnesian War. There was no more antiquarianism about Timotheos than there was about Pindar, who uses the ἄγκυραι of his day and not the εὐναί of the Argonautic age (P. 4, 24). In order to understand Timotheos we must read Thukydides and Xenophon and the other authorities for that period, and, as the Confederates reintroduced antique methods, not to say, antique valor, a man of my time is occasionally reminded of the performances of the Merrimac in the spring of 1862. So much for the time; and as for the place, the harbor of Syracuse will serve as well as the Bay of Salamis. The local touches amount to very little. 'Enwreathed with strings of fishes' will answer for Hampton Roads, and Norway is full of bays with rocky headlands 'that jut out like wings'. Technical terms are set at naught and the poet's only aim is to say the ordinary things in an extraordinary way, so that we are really grateful to him for using so familiar a word as ἐμβόλοισι (v. 1), which Pindar did not disdain. Elsewhere the homely ram is an ἀντίτοιχος ἀκτίς (v. 12), a σιδάρεον κράνος (v. 21). In fact, the ram seems to be omnipresent. WILAMOWITZ recognizes it in the σκηπτός of v. 18, and I am surprised that he does not consider the puzzling γε . . . λογχο . . . ὀδόντων (v. 4 sq.) another avatar of the ram. At least, one of the prows figured in Baumeister (No. 1691) might be thought to look like WILAMOWITZ'S 'toothed cornice.' The oars are nowhere oars. Now they are 'feet,' πόδες (v. 4), for the ship 'walks the waters like a thing of life' and the true nautical πούς or 'sheet' is banished. Anon the oars are χεῖρες ἐλάτιναι (v. 7) for the ship is a swimmer as well and the true σιδηραῖ χεῖρες or 'grappling irons' are nowhere to be seen. The same oars are πόδες again, this time ὄρειοι πόδες (v. 102) and in v. 88 they are πεῦκαι ὀρίγονοι. In point of fact, we encounter from the start a series of γρῖφοι such as Greek comedy delights in; and inasmuch as a great deal of our knowledge of antique nauticalities is guesswork, we have riddle within riddle and an Oedipus like WILAMOWITZ will be welcome to those who hate conundrums.

Still, even unaided by restorations, we can make out something of the course of events. So v. 8 there can be very little doubt that a front attack is delivered, ship against ship, ἀντίπρῳροι ἐμβαλλόμεναι (Thuk. 7, 34, 5) ram against ram, man against man.—The indications of boarding are not very plain, for this is not the way in which hostile ships are usually boarded, but for all that, we must consider WILAMOWITZ'S paraphrase as a possibility: πάντες οἱ ναῦται ἐπὶ τὴν πολεμίαν ναῦν ἐπιδιαβῆναι ἐπειρῶντο.—A side attack is threatened and the opposing ships back water. We have a

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vision of ships that go apart or drift apart and show their linen girths; of a 'thunderbolt,' ram or haply dolphin, that plunges into the hold with a blow that makes the vessels toss the head, that makes them capsize. We have a vision of ships sinking by the prow or haply turning over on the side, shorn of the glory of their oarage by the iron skull-cap of the ram.—*ὑπὸ τῆς σιδηρᾶς . . . κεφαλῆς ἀποβαλοῦσαι*, says the paraphrast, but there is no causal nexus and *ἀποβεβληκυῖαι* would have been nearer the mark.—Darts are sped like fire or lightning and fall, quivering as they fly, into the hull, into the hold of the ship. Fiery balls are sent into the enemy's vessels and many a life is lost beneath the shower of arrows. The green-haired sea is empurpled by the droppings of the ships, whether sparks of fire or gouts of blood. Yelling and shouting rule the scene (v. 35).—'Green-haired' is a rare epithet for the antique sea. Green, thinks W., is the complementary color to the red sparks. *ἐφοινίσσετο* of blood does not need a chromatic commentary.[1]

The barbaric fleet holds on its course to meet the enemy in the bay, a fishy bay, a rocky bay.—*ἰχθυ(σ)στεφέσι*, if rightly restored, is little more than *ἰχθυόεσι*. The latter part of compounds is often almost otiose and must not be pressed.—Suddenly a man of the plain appears,—a Phrygian, says the paraphrast, but we have one Phrygian below and this man, for aught we know, may be a Philistine, for the Philistines were emphatically men of the plain, as are their modern namesakes. Well, Phrygian or Philistine, he appears swimming for his life, a continental become an islander, and tries to get out of the turmoil. Soon lost amid the wreckage of the text, he emerges again to eject the salt water he is forced to swallow and gives Timotheos an opportunity to glorify what some superfine writers of our day call by the grand old name of 'parbreak'. And as he vomits, he reviles the sea in high-pitched tone and maddened mood, grinning defiance at her whom his lord had once bound and will yet lash with his oars and control with his eye (Ps. 32, 8: I will guide thee with mine eye). And now the Persian fleet is in full flight and the vessels crash into each other in their mad swirl and 'knock the feet of the ships out of the hands of the rowers', and the gleaming teeth—the rowlocks—fly out of the mouth, out of the red gunwale (*χεῖλος*) of the vessel (v. 104).—We breathe more freely and thank Diels for solving the puzzle. *σκαλμός*, it seems, was too commonplace a word for Timotheos, but seven years ago it thrilled me to hear it still used in Greek waters.—The sea swarms with constellations of bodies that have lost the breath of life

[1] In solchem Zusammenhange kann schwerlich etwas anders gemeint sein als das von den Schiffen ins Meer strömende ("tropfende") Menschenblut.—DANIELSSON, p. 13.

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(unless one makes a new word and reads κατάστορος, and combines it with ἐγ λιποπνόης, as Professor MILLER has suggested, cf. v. 70), and the shores are loaded down therewith. The stranded survivors beat upon their breasts and fill the air with lamentations calling upon the wooded vales of Mysia to save them, deploring the lack of fit burial, yearning for the sight of the bridge that brought them far from their native land. There can be but one redeemer, the Great Mother, nay, could have been. Too late! Too late! And yet there is an urgent appeal for salvation, followed by a gloomy vision of death by the sword, by the wild winds, by the wild waves, and the end—to be devoured by the fowls of the air (v. 150).

A comic scene ensues. A man from Kelainai is fished up by the hair of his head, embraces the knees of his captor and breaks silence in broken Greek, broken past mending at first but his meaning gets plainer as he goes on. 'I—to me—to thee—how?—and—what matter? It is my master that brought me hither. Never, great father, will I come to fight thee again. I will stay peaceably at home, Sardis, Susa, Ecbatana. Great is Diana of the Ephesians. He, she, it will be my protector.'—One's memory goes back to the Anabasis, that bugbear of schoolboys, and to Kelainai, the inhabited city, great and prosperous, where Cyrus had a palace and a park full of wild beasts, and to the river Marsyas, five and twenty feet broad, and to Apollo's luckless rival. One wonders whether Timotheos had a special spite against Kelainai above all the towns of Phrygia.—Of course, on WILAMOWITZ'S theory the mountain Phrygian is an offset against the Φρυγιοπέδιος of v. 40 and the Philistine's chances are reduced to nothing, in fact, never did amount to anything; and I make the *amende honorable* to those Philistines who thought otherwise. As the iterative optative shows, ἐπεὶ (= ὁπότε) δέ τις λαβὼν ἄγοι, this Kelainite is only one of a succession of captives, and, apart from the language, there could be nothing more farcical than this fishing scene in which barbarian after barbarian is hauled up by the hair of his head, the long hair so characteristic of the enemy. It is the comic side of the βαθυχαιτήεις Μῆδος of Aischylos. The Kelainite is the spokesman for reasons best known to Timotheos, but we must imagine the other captives falling in at the end and saying, 'I live by (= in) Sardis, I by Susa, I by Ecbatana' (v. 170).

Meantime, the suite of the King drop their javelins and tear their faces with their nails, rend their garments and intone in unison an Asiatic lament. About the King there gathers a

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groaning crowd, and the King himself, when he sees his fleet fleeing in wild disarray, falls on his knees, does despite to his body, and bewails the desolation of his house, the loss of the flower of his men, whom he shall never lead back. Fierce flames of fire shall devour them and groans and anguish be the lot of Persia. An evil day it was that brought him to Greece. No more delay. Yoke the chariot. Pile the uncounted treasure on the wains. Burn the tents that those people may get no good out of our wealth. But the Greeks set up a trophy in honour of Zeus and raise a song of triumph to Apollo and dance a lilting dance of victory. Such is the substance of the *ὀμφαλός*, the narrative.

The *σφραγίς*, in which the poet sets the seal to his work, begins with an appeal to Apollo, whom he beseeches to favor his new-fashioned song, his *μοῦσαν νεοτευχῆ*. Wherein that innovation consisted does not concern us just now. The claim of novelty is the main thing poetically and we are aweary of it. It is as old as Homer and Hesiod. It was old when Pindar bragged of his *νεοσίγαλος τρόπος*. Aristophanes prides himself on the daring novelty of ending a comedy with a dance and Eupolis chides his detractors as does Timotheos. We are familiar with the 'Nullius ante trita solo' of Lucretius, with Milton's 'Things unattempted yet in prose or rhyme' and Platen's 'Frei steht die Folge jedem. Ich fliege voran'. We wax as tired of epoch-making poets as of epoch-making grammarians and turn to ask, What are we to say of this great discovery?

After all, the disillusion as to 'old Timotheos' is not very startling. Athenaeus tells slighting stories about him, and the diction of the few fragments previously known has been pronounced 'vapid and contorted'. Will that verdict be changed? To be sure, the vapidity is not so evident at first, when one takes in eagerly the unfamiliar vintage. But of the contortion there can be little question. To be frank, no adult person who is fairly familiar with Greek poetry will be carried away with this specimen of the poetic power of Timotheos. Somehow the word *νόμος* has always exercised an imposing effect even on scholars. They read into its early occurrences all the majesty we ascribe to Law; and they have a respect for the musical *νόμος* that they would not have for 'tune'. So the Terpandrian *νόμος* with its seven parts was likened to the seven lamps of the golden candlestick; and once upon a time the Pindaric student that did not recognize the Terpandrian *νόμος* in the Epinikian Odes (Pindar I. E. xlix) was under the same condemnation that made an end of Uzzah, who took hold of the ark of the Lord. For my part, the first impression made by the *κιθαρῳδικὸς*

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νόμος on my irreverent mind was comic rather than otherwise, and even the speech of the Shah with its impatient present imperatives reminded me of a similar cumulation in the Acharnians (S. C. G. § 405), whereas it ought to have reminded me of Aischyl. P. V. 56 foll. For this happens to be the Aristophanic year in my cycle, and, though the illustrious editor to whom we owe this new debt of gratitude and admiration, repeatedly rebukes in advance any semblance of levity, any cheap fun at the expense of Timotheos, my environment is too much for me. Nor am I wholly without defence. The easiest approach to this Akropolis of poetry, as to the real Akropolis, lies through the deme of Kydathenaion, the deme of Aristophanes. Nay, Köhler and Wilamowitz himself think that Kydathenaion and Akropolis are one; and those who take the aesthetics of Aristophanes so seriously, ought not to complain of the appeal to his decision here. Again we hear the rapid notes of the shivering, not to say frosty, poet who hails the founding of Nephelokokkygia. Again we breathe the atmosphere of the mock lyrics of the Birds, of the Frogs; and the triple compounds, πρόσθε λέων, ὄπιθεν δὲ δράκων, μέσση δὲ χίμαιρα, remind us of the cockinesses, the 'horse-cockinesses' of Aristophanes' comic fabrications, for in this regard the dithyramb at its worst was not worse than the κιθαρῳδικὸς νόμος of Timotheos. μελαμπεταλοχίτων, to cite no other example, belongs to the same poetical wardrobe as σκοτοδασυπτυκνόθριξ. Designedly comic is the figure of the barbarian suppliant, who furnishes a pendant to the Δατισμός of the Peace (v. 289) and recalls the Scythian archer of the Thesmophoriazusae. What would one not give for a dialogue between the lover of Artamuxia and the Asiatic Parolles of Timotheos. It would be as good as a discussion between Dr. Caius and Sir Hugh Evans. Of the metres I must renounce any judgment. I have no hope of reweaving myself, as old Lobeck said when he was urged to study Sanskrit, and as one who followed Westphal and Schmidt a generation ago into what was then the Celestial City and is now considered the Fool's Paradise of symmetry, as one who refused to obey the voice of Hephaestion and made merry over Dindorf's *olla podrida* of Greek metres, I feel that my best course is to keep silent about the lilting measures of Timotheos lest I be guilty of a return to the once familiar name of logaoedic.

The poem is lively enough. The κιθαρῳδικὸς νόμος must have been a law unto itself in the blending of the different departments of literature, and I should find it very hard to register the syntactical phenomena of Timotheos under any of the stylistic categories recognized in my Greek Syntax. But when I turn to consult my oracle, I find that there are no departments of literature left; and, seated high on the ruins of the Persians, WILAMOWITZ

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laughs to scorn the traditional division into epic, lyric and dramatic. 'Wer von griechischer Poesie irgend was verstehen will, muss die allerdings überhaupt schlechthin unbrauchbare Dreiteilung der Schulästhetik in Epik, Lyrik, Dramatik fahren lassen' (p. 105). This is sad news for me. I listened with resignation when the great scholar intoned my favorite dirge, *τὸ μηδὲν εἰς οὐδὲν ῥέπει* (A. J. P. IX 84), over the Terpandrian controversy, but this is a more serious matter. 'Mir zerbricht mein frühres Leben Unter den Händen wie Knabenspielzeug'. However, I recognize the voice of fate and behold an omen, an *οἰωνός*, in the facsimile of Timotheos. Between the *ὀμφαλός* and the *σφραγίς* is a figure that looks more like a bird than anything else.[1] Can it be, can it be an ibis out of drawing? The bird would suit the Egyptian habitat, and Robinson Ellis has set forth its unlovely ways in his Prolegomena to Ovid's poem (A. J. P. III 89). Ibis-like, Timotheos has swallowed and digested all the departments of Greek poetry, epic, lyric, dramatic. But, honestly, I do not think that they have been improved by the process. To be sure, if we had the music, everything would be plain (A. J. P. XVI 394). But we haven't the music, and it is small comfort to beat time and hum *τοφλαττοθραν*.

And here I might plead lack of space and content myself with the safe generalities in which I have indulged thus far, but it seems a duty to the younger generation of scholars to illustrate what I meant in the beginning of these desultory remarks by the virginity of the eye. Read the Oidipus of Sophokles and you can remember no other plot. Read WILAMOWITZ's reconstructions and it is with great difficulty that you can recall what the attitude of your mind was when you read the text independently.[2] Take one of the first connected passages that emerge from the wreck of the Persians (vv. 15–21) which WILAMOWITZ paraphrases thus: *ὅσαι δὲ καταθραυσθεισῶν τῶν κωπῶν* (which, by the way, Professor More in the Independent renders as if it were *τῶν καταθραυσθεισῶν κωπῶν*, to the utter demolition of the sense) *δεῦρο κἀκεῖσε φερόμεναι τὰς πλευρὰς τὰς διαζώμασι περιειλημμένας ἐγύμνουν, ταύτας κεραυνοῦ τρόπον τὸ ἔμβολον ἐναράττοντες ἀνέτρεπον ὥστε προνεύουσαι κατεδύνοντο, τὸ τῆς κατασκευῆς κάλλος ὑπὸ τῆς σιδηρᾶς τοῦ*

[1] Es wird doch wohl ein zu einem Vogel stilisiertes Zeichen sein, das die Funktion der späteren Koronis erfüllt; ob es eine ist und eine Krähe vorstellen will, lasse ich dahingestellt; über diese Äusserlichkeit wird wohl noch viel geredet werden.—WILAMOWITZ, p. 8.

[2] These reproductions of my first impressions were partly in the hands of the printer, partly on the way thither, when, on the eighteenth of May, Professor BLOOMFIELD handed me an advance copy of DANIELSSON'S *Zu den Persern des Timotheos* in the Upsala Eranos for 1903. Our interpretations coincide at a number of points, and their absolute independence may serve as an illustration of my thesis, the value of fresh vision.

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πλήκτρου κεφαλῆς ἀποβαλοῦσαι. 'Es ward beschrieben', he says (p. 57), 'welche Folgen die verschiedenen Stösse hatten, wie das Schiff nach dem Verluste der Ruderreihe dem Feinde die wehrlose Seite bot, den Stoss erhielt, kenterte, mit dem Vorderteile voran sank'. This is very plausible. But let us examine the text in detail.

What is γυῖα? What is διαφέρουσαι? And what does γυῖα διαφέρουσαι mean? And remember above all that there is no περὶ πάντη in the papyrus. The γυῖα cannot be 'hands and feet.' It may be 'tiers' or 'wales' (compare the Pindaric ὑψίγυιον ἅλσος O. 5, 13), but the use of the word elsewhere points to the body of the ship, whether waist or hold. Lyric poetry like epic avoids the reflexive and prefers more concrete forms (Pind. P. 4, 173) and it requires no argumentation to show that γυῖα διαφέρουσαι is = διαφερόμεναι. But there is more than one διαφέρειν and in the absence of περὶ πάντη the uninstructed soul might have thought first of the meaning 'rend apart', might have thought first of γυῖα λέλυντο, might have translated γυῖα διαφέρουσαι into διεστάμεναι or haply κεχηνυῖαι, might have remembered Vergil's fleet after a storm (Aen. 1, 122): Laxis compagibus omnes | accipiunt inimicum imbrem (our ὄμβρον ἀβαχχίωτον v. 72) rimaeque fatiscunt. 'The shattered ships display their linen girths' and this may be due to the impact of the ever active ram. But WILAMOWITZ tells us that these girths were made visible by the shearing off of the oarage, but really, in the present state of controversy about the διάζωμα and the ὑπόζωμα, I am not prepared to say whether this explanation is even plausible. The sides of the vessels are clearly to be seen between the oars in all Baumeister's figured monuments; and one would have imagined these girths neatly covered up with planks except when repairs were hastily made as in Acts 27, 17: βοηθείαις ἐχρῶντο ὑποζωννύντες τὸ πλοῖον. Next, what is the nature of the σκηπτός? Literally, it means 'thunderbolt' and though it is unfair to insist on a natural expression in Timotheos, a thunderbolt naturally falls and ἐπεμβάλλοντες leads one naturally to think of missiles projected from above and first of the familiar δελφῖνες μολύβδινοι, for δελφίς is hog-fish and the Greeks call 'hog-fish of lead' what we call 'pigs of lead'. Surely no classical scholar will need to be referred for these δελφῖνες to the scholiasts on Thuk. 7, 41 and Ar. Eq. 762. Now, conjecture for conjecture, is not μολύβδινον as good as μελάνδετον?[1] The next passage is still more puzzling. Accept the restored parts of πρα[νὲς] ἐ[κλίνοντο δέμ]ας and I am free to confess that untaught by WILAMO-

[1] So wird der Dichter nicht vom Rammstoss gesprochen haben; dagegen passt der Ausdruck vorzüglich auf den zerschmetternden Wurf des δελφίς genannten 'Fallklotzes'. Somit hätte man in V. 17 τὰς [δὲ und danach etwa z. B. μολίβινον πτυχα]ῖς 'den bleiernen Wetterschlag' zu ergänzen.—DANIELSSON, p. 13.

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WITZ I should not have elicited from πρανές the meaning προνεύουσαι κατεδύοντο. An ὀρθὴ ναῦς is a ship on even keel. The opposite is ὑπτία as in Soph. Antig. 717: ὑπτίοις κάτω | στρέψας τὸ λοιπὸν σέλμασιν ναντίλλεται. To be sure, with a human being πρηνής and ὕπτιος are opposed to each other, but starboard and port are symmetrical so that πρανές as the reverse of ὀρθόν may be equivalent to ὕπτιον, and uninstructed I should have fancied that πρανὲς ἐκλίνοντο δέμας meant that the ships were on their beam-ends. True, the pictorial sequence evoked by WILAMOWITZ is very satisfactory and he can cite for the second αἱ δὲ as referring to the subject of the preceding sentence such authorities as Herodotos and Xenophon. But this is not Attic syntax nor is it Timothean syntax (cf. vv. 157, 174, 205, 210) and one's first impression is in favor of rendering the second αἱ δὲ, 'yet others'; and 'yet others' would spoil the WILAMOWITZIAN sequence. And then αἱ δὲ stirs another question. Why should we not read with Professor MILLER τὰς δὲ and assume three sets of ships, ships with gaping sides, ships sinking under the crushing weight of the δελφίς, ships on their beam-ends?[1] Observe the parallelism of the three imperfects and the unnaturalness of the relative construction here.

The Persians of Timotheos is not high poetry, but it is at all events high-strung poetry, and the chords of our responsive lyre must be screwed up. Of the parts of the Terpandrian νόμος we have here the ὀμφαλός and the σφραγίς; and the ὀμφαλός, which carries the narrative, is fearfully corrugated and the interpreter must often do violence to his imagination. But Timotheos can be as simple as the most simple. There is nothing more direct in literature than the speech of the Shah, and if I dare mention syntax in a number that groans under syntax, the syntax of Timotheos is perfectly normal where it is not childishly simple, as it is in his tiresome δέ—δέ—δέ parataxis. There is one 'mixed condition', it is true. But it occurs in a highly emotional passage and can easily be defended, even if such shifts were not common in sentences of comparison. The speaker begins (v. 132) with something feasible and finds as he goes on that it is hopeless: Ἰλιοπόρος κακῶν λυαία μόνα γένοιτ' ἄν, εἰ δυνατὰ (sc. ἦν) πρὸς μελαμπεταλοχίτωνα Ματρὸς οὐρείας δεσπόσυνα γόνατα πεσεῖν, εὐωλένους τε χεῖρας ἀμφέβαλλον. Cf. Eur. I. T. 447: ἥδιστ' ἂν τήνδ' ἀγγελίαν δεξαίμεσθ', Ἑλλάδος ἐκ γᾶς πλωτήρων εἴ τις ἔβα, the pathos of which is recognized by the editors. If, then, the ordinary interpretation gives a good sense, I do not see why we should resort to the strained, the violent, the obscure. The enraged swimmer, WILAMOWITZ'S [Φρυγιο]πέδιος, apostrophizes the sea (v. 90), as his οἰστρομανὲς παλεομίσημα, as his 'frantic pet

[1] Also ist auch das erste αἱ δὲ demonstrativ und drei Fälle des Verunglückens zu unterscheiden.—DANIELSSON, p. 12.

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aversion', as the ἄπιστον ἀγκάλισμα αὔρας, as the 'faithless minion of the breeze'. Is this nonsense, as WILAMOWITZ would have us to believe? Fire and water are natural enemies—Ag. 650 f.: ὄντες ἔχθιστοι τὸ πρίν, | πῦρ καὶ θάλασσα—but wind and wave are something more than alliterative allies. They are comrades, they are partners in mischief. The Greek, who loved the sea, was prone to put the blame on the winds, as we learn from Solon, ἐξ ἀνέμων δὲ θάλασσα ταράσσεται· ἢν δέ τις αὐτὴν | μὴ κινῇ, πάντων ἐστὶ δικαιοτάτη; and Herodotos foists the same Greek sentiment on a Persian (7, 16), but here the two go together and are alike guilty. More commonly the wind (ἄνεμος) is the man and the sea (θάλασσα) is the woman. The winds are masculine, and woman and the sea have been one for ages. Why rattle citations? to use WILAMOWITZ'S phrase. But sometimes the sea is masculine. So in later times when Ὠκεανός, the river became Ὠκεανός, the Ocean. πόντος has an ἄρσην κτύπος and αὔρα and θύελλα are feminine. In Timotheos both the mischief-makers are feminine, Rosalind and Celia. But, says WILAMOWITZ, the wind is not apostrophized. Of course not. It is the sea that is 'the hugging-piece of the breeze'. But the wind does not hug, says WILAMOWITZ. What of Boreas and Oreithyia in the Phaidros of Plato, what of Alkaios's Zephyros and Iris, what of Milton's Zephyr and Aurora? The winds not only visit, as Shakespeare has it, and caress and toy, but they hug—and worse; and as I write, my eye falls on Henley's 'Speed'. 'Speed', he sings, 'and the hug of God's winds. Speed and the play of God's airs'. WILAMOWITZ says that he cannot translate Timotheos; he can only paraphrase him into scholiastic Greek. Of course, when the master translator gives it up (A. J. P. XIII 517), where shall the mere botcher appear? And yet I venture to say that 'faithless minion of the breeze' is fairly comprehensible,[1] and at all events does not require an unheard-of syntactical juggle with the genitive such as Timotheos gives us no warrant for suspecting and such as WILAMOWITZ'S paraphrase postulates: προδοτικῶς με περιβάλλουσαν θάλασσαν μετ' αὔρας οὕτω ταχέως ἐπερχομένης ὥστε με κατακλύσαι.

In v. 159: διάτορον σφραγῖδα θραύων στόματος, Ἰάονα γλῶσσαν ἐξιχνεύων WILAMOWITZ interprets the διάτορος σφραγὶς στόματος as = τὸ εὖ ἐξάκουστον τοῦ στόματος σύμβολον (τὸ συνετὸν τοῦ λόγου). The 'clear stamp of the mouth' is 'distinct utterance' which is 'broken by this braiding of Greek with Asiatic speech.' But according to

[1] ἀγκάλισμά τινος heisst ja was jemand in die Arme nimmt und darin trägt, übertragen also, sein 'Hätschelkind, Liebling', wie Lykophron 308 der junge Troilos τερπνὸν ἀγκάλισμα συγγόνων genannt wird: und nichts ist natürlicher als die, wenn ich mich recht entsinne, auch der modernen Dichtung ganz geläufige Anschauung dass Wind und Welle Buhlen seien.—DANIELSSON, p. 19.

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WILAMOWITZ Timotheos thought that this phrase needed explanation and so he added *'Ιάονα γλῶσσαν ἐξιχνεύων*. This interpretation can hardly be called convincing. The *σφραγὶς στόματος* would naturally mean 'silence' which the barbarian breaks or crushes into penetrating utterance, *διάτορον* being used proleptically = *ὥστε διάτορον εἶναι*.[1] Tragic poetry is full of this figure and it would be impertinent to cite examples. Bruhn has collected a considerable number of them in his 'Anhang zu Sophokles' (pp. 5, 6) and others will be found in the Index to my Pindar. On this theory the man of Kelainai would match the *Φρυγιοπέδιος ἀνήρ* in his *ὀξυπαραυδήτῳ φωνᾷ* and that would be quite in the manner of Timotheos who is perpetually varying the same theme. For the use of *σφραγίς*, cf. Anth. P. 10, 42: *ἀρρήτων ἐπέων γλώσσῃ σφραγὶς ἐπικείσθω· | κρείσσων γὰρ μύθων ἡ κτεάνων φυλακή.*

Not being acquainted with the Phrygian language except so far as Kretschmer teaches it in his 'Einleitung', I am unable to criticize Timotheos's Phrygian Greek (v. 162). The first words: *ἐγώ μοί σοι κῶς καὶ τί πρᾶγμ(α)* are rendered thus: *ἔγωγε σός εἰμι· πῶς δέ; καὶ τί τὸ πρᾶγμα; μοι* is puzzling. A barbarian who had heard *ἐγ̓ψμαι* might readily make a crasis of *ἐγώ εἰμι* and *σοί* for *σός* would be a very likely turn, if he had picked up his Greek from a Kolophonian acquaintance (A. J. P. XXIII 22). The next words are not so simple as they seem. The speaker is bewildered. He is feeling his way through the Ionic dialect and promptly loses it; for the vulgar Ionic *κῶς* is succeeded by the Attic *πρᾶγμα*, an inconsistency that may be set down to supreme art or else to a blunder of the scribe. Here WILAMOWITZ'S paraphrase is not so helpful as usual: *πῶς δέ; καὶ τί τὸ πρᾶγμα*; the *δέ* is doubtless inserted in deference to the feelings of the imaginary paraphrast but the asyndeton is more dramatic; and the article does not help the situation, for *τί τὸ πρᾶγμα*, 'what's the matter'? is not a natural address in the circumstances. We expect some such question as that of the jailor at Philippi: *τί με δεῖ ποιεῖν*; and *πρῆγμα* in the sense of *opus*, the wretched Kelainite might have learned from Herodotos. *τί πρᾶγμα*, therefore, is *τί πρακτέον* and this is the sense that the translator in the Independent has given it, regardless of the Greek paraphrase. 'What is to be done', 'what is wanted', 'what's your will'? One is reminded of Haimon's professed subservience to his father's will: *πάτερ, σός εἰμι· καὶ σύ μοι γνώμας ἔχων χρηστὰς ἀπορθοῖς, αἷς ἔγωγ' ἐφέψομαι.* Another solution, which had crossed my own mind, is suggested by Professor MILLER. The


[1] Den Siegel seines Mundes bemüht sich der Phryger zu durchbrechen, indem er so gut es eben gehen will, ionisch zu sprechen versucht. *διάτορος* wird proleptisches Prädikativ sein.—DANIELSSON, p. 38.

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barbarian is trying to say, 'There is nothing between us. There is no quarrel between us. How should there be? What quarrel should there be? It is all my master's fault'. Comp. Hdt. 5, 84: *οἱ δὲ Αἰγινῆται ἔφασαν σφίσι τε καὶ Ἀθηναίοισι εἶναι οὐδὲν πρῆγμα* and the notorious *τί ἐμοὶ καὶ σοί* of John 2, 4 and Luke 8, 28. The meaning of the rest is deliciously clear, in fact, *διάτορον*. The fun of *παρά*, by the way, does not lie in its use with the accusative but with the use of it at all in connection with a certain class of words. In the spoken Greek of the time *παρὰ Σάρδι* is as bad as *παρὰ Σοῦσα*. Cf. Sobolewski, De praepositionum usu Aristophaneo, p. 185.

C. W. E. M.: With reference to the clause *ἦν Δαναΐδᾶν λόχος ἔμολεν* in the first of the literary fragments of the Tebtunis Papyri, the editors have the following note: "The use of the simple accusative with *ἔμολεν* is unsatisfactory in this context, and perhaps a preposition has dropped out." The editors are probably right, and it is interesting to note that the metre also seems to point to the existence of a lacuna after the word *ἦν*. As the text now stands, starting at *ἦν*, we have the following awkward movement: — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ — — ∪ — ∪ ∪ ∪ ∪ — ∪ —. But if the words *γε μέτα* be inserted after *ἦν*, the requirements of both metre and syntax will be satisfied, and we get the following symmetrical structure:

ὦ φανεὶς χάρμα μοι φίλον, ὅτε με
ἠγάπας, ὅτε δόρατι πολεμίῳ
τὰν Φρυγῶν πόλιν ἐπόρθεις, μόνα
τὰμὰ κομίσαι θέλων λέχεα πάλιν εἰς πάτραν·
νῦν δὲ μούναν μ' ἀφεὶς ἄλοχον, ἄστοργ', ἄπεις,
ἦν <γε μέτα> Δαναΐδᾶν λόχος ἔμολεν,
ἧς ἕνεκα παῖδα τὰν ἄγαμον εἶλ'
Ἄρτεμις, {τὸν} σφάγιον Ἀγαμέμνονι;



The above had been put in type and was about to go to press, when WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORFF'S edition of the *Persae of Timotheos* came to hand. In a footnote on page 82, the editor discusses the fragment that forms the subject of the preceding

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remarks, but as his treatment is so radically different from mine it seemed best to append here a brief review of the results reached by him.

The text as constituted by Wilamowitz is as follows:

> ὦ φανεὶς χάρμα μοι φίλον, ὅτε μ' ἠγάπας,
> ὅτε δόρατι πολεμίωι τὰν Φρυγῶν πόλιν ἐπόρθεις μόνα
> τὰμὰ κομίσαι θέλων λέχεα πάλιν εἰς πάτραν.
> νῦν δὲ μούναν μ' ἀφεὶς ἄλοχον, ἄστορ', ἄπεις,
> ἣν Δαναΐδᾶν λόχος ἔμολεν <'Αρήιος μέτα,>
> ἧς ἕνεκα παῖδα τὰν ἄγαμον εἰλ' Ἄρτεμις,
> τὸν σφάγιον 'Αγαμέμνονι.

Wilamowitz thinks that the verses were originally tetrameters, "denn", to use his own words, "in dem zweiten Verse, der jetzt ein Pentameter ist, steht ein sinnloses *μόνα*, und die Verderbnis ist stark." It is not apparent whether the remark "und die Verderbnis ist stark" is intended to apply to the whole fragment, or simply to the second verse. The former supposition would account for the presence, in the first verse, of the proceleusmaticus *φίλον ὅτε*, for, surely, one would hardly think of a *φῖλον* and still less of an *ε* lengthened either before the *μ* or under the influence of the ictus. But to pass on to "sinnloses *μόνα*", why "sinnlos"? Helen imputes to Menelaus the desire of wishing to convey *her* (= *τὰμὰ λέχεα*) *alone* (*μόνα*) to his home. In other words *she* was his *sole* object; the *only desire* he had was to get *her* back home. We understand the thought better by applying the qualifier to the verb, the Greeks understood it quite as well with the qualifier attached to the object. There is no need of striking out, or of emending, the *μόνα*. In verse 5, W. agrees with me in supplying *μέτα*, but differs in the position accorded to it in the verse; and, instead of his metrically unpalatable 'Αρήιος, our conjecture shows a *γε*. In the last line, W. thinks of iambic verse, but states that even with the omission of the article this verse makes no sense, "oder was sollte der Dativ?" And yet, there is no serious difficulty about the dative. *σφάγιον* is in apposition with *παῖδα*, and *σφάγιον 'Αγαμέμνονι* means 'a victim, an offering, for Agamemnon, i. e. something that served as a victim, an offering, for Agamemnon, i. e. an object for Agamemnon to slaughter, offer'. 'Αγαμέμνονι is but an ordinary dative of the "person to or for whom". Of course, Iphigenia was not actually slaughtered by Agamemnon (Eur. I. T. 26 ff.), but, as Iphigenia herself says (vv. 175 ff.): *τηλόσε γὰρ δὴ σᾶς ἀπενάσθην | πατρίδος καὶ ἐμᾶς, ἔνθα δοκήμασι | κεῖμαι σφαχθεῖσ' ἃ τλάμων*. For the dative compare vv. 241 ff.: *ἦκουσιν εἰς γῆν ... | ... δίπτυχοι νεανίαι, | θεᾷ φίλον πρόσφαγμα καὶ θυτήριον | 'Αρτέμιδι*, and 209 ff.: *ἀν πρωτόγονον θάλος ... | Λήδας ἃ τλάμων κούρα | σφάγιον πατρῴᾳ λώβᾳ | καὶ θῦμ' οὐκ εὐγάθητον | ἔτεκεν κτέ.*, and, indeed, the phrase *σφάγιον πατρῴᾳ λώβᾳ* of the latter passage was probably hovering in the mind

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of the author of our fragment, the style of which is characterized by Wilamowitz as "ausgeleierter tragischer Stil".

For my view of the rhythmical composition, compare Aristophanes, Acharn. 665–675 = 692–701. The ode and antode, which are paeonic, comprise four periods each. The first period consists of a paeonic hexameter (= 2 trimeters), the second period is an octameter, the third is composed of two tetrameters, and in the fourth there is a return to the hexameter (= 2 trimeters), with a trimeter following. Compare also Pax, 354–360 = 592–600 and *ibid.* 393–399, in each of which passages a paeonic hexameter is followed by a trochaic tetrameter, which is, in turn, succeeded by another paeonic hexameter, plus a trimeter. While, of course, none of the passages above cited, is the exact parallel of ours, they all show a grouping of cola of three feet around cola of four feet and they afford ample warrant for the rhythmical structure presented by me. It would appear, then, that our fragment is not nearly so corrupt as Wilamowitz would have us believe, and by supplying the words γε μέτα after ἦν and removing the τὸν before σφάγιον, the first of the Tebtunis fragments is reduced to a state, which, from a critical, exegetical, syntactical and rhythmical point of view, seems unassailable.

CORRESPONDENCE.

To the Editor of the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY:

Dear Sir:—I shall be grateful if you will announce in your next number that I have undertaken to write and edit the "Life and Letters" of the late Prof. E. B. COWELL, of Cambridge, and that it will be published by Macmillan & Co. There are probably many admirers of my cousin and even pupils amongst your readers from whom I am anxious to obtain the loan of letters, and who would be willing and glad to lend them to help to make the life interesting and complete. I need not say that I will take great care of and return any papers with which I may be entrusted.

24 HARRINGTON GARDENS, LONDON, S. W.,
May 21, 1903.

GEORGE COWELL.

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NECROLOGY.

THOMAS RANDOLPH PRICE.

The seventh of May, 1903, closed a career of singular importance for the philological life of America. What THOMAS RANDOLPH PRICE did for the study of English, the favorite province of a scholar who commanded many, calls for a more competent chronicler than I am. What he was to a large circle of friends no one can feel more deeply than I do. And yet though thus doubly disqualified for an adequate and a calm appreciation of the true man and the admirable scholar, who has been removed from the life that now is, I cannot leave wholly to others the estimate of what America has gained by his life, has lost by his death. If he had been a voluminous writer, it might have sufficed to point to his published works, but in spite of all the urgency of his friends and admirers he could seldom be prevailed on to appear in print. Gem after gem was tossed with lordly lightness into drawer and pigeon-hole; and he seems to have held with Herder that authorship is only too apt to make the head a waste and the heart a void. Years ago he wrote to me that he was first and last a teacher and that his after life was to be lived on in his pupils; and surely no master ever impressed on his disciples more strongly the stamp of his own idealism. Every element in the composite structure of the English language and literature was to be studied in its historical and linguistic aspects. Not only the ancient classics, not only the contributions of the Romanic peoples. The Norse strain was to be traced in Norseland itself, and living Frisia was to yield him the secret of an earlier England that had passed away. The breadth of his reading was marvellous. Nor was its intensity less so. His studies were minute even to the small dust of statistics; and I have often been surprised to find that in my own field of research he had accumulated and digested a host of details, which, having once served their purpose and given up their ultimate meaning, had been consigned to silence. No sphere of literature, of history, was alien to him, and what he learned, he reproduced with artistic finish; for to him the English language was not a mere vehicle; it was a precious vessel. And this scholar, this thinker, this artist, had a lofty and noble and ardent and generous nature; and with all his intellectual endowment and all his stores of learning, he would not have worked to so much purpose, if his whole being had not been filled with the love of all that was high and a scorn of all that was base. To have known him is to have shared his enthusiasms. To express what it is to have lost him would require the language of an earlier world than ours.

BASIL L. GILDERSLEEVE.

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Thanks are due to Messrs. Lemcke & Buechner, 812 Broadway, New York, for material furnished.

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VOL. XXIV, 3. WHOLE NO. 95.

I.—FURTHER NOTES ON THE MOSTELLARIA OF PLAUTUS.[1]

A. THE MOSTELLARIA AND THE TAMING OF THE SHREW.

The extent of the influence of the Mostellaria on the Elizabethan drama seems not to have been entirely understood. It is true that Thomas Heywood's The English Traveller is a well-known translation of the Mostellaria; and, interwoven as it is with an entirely different plot, it furnishes the younger student with a most admirable instance of 'contamination'. A second adaptation, Fielding's The Intriguing Chambermaid, which belongs to a later period, may be studied for the same purpose.

It is hard to say whether Ben Jonson's The Alchemist was consciously founded on the Mostellaria or not. Taken broadly, both plays turn on the misconduct of a servant during his master's absence from home. Of minute resemblances there are none: it is true, as Sonnenschein[2] says, that the line "Nothing's more wretched than a guilty conscience" (Act V, sc. 1) looks like a translation of Most. 544, *nihil est miserius quam animus hominis conscius*, but, after all, this sentiment is a commonplace, and a charge of direct imitation will not lie.[3]

It has been observed that in The Taming of the Shrew two of the characters have names borrowed from the Mostellaria,

[1] This paper is a continuation and supplement to Textual Notes and Queries on Plautus. I. Mostellaria in Vol. XVIII, pp. 168–188, of this Journal.

[2] Introduction to his edition of the Mostellaria, p. xiii.

[3] Cf. also Reinhardstoettner, Spätere Bearbeitungen plautinischer Lustspiele, p. 489.

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but any further traces of imitation have been expressly denied,[1] or, if pointed out, seem altogether unconvincing.[2]

Very marked resemblances may, notwithstanding, be pointed out between the plays under discussion. Thus, in the beginning of The Taming of the Shrew (I, i, 1–47), it is clear that Tranio acts as tempter of his young master, Lucentio, who, having come to Padua to study, thus delivers himself:

> Virtue and that part of Philosophy
> Will I apply that treats of happiness
> By virtue specially to be achieved;

whereupon Tranio, first commending Lucentio's virtuous resolves, adds:

> Only, good master, while we do admire
> This virtue and this moral discipline
> Let's be no Stoics, nor no stocks, I pray;
> Or so devote to Aristotle's chicks
> As Ovid be an outcast quite abjured.
> . . . . . .
> Music and Poesy use to quicken you
> . . . . . .
> No profit grows where is no pleasure ta'en:
> In brief, sir, study what you most affect.

Lucentio quickly yields, resolving to

> Take a lodging fit to entertain
> Such friends as time in Padua shall beget.

Lucentio's rôle of a virtuous young man reflects Philolaches's long monody in the Mostellaria, while Tranio is a prompter to coming vice in the Shrew, as he was in the Mostellaria the prompter to vicious courses already in progress, the young masters in each case being model young men.

The relation of man to master is pictured in the Shrew (I, i, 218–220) as follows:

> For so your father charged me at our parting;
> 'Be serviceable to my son', quoth he,
> Although I think 'twas in another sense;

with this compare Most. 25–28, in which a virtuous slave upbraids Tranio for seducing his young master to evil:

[1] Lorenz, Mostellaria,[2] p. 40.

[2] Sonnenschein, l. c., pp. 5 and 10 (note on vs. 18).

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haecine mandauit tibi, quom peregre hinc it, senex?
hocine modo hic rem curatam offendet suam?
hocine boni esse officium serui existumas
ut eri sui corrumpat et rem et filium?

In the same scene Lucentio stands aside, overhearing and viewing Bianca, with whom he falls suddenly and rapturously in love. This situation is very similar to the situation in the Mostellaria (I, iii), where the young master falls into raptures aside over his lately acquired sweetheart, Philematium. The only difference in the dramatic situation is the same temporal difference as noted above, viz., that in Shakespeare the situations are prophetic, in Plautus narrative.

In the second scene of the Shrew (Act I) the stage business consists in knocking at a door; and the servant of Petruchio, Grumio by name, gets a violent beating for not understanding his master's order,

Villain, I say, knock me here soundly.

In the Mostellaria the opening scene reveals Grumio pounding loudly at a door, whence Tranio suddenly emerges to give him a violent beating.

In the Mostellaria Tranio's chief rôle is to beguile his old master, who has unexpectedly returned home, and come into a violent altercation with him. Shakespeare puts Tranio in disguise as Lucentio, a disguise that is utterly futile and meaningless for the action, however elaborately justified (I, i, 200), until V, i, 42 fg., where his old master, coming to Padua, meets Tranio, disguised as his son, and falls into violent quarrel with him. His anger reaches its culmination in the outcry:

Where is that damned villain Tranio
That faced and braved me in this matter so?

This reminds, even verbally, of the situations in the Mostellaria (IV, iii, end, and V, i, 16 fg.), where the old master, after making every preparation to flog Tranio, cries out:

nunc ego ille ueniat uelim (1074).

A further dramatic correspondence is the begging off of Tranio from punishment at the hands of his old master. In the Shrew this action is performed by Lucentio, his young master, with the following entreaty:

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> What Tranio did, myself enforced him to;
> Then pardon him, sweet father, for my sake (V, i, 132–3).

In the Mostellaria Tranio is begged off by the chum of his young master in the following words:

> quicquid fecit, nobiscum una fecit: nos deliquimus (1159).

In the light of the above correspondences it seems not too much to say that the rôles of Tranio and Grumio correspond rather minutely in point of dramatic business in both plays, and so do the rôles of Tranio's young and old masters.

B. Tell-tale Names in the Mostellaria.[1]

The extent to which the characters in the Mostellaria bear tell-tale names is surprising. The ironical Misargyrides, 'Hate-silver-son', we may pass over. The ironical significance of Theopropides, 'Prophet-son', is also clear. For Philematium, 'Kissy' is a most appropriate designation, and for Callidamates, 'Lady-Killer' (Beauty-tamer). Simo of the snub-nose represents a type, not an individual, and Delphium may be his female counterpart (cf. the gloss[2] simones 'delfini'), but with Callidamates to her lover, it is natural to suppose the name allusive to some more graceful attribute of the dolphins: at any rate the name has been curiously permanent in the form Delphine. Why one of the slave boys was named Sphaerio ('Ball') is not evident, but another bears the name Phāniscus, 'Little-Revealer', and *Φᾱνός* is the name of an Aristophanic sycophant (Eq. 1256). It is Phaniscus' explicit function in the play to reveal the plot and bring on the dénouement. His associate, of a very surly disposition, was probably named Pinacium, 'Tablet', and the *πινάκιον* was specifically employed in lodging a writ of *εἰσαγγελία*. In the Stichus, the slave named Pinacium has a corresponding nasty temper. There seems, accordingly, no good reason for interpreting Pinacium by 'Picture'. The name of Philolaches the 'hero' of the piece, perpetually suggests to me, as I study his lines, the rendering 'Happy-go-lucky', but I know not how to justify any such definition.

[1] See the Prolegomena to the critical editions of Ussing and of Schoell; also Sonnenschein's edition, p. 5. Lately, the article of Karl Schmidt in Hermes, 37, pp. 173 sq., 353 sq., 608 sq.

[2] Goetz's Thesaurus Glossarum Emendatarum.

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The generally tell-tale character of these names has hardly been outdone by Bunyan in his Pilgrim's Progress.

Three characters yet remain. The characteristics of Scapha, duenna and maid to Philematium, are correctly indicated by the name Blanda, which Heywood has given to the corresponding character in The English Traveller. In Greek, λέμβος, a name for a boat similar to the σκάφη, meant outright a flatterer and parasite, cf. Anaxandrides, Odyss. 2. 7 ὄπισθεν ἀκολουθεῖ κόλαξ τφ; λέμβος ἐπικέκληται, 'should a flatterer tag after us, we dub him trailer'. With this we may compare the definition in Nonius (535), scaphae sunt nauiculae quae maiores naues consecuntur.

But inasmuch as Menander uses the phrase συστομώτερος σκάφης, interpreted by Zenobius (Cent. v. 95,—in Leutsch's Corpus Paroem. Gr. I, p. 158) as 'scant of speech', Scapha, the much talking, might also be considered to have an ironical name.

Honest Grumio, a country slave who appears with Tranio in the first scene only, has a name that may be explained either as Greek or Latin. In Themistius 23, the words συρφετὸς καὶ γρυμαία signify 'dirt, trash',[1] and Latin glosses[2] furnish the entry grummum 'congestio pulveris'. I would therefore interpret *Grumio* by 'Clod' i. e. 'clodhopper'. The correctness of this interpretation seems to be borne out by a surprising string of epithets in vs. 40 sq. applied by Tranio, the pampered city domestic, to Grumio, stable-boy and Clod, from the farm. This string of epithets is, in my amended text (see p. 263):

> germana inluuies, rusticum hercus, hara sui,
> caulae caprum commixta.

"Thou native filth, thou stable-yard of the farm, pig sty | goat-pen—, all mixed:" cf. Tempest, I. 2, 314 "Thou earth, thou,—" ib. 346. "Filth as thou art". Before pronouncing these epithets for a farm-hand impossible, the reader is asked to note Shakespeare's names for a tailor (Taming of the Shrew, IV, iii, 106 fg.):

> O monstrous arrogance! Thou liest, thou thread, thou thimble,
> Thou yard, three quarters, half-yard, quarter, nail!
> . . . . . .
> Away, thou rag, thou quantity, thou remnant.

It must have occurred to everyone that ever looked at the name of Tranio that it might be etymologically cognate with

[1] Cf. Ussing's Plautus III, 2, 300, citing Ritschl. [2] Goetz, l. c., s. v.

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τετραίνω (with a by-form τιτράω) 'pierces' and its derivative adjective τρανής, but no one has been able to derive from this etymological cognation a satisfactory explanation of the name. The tragedians, Euripides and Aeschylus, use the adverb τρανῶς in combination with verbs of saying, showing and learning in complexes that signify "to reveal" or "to have revealed to one"—the mysterious, the *mot de l'énigme*. Further, a by-form of τρανής was used as an epithet of Hermes, the revealer, the messenger of Zeus and the other gods. This by-form is τρανός, and it occurs in the mythological writer Cornutus in the following connection (N. D. 16): πρῶτον μὲν διάκτορος κέκληται ἀπὸ τοῦ διάκτορος εἶναι καὶ τρανός. Later Greek authors, as the most cursory inspection of the appropriate articles in Stephanus's Thesaurus will show, used the verbs τρανέω and τρανόω in the sense of *revelare*. From these data we would seem to be justified in defining Tranio by "Revealer." Our play will then contain a Revealer in chief, Tranio; a stupid contratype, Theopropides (Prophet-son) his master; and a slave, Phaniscus, who reveals the revealer.

The general appositeness of the name Revealer for Tranio must strike any one who has ever read the ghost-scene (455–531), wherein Tranio reveals to his master the secret of the ghost of the haunted house.

An examination of the play will reveal that this interpretation of Tranio's name is otherwise apposite. For instance in vs. 667:

quicquid dei dicunt id decretumst dicere,

Tranio speaks quite in the character of a Hermes. Again, in 514, it is a Hermes ψυχοπομπός that speaks:

nil ego formido; pax mihist cum mortuis.

When Tranio has taken refuge on the altar near the end of the play, he replies to his master's threat of burning him quite as though he were under the special protection of the gods (1113):

nunquam edepol hodie <di med> inuitum destinant tibi.

Only a few verses before, when urged to leave the altar, he replied (1104–5):

sic tamen hinc consilium dedero: nimio plus sapio sedens:
tum consilia firmiora sunt de diuinis locis.

On this passage Lorenz's note is: "it is natural to think of the Delphic Pythia who, sitting on the tripod, gave her oracles therefrom. There is perhaps also a jesting allusion to the common practice of holding sessions of the Roman senate in temples."

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Again, in 849 sq., where Tranio and his timid master, an anti-Herakles, pass by the house-dog, the situation recalls, in a burlesque fashion, Hermes' conduct of Herakles past Cerberus into Hades.

Also, when Tranio undertakes (523 sq.) to drive his master away from the door of the haunted house, *capite operto*, the words:

caue respexis, fuge, operi caput

might be taken for a burlesque suggestion of the Hermes-Orpheus-Eurydice tale.

It would be only in the two last of these passages that Tranio poses outright as a Hermes; while in the rest he would be but jesting from time to time upon the etymological significance of his own name of "Revealer." But even if we should regard Tranio's rôle as retaining traits of a burlesque Hermes of Middle Comedy, it would not be transgressing the bounds of probability in literary heredity.

One purpose, we may call it, of the dramatist in giving his characters tell-tale names is to furnish opportunity for quips and puns. This may be an easy form of wit, but Shakespeare did not disdain it. Thus in The Merry Wives of Windsor there is a servant named Simple employed as a go-between. He has just been shut up in Doctor Caius's closet when the medical man, about to leave the house, says (I, iv, 64):

Qu'ai-j'- oublié! dere is some simples in my closet ...
Villain! larron! [*Pulling Simple out*] ...

In the house inspection scene of the Mostellaria (783 seq.), which is full of equivoques (cf. Strong in The Classical Review, XI, 160), Theopropides says (825):

quia edepol ambo ab infumo tarmes secat.

The previous dialogue has put the audience in a position to understand by ambo (sc. postes) the two 'sticks' of old men, and to divine in tarme<s> 'woodworm' (which we should perhaps write trami<s>, with the manuscripts) an allusion, all unconscious on the part of Theopropides, to Tranio.

In 984 Phaniscus describes Tranio in the following language:

Tranio: is uel Herculi conterere quaes<i>tum potest.

Here *conterere quaesitum* means, by equivoque, 'to make a hole in (=squander) the hoard', and there is small room for doubt

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that the real purpose in using *-terere* was to furnish a quip on the name of Tranio. If, further, Tranio is *qui teret*, quasi 'the Bruiser', then the fear expressed in 903:

ne huc exeat (sc. is?) qui male mulcet

may be rendered 'lest he come forth who bruises badly'. That *mulcere* may originally have had the sense of 'strike, beat' (later confined to *mulcare*), rather than the gentler sense of 'stroke', is perhaps attested by Ennius, Ann. 257 (Vahlen):

mulserat huc nauem compulsam fluctibus pontus,

for which the natural sense is 'the sea had buffeted (driven) hither the wave-beaten ship'. The propriety, however, of interpreting *mulcet* as a (purpose) subjunctive from *mulcare* is not to be gainsaid.

There is another group of passages in which the name Tranio seems to be played upon. In the scene with the old men already referred to (832–840) Tranio points out in the vestibulum a picture of two vultures, the two vultures being the two old men, pecked by a *cornix*, the cornix being himself (cf. Aristophanes, Eq. 1051, where κορῶναι are charged with carping at a hawk). 'Vulture' is as common a metaphor in Graeco-Roman comedy for a greedy person as 'cormorant' would be with us, and seems applied here largely as a mere *epitheton ornans*, greed being a general characteristic of old men in comedy, rather than a specific characteristic of the two old men in the Mostellaria. But when Tranio calls himself a *cornix* one is tempted to believe that the epithet is explicit in its characterization. The cleverness of the *cornix* was proverbial, and when Tranio says:

quaeso huc ad me specta cornicem ut conspicere possies,

he may merely mean to draw attention to his own superior cleverness (cf. Otto, Sprichwörter . . . d. Römer, s. v. cornix); but if Tranio is a revealer, it makes the allusion much more pointed if we stress the prophetic character of the cornix.

The prophet bird is a well-known Greek conception, and Aristophanes (Aves 719 sq.) makes especial mockery of the use of the word ὄρνις in the sense of omen; while he introduces Euelpides and Peisthetairos as personally conducted in their expedition, the one by a prophetic jackdaw (κολοιός), the other by a crow (κορώνη = cornix): cf. also Epictetus, 1. 17. 2; 2. 7. 3.

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Would an audience in the time of Philemon have been apt to appreciate the allusion when a character named Tranio, a burlesque Hermes the revealer, suddenly referred to himself as a prophetic crow (κορώνη) or raven (κόραξ)?

The Hermes character of Tranio might be plain enough, it would seem, for ever so slight a hint in his make-up—like the wings of the burlesque Mercurius in the Amphitruo (143)—to betray it, supposing the name Revealer not perpetually to suggest it. The text of our play gives no hint, however, of Tranio's make-up, and the raven (κόραξ) belongs to Apollo, not Hermes.[1] In the Greek original, the connection might have been made, not by a make-up, but by a pun on κόραξ ('corvus') and κᾶρυξ[2] 'herald', a standing epithet of Hermes, but the play bears no trace of such a pun. Accordingly, if *cornix* (which corresponds to κορώνη, not to κόραξ) here refers specifically to Tranio, the hint was probably conveyed neither by a make-up nor by a pun.

But the term cornix is here perhaps the name of another sort of bird, some one of the cornidae, a daw (κολοιός), say, or a magpie (κίσσα). The glosses define cornices by corniculae, aues lasciuae, iocosae. Horace (Epist. 1. 3. 29) briefly synopsizes the Aesopic fable of the daw in borrowed plumage, agreeing with the later Aesopic tradition that the disguised bird put on the feathers of all the other birds, rather than with Babrius and Phaedrus, who clothe their daw in peacock's plumes. Horace calls his bird *cornicula*. That he had in mind thereby the jackdaw rather than the *cornix* proper seems clear from the words κολοιὸς κορώνης υἱός of the later Aesopic tradition. The gloss already cited lends support to this idea. Either daw (κολοιός, the *corvus* monedula of Linnaeus), jay (κίσσα) or magpie (κίσσα?) suit well the description aues lascivae, iocosae. The thievish and chattering habits of the magpie are particularly well known, and these characteristics would fit Tranio very neatly.

It is obviously impossible, without the Greek original, to tell what bird-name originally stood there for *cornix*. The field of

[1] There is a tale (see Thompson's Greek Birds, p. 93) to the effect that Apollo sent his raven (κόραξ) to fetch water, and had to punish him for dallying by the way: a possible allusion to this occurs in vs. 789, where Tranio's master chides him with the words: antiquom optines hoc tuom, tardus ut sis. Note the pun in *Tra*nio / *tar*dus, and see below on vs. 362.

[2] The κόραξ was Apollo's κᾶρυξ or Hermes; see last note.

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conjecture is wide and airy. Recalling the habit of the smaller birds to fight hawks—as to vultures my knowledge permits me not to say—we might think of one of the σπερμολόγος flock, with the meanings of 'seed-eater' and 'babbler', noting Latin *cornicor*, defined in the glosses by *inepte loquor*. Linnaeus called the rook *corvus frugilega*, and *frugilega* approaches a Latin rendering of σπερμολόγος[1]; Epicharmus and Alexander Myndius (*ap.* Athen. 398 C–D) mention a bird, the *tetrax*, with a name etymologically suggestive of 'Tranio', that was σπερμολόγος, (σπερματολόγος), καρποφάγος. The latter also comments on the noise of the τέτραξ: ὅταν ὠοτοκῇ δὲ, τετράζει τῇ φωνῇ; while Athenaeus (398 F.) calls the voice of the τέτραξ harsh (βαρεῖα). Besides the τέτραξ—including besides one of the pheasant tribe (perhaps the Guinea fowl) a small bird—the Greeks had birds named τετράων (Lat. *tetrao*), τέτριξ, τετράδων, τετραῖον, τετράδυσιν (ἀηδόνα), cf. τατύρας, τέταρος, τίτυρος ('satyrus, colonus vel avis'): names for all of which the reduplication, as well as the syllable *tra* (*tar*, *tur*), suggests onomatopoetic origin. It is impossible to fix the precise species and nature of these birds. The tetrax, however, had been put upon the stage, so to speak, by Aristophanes (Aves 885), in a list of hero-birds (god-birds), to whom worship should be offered.

That it was easy to pun on the name of Tranio with any of these bird names is self-evident, and the susceptibility of Greek audiences to puns may be caught by observing that Aristophanes (Acharn. 725–6) plays on Φασιανός (pheasant?) and συκοφάντης. The connection of τρανός 'piercing' with τορός 'shrill', with τορεύει and τορεῖ 'shrills' (cf. Aristophanes, Pax 381 where εἰ μὴ τετορήσω ταῦτα 'unless I shall proclaim in shrill tones' is put in the mouth of Hermes) would hardly have occasioned difficulty to a Greek audience who would thus have bridged the way from Tranio, via the τέτραξ, to Hermes.[2]

But the *cornix* is not, if we may trust the glosses, the only bird with which Tranio identifies himself. In 823 he says:

atque etiam nunc satis boni sunt, si sunt inducti pice,

[1] Thompson (in his Greek Birds s. v.) defines σπερμολόγος by 'rook' and cites Hesychius for the gloss σπερμολόγος· κολοιῶδες ζῷον.

[2] It is probably only accidental that the lexica do not register an example of τρᾱνός in the sense of 'shrill': cf. Antiphilus in Anthol. P. 9. 298. 6: ὄργια Δηοῦς κηρύσσων γλώσσης ὁμμασι τρᾱνότερον with Aeschylus Choeph. 452: ὅ' ὦτων δὲ συντέτραινε μῦθον 'let the tale penetrate thy ears': a life of Demosthenes is cited for τρᾱνο-ποιέω 'I pronounce clearly', and Empedocles for τρανώματα γλώττης.

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where the subject of boni sunt is *postes* 'the posts' but by equivoque, 'the sticks of old men'; si sunt inducti means literally 'if they are overlaid'—but by equivoque 'if they are overreached.'

Strong (l. c.) interprets *pice* as an ἀπροσδόκητον, but *inducti* may better be regarded as equivocal if *pice* joins in the equivoque. This it does if we may follow the gloss *pica* κίσσα καὶ πίσσα 'jay (magpie) and pitch (sic).' The magpie and cornix are near enough kin to pass for identical on the stage,[1] and when Tranio's master says in 839

nullam pictam conspicio hic auem,

he may very well, unconsciously to himself, be combining for the audience *pice* (827) and *cornicem* (835) into *picam* (pictam avem), just as his *tramis* (*tarmes* 825) unconsciously suggests *Tranio*.

As to the stem-form *pic-*, Plautus may well have used for *pica* the noun *pix*, to be inferred as the source of Festus' gloss *picati*, appellantur quidam, quorum pedes formati sunt in speciem Sphingum: quod eas Dori ficas vocant. In early borrowings φίξ (= σφίγξ) would pass into Latin as *pix*, a form already recognized by some scholars for Plautus in Aul. 700, picis (nom. by 'inverse attraction'), diuitiis qui aureos montes colunt, | ego solus supero. Nonius (p. 152, 6), who reads here *pici* (from picus) gives to the bird the character of the Greek mythological fowl, the γρύψ. That the syllable *pic-* might suggest, in this connection, to an audience of Romans, either the mischievous domestic thief, the *pica*, or the mythological *Picus*[2], is hardly to be doubted.

A further passage, viz., 1104–5, cited above, may be interpreted as allusive to Tranio in his bird character of the *pica*, or rather, perhaps, the *picus* ('woodpecker'), if we may suppose Plautus to have identified these birds to the same extent as did Nonius (518, 30): picummus et avis est Marti dicata, quam picum vel picam vocant . . . et deus qui sacris Romanis adhibetur. The deified Picus was represented in sculpture as sitting, cf. Ladewig's note on Aen. vii. 187: "The statue of Picus differs from the statues of the kings previously mentioned in this respect, viz., that Picus is represented in a sitting posture." The sitting habit of the *picus* was perhaps regarded as characteristic, cf. Varro, cited by Nonius (l. c.): P. Aelius Paetus cum . . . sedens in sella curuli

[1] Cf. also Thompson, l. c., s. v. κίσσα.

[2] King Celeus was the deified woodpecker (κελεός, κολιός) of Greece.

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ius diceret populo, picus Martius aduolavit adque in capite eius *adsedit.*

This interpretation of 1104–5 does not differ essentially from Lorenz's (cited on p. 250): the picus was also of the prophetic birds (oscines), cf. Asin. 260: picus et cornix ab laeua, parra ab dextera | consuadent . . . | sed quid hoc, quod picus ulmum tundit?

To the identification of Tranio with the pica (picus) or rather with the Greek κολοιός we shall return below.

A further allusion to the bird-character may be found in 1115, where Tranio says:

elixus esse quam assus soleo suavior.

It is at any rate a modern practice to stew tough birds and not to roast them.

Further indication of the bird character of Tranio is perhaps found in vs. 362, see p. 270.

There is nothing that surprises me so much, when after a careful reading I go to see a Shakespeare play, as to observe how different a thing the actors' make-up, the stage business and the *mise-en-scène* make of it. These elements must always be elusive to a merely literary study, however diligent, of an ancient drama. In the make-up of Tranio a mere hint of wings (as in the Amphitruo passage mentioned on p. 253) would indicate, not only his Mercurial character, but equally well his bird characteristics. But the archaeological evidence of vase paintings, accessible to me only in works of a somewhat general character, is not full enough to settle points of this kind. The Vatican does contain a vase with a burlesque Zeus-Hermes-Alcmena scene that had its literary source, perhaps, in the Amphitryon of Rhinthon, the Tarentine poet (cf. Helbig, Führer durch die Sammlungen Klass. Alther. in Rom. II², 314), and the same subject reappears on a British Museum vase (4th Vase-Room, F. 150). The subject belongs to the Phlyakes, and Philemon, the probable Greek author of the Mostellaria (the date of which is subsequent to 289 B. C., cf. Schanz, Römisch. Lit.-Geschichte², I, p. 49), might have been influenced in his old age by Rhinthon, whose *floruit* was 300 B. C. (cf. Barnett, Greek Drama, p. 47); for Philemon was a great traveller (cf. Christ, Griech. Lit.-Geschichte², § 204).

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Burlesque mythological scenes, probably suggested by dramas, occur much earlier also, e. g., the Cabiri vases (see Guide to the Greek and Roman Antiquities of the British Museum, p. 176, Case 7). Of special interest are the subjects of "two comic actors, dressed as birds, and a flute-player" (ib., p. 183, No. B. 509), and "a dance of girls, imitating the flight of birds, under the instructions of a grotesque dancing master" (cf. also on this general subject Barnett, l. c., p. 49).

But I am very far from the suggestion, on the ground of such evidence, that Tranio in the Mostellaria could have been made up as a burlesque Hermes, or as a bird; or even from supposing that some hint like a peaked cap, or a pair of wings on ankles or petasos, conveyed the suggestion of Hermes or of bird; but if burlesque filled a large place in Middle Comedy (cf. Christ, l. c., § 200), and if bird rôles were common, as we might infer not only from the Birds of Aristophanes, but from the older Komoi (cf. Barnett, l. c., p. 55); we need not wonder at the recurrence, in the subsequent comedy of Philemon, of traits of a burlesque Hermes, and of the stage-bird.

Such allusions, however, must have been intelligible to an audience, and if it seems improbable that Tranio's make-up suggested, by the use of wings, both his characters—as a Hermes and as a prophet-bird—it remains true that the name Tranio, if rightly interpreted by 'revealer', does suggest both characters; while it would be the easiest thing in the world for an actor, by gesture and voice-color, to indicate his bird characteristics, thus making clear to ordinary folk in the audience points beyond the reach of the probe of the scholar closeted with his books.

There is yet another way in which the name of Tranio might suggest a bird character. In the light of names like Mag-pie, Tom-tit, Jenny-wren, Jack-daw, Poll-parrot, Martin (cf. also Jack and Jenny, the donkey-pair, and Tom of a Tom-cat), Dicky-bird—Dick is a very common name for a canary bird—we might suppose that the name Tranio was commonly bestowed upon some domestic bird, say the Mag-pie, as conversely the slave-name Corax (Capt. 657) comes from the name of the raven (κόραξ). It is semantically attractive to imagine in Tranio a bird appellative, 'the shrill one'. But, on the other hand, our testimonia for the name Tranio are absolutely inadequate to prove any such thing. The supposed occurrence of the name Tranion

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on a Campanian crater (cf. Klein in Archäol. Zeit, 37, pp. 31–33) applied to a boy extracting a splinter from one Hippomedon would be of value, but the certain part of the name is only Τρ . . ον, with space for but two letters rather than three.

In nothing of what has been advanced would I seek to justify allusions in the play by an etymological interpretation of the name Tranio. We must, on the contrary, seek to establish the tell-tale significance of the name Tranio by the evidence of the allusions in the play, and this will lead us briefly to recapitulate the course of the argument which, with some shift and enlargement, is as follows:

Tranio's name is etymologically connected by Plautus with Latin *terit* (Gr. τιτράει) 'bores, rubs' in the following verse (984):

Tranio: is uel Herculi conterere quaesitum potest.

This cognation is supported by an equivoque in which Tranio is called *tarmes* (or better, with the manuscripts, *tramis*) 'borer' (825):

quia edepol ambo ab infumo tramis secat,

words which the audience is to understand by 'a borer (a τερηδών, i. e. Tranio) is undercutting the old men'.

The next step, after fixing the connection of the name Tranio with τιτράω, is to analyze the name morphologically; and the most direct derivation is from τρᾱνής, τρᾱνός 'piercing, shrill, clear, plain': cf. for the formation the Plautine names Euclio: εὐκλεής, or Sceparnio: σκέπαρνον, Olympio: Ὄλυμπος. Cornutus (68 A. D.) specifically applies the appellative τρανός to Hermes, and in post-classical Greek verbs derived from τρανός mean to 'reveal', while as early as Aeschylus the adverb τρανῶς is used in connections that would justify for τρανός the connotation of 'revealing'.

Quite independent of these morphological speculations whereby Tranio is derived from τρανός and defined as 'Revealer' (a Hermes, to wit), the following passages strongly suggest the character of revealer for Tranio:

667: quicquid dei dicunt id decretumst dicere
1104–5: sic tamen hinc consilium dedero, nimio plus sapio sedens:
tum consilia firmiora sunt de divinis locis.

The following passages admit of the same interpretation, though they may not demand it:

1113: nunquam edepol hodie di med inuitum destinant tibi:
514: nil ego formido: pax mihist cum mortuis.

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As the last passage specifically suggests the mythological Hermes, so does the situation in 849 sq. where Tranio-Hermes escorts his master, an anti-Heracles, past a house-dog—Cerberus. Also, when Tranio (523) bids his master 'begone, to cover his head, and not to look back' a burlesque of the Hermes-Orpheus-Eurydice scene is suggested.

But certain verses suggest a bird character for Tranio: he points to himself in 835 as a *cornix;* in 827, in an equivoque, he uses the word *pice* (ablv.) of himself, and the whole point of the equivoque demands the interpretation of *pice* as allusive to Tranio. If we apply to this passage the gloss *pica* κίσσα καὶ πίσσα, it would seem as if *pice* might, in a pun, suggest the magpie (*pica*, a sort of *cornix*), or the woodpecker (*picus*). In 839 Tranio's master uses the words 'pictam . . . auem', in what is again best regarded as an (unconscious) equivoque. It conforms to the character of Tranio as a *picus* (*pica*) if we interpret the relative clause in 903:

cautost opus | ne huc exeat qui male mulcet

by 'the bruiser' (*mulcet* indic.), or by 'to bruise us' (*mulcet*, subj.). Similarly, vs. 365

este, ecfercite uos, saginam caedite,

may, in view of the connotation, common for *sagina*, of 'feed for fowls', be interpreted by 'eat, stuff yourselves, peck your feed': this is to treat *caedite* as a rendering of κόπτετε in its special sense of 'peck, gnaw'; cf. the gloss *caedo* κόπτω ὅ ἐστι τίμνω, which shows that κόπτω was the regular equivalent for *caedo:* and note the Lucilian word *cibicida*, a designation for slaves. We might suppose that *saginam caedite* is in some sort a Latin rendering of a pun on σπερμολόγος 'rook', corvus *frugilega;* cf. cornix. Or perhaps allusion is made to the κολοιός (see Thompson, s. v.) as a destroyer of crops.

Another mark of the bird character of Tranio is supplied by vs. 5:

exi inquam nido, †re cupi, nam quid lates?

It is curious how Tranio's more specific bird names, as well as their equivoques, lend themselves to transfer back to the Greek. He calls himself

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cornix 'crow'	cf. κολοιός (κορώνης υἱός) 'daw';
[cf. *cornicula* 'daw']	κορακίας, a variety of κολοιός;
	κορακῖνος, rendered 'jack-daw' by Frere, Aristophanes, Eq. 1053.
pix 'pitch, cement'	cf. κόλλα 'glue, cement'
pix, equivocal with	cf. κολοιός 'pica' (?)
pica or *picus*,	κολιός 'picus'
cf. *picta auis*.	δρυο-κολάπτης, " -κόλαψ } 'picus'

The gloss *pica* κίσσα ('jay' or 'magpie') καὶ πίσσα ('pitch'), for which the emendation *pix* is suggested in Goetz's Thesaurus, seems to confirm both the equivocal and literal meanings given above to *pix*. With these correspondences and the evidence of the gloss before us, is it too hazardous to guess that Tranio alluded to himself as a κολοιός 'daw' and a κολιός 'woodpecker'? And if Tranio was, by equivoque, a daw, it is in point to note the common name of the daw, βωμολόχος 'lier in wait at altars', thus explaining the situation in 1094 sq. (cf. particularly vss. 1104–5, already cited, p. 250, as apt for the characterization of Tranio both as a Hermes and a *picus*, the mythical king Picus, to wit), where Tranio, the κολοιὸς βωμολόχος, perches himself upon the altar.

If Tranio was a κολοιός, we must exclude the notion that a bird name like τέτραξ (see p. 254) made the electric connection for the passage of the sparkle of jest and pun, unless through the epithet σπερμολόγος; nor have we ground for supposing that his make-up was such as perpetually to furnish a key to the equivoques. Hence we are left, as the most probable solution, with the idea that the appellative Tranio, quasi 'Shrilly, Pecky or Prophet', was so commonly associated with the domesticated κολοιός—cf. Barnaby Rudge's raven, 'Grip'—as to suggest without more ado the Jack-daw.

C. Textual Notes.[1]

Argum. 5,

et inde primum emigratum.

For *primum* I read *prōtinam*, a rare Plautine adverb = *statim*, for which the Plautine quantity was prŏtinam (Cas. 959/960,

[1] This paper, in conjunction with my first paper (supra, p. 245, f. n.) on the text of the Mostellaria, is devoted to an explanation of the readings—whether emendations or defences of the MSS—adopted in my edition of the Mostellaria (Allyn & Bacon, Boston, 1902). Not every minute point is recorded, but

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Curc. 363, Bacch. 374, Pers. 680, Terence, Phor. 190). So in Miles 1193 the first half of a trochaic Septenarius is prórsum A | thenas | prŏtĭnŭs ăb | ibo, while in Capt. 510 and Pseud. 587 the metre is too uncertain to enable us to fix the quantity of *protinus*. Obviously *protinus* is a compound of *pro* and *tenus*, and Plautus shortens the final syllable of the first member of such compounds at will. The occurrence of Plautine words in the Argumenta is well attested.

If PROTINAM stood in a capital manuscript, it was easy to misread as PROIMAM; next would come a minuscule stage *ꝓimam*, *primum*.

5. The MS reading is

exi inquam nidore cupinam quid lates?

Ussing reads: exi inquam nido, volturi, nam quid lates, and *nido* and *nam quid* (so Ritschl) seem to me indubitable. Ussing seems not to have defended the reading *volturi* by any palaeographical argument, though one might now be tempted to appeal, in defense of *volturi* as a substitute for the *-re cupi-* of the MSS, to the glosses[1] *vulturnos* 'gypy', *vulturis* 'gypi'.[2] He rather suggests *volturi* as an appropriate bird-name after *nido*.

I have myself put *Tranio* into the text instead of *volturi*. In vs. 1083 C and D read *re* in the text in place of the nota personae, TR. The same reading seems to have stood in B, but was subsequently erased. I assume that *Tranio* stood in our text; was then supplanted by the nota TR.; the latter being misread *re*. We are left to explain the intrusion of *cupi* into our text. I take it to be a gloss, either for (1) *nido*, or (2) for *Tranio*. If for *nido*, we may think of the Hesychian words κύπη 'hut' or γύπη 'a vulture's nest, hole'; cf. the gloss *vulturis* 'gypi', already cited, to show that γύπη was a word known to the glossists. If a gloss for *Tranio*, which seems to me much the less likely, perhaps, in view of Tranio's character as a *picus* (see p. 255), *cupi*

I have tried to record all the emendations and interpretations for which I accept a personal responsibility: without, however, laying claim to absolute originality and priority, as, in the quantity of dissertations I have read in the past few years, I may well have caught up suggestions whose sources I failed at the time to record. Mere ad sensum emendations are not noted.

[1] Glosses, mentioned without further notice, are always extracted from Goetz's Corpus Glossarum Emendatarum.

[2] One might surmise that τόργος 'γύψ' stood in the Greek original, and τόργος would approximately pun with *Tranio*.

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may be regarded as a syllabic inversion for *picu(s)*; cf. Lindsay, Latin Textual Emendation, p. 36, and Housman in Cl. Rev. 3, 201 for examples.

382.

<Tr.>ecce autem hic deposi<u>it, etc.

It is a question whether we should correct the hiatus of *ecce autem* at all. Editors are extremely shy, however, about admitting the validity of "punctuation" as a justification for hiatus, and phrasing, like all the other purely musical elements of a dead language, seems unlikely ever to be so revealed to our knowledge, as to be capable of reduction to an unchanging uniformity, expressed in terms of 'rules' and 'laws.'

In view however of Mil. 207, eccere autem capite nutat, continued in 209 by ecce autem aedificat, one is tempted to read here also eccere autem, connecting the loss of *-re* with the loss of the nota Tr.: perhaps by assuming a stage *re eccere;* cf. the repeated *quidem* in 235 below.

580.

Da. Reddeturne igitur faenus? Tr. reddetur: nunc abi.

This line becomes metrical if we read *dabitur* for *reddetur*. The repetition of a compound (verb) by its simplex is a phenomenon well attested for Greek and Modern languages (cf. Oertel, Lectures on the Study of Language, p. 314 who does not cite any Latin examples).[1] The intrusion of *re-* into the text may be attributed to the nota, Tr. So in 1083 B^2 reads *Tr. eho*, and B^1 (probably) *re eho*. In 580 the condition is as if *Tr. re eho* stood in a MS of 1083. If *re dabitur* stood in a MS *reddetur* represents a copyist's emendation. As a general parallel to this verse cf. Merc. 769: mercedem cedo:: cras petito: dabitur, nunc abi.

1091.

uel hominem iube aedis mancipio poscere. <Th>
immo hoc primum uolo.

I have corrected this reading of the editio minor to u. h. tu aedis mancipio posce, etc.: *iube* for *tu* is perhaps a copyist's emendation to put *poscere* in construction, though *-be*, whether from an uncial *de* (dittography for *ae-*), or from *ue* (dittography from the *-u* of *tu* and *ę* of *aedis*), may be a palaeographical mistake. The phrase *mancipio posce*, 'demand in possession',

[1] But note Merc. 769, cedo:: dabitur; Truc. 276, ne attigas me.:: egon te tangam?; and conversely Seneca, Med., 197 i:: redeo.

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should be as normal as mancipio da, accipe, promitte, all in Plautus.

39.

. . . . Iuppiter
dique omnes perdant < alii > : oboluisti alium.

I have inserted *alii*, with some inconsistency, it must be confessed, as the hiatus before *alium* is a sort I am in general prepared to admit. The falling out of ALII after -ANT is haplographic, cf. Poen. 314, where A reads PLELLI, it would appear, for PLENI. For the phraseology cf. Persa, 755: Iuppiter, iuuisti, dique alii omnes. Other passages in which Iuppiter, or another god or group of gods, are contrasted with the *di alii* (*ceteri*) are Trin. 944; Amph. 12; Poen. 460; cf. Livy, 26. 8. 5; 6. 16. 2; Cicero, Rab. perd. 2. 5.

An additional reason for the falling out of *alii* is that it is followed, after an interval of one word, by *alium* (*allium*).

40–41.

germana inluuies, rusticus, hircus, hara sui
canem capram commixtam, etc.

I have corrected to g. i. rusticum hercus ('country stable-yard'), h. s. caulae caprum ('goat-pen') commixta.

The words rus|ticus hir|cus offend against the metrical law that two shorts, ending a polysyllabic word, cannot stand either in arsis or thesis. These words are, however, attested not only by the Plautus MSS but by Donatus on Terence, Phormio 709 (=4. 4. 28), and an acceptable correction must be based on them; *hercus* (*ἵρκος*) for *hircus* carries with it *rusticum* for *rusticus*, thus not only mending the metre (to which Leo, Plaut. Forsch. 238 applies his 'elision of final s'), but furnishing a suitable step (cf. Leo, l. c.) in the climax from *germana inluuies* to *hara sui*.

The reading *canē* (C) *canæ* (D) is a not difficult *ductus* perversion of *caulae*, particularly when *canem* is preceded by *sui* 'swine' and followed by *caprā* i. e. *caprū*: *caulae*, with its rich treatment by the glosses, and its rare literary occurrence in the sense of 'fold' ('sheep-fold', *par excellence*, cf. Aen. 9. 60, and the note of Servius)—here, with *caprum*, 'goat-pen'—continues the climax after *hara sui* 'pig-sty'. On the special applicability of these epithets to Grumio 'sordidus' see p. 249.

65.

. . . . saginam caedite.

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See the interpretation of these words on p. 259.

73.

. . . . nimio celerius
venīre < id > quod molĕste < est > quam illud quod cupide petas.

I have inserted *id*: D would fall away easily before Q, and I after E; <*est*> was suggested in my first paper (p. 173). Two cases of iambic shortening in the same verse of words made dissyllabic by elision are not otherwise known to me in Plautus, but the type of sentence has a perfect parallel in Pseud. 281, nimio id quod pudet facilius fertur quam illud quod piget. Perhaps, with Bentley and Seyffert, we should correct uenire < id > to uenit < id >, assuming that *uenire* was a copyist's correction.

In Truc. 321 *conuenire etiam* has been corrected to conuenit etiam, making it look as if *-te* was read *re* (cf. *re* for the nota Tr., in vs. 5 fg.); accordingly, uenitidquod may have resulted in venire(i) quod.

84.

. . . . adulescentī optumo.

I have printed adulescente with the long *ī* of the adjectival flexional type; it would have been as correct perhaps to print *-ē*: at least there is a certain number of consonant-declension ablatives with a long final (cf. Niemeyer's notes on Capt. 914, Miles 707). The hiatus seems better justified after a long vowel.

112.

tigna putrĕfacit; < it > per operam fabri.

I have supplied < *it* >: the usual emendation is per< dit >, but unless we assume a torn manuscript, for which, *pace* Schoell, the evidence is insufficient, it is simpler to restore *il* (sc. *imber*). There is no reason to object to the idea in 'rain goes (runs) through (across) the carpenter's work': *ire per* is normal Latin for the diffusion of liquids over surfaces or through substances; cf. Aeneid 2. 173, per artus | sudor iit.

129.

ad legionem [comita] adminiculum eis danunt.

I have dropped *comita*, corrected in B to *comitum*, from the text, believing *comitū* (or *comitē*) to have been originally a gloss for the somewhat unusual word *adminiculum* 'assistant, squire'. Any copyist that knew his Aeneid might have made the gloss; cf. 9. 649, tum comitem (sc. Buten) Ascanio pater addidit. This

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emendation converts 129–130 into an iambic octonarius, like 128 and 131.[1]

140.

deturbavit extersit detexitque, etc.

Extersit is my correction for *texit* in the MSS. We may assume a stage DETURBAVIT <T>EXTERSIT, with a loss of *-ters-* by haplography, or by skipping from the second TE past -IT. As to construction, verecundiam mi . . extersit is like Poen. 970, mihi apsterserunt omnem sorditudinem.

146.

atque edepol ita haec umide putent: etc.

I have emended to umidā deputent; *deputere* 'to rot down', though not found in the lexica, seems as natural a word for Plautus to use as the nonce-word exputescunt (Curc. 242). The reading *umide <de> putent* might also stand.

150.

quo neque industrior de iuuentute erat.

So I read with the editio minor, though the editors in general impugn this passage. But Rudens 675 b offers a perfect parallel (in the neuter) both for the omission of *quisquam* (*alter*), and for the single *neque*, to wit: neque est melius morte in malis rebus. A further parallel for the omission of *quicquam* with a *de-* phrase is Nepos, Cato, 3, ut non facile reperiri possit, neque de Graecis neque de Italicis rebus, quod ei fuerit incognitum.

171.

ut lepide omnes res tenet sententiasque amantum.

Editors have adopted Bergk's correction of *res* to *mores*, chiefly to avoid the hiatus with *lepide*. Stich. 104 has the phrase imperitus rerum et morum mulierum, and accordingly I have not disturbed *res*. The hiatus is easy to remove in other ways, e. g. thus, lepide < hęc > omnes (the eligibility of haec for application to Scapha is proved by 279): hiatus is in fact so easy to remove in Plautus that it ought to render the wary suspicious of the surgical value of such plasters. There seems to be no musical reason—phrasing, elocutionary delivery—to qualify a hiatus between 'lepide' and 'omnes', but, unless we are to believe that in Roman speech elision was so complete that a listener would hear lepid' omnes alike for 'lepidi,-do,-dum,-dē omnes', are we to suppose that the poetic convention regarding hiatus was so

[1] I take occasion in passing to ask users of my book to explain the metre of 131 by § 27. 4, instead of by § 27. 3.

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strong that the distinctive vowel fragment that was heard could never have syllabic value?

The inversion, *res omnis* (this order in Stich. 362), will also mend the metre.

174.

ergo ob hoc verbum, etc.

I have not corrected *hoc*. Scapha's cleverness in 168–9 had been rewarded by a mere compliment; for her *present* (*hoc*) speech she is promised a more substantial reward: supposing an archetype ERGOHOCOB, a skip over HOC might easily have resulted, after correction, in the unmetrical order of the MSS.

186.

equidem pol miror tam captam, tam doctam te et bene doctam.

I have corrected this unmetrical line to e. p. m. t. catam, perdoctam, etc., on the supposition that the *p* of *captam* got in from supralinear *p̄*, the abbreviation of *per-*. Perhaps we should read *perdocte* for *-tam*, defending perdocte . . doctam by Miles, 258, docte . . perdoctam.

200.

nilo ego, quam nunc tu, amata sum atque uni modo gessi morem.

This verse, which had previously been pronounced corrupt by nearly all the editors, is retained by the editio minor. I interpret the verse, supplying *tam* with *nilo*, by "I sold my love (*amata sum*) <as> gratis (nilo) as you now <sell yours>, etc." For the omission of *tam* I compare Rud. 943, non edepol piscis (sc. tam) expeto | quam tui sermonis sum indigens; and Men. 968–9, ut absente ero rēm eri diligenter | tutetur quam si ipse adsit, aut rectius; for the construction of *nilo* I compare Naevius 105, eius noctem *nauco* ducere; for the use of *tam* and *quam* with *amari* I compare Mil. 1202, nunquam ego me tam sensi amari quam nunc ab illa muliere, noting also the correspondence of *quam nunc* with *quam nunc tu*. From Most. 36, lubet potare, amare, scorta ducere, we may defend the interpretation of amata sum by passa sum me scortum duci.

213.

illa hanc corrumpit mulierem malesuada uiti lena.

I have corrected to i. h. c. m. malesuadelā ('by evil promptings') vitī lena. The adjective malesuadelă, might stand as well with lena agreeing. The reduction by the copyist of *malesuadela* to *malesuada* is on much the same footing as the common writing of *custodia* for *custodela*.

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235.

iam istaquidem absumpta [quidem] res erit, etc.

I read iam ist*i* absumpta quidem, etc., believing that *quidem* in the second position constitutes the lectio difficilior: a parallel is Capt. 789, conlecto quidemst pallio, cf. also Miles, 634; Cicero, ad Fam. 5. 16. 2, ad Att. 15. 13. 5, Orat. 13. The change of *ista* to *isti* is not necessary, but seemed to me to improve the sense, without taking any palaeographic risk to speak of.

241.

edepol si summo ioui bo agento sacruficassem.

This is the reading of B (with *io* changed from *iu*), corrected by B^2 to

.uiuo r
ioui· bo agent o

D reads ioui uiuo argento, and C ioui ioui a. With *bo* in the archetype, for which *vo* would be a very normal variant, it is clear how ioui <ui>uo arose. But inasmuch as *b* and *d* are confused in both minuscule and capital manuscripts (see my first paper, p. 184, vs. 926), I have corrected *ioui* (*iuui*) *bo* to *ioui inuido:* for an interpretation and defence of *inuido* see my notes.

308.

qui inuident, ne umquam eorum quisquam inuideat prosus commodis.

The definition of *commodis* by 'good fellows' (supported by Poen. 615, Pseud. 443) destroys all Langen's merely verbal objections to this verse. In thought it does not ill continue

306.

haec qui gaudent, gaudeant perpetuo semper bono.

A similar sententia in Persa 777; bene ei qui inuidet mihi et ei qui hoc gaudet. How Plautus might have gone on after qui inuident, had he chosen to make a harsh antithesis, let Shakespeare witness (Tempest V. i. 214): Let grief and sorrow still embrace his heart | That doth not wish you joy.

The interruption of the moralizing of 304–306 and 308 by the practical directions of the hostess to her servants (307) is an experience any of us may have enjoyed, whether as speaker or as auditor.

319, 325, 331, 339.

*h*ecquid ... ma-m-ma-madere—*h*o-*h*o-*h*o-cellus—
a-*h*-is ma-m-ma-madere—*h*-ec-quis.

As a warrant for accepting all this *aitch*-ing as a part of the drunken mimetic, I quote the following from a letter of Mr. F.

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H. Sargent of the American Academy of Dramatic Arts, though his reply touches only the one case submitted to him (*ho-ho-ho*cellus):

"I think that the '*ho*' added to the word *ocellus* is without doubt intended to represent the sound a drunken man makes in attempting to get out words. It is exactly what we would do in the impersonation of drunkenness where the drunkard would take the easiest sound which he could produce, which would be approximately 'ho' or 'hah'. The organs of speech being relaxed by the alcohol the consonant sounds are difficult for the intoxicated man to give; he therefore makes expulsions of breath in the form of incomplete vowels, like 'ho'."

It is quite true that *hecquis* and *ahis* are common MS spellings, and it is accordingly impossible to claim a certain mimetic value for them in the drunken scene before us.

327.

quam illi ubi lectus est stratus coimus.

coiimus is my correction for *coimus* (cf. Neue's Formenlehre III,[3] p. 448). This renders the verse metrical (see my text, § 31, 5); and perfect for future perfect is normal Plautine Latin. The reading coiimus is perhaps attested by D's *cojm'*.

328.

Del.

sine sine cadere me. sino. ſ &[t] hoc (B[2]) quod mihi in manust.

B[1] differs from B[2] in reading sinoſ & hoc etc.

My correction is s. s. cadere me; desino: fetet hoc | quod mihi in manust, interpreted as 'well, let me fall here; I give it up—it's sickening—my present undertaking'. The absolute use of *desino* seems pretty well justified by the examples cited in Harpers' Lexicon, and on the interpretations possible for *fetet* I refer to my notes.

358.

VBIALIQVIVELDENIS, etc.

This is my correction (*aliqui* is dative = *alicui*), printed in capitals. The MSS read ubi (B[1] uel) aliqui quique denis, which may easily have arisen from a haplography of VIVE, with subsequent supralinear insertion of the dropt VI.

362.

sed ego, sumne ille infelix, qui non curro curriculo domum?

I here follow the MSS, scanning *ille infelix*. If I am right in

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doing so, this verse, perhaps, forms the second test case[1] necessary to prove the older view that *ille ipse*, etc., are sometimes genuine pyrrhics, and neither owe their pyrrhic value to the iambic law (quid illic), etc., nor are to be read *ill'*, *ips'*, etc., with Skutsch. The grounds for skepsis in respect to Skutsch's theory cannot be better stated than has been done already by Seyffert (Bursian's Jahresber., vol. 80, p. 256). I agree with Seyffert and Niemeyer that *illum* in Miles 1231 has a naturally short initial syllable. I believe that *ille* and *iste* are as truly compounds as *ipse:* accident has left us no **eumle*, **eum*<*p*>*te* (cf. *tu-te*, *eop-te*) to match off against *eumpse*, that is all. If this is the case, *ille* and *iste*, as compounds, are entitled to such variations of quantity in Plautine metre as *ecquis*, and *ecquis* admits the iambic shortening in its final when long by position (e. g. in Persa 225, as pointed out by Seyffert, l. c.). The theory of composition with an enclitic also accounts for *nĕmpe*, and the fact that *nempe* never fills a complete foot in Plautus is a phenomenon of musical phrasing (proclisis), and does not prove it a monosyllable.

A list of sentences, believed to be exhaustive, comparable in type with the line before us is herewith presented:

Men. 852. sumne ego mulier misera, qui illaec audio?
Merc. 588. sumne ego homo miser, qui nusquam queo bene quiescere.
Persa 75. sed sumne ego stultus qui rem curo publicam.
Cf. Men. 904. sed ego stultus sum qui illius esse dico quae meast.
Rud. 1184. sumne ego scelestus ('accurst'), qui illunc hodie excepi uidulum.
Bacch. 91. sumne autem nili, qui nequeam ingenio moderari meo.
Pseud. 908. sumne ego homo insipiens, qui haec mecum egomet.
Cf. Bacch. 623. sumne ego homo miser? perdidi me, etc.
Cas. 303. sumne ego homo miser? satin omnes res sunt aduorsae mihi?
Miles 1345. . . . . sumne ego apud me?

In these sentences the *qui-* clauses (and the coordinate clauses) furnish genuine motives for conviction of sorrow, folly, ill luck on the part of the questioner; while in our sentence, Tranio's not trotting along home is hardly a natural ground to allege for his personal conviction of ill luck. But the presence of *ille* in our sentence differentiates it from all the rest. I have cited in my note on this passage Plautine and other instances of *ille* in the sense of 'the typical, the proverbial, the notorious'; here I will cite but one fresh instance (Horace, Epist. 1. 20. 14): ridebit monitor non exauditus, ut *ille* | *qui* male parentem in rupes pro-

[1] I say 'perhaps' because sŭmne seems to me a possible scansion, and if so sŭmne ĭll(e) might fall under the iambic law.

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trusit asellum | *iratus* (cf. Cist. 15). Does Plautus here use *ille infelix* of a typical man in a difficulty, as Horace uses ille iratus of a typical man in a passion? If so, not proceeding home is cited as a sign of being in a difficulty. A proverb to this effect is found in Greek: οἴκοι γενοίμην: ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκφυγεῖν τὰ δεινὰ εὐχομένων; cf. also the proverbs οἶκος φίλος, οἶκος ἄριστος and οἴκοι μένειν δεῖ τὸν καλῶς εὐδαίμονα (see Leutsch l. c., I, pp. 439, 262; cf. also his notes). A possible echo of these proverbs in Horace, Epist. 1. 17. 37,

sedit qui timuit ne non succederet.

From what fable shall we suppose this proverb to have come? Inasmuch as grounds have already been given for identifying Tranio with the jackdaw (κολοιός), Phaedrus' fable of the jackdaw may be brought to our notice here:

. . . (Graculus) deinde *contemnens suos*,
se immiscuit pavonum formoso gregi.
illi impudenti pennas eripiunt avi
fugantque rostris. *male mulcatus* graculus
redire maerens coepit ad proprium genus, etc.

Or perhaps allusion is made again to the dallying κόραξ (see f. n. on p. 253).

375.

. . . disperii :: bis peristi, . .

I have interpreted *bis* as perhaps an etymological quip with *dis-*, rather than a drunken stumble such as totus . . :: potus (Stich. 771). Words like *des* for *bes* (Varro) and the glosses *dimus* for *bimus*, *difariam*, *difrax*, to say nothing of the form *dicolor*, a bad spelling (?) for *bicolor* (cf. Goetz, l. c. s. vv.), show a variation of *d-* and *b-* in the adverbs for 'twice'; cf. also in Cas. 974 *dismarite*, with Leo's note.

1166.

dispudet. <Tr.> istam ueniam: quid me fiet nunciam.

I have corrected i. u. to <bis> isti ueniast, assuming a repetition here of the etymological play noted at 375. On the correction of *ueniam* to *ueniast* see below on 926.

377.

<i,> iube abire rursum: quid illi reditio | etiam huc fuit.

So the editio minor. The offending hiatus, which I put in my text after *etiam*, might be removed by reading illi | <málūm> red | itio eti | am, etc. The result is a good Plautine sentence (cf. vss. 6, 34): but how account for the falling out of malum?

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382. See above, p. 262.

407–408.

407 Pluma haud interest, patronus an cliens probrior siet.

408 Homini, quoi nulla in pectorest audacia,
410 [Nam quoiuis homini, uel optumo uel pessumo]
411 Quamuis desubito facilest facere nequiter.

So the editio minor. My text transposes the space of one line before 407, inserting therein the (late) scene heading of D^b, and reads,

TRANIO *Seruos* SPHAERIO *Puer.*

pluma haud interest patronus ac cliens: probe cor ciet
hominem quoi nulla in pectorest audacia.
Nam quoiuis homini, etc.

The metrical change from trochaic septenarii to senarii is not unlike the modulation in 745–747 from iambic octonarius through an iambic Septenarius to Senarii. At Amph. 973 Jupiter speaks a trochaic septenarius in dialogue, and then goes on with senarii in soliloquy. In the present passage, according to my reading, Tranio, after a long dialogue in septenarii makes use of one septenarius more to pass into his soliloquy in senarii: cf. also Capt. 360–361.

In reading *ac* I but follow B. B's probrior (propior, CD) I change to probe cor, and my reading of ciet is founded on the *sciet* of BCD, which was changed in B to *siet*. The miswriting of ciet as sciet is on a par with consciuit for conciuit (Persa 784) and, conversely, citus for scitus, i. e. scitius, Pseud. 748.

For the sense, cor means 'conscience', and ciet 'accusat', as in Bacch. 415 (cf. Ussing's note): the sense is 'conscience makes a brave attack upon the coward'. Perhaps we should read, not probe cor, but *probri* <*c*> *or*, 'conscience impeaches the coward only of ill-doing' (*probri*). In anapaestic verse, at least, probri is susceptible to the iambic shortening (Bacch. 1167): the iambic shortening through mute and liquid in iambic and trochaic measures is rare, but fabris in vs. 131 of our play is a probable instance, and patrĕm s- in Bacch. 404 is not to be called in question.

469.

. . . obsecro hercle, quin eloquere <rem>?

I have supplied rem 'it, the truth, the matter'; cf. 198–9, si dictis nequis perduci ut uera haec credas | mea dicta, ex factis nosce rem.

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506 sq.

I have given the words *st st* to the insiders, interpreting them as a cautious attempt to open communications with Tranio, and have followed the MSS in leaving to Tranio *hicine percussit* (508); in 512 I again follow the MSS, leaving abscede ab ianua: fuge obsecro hercle to the frightened master, now trying in his turn to get Tranio away from the door. This involves changing the nota TH. in 513 to TR. This readjustment of the parts renders it possible to interpret *percussisses* in 521, as it stands, without changing to *percussissem*. For the interpretation of all this difficult ghost scene I refer to my text and notes.

545.

sicut me habet < miserum >. uerum, etc.

I have inserted miserum: it were better placed perhaps after *me*. The possibility of confusion by homoioteleuton with uerum is of course reckoned with, and miserum makes an excellent repetition of miserius in the previous verse. For the thought of (conscius animus) me miserum habet cf. Cist. 672, itaque petulantia mea me animi miseram habet. Other cases of the idiom miserum habere are Asin. 869, Casina 116, Epid. 667, Trin. 268.

552.

dixtin<ei> quaeso? :: dixi inquam ordine omnia.

I have supplied *ei*.

559.

tam facile uinces, quam pirum uolpes comest.

My notes defend this passage, but the following emendation for *pirum* seems worth suggesting, viz., *pinam* 'mussel'. This suggestion is based on the Greek proverb (cf. Leutsch., l. c. II, 268), Ἀλώπηξ οὐ δωροδοκεῖται: ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ ῥᾳδίως δώροις πειθομένων, which Apostolius (II, 17) goes on to illustrate with three fox stories; first, how the fox catches hedgehogs (χερσαίους ἐχίνους), which, having split open, ἐσθίει ῥᾳδίως; a second story tells how the fox hunts ἰχθύδια, viz., by letting down his tail into the water, which, when the fishes tangle themselves therein, he draws out, καὶ ἐκεῖναι δεῖπνον ἄβρότατον ἔχουσι. The situation here is that Tranio has just wished for a judge who will believe him, "then", says he to his master, "you will win your case as easily as a fox eats a mussel".

I do not define ἰχθύδια, as shell-fish, crustaceans, but I think ἰχθύδια has taken the place in the story of some word for shell-

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fish, crustaceans, perhaps of *ἰχθύους πελαγίους*: nowadays the fox does secure shell-fish and crustaceans upon the seashore.

569.

. . . qui de argentos (B[1]-*tos*)? . .

So the MSS, with a correction in B[3] to quid de argentost, which the editors follow. My text reads qui de argento es? 'how are you off for money?' comparing Truc. 741, de eo (sc. argento) nunc bene sunt.

580.

See above, p. 262.

663.

nisi ut in uicinum hunc proxumum d<olum ĕx>ercitem.

This reading accounts for all of the reasonably certain letters of A. P's line end, *mendacium*, can clearly not be brought into conformity with A's reading, and seems to have been caught up from the next line but one. The frequentative verb *ex(s)ercĭtare* may be derived either from *exercēre* 'to practice', or from *exsercīre* [ptc. exserc(ī)tus] 'to cobble up, patch up': for the sense, the latter is the more probable derivation, cf. Amph. 367, compositis mendaciis aduenisti . . . *consutis dolis*. This passage makes us wonder if *mendacium* in the Palatini was not perhaps a gloss on *dolum*?

725.

< tuo animo > morem geras.

The Palatini indicate a gap before morem, and we cannot judge how much to supply by the spacing of the gaps in these MSS. Of course tuo animo is a mere *ad sensum* supplement, but Casina 784 facite uostro animo uolup, in conjunction with Amph. 131 pater nunc intus suo animo morem gerit,—cf. also Bacch. 416: est lubido homini suo animo obsequi; | iam aderit tempus, cum sese etiam ipse oderit: morem geras—, sufficiently vindicate the phraseology for Plautus.

727.

. . . quid <est>? Ehem.

I have supplied est (following Z), and have transposed ehem from the beginning of 728 to the end of 727. Notice that B reads the *hic*, final in 723 (A), as the initial word of 724.

757.

quid <rei> consomniauit? Tr. etc.

The loss of *rei* (?*rē*, gen.) may perhaps be connected with the misunderstanding of the word as the nota, Tr. (see on vs. 5). For quid rei? cf. Rud. 487 si . . . quid rei, etc.

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802–803.

Misericordia<m> s<e abstinere> hominem oportet
:: morare hercle <uerba ut> facis, etc.

My text adopts these insertions from other sources. For 802 we get as good sense and metre by reading misericordia<m> s<ibi adhibere> etc., 'charity ought to begin at home' and this makes 802 parallel with 801:

lucri quicquid est, id domum trahere oportet.

A general approach to the sentiment is found in Men. 982, ego ita ero ut me esse oportet: | metum [id] mihi adhibeam, etc. For 803 we might supply *me et male*, comparing Poen. 359 morare et male facis, but we should have to define male facis by something like 'you're boring', or 'you're making a fool of yourself'.

870.

. . . probe textum habebo

So I read for tectum h., treating *textum* as a verb of effecting with an *ut* and a *ne* dependence. This is forcing texit 'contrives', beyond the warrant of the examples known to me. Perhaps rather we should correct to *effectum*. This is palaeographically easy (see on 890) and the context might have prompted a copyist to the misreading.

890.

ferocem facis quia effertus fumat:: uah.

I read effe(a)rtus for te eratus of the MSS (see my 1st paper p. 184),—cf. Men. 91 where A reads effugiet and P te fugiet—; and for amat,<f>umat. For the interpretation of these words I refer to my notes. Metrically, fūmāt vāh as a 4th Bacchius in the tetrameter is a rare type. It were easy to infer from the statement of the metrical hand books that — — : — (the colon here symbolizes a word end) *does* not occur in the the 2d and 4th Bacchius, that it *can*not occur (but cf. Most. 101, where (ex-)templo sunt is a 2d foot; and Cas. 23, where inter se is a 4th — though inter se might be regarded as — — — rather than — — : —); but such an inference will not hold. In the 378 (=370) bacchii listed by Goetz and Schoell only 40 + instances of a 4th foot containing 6 morae occur [— — — (24); — : — — (10); — ∪ ∪ — (2); — : ∪ ∪ — (3); ∪ ∪ : — — (? Men. 759); — — : — (Cas. 23)]. In the remaining 330 instances of 5-moric 4th feet, the type ∪ — : — occurs 25 times (1 : 13), not counting among the monosyllabic endings cases where there are two monosyllables, nor

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cases where the final monosyllable is merged with the preceding word by elision. There are not enough cases for a certain induction, but if in 330 cases of ∪ — — only 1 in 13 are of the type ∪ —: —, the utmost expectancy of the type — — : —, in 40 + cases of — — —, would be 3.[1]

Possibly, however, we should read 890 as follows: ferocem facis quia effertūs amat :: uah, interpreting "you're showing off your wit (or temper) because a full man loves <to do so>", defending the quantification of effertūs by Casina 650,

malúm pessumúmque hic modo intūs apúd nos

904.

quid tibi uisumst mercimoni? Th. <totus> totus gaudeo.

So my text, following Gruter. It now occurs to me that the word that has fallen out may have been emtum (emptum), written ētū; cf. Merc. 500, hoc emi ('I've taken'?) mercimonium.

926.

. . . tam deis gratia, etc.

This reading, advanced in my first paper (p. 184) for B's Eam dehis gratiam, may be further defended by Pseud. 713, *tam graciam* (B) *tamgratia* (A), but tam gratiast (the editors); here also we might read gratiast. In Aul. 758 eam has been corrected to iam.

967.

. . . amplius quam cui . . .

Thus I have combined A's amplius quam and B's melius cuiquam.

984.

Tranio: is uel Herculi conterere quaes<i>tum potest.

In this verse I restore the metre by recognizing a doublet quaesitus/quaestus; cf. Casina. 530, in quaesitione, against

[1] May I ask users of my book to correct the table at the top of p. xxv, under 4th foot to ∪ — ⏑ 36, and insert below it — — — 2? I have neglected also to call the students' attention in § 24.1 and § 30 to the common occurrence of a caesura in bacchiac tetrameters in the second or third feet as a substitute for the diaeresis between said feet: however, if it be observed that the diaeresis can come between the parts of a compound word, the diaeresis rather than the caesura must be regarded as the normal pause. We should do well, in my opinion, to scan 785, e. g., as follows:

eró seruŏs múltī—modīs sŭ́ fidus :: únde is.

If we had the musical score, we might discover that in the musical phrasing diaeresis was in general made good at the expense of dividing words by a musical pause between syllables.

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some half-dozen cases of in quaestione (Capt. 253; Cist. 541, 593; Persa, 51; Pseud. 663; cf. Trin. 1012).

A surprising number of verses occur with defective metre containing the word quaestus: it is more surprising how many of them are mended in their metre by reading quaesitus, e. g.

Most. 1107. quídum? :: quia nil quaes<i>ti sit: ita mali hercle ambo sumus.
Capt. 98. nunc híc óccipit quaes<i>tum hunc fili gratia.
Persa 61. unde égo hũnc quaes<i>tum optineo et maiorum locum.
Rud. 291. praésertim quibus nec quaes<i>tus est nec didicere artem nullam.
Rud. 1345. si fraúdassis dic ut te in quaes<i>tu tuo.
Truc. 416. ad suóm quemque aequomst quaes<i>tum esse callidum.
Truc. 932. ómnes homines ad suom quaes<i>tum calĕnt et fastidiunt.

990.

puere atque puero quaeritemus :: sequere hac me <modo>
:: puere, etc.

This is A's reading; the editors correct puero to porro. For reasons of interpretation (explained in my notes) I have transposed the first puere to a position before sequere, inserting before it the nota Th. Leo drops puere altogether, inserting *illos* after quaeritemus.

1012.

Quid, a Tranione seruo? :: multo id minus.

So B. A preserves, of the whole line, only multo minus, with space for more words than the Palatini. My text reads, mending the metre, id <nimis> multo minus. In behalf of this emendation I note F's misreading of *minus* by *nimis*, a common manuscript fault; and Bacch. 672, where the editio minor corrects nimio minus multo to nimis multo minus.

1038–9.

. . . Th. seruorumque operam et lora mihi cedo.
<Si.> sume <ea>. <Th.> eademque opera haec tibi narrauero.

So the editio minor, plus <ea>, which is my insertion.

1091.

See above, p. 262.

1107.

See on 984 above.

1134.

age mitte ista: cito ad me ad cenam.

I read *cito* for *acto* of the MSS, supposing it to stand for καλῶ in the original, with the sense of voco, inuito, playing on the legal

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sense 'I summon(s).' Callidamates has been appointed *orator* for the errant son, and his use of legal language is not unnatural. Perhaps, however, Plautus wrote καλῶ (transcribed *cato*, then *acto*), for the sake of a quip on the name of Callidamates.

1166.

See after 375.

1172.

Ca. Mitte quaes<o>, istum <mihi> <Th.> Em uiden? Ut resistat furcifer.

This reading is new only so far as concerns the insertion of mihi; em and resistat for e and restat of the MSS were suggested in my first paper (l. c., p. 188).

1178.

hanc modo unam noxiam unam quaeso fac causa mea.

My notes defend the second unam as predicate after fac, not a skipping dittography: 'make (treat) one fault (as) one'; unam domum (familiam) facere occurs in Terence, Adelph. 909, 926.

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS,
AUSTIN, TEXAS.

EDWIN W. FAY.

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II.—THE MODES OF CONDITIONAL THOUGHT.

III.

1.

Having considered the question of the order of the two concept-groups most intimately concerned in a conditional thought-period, it now remains to examine somewhat closely into the nature of the act of intellection that binds the two together; the precise nature of this act of intellection determines the mode of the conditional thought.

It should perhaps be made clear at the very outset that the act of intellection that binds together the groups of a conditional thought-period is in no way peculiar—it is identical in kind with that which binds together the groups of other periods. To illustrate, suppose a general has left an officer in command of a town with directions to keep a certain signal flying at the cost of his life, if need be. As he returns to relieve this officer a messenger comes in with the news that the flag is down. The general's thought will instantly leap to the inference to be drawn from this state of affairs reported, namely, that the officer is dead. If for any reason he is not assured of the reliability of the news, his course of thought would naturally be indicated by the words,

> "If that is so (i. e., if the flag is down), my officer is dead".

The act of intellection that binds together the thought of the flag's being down and the thought of the officer's being dead is obviously a simple act of inference—the speaker judges that the first presupposes the second. Such an act of inference is not in any way peculiar to conditional thinking, but is common in all kinds of thought. What is true of the act of intellection that binds together the concept-groups in this case is true in all other conditional periods. The reader will have an opportunity to test the truth of this statement for himself later when the different modes of conditional thought are taken up; meantime this one case will serve as an illustration of the general principle.

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The real peculiarity of the conditional thought-period which distinguishes it from other thought-periods is the quality of its concept-groups; in other respects (the subject-matter of the groups and the act of intellection that unites them) the conditional thought-period is identical with thought-periods of other kinds. For suppose that the general above referred to marches to the relief of his officer without meeting any messenger by the way; instead a sudden turn in the road brings him in sight of the town, and his first observation is that the signal is not flying. He will instantly draw the same inference as before,—the death of his officer. He would not be apt to express himself so formally, but the course of his thought, exactly stated, would be

"The flag is down; therefore my officer is dead".[1]

The difference between this and the course of thought which underlies the sentence

"If that is so (i. e., if the flag is down), my officer is dead"

lies simply in the quality of the concept-groups; in the first case the speaker feels that he is dealing with facts—he sees that the flag is down, and is convinced that his officer is dead; while in the conditional period his groups are strongly colored by the lack of assurance that they correspond to actual fact—he does not know that the flag is down, and is therefore not assured of the death of his officer. But except for that peculiarity in the quality of the groups of the conditional thought-period the two courses of thought are identical; for the concept-groups in each case deal with the same subject-matter (the flag's being down and the officer's being dead), and in both cases the speaker passes from one group to the other by an identical act of inference—he judges that the flag's being down presupposes the death of his officer. To avoid any possible ambiguity, it should perhaps be definitely stated that the *certainty* with which the inference is drawn is exactly the same in both the cases just described—in the conditional period the general's lack of assurance

[1] A natural form of verbal expression would be an exclamation, "My officer is dead". This form gives full expression only to the second group—the inference. In speaking to someone who did not understand the situation he would be apt to add a statement of the ground of the inference (contained in his first group); "My officer is dead; for the flag is down".

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that the flag is down does not in the slightest degree affect the certainty of his judgment that its being down implies the death of his officer. This is simply another way of saying that we reason just as certainly about a supposed case as we do about admitted facts.[1]

There may be still a lingering doubt about the validity of the claim that I am trying to make good, namely, that the act of intellection that binds together the concept-groups in a conditional thought-period is identical with the act that binds together the groups of other thought-periods. For it might be said in objection that when these other thought-periods find ingenuous expression in speech, the varying nature of the act of intellection that binds together the groups betrays itself in some characteristic word like "Since", "When", "Because", etc., and therefore that it would seem antecedently probable that the use of "If" in the expression of a conditional thought-period indicates a connecting act of intellection different from that in any of the other thought-periods. But this argument is not valid, for the function of "If" is not parallel to that e. g., of "Since", as may be clearly seen by taking a concrete example and applying what has already been said above. Thus suppose a course of thought that would find natural expression in the words

"Since he has done his best, no more will be required".

In this sentence "Since" gives expression to the fact that there is a connection between the speaker's concept-groups, and further, it signifies the nature of that connection—the apprehension of a cause and effect relation. But suppose a parallel train of thought that would find ingenuous expression in

"If he has done his best, no more will be required".

Here "If", like "Since", gives expression to the fact that there is a connection between the speaker's concept-groups, and further, unlike "Since", it indicates the peculiar character of

[1] Any uncertainty about the validity of the inference would spring from a doubt of the faithfulness of the officer to his trust, and would affect both thought-periods equally. In the verbal expression this uncertainty might betray itself by the use of "probably" or the like;

"My officer is *probably* dead; for the flag is down".
"If the flag is down, my officer is *probably* dead".

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the concept-groups themselves, i. e., that they have the coloring of lack of assurance characteristic of the conditional thought-period. The force of the word is expended in this way, for there are several modes of conditional thought, and it has to be left to the hearer to guess that the act of intellection that binds together the groups in this particular case is the apprehension of a cause and effect relation. Since then it is not the function of "If" to give expression to the nature of the act of intellection that binds together the groups of a conditional thought-period, obviously no inference can be drawn as to the nature of that act of intellection from the fact that this word is the subordinating conjunction of the conditional sentence. The failure to grasp the real function of the conditional particle, probably in large measure accounts for the scanty attention given to the act of intellection that binds together the groups of the conditional thought-period, and for the lack of a clear description of its varieties, i. e., of the modes of conditional thought.[1]

From what has been already said, it is very easy to understand the often noted interchange in speech of conditional and other subordinating particles. For it has been shown that two courses of thought may be identical except that in one case the concept-groups exhibit the quality characteristic of the conditional thought-period. Two such courses of thought would find natural expression in the following pair of sentences:

> "Since he has done his best, no more will be required".
> "If he has done his best, no more will be required".

Assuming that the speaker is giving ingenuous expression to his thought, he will use one form or the other according as he is sure or lacks assurance that the person in question has done his best, and consequently that nothing more will be required of

[1] To indicate these in speech it would be necessary to have a sort of compound conjunction, one part (like "If") unchanging, to denote the peculiar quality of the groups of the conditional thought-period, the other varying according to the nature of the act of intellection joining the groups. The varying second part of the compound would correspond in function to "Since", "When", "Because", etc.; for these latter are left free to indicate the nature of the act of intellection which binds together the groups in the thought-period in whose verbal expression they appear by the fact that they all take for granted that there is nothing peculiar in the nature of the concept-groups themselves, i. e., their use presupposes that the speaker is dealing with what he knows or believes to be facts.

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him. This distinction appears so clear-cut at first sight that there might seem to be no excuse for inconsistency in the use of two words like "Since" and "If", provided that the speaker were to give exact expression to his thought. But it must be remembered that the line between human certainty and uncertainty is not fixed and unvarying; with the same subject-matter and exactly the same evidence before him, the optimist might feel certain, and thus justified in saying "Since", while the lack of assurance of the pessimist left nothing open to him but "If". A similar observation might be made with reference to a single individual if he were taken at times of widely varying moods. However, any inconsistency in the use of conditional and other subordinating particles arising from this source is only a reflex of inconsistency in thought, and probably exerts little influence in producing the real confusion that does exist in the use of these words. A much more potent factor is the attempt of the speaker to hide his real thought, either by choosing the form of speech that implies lack of assurance when he is sure, or the formula of certainty when he really lacks assurance. As an example of the latter we may take the case of a man of broken fortune who has little hope of making good his losses; despite his lack of assurance that amounts almost to despair, he may yet say to his family "*When* I regain my fortune, we will do thus and so". This form of speech he assumes to encourage them; his own thought really justifies nothing stronger than "If". The converse process—the use of the formula that implies lack of assurance when one is sure—is very common. The reason is, I suppose, that the speaker in this way secures a modest form of expression. Such a use appears when, in asking a favor, the speaker wishes to support his claim by a reference to past services rendered by himself to the hearer; the use of the conditional particle gives the impression of virtuous self-depreciation. Thus in Homer (Il. i. 39 ff.) the priest Chryses prays to Apollo, "*If* I have ever roofed over a temple pleasing to thee, or *if* ever for thee I have burned the fat thigh-pieces of bulls and goats". A similar form of modesty is found in the expression "If this is so"; these words are often used when the speaker is sure of his premise, but by expressing himself in this way he seems to lead the hearer to a conclusion, whereas "Since this is so" would seem to force him to it, and thus might rouse his antagonism. As

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soon as uses like these become conventional something like a real interchange of subordinating particles has taken place; e. g., the phrase just quoted ("If this is so") becomes a mere commonplace in formal argument—it is often used when the speaker has no feeling that he is understating his certainty, and the audience is not misled on that point by the use of the formula he employs; he means, and they gather from his words, just what would be conveyed by "Since this is so". From such uses it is but a short step to passages in which there is found a conditional particle used side by side with a subordinating conjunction of another sort as an exact synonym of the latter; the following seems to be a case in point:

Hor. Ep. II. 2. 175 ff.:

> Sic, *quia* perpetuus nulli datur usus, et heres
> Heredem alterius velut unda supervenit undam
> Quid vici prosunt aut horrea? Quidve Calabris
> Saltibus adiecti Lucani, *si* metit Orcus
> Grandia cum parvis, non exorabilis auro?

In this passage we should not far miss the sense if both *quia* and *si* were rendered by "in view of the fact that"; for Horace himself can hardly be less sure that death reaps great and small than he is that a perpetual lease is given to none—these are merely two aspects of the same thought, and, on the other hand, *si* can hardly be chosen to secure a modest form of expression, for the formula of assurance above (the *quia*-clause) refers to practically the same subject-matter. Finally the metre does not force the writer to the use of *si*, for though *quia* could not stand in the line as arranged, *cum* (*metat*) might have been used at that point. The reason, therefore, for the choice of *si* is not obvious, unless it be the avoidance of *cum* . . . *cum* (*parvis*), or that Horace, as he impresses his lesson by asking substantially the same question twice, carries out the variety of verbal expression even to the detail of the subordinating conjunction, finding in *si* a more striking variant on *quia* than *cum* would have been.

In describing the modes of conditional thought the examples supposed are Consequence rather than Proviso Periods; for the latter order of conditional thought is but a subsidiary development of the former, as I have tried to show in a preceding paper, and further, its groups are not closely contiguous as in the case of the Consequence Period. A discussion of the effects

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of the Proviso order on the modes of conditional thought would be interesting from the point of view of psychology, but it seems to offer little for the purposes of syntax, and is not attempted here. In terms of the Consequence Period the problem is, What relations may a person apprehend between two possibilities such that he feels that the realization in fact of one of them entails the realization in fact of the other? At least three such relations are to be distinguished; (1) a cause and effect relation, (2) a relation of ground and inference, and (3) a relation of equivalence. The subsequent discussion follows this order.

2.

The Cause and Effect Relation.

Conditional periods whose groups are bound together by the apprehension of a cause and effect relation may be defined as judgments that the coming to pass of one event is (will be, etc.) followed by the coming to pass of another. All such judgments are applications to a particular case of generalizations based, for the most part, on our preceding experience. Thus we are not slow to learn that the hand thrust into the fire is burned. This generalization puts us in a position to forecast the outcome when we see a child apparently planning to touch the fire, and our thought finds expression in such sentences as

"If you do that, you will be burned".

The conditional periods which fall within the first class may be subdivided into two groups; for the phrase "cause and effect relation" has a broad meaning, being sometimes used of real cause and effect, sometimes of immediate cause and effect (an immediate cause being one that merely precipitates the effect of the real cause). According as it is a real or immediate cause that is apprehended in the act of intellection that binds together the groups of a conditional thought-period, the period may be styled Conditional-Causal or Conditional-Circumstantial respectively.

(a). Conditional-Causal Periods.

Suppose that a child is tempted to do wrong; he judges on the basis of his past experience that the commission of the proposed

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act will be followed by punishment—a clear case of real cause and effect. His thought might be thus expressed:

"If I do this, I shall be punished".

The same mode of conditional thought underlies the following sentence

"If he has done his best, no more will be required".

Whenever there is any doubt about the mode of conditional thought underlying a given sentence, a practical test may be applied by asking ourselves how the speaker would have expressed himself if his concept-groups had not been colored by the lack of assurance about realization in fact characteristic of the conditional thought-period. By discarding this element that alters the quality of the concept-groups we do not at all affect the act of intellection which links the groups together (see section 1), but we thus find ourselves forced to a form of verbal expression in which we must take ground as to the nature of that act of intellection. Thus in the first case above, suppose the child determined to commit the act. When it occurs to him that the commission of the deed entails punishment, his course of thought would be expressed by

"I shall be punished *for doing this*".

So, in the other case, the removal of the lack of assurance that colors the concept-groups produces

"Since he has done his best, no more will be required".

These forms of verbal expression indicate clearly the nature of the act of intellection that binds together the concept-groups of the corresponding conditional periods.[1]

(b). Conditional-Circumstantial Periods.

Suppose that a child has already done something wrong and

[1] Instead of "I shall be punished for doing this", we might conceivably say "Since I shall do this, I shall be punished", but one doubts whether that is good English; for "Since" seems not much used referring to the realm of the future. Quite often, as in the other example, the assumption of realization in fact for the subject-matter of the concept-groups calls for verbal expression in a hypotactic period, and when this is the case, the door is open (as noted in section 1) for an interchange in the use of the conditional and other subordinating particles.

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proposes to confess it at once. A companion sees that punishment will follow such a course, and might say

"If you tell, you will be punished".

Here the cause is only immediate—the child will not be punished for telling, but his confession will precipitate the result of the real cause (the commission of the wrong). We may apply here the the test above suggested for bringing out more clearly the nature of the act of intellection that binds the groups together. Assuming the second child has no doubt that the first will carry out his design of confessing what he has done, his thought may find expression in

"When you tell, you will be punished".

Under this head of cause and effect relation fall all the periods that have an element of will or wish in the conditioned group. This element most often produces conditional sentences whose apodoses are expressions of determination with regard to the speaker's own action, or commands and exhortations addressed to others. When the conditioned group is thus modified, the act of intellection that joins the groups is less distinctly a judgment—the speaker no longer judges that the coming to pass of one event is (will be, etc.) followed by the coming to pass of another, but rather he wills or wishes such a sequence. Here too are found the Conditional-Causal and Conditional-Circumstantial types.

(a). Conditional-Causal Periods.

Suppose that the parent of the child above referred to is informed from a not very reliable source that the boy has done the wrong in question; he may however determine on a course of action, and his thought find expression in

"If he has done that, I will punish him".

Remove the uncertainty about the truth of the message, and the verbal form becomes

"I will punish him for this".

This form of speech again shows clearly the nature of the act of intellection that binds together the groups in both cases. To illustrate again, suppose that both parents hear the doubtful

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report, and that it suggests to one a certain course of action; to delegate this to the other the verbal form might be

"If he has done that, punish him".[1]

(b). Conditional-Circumstantial Periods.

Suppose that A says to B, "C may pass by here this morning"; this reminds B that he wishes to interview C, and he may say

"If he does, I will stop him".

On the other hand, if A states without reservation that C will pass and B believes it, his verbal expression will be

"I will stop him as (when) he passes.

The real reason for stopping C is that B wishes to interview him—not the mere fact of his passing by that way; the latter is but the immediate cause—it gives the real cause a chance to produce its effect. An example with an imperative apodosis appears if we suppose that when A says "C may pass here this morning", B delegates his interest to A with the words

"If he does, stop him".[2]

It may be said in general of the conditional periods that show

[1] In the use of the first person of the verb the speaker may express will directly, or he may simply predict his own action as he might that of another person. In trying to arrive at the thought underlying conditional sentences it is sometimes difficult to tell which of these meanings is to be attached to the first person of the verb. The matter is still further complicated because it is quite possible that the two things—direct expression of will and statement of fact—are united in many cases. Genuine imperative expressions (as in the last example above) are not, and cannot be, statements of fact or belief; hence when they appear in apodosis they provide better and clearer illustrations for the conditional thought-period with an element of will in the conditioned group.

[2] It may be of interest to note in passing that an element of will in the conditioned group does not always result in a verbal form that we count a direct expression of will; for the group may be further colored by a feeling of modesty, politeness or the like. The speaker then will say e. g., "when he passes, I *wish* you would stop him." So also a speaker whose feelings urge him to exhort may content himself with a formula of advice, as a matter of diplomacy or for other reasons: "If that is so, you had best proceed as follows." An element of will does not always figure in the thought that underlies such a sentence as this last; for a statement of propriety or duty may be the outcome of the most dispassionate and disinterested judgment on the part of the speaker.

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the cause and effect relation that they belong mostly to the realm of the present and the future; this is particularly true of those which have an element of will or the like in the conditioned group, for man cannot well will the past to be different than it is. Even in the case of those periods whose conditioned group contains no such element, examples are rare in which both concept-groups deal with the past; e. g.,

"If he did that, he has been punished".

It may be noted also that this first mode of conditional thought described accounts for the great majority of conditional sentences.

3.

THE GROUND AND INFERENCE RELATION.

Conditional thought-periods whose groups are bound together by the apprehension of a ground and inference relation may be defined as judgments that the coming to pass of one event *presupposes* an antecedent state of affairs; in such a case we reason backward from effect to cause, and our judgment here again is, for the most part, an application to a specific case of a generalization based on past experience. To this type of conditional thought-period is given the name

Conditional-Inferential.

To illustrate, suppose that a person who has arrived at the generalization that after a night rain the flowers are fresh, is told on any particular morning that the flowers outside seem fresh; if he does not trust the powers of observation of the informant he might say

"If the flowers are fresh, it rained last night".

On the other hand he might himself glance out of the window and note the condition of the flowers; he would draw the same inference as before, and free from the lack of assurance that characterized his concept-groups in the former course of thought, he might say

"It rained last night; for the flowers are fresh".

The latter form of verbal expression indicates very clearly the nature of the act of intellection that binds together the groups

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in each of the thought-periods—it is an act of inference, a judgment that one state of affairs presupposes another.

The same generalization, if the train of thought starts from the other end, will furnish the basis for a Conditional-Causal Period. Thus suppose that the person above referred to hears that it probably rained in the night; he will apprehend the result entailed, and his thought may be thus expressed

"If it rained last night, the flowers are fresh".

The difference in the act of intellection that binds together the concept-groups in this conditional thought-period and that which unites the groups in the thought underlying

"If the flowers are fresh, it rained last night".

may be further accentuated by contrasting the thought of the following sentences which shows a like difference:

"The grass is green *because* the sun shines here".
"The sun shines here, *since* the grass is green".

The difference may be again illustrated by comparing the two following conditional sentences, the first of which is the expression of a Conditional-Causal Period, and the second of a Conditional-Inferential:

"If there is water in that valley, there is also vegetation".
"If there is vegetation in that valley, there is also water".

The distinction between real and immediate cause in this mode of conditional thought is not important enough to call for separate names for the thought-periods according as it is one or the other that is involved in them. Further, there cannot well be an element of will or the like in the conditioned group, for it is a matter of hard and cold reasoning—the speaker simply judges that one event presupposes another. In Plautus there is but scanty evidence of this mode of conditional thought; it is common enough in an age of more formal thinking.

4.

The Relation of Equivalence.

If we should seek a set formula to express the act of intellection that binds together the concept-groups in the two modes of con-

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ditional thought thus far described, for the Conditional-Causal Periods it would be "A *is followed* by B", and for the Conditional-Inferential "A *presupposes* B". In this third mode of conditional thought the judgment is of the form "A *is* B", i. e., the subject-matter of the conditioning group is defined or characterized by the subject-matter of the conditioned group. Accordingly I suggest for the conditional periods that fall under this heading the name

Conditional-Defining Periods.

Suppose that A reports to B that C proposes to commit some act of cruelty. B passes judgment on the act, and the course of his thought might find expression in

"If he does that, it will be a shame".

Similar intellection underlies the following sentence

"If you are obedient to your father, you are doing the right thing".

Taking away the lack of assurance that colors the concept-groups in this case, the verbal expression becomes a hypotactic period whose introductory word indicates the nature of the act of intellection that binds together the groups

"In that you are obedient to your father, you are doing the right thing".

Evidence of this mode of conditional thought is abundant in Plautus. The conditioned group cannot of course contain an element of will or the like; it is another case of judgment pure and simple.

The name "Conditional-Defining" as a description of the conditional thought-periods that fall under this heading calls perhaps for a word of explanation. In naming the periods that exhibit the other modes of conditional thought it was possible to accept the terms that formal grammar would naturally choose as designations for the conditional sentences through which these modes of conditional thought are suggested to the hearer. But the term that would naturally be applied in grammar to the sentences by which a Conditional-Defining thought-period is suggested to the hearer could hardly fail to produce confusion if applied to the thought-period. Take, for example, some conditional sentences from Plautus which convey this mode of conditional thought:

Bacch. 1165:

si amant, sapienter faciunt.

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Curc. 144:

magnum inceptas, si id expectas quod nusquamst.

Men. 126:

si foris cenat, profecto me, haud uxorem, ulciscitur.

Men. 805:

male facit, si istuc facit.

Tri. 279 ff.:

feceris par tuis ceteris factis,
patrem tuom si percoles per pietatem.[1]

The *si*-clauses in these sentences will at once appeal to the student of Latin as parallel to *quod*- and *cum*-clauses that grammar has named "explanatory" or "explicative", and it would seem natural to apply these adjectives also to them. But such a designation would not answer for the conditional sentences that show the mode of conditional thought under discussion; for it would seem to imply that the conditioning group in the underlying thought explained or amplified the conditioned group. Almost the reverse is true—it is the conditioned group that characterizes or defines the conditioning group; or, to put it in another way, it is the subject-matter of the conditioning group on which judgment is passed; e. g., (as above)

"If he does that, it will be a shame".

[1] Other illustrations may be found in Plautus, Amph. 198, 675, Cas. 997, Men. 760, Merc. 874, Mil. 694, Tri. 1173; Cic. ad Fam. III. 3. 2, III. 6. 6, III. 7. 5, XIII. 23. 2, p. Clu. 50, 139, in Cat. I. 11. 28, II. 3. 6, p. Mur. 3. 5, 30. 62, p. Sulla 3. 8, p. Arch. 10. 23; Livy, XXI. 11. 2; Pliny, Ep. VII. 33, 3; Hor. Ep. II. 1. 3 ff., II. 1. 64 ff. cf. Soph. Oed. Tyr. 549 ff.:

εἰ τοι νομίζεις κτῆμα τὴν αἰθαδίαν
εἶναί τι τοῦ νοῦ χωρίς, οὐκ ὀρθῶς φρονεῖς.

The conditioning group may find expression in an infinitive; e. g.,

Cic. ad Att. VIII. 3. 7;

non puto etiam hoc Gnaeum nostrum commissurum, ut Domitium relinquat; etsi . . .; sed turpe Domitium *deserere* erit implorantem eius auxilium.

That "to desert him will be base" is equal to "If he deserts him, it will be base" is shown by what precedes—Cicero is not assured that Pompey will desert Domitius, in fact he says he thinks he will not. Cf. Plautus, Cist. 42, Tri. 119; Pliny, Ep. IV. 13. 4; Cic. Lael. 11. 39.

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To avoid any confusion that might thus arise, the name Conditional-Defining has been given to the thought-period.[1]

In attacking a pile of conditional sentences it will be found much easier to pass judgment on the mode of the speaker's conditional thought than it was to determine the order of that thought; for the test is much more tangible in this case, and

[1] As for the conditional *sentence* through which this mode of conditional thought is suggested to the hearer, it is perhaps not worth while to introduce further inconsistency into the nomenclature of formal grammar by insisting that the *si*-clause be not called "explanatory" or "explicative", though there is no other warrant for the use of these terms than the unfortunate application of the same to analogous *quod*- and *cum*-clauses which they fit as little as they do the *si*-clauses under discussion; take for instance:

Cic. in Verr. II. 2. 6. 16:

Videor mihi gratum fecisse Siculis, quod eorum iniurias ... sum persecutus.

In this sentence clearly it is the subject-matter of the *quod*-clause on which judgment is passed; the thought order must be "My prosecution of their wrongs is, I think, pleasing to the Sicilians". Sentences in which are found such *si*-, *quod*- and *cum*-clauses deserve, in grammar, a distinctive name descriptive of the nature of the underlying thought.

On the other hand grammar may be said to be justified in applying, in a rather mechanical way, the terms "explanatory" and "explicative" to any *si*-clause (whatever the mode of conditional thought) that is anticipated by some particular word or words in a preceding apodosis; e. g.:

Livy XXI. 17. 6:

Cum his ... copiis Ti. Sempronius missus in Siciliam, *ita* in Africam transmissurus, si ad arcendum Italia Poenum consul alter satis esset.

The only example at hand where there is such anticipation of the conditioning clause when the underlying thought is a Conditional-Defining Period chances to be one in which the conditioning concept-group finds expression in the infinitive:

Plaut. Bacch. 97 ff.:

ego opsonabo; nam *id* flagitium meum sit, mea te gratia
et operam dare mi et ad eam operam facere sumptum de tuo.

I have said just above that it is in a rather mechanical way that grammar may apply the names "explanatory" and "explicative" to *si*-clauses that are anticipated in apodosis in this way. For such an arrangement of the sentence does not by any means signify that the *si*-clauses expresses a concept-group that occurs to the mind after the thought of the apodosis is worked out; when the thought-period is of the Conditional-Defining variety this would hardly ever be the case, and in other thought-periods (cf. the passage just quoted from Livy) the fact that in speech the condition is anticipated shows that the conditioning concept-group is already present in the mind; in the thought-period it may have either preceded or followed. The range of words

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the fact that the sentences are written, not spoken, is much less of a disadvantage. There are of course complicated cases, but often it is simply a question of noting the subject-matter of protasis and apodosis and the relation that these two subject-matters would naturally sustain to one another. Here again all conditional sentences that are not really the expression of conditional thought must be thrown out; most of the others classify readily according to the mode of the underlying thought. The relation between the subject-matter of the protasis and that of the apodosis is sometimes so obvious that it is surprising that the matter has not attracted more attention; there are, however, sporadic references that show that it has not escaped notice altogether. E. g., Lindskog[1] heads one of his sections as follows, "Vis causalis sententiae condicionali subest", quoting such examples as

Plaut. Amph. 857:

Abin hinc a me, dignus domino servos?—Abeo, si iubes.

Plaut. Asin. 460:

Non magni pendo; ne duit, si non volt.

In terms of the present paper, the thought suggested by such sentences as these is Conditional-Causal.[2]

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and phrases that may anticipate a following conditional clause is somewhat wider than seems generally noted; e. g.:

Cic. ad Att. II. 22. 5:

sed totum est in *eo*, si antequam ille ineat magistratum (sc. te videro.)

Cic. p. Sest. 10. 24;

Foedus fecerunt cum tribuno pl. palam, ut ab eo provincias acciperent, quos ipsi vellent ... *ea lege*, si ipsi prius tribuno pl. adflictam ... rem publicam tradidissent.

Pliny Ep. IV. 13. 7:

Huic vitio occurri *uno remedio* potest, si parentibus solis ius conducendi relinquatur.

Cf. Cic. Lael. 17. 64, Caes. B. G. III. 5, Livy XXI. 10. 4.

[1] De enuntiatis apud Plautum et Terentium condicionalibus, Lundae, 1895, p. 83 ff. Cf. Rothheimer, De enuntiatis condicionalibus Plautinis, Göttingen, 1876, Chap. I (and his reference to Holtze), Reisig, Vorlesungen über lateinische Sprachwissenschaft, Berlin, 1888, § 264 ff., and Lane, Lat. Gram. 2065.

[2] In the first of these cases the question might be raised whether the thought to be conveyed is not a causal period rather than a conditional, and I see no objection to such an interpretation, though Lindskog seems to fear it.

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In applying the test suggested it will be found that, in dealing with negative expressions, the term "cause" has a somewhat different meaning than in other kinds of sentences, but this adjustment will be readily made. More likely to confuse is the common substitution in language generally of expressions of ability, readiness and the like for e. g., a promise. Such substitutions are not peculiar to the conditional sentence; thus, when we wish to change a piece of money, we commonly say "*Can* you change this?" and the reply "Yes" or "I can" is as commonly taken as an expression of willingness to do so. The writer once witnessed a case of this sort when the first speaker, at the words "I can", confidently held out his money, only to be met with the unexpected addition "but I do not know that I care to part with the change", much to the amusement of the spectators. Examples of this tendency to substitution may be seen in the following conditional sentences:

"I can attend to this for you, if you will wait a moment".
"If you want anything, I am ready" or "at your service".

cp. the following cases taken from Plautus:

Curc. 328:

PH. Perdidisti me. CV. Invenire *possum*, si mi operam datis.

Ep. 448 ff.:

sed istum quem quaeris Periphanem† Platenium
ego sum, siquid vis.

Merc. 287 ff.:

Quamquam negotiumst, siquid veis, Demipho,
non sum occupatus umquam amico operam dare.

Mil. 972:

cupio hercle quidem, si illa volt.

In cases like this the speaker says less than he means and less than the hearer understands him to mean; in seeking to determine the mode of conditional thought that is suggested to the hearer we must of course deal with the real meaning of the apodosis. In the same way must be treated sentences like the following:

"If you want me, I shall be at the bank".

Here again the speaker means more than he says; the hearer

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gathers from the scant verbal expression what he would gather from

"If you want me, come to the bank; I shall be there."[1]

We must treat the sentence in this way, for in the original form the two parts are not protasis and apodosis. One other source of confusion that crops out insidiously is the fact that many *si*-clauses are concessive rather than purely conditional in function; when this is true, there is an adversative relation between the subject-matter of protasis and apodosis not treated in this paper.

These remarks on the difficulties met in trying to determine the mode of conditional thought underlying given conditional sentences are merely general suggestions; further particulars would naturally be added in a detailed discussion of concrete sentences. Calling for special treatment are idioms like *miror si* and sentences that contain *si* in the sense of "on the chance that".

6

Unreal Conditional Periods.

Any conditional thought-period referring to the time realms of the existent or the past differs from an unreal conditional thought-period only in this that its concept-groups are colored by a lack of assurance about realization in fact, while those of the corresponding unreal period are permeated by the assurance of *non*-realization in fact. Consequently the variety seen in the act of intellection that binds together the concept-groups of conditional thought-periods generally may be observed also in periods of this class. The following sentences would be natural expressions for unreal thought-periods exhibiting the different modes of conditional thought;

(a). Conditional-Causal.

"If he had done wrong, he would be punished".

(b). Conditional-Circumstantial.

"If he had come home, he would be punished".

[1] This fuller form is rarer than the other; there is a very good case in Plautus, Mil. 480.

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(c). Conditional-Inferential.

"If the flowers were fresh, it would follow that it rained last night".[1]

(d). Conditional-Defining.

"If he were doing that, it would be a shame".

Taking up a mass of syntax material, some unreal conditional sentences like these will be found—sentences designed to convey to the hearer the bare information that something would follow from circumstances that do or did not exist. But a very large number are not (at least primarily) the expression of conditional thought at all. This has come about very naturally from the fact that when the speaker utters the clauses of an unreal conditional sentence, the hearer cannot well help thinking of the corresponding realities; e. g., when I say "If I had been present", the hearer invariably infers that I was not there. A speaker often takes advantage of this state of affairs, and makes use of an unreal conditional sentence as a mere roundabout way of suggesting to the hearer (a) the cause of an existing or past state of affairs or (b) the ground from which an existing or past state of affairs may be assumed.

(a). Suggests a Cause.

Suppose A says to B "You ought to have invited C". This suggests to B's mind the reason why C has not been invited, and he might thus express his thought;

"I have not invited him, because he offended me".

Yet, with precisely the same thought to convey, he would be quite as apt to say

"I should have invited him, if he had not offended me".

This form of expression is available for the conveyance of his thought because the hearer will instantly extract from "if he had not offended me" the information "he offended me", and the general circumstances under which the words are spoken, along with the speaker's tone and manner, show clearly that this is the

[1] The English idiom demands the periphrasis in the unreal conditional sentence; elsewhere it is optional. Thus we may say either "If the flowers are fresh, it rained last night" or "If the flowers are fresh, it follows that it rained last night".

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reason that C has not been invited—this last being a fact already known to A, but also in addition implied by "I should have invited him". Such a conditional sentence is not really the expression of conditional thought at all; its function is to tell A why C has not been invited. To take another illustration, suppose that A says to B "These goods are inferior"; B replies

"If you had provided skilled workmen, they would have been satisfactory".

Here again the unreal conditional sentence is but a tool to suggest to the hearer the reason for the state of affairs to which he has called attention—he is told that it was his own lack of interest in providing proper workmen that accounts for the unsatisfactory grade of the goods in question.

(b). Suggests the Ground of an Inference.

Suppose again that a general advancing to the relief of an officer whom he has left with directions to keep a certain signal flying, at the cost of his life, if need be, catches sight of the town and notes that the flag is not flying; he at once infers from this the death of his officer. Someone who does not know about the order for the display of the signal might call for an expression of this intellection by asking whether he (the general) thought his officer safe. The latter could express his thought directly by by saying

"No; (for) the flag is down".

Or, more fully,

"No, he is dead; (for) the flag is down".

To convey the same thought he would however be quite as apt to say

"No; (for) if he were safe, the flag would be up".

This last form of speech is a clear expression for the thought because the words "the flag would be up" instantly calls the hearer's attention to the real state of affairs—that the flag is down; the circumstances under which the words are spoken show that this is the ground from which the speaker infers the death of his officer, which inference (already known to the hearer) is implied in "if he were safe".

Other examples of the same use of the unreal conditional sentence are; "Did it rain last night?"

"No; for the ground would be wet, if it had rained last night".

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Again, "Is he within?"

"No; for we should hear talking, if he were within".

The fact that sentences such as these are being used as a round-about form of expression for thought that is not really conditional sometimes produces curious and (possibly) hybrid forms of speech; e. g., the thought of the last example might produce

"No, he is not within; for we should hear talking".[1]

This form of verbal expression states the inference in so many words, and implies the ground of the inference. It is possible that such a sentence should be treated as a sort of compromise between two regular ways of expressing the same thought, namely

"No, he is not within; for we do not hear talking".
"No; for if he were within, we should hear talking".

These two special uses of the unreal conditional sentence are easily distinguished from the use of the same verbal form to express real conditional thought, for in the latter case the speaker's point of view is what would be if things were not (or had not been) as they are (or were), e. g., he forecasts the outcome of circumstances that do or did not exist. This is obviously not the case with such a sentence as e. g.,

"I should have invited him, if he had not offended me".

Even without making any formal analysis whatever the reader feels instinctively, from the circumstances under which the words are spoken, that the speaker is explaining or defending his course of action, and that this explanation is the real information conveyed to the hearer. It is noteworthy that these two rhetorical uses of the unreal conditional sentence are well established as early as Plautus.[2] The second (suggesting the ground of an inference) is a striking feature of the diction of the first book of Lucretius; e. g.,

I. 159 ff.:

Nam si de nilo fierent, ex omnibu' rebus
Omne genus nasci posset, nil semine egeret.

cf. 180, 213, 217, 239, 335, 342, 356, etc.

[1] Cf. Plautus, Cas. 910.

[2] The facts of Plautus' usage are recorded in the American Journal of Philology, Vol. XXII. p. 310 ff. It is there shown how our instinctive feeling for these rhetorical uses lies at the basis of our judgment that many conditional sentences that use the present subjunctive deserve the name "unreal".

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Elsewhere[1] I have noted the interesting fact that, in Cicero's Orations, nearly all of the unreal conditional sentences with the imperfect subjunctive in the protasis and the pluperfect in the apodosis (a hard combination) may be explained by observing that the imperfect subjunctive in the unreal condition may refer to a time realm as wide as does a general truth, e. g., "If black were white" (such a phrase being so to speak, both present and past unreal all at once), while the pluperfect of the apodosis may refer to the same time realm as the perfect definite of the indicative mood, e. g., "I should have known (and should now know)", thus being a sort of combination past and present unreal; and further, that the remaining cases are conditional sentences used in the second of these two special ways (suggesting the ground of an inference); the passages are in Verr. II. 3. 39, 89, II. 3. 58. 134, II. 5. 51. 133, p. Mur. 14. 32, p. Arch. 7. 16, p. Cael. 6. 14, p. Planc. 22. 53, p. Mil. 17. 45. Other examples may be found in Cicero outside of the Orations; e. g.,

Lael. 4. 13:

> . . . qui mortuis tam religiosa iura tribuerunt, quod non fecissent profecto, si nihil ad eos pertinere *arbitrarentur*.

It certainly seems that this peculiar use of the imperfect subjunctive—referring flatly, as it does, to the past—must find its explanation in the special rôle which the unreal conditional sentence is playing as the expression of a quite different class of thought; that the two things go hand in hand so often must be something more than a coincidence. Beyond this I make no special claim, though (l. c.) I have suggested one way in which the nature of the thought to be conveyed might have affected the choice of tense. The current explanation of the use of the imperfect subjunctive in the protasis of conditional sentences of this type, namely that the reality to which the clause is opposed is a continuous state, sounds like an echo of Greek grammar, and needs at least to be very carefully stated if it is to cover such cases as

p. Mil. 17, 45:

> quem diem ille, quam contionem, quos clamores, nisi ad cogitatum facinus *adproperaret*, numquam reliquisset.

Here (as the context shows) the reference is to a single act on a

[1] Amer. Jour. Phil. XXI. p. 264 ff.

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definite day in the life of Clodius, who is now dead. A case like this should perhaps predispose us to seek some explanation that is based on the function of the sentence as a whole—some such explanation as that offered in the article in the American Journal of Philology above referred to; additional support for that explanation is afforded by

Sallust, Cat. LII. 19:

> Nolite existumare maiores nostros armis rem publicam ex parva magnam *fecisse*. Si ita res *esset*, multo pulcherrumam eam nos haberemus.

7.

THE GENERAL "CONDITION".

The heading of this section reads general "condition" because the point of view is the speaker's intellection. Some would write it "general" condition, and there is some justification for that phrasing from the point of view of the hearer; for he at times cannot read the idea of repeated action into the protasis until he reaches the verbal indication of the same in the apodosis. When I say general "condition" I mean to raise the question whether the thought which underlies a protasis that refers to a repeated action is really a conditioning concept-group. For the characteristic thing about a conditioning concept-group is its lack of assurance concerning realization in fact—the speaker is not sure that the thing in question will happen (has happened, etc.) but in a course of thought that we would be apt to express by

> "If he saw a soldier fighting bravely, he always rewarded him"

the speaker knows that the action referred to in the protasis did happen, at least occasionally, a fact which receives due recognition in another form we sometimes use under the same circumstances;

> "When(ever) he saw a soldier fighting bravely, he always rewarded him".

Looking at the question from the point of view of psychology it would certainly seem that the second of these forms is the wholly unexceptional expression for the speaker's intellection, and that the use of a conditional particle in such a case calls for explanation. Unfortunately for Latin syntax, the literature of that language begins too late to show whether the Roman mind

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originally experienced a jar when the conditional particle was so used; in Plautus the problem of verbal expression is already worked out almost (if not quite) as completely as at a later period, the *si*-clause being perhaps the prevailing form, though such relative words as *qui* and *ubi* appear not infrequently. But Greek literature began early enough to show clearly that the Greek mind attacked the problem along exactly the lines we should expect from the psychological considerations above noted; for the normal early form of verbal expression is a clause introduced by a relative word like ὅτε, whereas the wide use of εἰ (and ἐάν) in the classical period is a distinct intrusion on the part of those particles. This is manifest from the statement of Goodwin (Greek Moods and Tenses, § 462 ff.), who says that in Homer the subjunctive of the present general condition (his term is "supposition") is introduced by a conditional particle but nineteen times, and the optative of the past but once—this too in spite of the fact that Homer has very frequent occasion to express the type of thought under discussion (cf. l. c. § 538). But these figures given by Goodwin may be further cut down in dealing with the problem in hand, for of the nineteen cases of the present subjunctive quoted by him, at least fourteen are *concessions*, differing not at all from ordinary concessions except for the fact that they refer to a repeated act. The introductory word in these cases is not εἰ, strictly speaking; it is εἴ περ (Od. i. 166 ff., Il. i. 81 ff., iii. 25 ff., iv. 261 ff., x. 225 ff., xi. 116 ff., xii. 302 ff., xvi. 263 ff., xxi. 576 ff., xxii. 191 ff.), καὶ εἰ . . . περ (Il. xi. 391 ff.), εἰ . . . καὶ (Od. vii. 204 ff.), and καὶ εἰ (Od. xvi. 97 ff. = 115 ff.); in four of these passages the concessive force is still further accentuated by the presence of ἀλλά in the apodosis (Il. i. 81 ff., x. 225 ff., xxi. 576 ff., xxii. 191 ff.). It might be added that the single case of εἰ and the optative cited as a past general condition also has ἀλλά in its apodosis. Concessive clauses should not be counted in the present discussion, for a concessive clause in Greek (as in Latin and English) refers indifferently to something of whose realization in fact the speaker is not assured or to something of which he is sure; an instance of the latter is

Soph. Oed. Tyr. 302 ff.:

> πόλιν μέν, εἰ καὶ μὴ βλέπεις, φρονεῖς δ' ὅμως
> οἵᾳ νόσῳ σύνεστιν.

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When the speaker here says "though you cannot see" in addressing the blind and aged seer, he refers to a patent and obvious fact. There is therefore nothing noteworthy in the fact that the concessive εἴ περ, καὶ εἰ, etc., of the Homeric examples above quoted introduce clauses that refer to an action that the speaker is assured does happen at least occasionally. But from the Greek point of view manifestly *conditional* εἰ had to swerve from its proper function to be used under like circumstances; that it did so swerve is abundantly attested by the language of the classical period; e.g.,

Eur. Alc. 671:

Ἦν ἐγγὺς ἔλθῃ θάνατος, οὐδεὶς βούλεται θνῄσκειν.

The problem in hand is to determine whether, in Homer, conditional εἰ had begun to overstep its bounds, threatening the hitherto undisputed reign of ὅτε and other relative words in sentences of the type just quoted (Eur. Alc. 671). Throwing out, then, the fourteen or fifteen[1] concessive sentences above referred to, there remain but five or six passages in which to find examples of conditional εἰ overstepping its proper bounds. These latter figures give a truer impression of the disparity between the use of Homer and that of the classical period than does the original statement quoted from Goodwin.

It may be even questioned whether putting the figure at five or six is not making it too large. Ameis rejects Od. xi. 158 ff. as spurious (not, however, with reference to the use with which we are dealing), and Il. xii. 238 ff. is certainly peculiar:

Τῶν οὔ τι μετατρέπομ' οὐδ' ἀλεγίζω,
εἴ τ' ἐπὶ δεξί' ἴωσι πρὸς ἠῶ τ' ἠέλιόν τε
εἴ τ' ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ τοί γε ποτὶ ζόφον ἠερόεντα.

The meaning of εἰ in this passage hardly looks toward "when" or "whenever"; rather it verges toward the indirect question; for "I care not for them, whether they go to the right or the left" is but a step removed from "I care not whether they go

[1] It should perhaps not be insisted that Il. xxiv. 768 ff. is concessive, though the ἀλλά in the apodosis looks in that direction; the sentence however is involved, and there may have been a shift of the point of view by the time the apodosis was reached.

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to the right or the left". The three remaining cases not yet cited are Od. xii. 95 ff., xiv. 372 ff., Il. i. 166 ff.; it is noteworthy that the conditional word in each of these passages is accompanied by an indefinite (*εἴ ποθι, εἰ μή που, ἤν ποτε*). Showing thus as it does the very beginnings of the process, Greek literature affords a very interesting field for the study of the causes that led to the intrusion of the conditional particle into the realm of various relative words of that language.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. H. C. NUTTING.

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III.—THE EDITIO PRINCEPS OF THE GREEK ÆSOP.

So many uncertainties surround the first edition of Æsop's Fables in a Greek form that although bibliographers have been discussing the subject for several centuries there still remains much to be done in order to clear away the difficulties which surround this knotty problem. In the present article an investigation of certain phases of the question will be attempted, and it is hoped that the result will be readily recognized as a distinct advance in one or more directions in the way of attaining to greater definiteness in our information concerning the copies of this edition which have hitherto escaped the ravages of time.

The first point to engage our attention will naturally be to determine, as well as may be, how many copies of the Editio Princeps are still in existence, and where they are preserved. By means of personal research, correspondence with librarians, and in various other ways it has been possible to construct the following list of libraries and shelf-numbers:

List of Extant Copies.

1. Firenze, R. Bibl. Mediceo-Laurenziana, K. 3. 401.
2. London, British Museum, C. 1. a. 1.
3. London, British Museum, C. 19. c.
4. London, British Museum, G. 7726.
5. Manchester, John Rylands Library, 3474.
6. München, K. B. Hof- u. Staatsbibliothek, Inc. s. a. 56. 4°.
7. Oxford, Bodleian Library, Auct. K. 4. 9.
8. Oxford, Bodleian Library, Douce A. 541.
9. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Rés. Yb. 478 (Exposition VII, 125).
10. Washington, Library of Congress, Chap. 35 (Exhibition).

An endeavor to ascertain the contents of these ten copies immediately reveals the rather disconcerting fact that they vary widely in this respect, and yet this is only one of the many interesting problems which thrust themselves upon our notice in a study of this edition. Short descriptions of the extant copies will, therefore, throw important light on this question.

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Descriptions of Extant Copies.

1. *The Firenze Copy.*

No description of this copy is at hand, unfortunately, and we must for the present be content with the bare mention of its existence as kindly reported by Dr. Murray P. Brush, of the Johns Hopkins University, in a letter to the author of the present article written in Italy in the summer of 1897.

2–4. *The London Copies.*

The printed catalogue of the British Museum[1] gives the following collective description of these copies, only the most pertinent portions being here cited:

"*Begin.* [pt. 1 fol. 2 *recto*, after a Latin letter by the editor Bonus Accursius on fol. 1 :] Αἰσωπου βιος του μυθοποιου Μαξιμω τω Πλανουδη συγγραφεις. [Fol. 33 *recto* :] Αἰσωπου μυθοι. [147 fables, including three in iambic verse by Ignatius Archbishop of Nicæa. Pt. 2 fol. a 1 *recto* :] Vita Aesopi fabulatoris clarissimi e græco latina ꝑ Rynuciū facta, *etc.* [Fol. e 1 *recto* :] Argumentum fabulaꝝ Aesopi e græco ī latinū. [Fol. h 3 *recto* :] Totius operis anacephaleosis. hAbes uitam pariter & fabulas [100] æsopi . . . per me nuꝑ uerbis latinis intusiatas. non tamen oēs sed quotquot ad manus meas usque peruenerunt, *etc.* [ib. *verso* :] Finis . . . Ego Bonus accursius Pisanus: eadem in ea omnia correxi: & emendaui. 4°. C. 1. a. 1. (1.).

129 *leaves, without titlepages or pagination; 25 lines to the full page. Pt. 1 has 70 leaves without signatures. Pt. 2 has 59 leaves with sig.* a - h 3 *in eights.*

[Another copy.] C. 19. c. (1.)
[Another copy.] G. 7726. (2.)

Begin. [sig. a 2 *recto*, preceded by the preface of Bonus Accursius on fol. a 1 *verso* :] Μυθοι Αἰσωπου. Fabulae Aesopi. [A selection of 61 fables, edited in Greek with a literal Latin translation.] *Bonus Accursius pisanus impressit:* 4°. C. 1. a. 1. (2.)

38 *leaves, without titlepage or pagination; 25 lines to the full page; register, sigs.* a, b, C, D, E 6 *in eights. Fol. a 2 is mutilated.*

[Another copy.] C. 19. c. (2.)
[Another copy.] G. 7726. (1.)"

[1] British Museum Catalogue of Printed Books: Æsop. London: printed by William Clowes and Sons, Limited, Stamford Street and Charing Cross, 1883. Folio, 34 cols. See cols. 4–5.

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5. *The Manchester Copy.*

A letter from Librarian H. Guppy, dated January 28, 1902, kindly informs me that this is the copy described by Dibdin.[1] We may therefore cite the following extracts from his description:

"On the recto of the first leaf is the following address:

Bonus Accursius Pisanus doctissimo ac sapientissimo ducali quæstori Iohanni Francisco turriano salutem plurimam dicit. . . .

On the recto of the following leaf AICΩΠΟΥ BIOC. The Greek life terminates on the reverse of fol. 31, from its commencement. On the recto of the ensuing leaf begin the Fables . . . The fables extend to 36 leaves. On the recto of the ensuing leaf begins a Latin version by Rinutius of the life of Æsop. This continues from sign. a i. to d viiij, in eights: on the reverse of d viiij, are 14 lines, ending with FINIS. On the recto of the following leaf, sign. e, begins the Latin prose translation of the Fables; which ends on the reverse of what should be h iii. in eights, thus:

Finis.

Vita Aesopi per Rynucium thettalum traducta.
Verum quoniam ab eo nonnulla fuerũt præter
missa: fortassis qa græcus eius codex esset minus
emendatus: Ego Bonus accursius Pisanus: eadem
in ea omnia correxi: & emendaui.

On the reverse of the ensuing leaf (sign. a i.) is an address, in 17 lines, of Bonus Accursius Pisanus to John Franciscus Turrianus, in which mention is made of the foregoing impression. For the sake of the children of Turrianus, and that they may the more readily understand both languages, Pisanus subjoins some SELECT FABLES from Æsop—'hoc enim pacto uerbum quasi uerbo respondebit sine longa inquisitione'. [After this come the fables in parallel columns.] The signatures (a b C D) run in eights, as far as E; which latter has only six leaves: on the recto of the 6th of which, is the following colophon:

ΤΕΛΟΣ ΤΩΝ ΤΟΥ	FINIS AESOPI FA
ΑΙΣΩΠΟΥ ΜΥΘΩΝ	BVLARVM.

[1] Bibliotheca Spenceriana, or a Descriptive Catalogue of the Books Printed in the Fifteenth Century, and of Many Valuable First Editions, in the Library of George John Earl Spencer, K. G., &c., &c., &c., by the Reverend Thomas Frognall Dibdin. Vol. I. London: printed for the author, by W. Bulmer & Co. (Shakespeare Press), 1814. 8vo, VIII, XII, LII and 383 pp. See pp. 221–226.

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Bonus Accursius pisanus impressit: qui non doctorum hominum sed rudium ac puerorum gratia hunc laborem suscepit."

6. *The München Copy.*

A courteous letter from Geheimrat Dr. v. Laubmann, Direktor der K. Staatsbibliothek, under date of Feb. 17, 1902, contains the following statements concerning this copy:

"Unsere Bibliothek besitzt von dem griechischen Aesop, gedruckt von Bonus Accursius, nur eine unvollständige Ausgabe, welche Ludw. Hain, Repertorium bibliographicum, unter Nr. *265 ausführlich beschrieben hat. Wir besitzen also nur Teil 1: Bonus Accursius Pisanus. cum animaduerterem bis τέλος τῶν τοῦ Αἰσώπου Μύθων und Teil 3: Bonus Accursius . . . in superiore codice, ut nosti, imprimi curauimus uitam et Aesopi fabulas . . . bis zur Unterschrift . . . laborem suscepit. Der 2te Teil, die lat. Übersetzung des Rynucius Thettalus, fehlt also in unserem Exemplar."

As Hain's description[1] is well known and corresponds rather closely to that cited above from Dibdin, though much briefer, no specific citations from it will here be necessary.

7–8. *The Oxford Copies.*

Under date of Dec. 20, 1901, Mr. F. Madan, the Acting Librarian of the Bodleian Library, kindly writes enclosing the following descriptions from the pen of the Senior Assistant, Mr. Parker.

"Part 1.

Douce A. 541. Æsop's Life by Max. Planudes, in Greek, A 1 – D 8, showing most of the *signatures* at foot of page; they begin 2¼ in. below the text. a 1. (beg.) Bonus Accurſius Piſanus . . . Johanni Franciſco turriano ſalutem . . . Cum animaduerterem . . . a 2. (beg.) Αἰσώπου Βίος. D 8, verso. (end) γεγόνασιν.

Auct. K. 4. 9°. Another copy; the signatures cut off.

Part 2.

Auct. K. 4. 9°. The Fables, in Greek only. 38 leaves, without signatures, unless they are cut off. (beg.) Αἰσώπου Μῦθοι . . . (end), τέλος τῶν τοῦ Αἰσώπου Μύθων.

[1] Repertorium Bibliographicum, in quo libri omnes ab arte typographica inventa usque ad annum MD. typis expressi ordine alphabetico vel simpliciter enumerantur vel adcuratius recensentur. Opera Ludovici Hain. Voluminis I. Pars I. Stuttgartiae et Tubingae. Sumtibus J. G. Cottae. MDCCCXXVI. 8vo, 596 pp. See p. 31, col. 2, No. *265.

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Part 3.

Auct. K. 4. 9ᵇ. The Latin version of Remicius. a i - [h] iii. a i. (beg.) Vita Aeſopi . . . e græco latina per Rynucium facta; d. 8, vᵒ, Finis; e i. Argumentum fabularum . . . [h] iii, vᵒ (end) Ego Bonus accurſius Piſanus . . . correxi: & emendaui.

Part 4.

Auct. K. 4. 9ᵉ. The Fables in Greek and Latin, on same pages, a i (eights) - E 6 (Sign. a, b, C, D, E). a i, rᵒ is blank; a i, verso, 'Bonus Accurſius Piſanus . . . Iohanni franciſco Turriano ſalutem . . . iN ſuperiore codice . . . Vale.' a ii. Μῦθοι Αἰσώπου, Fabulae Aeſopi: (end) E 6 rᵒ, τέλος τῶν τοῦ Αἰσώπου Μύθων . . . Bonus Accurſius piſanus impreſſit . . .

Douce A. 541. Another copy, wanting leaves D 8, E 1–6.

The length and breadth of the text in each part is the same, viz. nearly 5⅞ x 3⅞."

9. *The Paris Copy.*

This copy forms part of the permanent exhibition (VII. 125) in the Galerie Mazarine of the Bibliothèque Nationale, and on July 24, 1897, through the kindness of the officials I was permitted to examine it. Upon this occasion I was able to take the following meagre note concerning its contents. The volume is bound plainly in red leather with full gilt edges, etc. On the back of the binding there have been stamped the words ÆSOPI || FABULÆ || MEDIOLAN || CIRCA || 1480 || TOM || I. On a fly-leaf at the beginning of the volume are the notes: 579 Y, Rés. Yb. 478, Hain 265.

Fo 1 ro begins: Bonus Accurſius Piſanus doctiſſimo ac ſapientiſſi || mo ducali quaeſtori Iohanni Franciſco turriano || ſalutem plurimam dicit. The Greek text begins on fo 2 ro, comprising 31 folios; the fables themselves begin on fo 32 ro and continue to fo 69 ro, the verso being blank. The entire volume thus comprises 69 folios.

The book has been officially stamped as follows: Bibliothèque Royale. I. on fos 1 ro and 69 ro; Bibliothèque Impériale. Impr. on fos 2 ro and 32 ro; R. F. Bibliothèque Nationale. Impr. on fo 48 ro.

10. *The Washington Copy.*

Of the two copies which I have been able to personally inspect, the Washington copy alone has been carefully examined. Having

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first been made aware of its existence on Mar. 24, 1896, by coming across the following entry in the printed catalogue[1]:

"*Æsopus.* Αισωπου Βιος του μυθοποιου. Μαξιμω τω Πλανουδη συγγραφεις, [and] Αισωπου μυθοι. fol. 1–70 unnumb. sm. 4°. [*Bonus Accursius pisanus impressit, Mediolani?* 1480?]"

I was led at the time of publishing the first fascicule of my manual to insert the following statement in a footnote[2]:

"On April 7, 1896, an unsuccessful attempt was made by me to verify this entry; the most that I was able to do was to make a copy of the corresponding entry in their card catalogue, where the book is described as an imperfect copy, etc., etc., preserved in the Librarian's private office. This gentleman, Mr. A. R. Spofford, kindly made a personal search for me, but was obliged to report it as 'unfindable.' The copy in question was acquired by the *Library of Congress* in 1875."

Several subsequent visits to the library while it was still in its old and cramped quarters in the Capitol failed to discover the book's whereabouts, but on my first visit to it after its installation in the then recently completed new library building I discovered on Oct. 8, 1898, the volume which had so long eluded me in a glass case on the second floor in quite an extensive exhibit of incunabula.

Upon this occasion I was enabled to make a careful examination of this copy, and subsequently on Feb. 8, 1902, I again made a study of its many interesting features. The points especially noted by me are the following:

The volume is handsomely bound in full black morocco and full gilt, with both blind and gilt tooling including a sparing use of an ivy-leaf ornament. The tooling consists of a framework design with the ivy-leaf stamped twice at each corner, gold exteriorly, blind interiorly, and is exactly the same on both covers. On the back these words have been stamped: ÆSOPI| FABULÆ|GR.|ED. PRINC.|CIRCA.|1480. The fly-leaves are merely plain white paper more modern in appearance than that used in the body of the text, and the whole aspect of the

[1] Alphabetical Catalogue of the Library of Congress. Vol. I. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1878. 4to, II and 912 pp. See p. 85, col. 1.

[2] A Manual of Æsopic Fable Literature, a First Book of Reference for the Period Ending A. D. 1500, by George C. Keidel. First Fascicule. Baltimore: The Friedenwald Company, 1896. 8vo, XXIV and 76 pp. (Romance and Other Studies II.) See p. 36, note 1.

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binding would seem to indicate that it was executed about the middle of the last century.

The following measurements in millimetres were taken

Binding over all 165 by 225;

Size of leaves 157 by 217;

Size of Roman matrix 98 by 149;

Size of Greek matrix 98 by 148.

Although the Roman matrix of the dedicatory letter to be mentioned presently is apparently one millimetre longer than the Greek matrix, this difference is no doubt due merely to the larger size of type used for it, and the same matrix was probably used for printing the whole of the text as found in this copy.

On the inside of the front cover a label has been pasted which contains the legend: *Library of Congress.* | *Chap.* 35 | *Shelf* Office. | *United States of America.* On the recto of the first fly-leaf at the top is the number 531, while the verso of the second fly-leaf contains the following annotations:

Æsopus. | Editio Princeps, 1480 | This is the largest & finest copy known of | the Greek text. $5^3 \times 6^3$ | *Wants:* 2d pt. 59 folios containing | Vita A. & fabulæ e graeco latina facta | also 3d. pt. 35 folios containing | Fabulae selectae gr. & lat., 2 columns to the page, one greek & the other latin. 35. Office. No water-marks are discernible on the fly-leaves, on which however the fine parallel lines run horizontally while in the body of the work they are vertical.

Combining the fact already mentioned that this copy was acquired by the Library of Congress in 1875 with the evidence furnished by the notes on the fly-leaves, we may reasonably conjecture that this copy was No. 531 of an auction sale probably held in London, and for which the notes were made by a careless dealer who has allowed himself to make a slip in his English.

The first fly-leaf at the end of the volume has on its recto the note:

Bonus Accursius pisanus impressit. | Mediolani? | 1480?

The second fly-leaf at the end is entirely blank.

Approaching now the body of the book as it left the printer's hands we find that the whole text is intact, and apparently only a small portion of the margin has been removed by the binder's knife. The whole volume is, in fact, in a perfect state of preservation, with the unimportant exception of the first leaf at the beginning and the last two at the end, which have a few spots on

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them due to dampness and evidently acquired before the book received its present binding. The recto of the first leaf is also somewhat soiled and the blank verso of the last leaf is very much so, blemishes which must have been caused by much handling previous to binding.

The entire text of this copy consists of three distinct portions, which will here be considered separately. First there comes a short dedicatory epistle in Latin, then a long biography of Æsop in Greek, and then a collection of Fables also in Greek.

The Latin text occupies the whole of the recto of the first leaf, and half of its verso, the remainder of the page being blank. It reads as follows:

Fo 1 *ro:*

Bonus Accurſius Piſanus doctiſſimo ac ſapientiſſi
mo ducali quæſtori Iohanni Franciſco turriano
ſalutem plurimam dicit.

Cum animaduerterem quanto 1 pretio et apud pla
tonem et apud uniuerſam uetuſtatem Aeſopus ha
bitus fuerit: exiſtimaui me facturum rem non in
dignam: ſi græcas eius fabellas & uitam una cū
latina interpretatione imprimi curarē: quo diuul
garentur inter omneſ: & eaſ ad te omnium primū
qui grauiſſimus & doctiſſimus ſis: dono mitterē.
res enim graues ac ſeueræ redduntur ueluti mitio
res: ſi ſuis ſalibus condiantur. hoc autem feciſſe
Aeſopum ex hoc ad te uolumine cum p otium lec
titaueris: non difficulter intelliges. nam huiuſmo
di fabellæ 1ter maximas tuas occupationes afferēt
tibi: ut exiſtimo: non parum uoluptatis: &
ex eaꝫ lectione conſules liberis tuis: quo tibi ſint
ut cæteris in rebus tum in doctrina eloquentia
que ſimillimi. Non enim me latet non licere tibi
per occupationes tuas harum rerum lectioni ope
ram dare: at ne indiges quidem: qui & ſcriben
do & loquendo ornatiſſimus ſis & eruditiſſimus.
Verum liberi tui ſi huic rei ſtuduerint: redden
tur propediem & docti & diſerti in primis: quos

Fo 1 *vo:*

tu plurimum cupis eſſe exculta quadam ac perpoli
ta litteratura. quā 1telligis nemini poſſe e noſtris

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hominibus abſolute contingere: ubi græcaꝝ litte raꝝ omnino sint rudes. Cæterum ut ad Aeſopum redeam·. ex eius uita quæ eſt ueluti totius operis ca put: qualis uir fuerit: dilucide cognoſces. Eſt enī ut uidebis: & lauta & facetiaꝝ plena: quæ dum le gitur uel e mortuis riſum excuteret. id autem ita eſſe res ipſa īdicabit. Nolim enī prolyxiore uti ora tione: ne pro uoluptate tædium tibi afferam. Vale uir doctiſſime ac ſapientiſſime: & me uti ſoles ama.

As this epistle affords us evidence of the utmost importance concerning many obscure points connected with the Editio Princeps of the Greek Æsop, it will be worth while to scrutinize its various features more closely.

This text has here been reproduced with the utmost care, being given line for line, with every abbreviation, every dot over an *i*, and every punctuation mark carefully noted. It is printed in a large-sized Roman type, and the following peculiarities should be especially noted:

All the single *t*'s are short, being the same height as the vowels, for instance. *ſt* and *ct* in every instance form ligatures.

Initial and medial *ſ* is always long, final *s* always short, except in the words *omneſ* and *eaſ* in the ninth line of the recto page. Double long *ſ* always forms a ligature, but double *f* does not in *afferēt*, although it does in *difficulter* and *afferam*.

Small *æ* is always printed as a diphthong, but capital *Ae* is not.

There are no *v*'s or *j*'s used, except capital *V*'s in *Verum* and *Vale*. A capital *U* does not occur.

The syllable *-rum* is four times abbreviated ꝝ. An *n* is indicated frequently either by a short line over the preceding vowel, or by a long one. The ꝑ sign is used only once. The & appears to be overgrown in comparison with the remaining letters.

The punctuation used differs from our modern system in some respects. The periods are triangular in shape, the colons square. A peculiar sign is a "slant colon", either right or left, composed of two triangular dots. The single instance of the left slant colon occurs after the word *redeam* on the verso page.

A full page of the Roman type would have contained twenty-

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five lines, but neither of the pages found is complete in this respect.

Passing on to the Greek text, we note that it begins on the recto of the second folio as follows:

Fo 2 ro:

ΑΙCΩΠΟΥ ΒΙ'ΟC ΤΟΥ ΜΥΘΟΠΟΙΟΥ . ΜΑ
ΞΙ'ΜΩ ΤΩ ΠΛΑΝΟΥΔΗ CΥΓΓΡΑΦΕΙ'C.

π ραγμάτων φύσιν τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἠκρί

The whole of the Life of Æsop has been printed as a single huge paragraph extending to fo 32 vo, on which there are only seventeen lines, the last one being:

τῷ Αἰσώπου θανάτῳ γεγόνασιν.

At the beginning of the body of this text the printer has left a blank measuring 18 by 28 mm., and extending over five lines. This space was intended to be filled by an ornamental initial, but the rubricator has not done his part, although in the middle of the first line the printer has put a small letter for his guidance.

On fo 33 ro the fables begin with the following heading:

ΑΙCΩΠΟΥ ΜΥΘΟΙ
ΑΕΤΟC ΚΑΙ ΑΛΩΠΗΞ

As a specimen fable the following may serve:

Fo 40 ro, line 6:

Γυνὴ καὶ ὄρνις

Γ *υνὴ χήρα τις ὄρνιν εἶχεν καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ὠὸν αὐτῇ τίκτουσαν. νομίσασα δὲ ὡς εἰ πλείους τῇ ὄρνιθι κριθὰς παραβάλλοι, δὶς τέξεται τῆς ἡμέρας, τοῦτο πεποίηκεν. ἡ δ' ὄρνις πιμελὴς γενομένη οὐδ' ἅπαξ τῆς ἡμέρας τεκεῖν ἠδύνατο.* Ἐπιμύθιον.

Ὁ μῦθος δηλοῖ, ὅτι οἱ διὰ πλεονεξίαν τῶν πλειόνων ἐπιθυμοῦντες καὶ τὰ παρόντα ἀποβάλλουσι.

These fables continue until fo 70 ro, where at the bottom of the page the last line is as follows:

ριτας. τέλος τῶν τοῦ Αἰσώπου Μύθων.

The verso of this last folio is entirely blank.

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The fables number one hundred and forty-seven, and are in accordance with Greek usage arranged in alphabetical order except towards the end where disorder prevails.

The spaces regularly left for the rubricator to insert an ornamental initial to each fable give rise to some interesting observations. In the case of the first fable, as we have already seen, this space is five lines high. For the remaining fables it is only three lines high, except in a few instances where the bottom of a page intervening it has been reduced to two lines, once even to a single line. In one instance without apparent reason this space has been reduced to two lines in the middle of a page.

The guiding letter for the rubricator is in every case placed in the upper left-hand corner of the blank space, not in the middle of the first line as was done in the Life of Æsop. A full page of the Greek text contains twenty-five lines, but as the leaves have been very irregularly folded the various margins are oftentimes extremely unequal in width. As a specimen page with margins of average proportions fo 2 ro was taken, and here it was found that the upper and interior margins were about equal in width, while they were less than half that at the bottom and a trifle more than half the exterior one. As margins depend primarily on the printer, and next on the binder, these proportions would probably vary considerably in other copies of the Editio Princeps.

The leaves are numbered in lead pencil (twice) by modern hands on the rectos at the lower left-hand corner of the text. But there are also traces of a much older system of foliation at the lower right-hand corner of the rectos placed quite an appreciable distance from the printed text. These letters and numerals were apparently stamped on the leaves after the printer had completed the body of the text, and probably originally extended throughout the entire volume. Most of them were no doubt later trimmed off by the binder's knife when this copy received its present covering, as only nine leaves now show any remains of what must have been the original marking. The letters used seem to have been Roman capitals interspersed perhaps with a few lower case forms, while the numerals are in every instance Arabic. The type (or stamps) used is much ruder in appearance than that in the Latin text.

The following traces were noticed:

fo 33 ro: upper portion of a capital E or F;

fo 36 ro: a stamp similar to the preceding;

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ΑΙCΩΠΟΥ ΒΙΟC ΤΟΥ ΜΥΘΟΠΟΙΟΥ · ΜΑ
ΞΙΜΩ ΤΩ ΠΛΑΝΟΥΔΗ CΥΓΓΡΑΦΕΙC ·

σ ραϐμάτων φύσιν τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀκρι
βῶσαι μὲν καὶ ἄλλοι, καὶ τοῖς μετ' ἐκεί-
νους παρέδωκαν φέροντες · ἀσφαλὲς
δὲ δοκῶ μὴ πόρρω πλανᾶσθαι τῆς ἐπιστημοί-
ας τῆς ἠθικῆς διδασκαλίας ἁπτόμε-
νος, πολλῷ τῷ μέτρῳ τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτῶν παρε-
λάσας · καὶ γὰρ οὔτ' ἀποφαινόμενος οὔτε συλλογί
ζόμενος, οὔτε μὴν ἐξ ἱστορίας, ἣν ὁ πρὸ τῆς κατ'
αὐτὸν ἡλικίας ἤνεγκε χρόνος, τὴν μυθευτικὴν ἀπο-
τιθέμενος, ἀλλὰ μύθοις τὰ πάντα παραδιϐοὺς,
οὕτω τοῖς τῶν ἀκροωμένων ἀγροικοτέραις ψυχαῖς, ὡς ἂν
σχολὴν ἄγεσθαι τοὺς λογικοὺς ποιεῖν ἢ φροντίζειν, ἃ μήτ'
ὀργίϐες μήτ' ἀλόγιστες · καὶ ὧν πάλιν μὴ προσέ-
χειν ἐκέλευσεν, οἷς πολλὰ τῶν ἀλόγων ἐν καιρῷ μου
μεχῶς προσεσχηκότα μυθεύεται · ἐξ ὧν, ἃ μὲν κυ-
νῶν ἐπηρμένους αὐτοῖς διέδρα ἃ δὲ μεγίστης
ἐν τοῖς καιρίοις τῆς ὠφελείας ἔτυχεν · οὗτος
τοίνυν ὁ τὸν καθ' αὑτὸν βίον φιλοσόφου πολιτεύ-
ας ἀκόμα προθέμενος, καὶ ἔργοις μᾶλλον ἢ λό
γοις φιλοσοφήσας, τὸ μὲν γένος ἐξ Ἀμορίου τῆσ
Φρυγίας καθήγετῆς μεγάλης ἐπικλήσεως · τὴν δὲ
τύχην γέγονε δοῦλος · ἐφ' ᾧ καὶ σφόδρα μοι δοκεῖ

The Greek text wherever cited in this description has been printed in ordinary Greek type. For its appearance in the original, the accompanying facsimile of the first page of the Greek text (fo 2 ro) may serve as an illustration.

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fo 42 ro: upper portion of a rounded letter;
fo 43 ro: a stamp similar to the preceding;
fo 44 ro: plainly F 4;
fo 57 ro: apparently part of a letter, thus h̄;
fo 58 ro: H 2;
fo 59 ro: H,;
fo 60 ro: plainly H 4.

A trial of the usual system of foliation by quaternions of eight leaves will be found to fit in with these slight fragments. It thus becomes apparent that fo 33 ro originally had an E stamped upon it, probably without a following Arabic numeral as is commonly the case for the first leaf of a quaternion (cf. fo 57 ro where no numeral, or fragment of a numeral, is visible). The numeral 4 has probably been trimmed off of fo 36 ro, as the numerals where preserved are a trifle lower than the letters of the stamp. The curves found on fo 42 ro and 43 ro must be portions of F's probably somewhat blurred. The letter on fo 57 ro must be an H of peculiar shape, as also the letters on fo 58 ro, 59 ro and 60 ro. The small mark after the letter on fo 59 ro must be the upper portion of the figure 3. As the whole volume contains just seventy leaves, the last quaternion must be two leaves short of the usual number.

The ink used in this edition is an intense black, although some pages are noticeably fainter than others, especially fo 54 ro. The signatures are much more blurred, and somewhat fainter than the text.

It is hoped that the above description, besides presenting many features intrinsically interesting in themselves, will also afford a norm with which other copies of the Editio Princeps may be compared, as well as other incunabula coming from the same press.

Descriptions of the Bibliographers.

The evidence afforded by the statements to be found in the various standard bibliographies for incunabula and rare books is rather special in its nature. While on the one hand these descriptions are more widely known among scholars and book-lovers than any of the others which may be found, their value is greatly lessened through the almost unintermitted presence in them of the bibliographer's pet sin of taking his information at second-hand, instead of deriving it from the sources themselves. As the

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bibliographers seldom state how much they know themselves, and how much they see through some one else's spectacles, their so well-known descriptions are in reality shrouded in a great deal of mystery when, as in the present instance, we find them varying widely—*omnes inter se differunt.*

The professional bibliographer of this sort is concerned mainly with the description of an edition as an edition, and only rarely does he think it worth his while to refer to the particular copy which he himself may have examined. As I have been unable with the means at my disposal to either harmonize the discrepancies found in these descriptions or decide between the contradictory statements made in them, I will content myself with subjoining a list of the bibliographical descriptions consulted by me.

a. Maittaire, Annales Typographici, Hagæ-Comitum, 1719, p. 262.[1]

b. Maittaire, Annales Typographici, Editio Nova, Amstelodami, 1733, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 764–765.[2]

c. Panzer, Annales Typographici, Norimbergæ, 1794, Vol. II, p. 96, No. 592.

d. La Serna Santander, Éditions du Quinzième Siècle, Bruxelles, 1806, Part II, pp. 20–21, No. 27.

e. Hain, Repertorium Bibliographicum, Stuttgartiæ et Tubingæ, 1826, Vol. I, Part I, p. 31, col. 2, No. *265.

f. Grässe, Trésor de Livres Rares, Dresde, 1859, Vol. I, p. 31.[3]

g. Brunet, Manuel du Libraire, Cinquième Édition, Paris, 1860, Vol. I, Part I, cols. 83–84.

In conclusion I will merely refer to the recent article of Aug.

[1] Annales Typographici ab Artis Inventæ Origine ad Annum MD. Operâ Mich. Maittaire A. M. Hagæ-Comitum, apud Isaacum Vaillant. M.DCC.XIX. 4to, XIV and 388 pp. (Boston Public Library, *2200. 17. v. 1.)

[2] Annales Typographici ab Artis Inventae Origine ad Annum M.DCLXIV., operâ Mich. Maittaire A. M. Editio nova auctior & emendatior, Tomi Primi Pars Prior. Amstelodami, apud Petrum Humbert, M.DCC.XXXIII. 4to, VI, XVI and 791 pp. (Washington, Library of Congress, Chap. Z 240, No. M 23 A.)

[3] Trésor de Livres Rares et Précieux, ou Nouveau Dictionnaire Bibliographique, par Jean George Théodore Graesse. Tome Premier: A–B. Dresde: Rudolf Kuntze, libraire-éditeur, 1859. 4to, IV and 588 pp.

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Hausrath[1] and the short statements concerning the Editio Princeps to be found in the literatures of Krumbacher[2] and Christ.[3]

GEORGE C. KEIDEL.

[1] Byzantinische Zeitschrift, herausgegeben von Karl Krumbacher. Zehnter Band. Leipzig: Druck und Verlag von B. G. Teubner, 1901. See pp. 91–105: Aug. Hausrath, Die Äsopstudien des Maximus Planudes.

Geschichte der Byzantinischen Litteratur von Justinian bis zum Ende des Oströmischen Reiches (527–1453), von Karl Krumbacher. Zweite Auflage, bearbeitet unter Mitwirkung von A. Ehrhard, H. Gelzer. München: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung (Oskar Beck), 1897. 8vo, XX and 1193 pp. See pp. 543–546 and 897–898. (Handbuch der Klassischen Altertums-Wissenschaft, herausgegeben von Dr. Iwan von Müller. Neunter Band, 1. Abteilung.)

[2] Geschichte der Griechischen Litteratur bis auf die Zeit Justinians, von Wilhelm Christ. Dritte vermehrte und verbesserte Auflage. München: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung (Oskar Beck), 1898. 8vo, XIV and 946 pp. See p. 140. (Handbuch der Klassischen Altertums-Wissenschaft, herausgegeben von Dr. Iwan von Müller. Siebenter Band).

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IV.—ON THE NON-EXISTENCE OF *yęmi* (*yęimi*), *yęhi* (*yęihi*), *yęiti*, ETC.

The first law in the decipherments and restorations of Zend Philology is to bring the Avesta language, so far as may be possible, into line with the Indian Vedic. As is known, the present writer so long ago as '87 in SBE XXXI[1] advanced the opinion that among the signs of the Avesta Alphabet more than one retained the polyphonic force of its original Pahlavi.

Up to that date, it should be stated for the benefit of those who do not study the Avesta, the Avesta alphabet was supposed to be wholly free from ambiguities.

Conspicuous among the opinions held in view was this, that the Avesta-Pahlavi character, generally reproduced as *ę*, or when lengthened, as *ę̄*, was in some of its more important uses actually the Avesta-pahlavi characters generally reproduced as $y + \bar{a}$ (or $y + a$).

The clear and irrefutable case where the equivalent of this form is '*yā*' (or '*ya*') in the gen. sg. masc. neut. of nouns in the '*a*' declension was brought forward illustrating the total error of rendering the sign as *ę* in such supposed forms as the *-ahę* reported for the gen. singular masc. neut. of the '*a*' declension,[2] and this was shown to possess convincing force as to other similar falsely reported usages.

Among the various items which I have proposed from time to time were the very prominent verbal forms which I have placed in the heading.

What I first presented was followed by Darmesteter and others; and if these opinions be correct, then we must conclude

[1] See also Zeitschrift D. M. G. '95, III Heft, '98, III, 1901, II.

[2] *-Ahę* was strikingly irrational as a gen. sg. masc. neut. of the '*a*' declension, as much so as if we were obliged to account for an Indian *-ase*, in the place of *-asya*, in the most familiar of all terminations; see also the Gāthic *-ahyā* and the old Persian -ahyā; there was never such a sound as *-ahę* in such a place as a gen. sing. masc. neut., and leading colleagues have assented to the remark.

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that much light must be thrown by them upon still other forms of Avesta Grammar.

As to the unsightly forms above mentioned with their irrational *ę* in *-yęmi* (*yęimi*), *yęhi* (*yęihi*), etc., I should say that I once indeed surmised that the presence of these supposed *ę* sounds in the terminations cited looked backwards towards the original Indogermanic '*e*' which has thrust the Indian '*ā*' and '*a*' for the moment aside from our consideration in our search for the original vowel sounds of the verbal terminations. But after we have seen that the once reported *ę* sounds in the very familiar and important terminations of the gen. s. masc. and neut. have no existence whatsoever, and that they never had any place among real linguistic features in use by persons speaking their vernacular, we look for another explanation of the phenomena in the verbal terminations. And we soon see that the explanation of the origin of our forms there is similar to that pursued before.

The character present in each of these cases of verbal termination, as in many others (see below) positively arose from the misapprehension of a Pahlavi sign which indeed, as I hold (see below), may have expressed $a + i$ which are the elements of an *ę*, but which also still more prominently expressed and expresses $y + \bar{a}$ in the original Pahlavi forms out of which our remarkable Avesta Alphabet was developed. So that the terminations which we have universally read as *-yęmi* (*-yęimi*), *-yęhi* (*-yęihi*), *-yęiti*, etc., etc. (much to the bewilderment of all who have given the matter interior attention) are the result of a complete mistake; and of one quite as irrational as our supposed *-ahę* for a gen. sg. m. n. of the '*a*' declension, and perhaps even more offensive to the philological instinct, though this last might be saying too much. And this explanation is fully corroborated by the occasional usages of *our Avesta text itself*, which sometimes leaves us no loophole to escape into our blunder; for the *Avesta itself* at times actually reads the normal forms *-yāmi*, *-yahi*, etc. fully in accordance with the Indian, see below on page 322. The sign which we have supposed to be *ę*! in the *yęimi* (!) of the *-ya* verbs is simply *-yā*, a survival of the original familiar Pahlavi form without which *-yā* at one time could hardly have been written, and without which it could never have been naturally written.

I do not produce the original characters here, as this might cause inconvenience or expense, but the reader will find them

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used in the Zeitschrift of the German Oriental Society as cited in the note above.[1]

The first item which an objector should notice is that I am obliged to render our compositum as *-yā* for the first personals and as *-ya* for the 2d and 3d. To this we must say at once that uniformity in equivalence is precisely what we must not look for in the developments of these transitional forms, and above all not just here and in reference to this *ā* and *a*, for the Avesta scholars of the early centuries were in fact just *beginning to use* the Pahlavi form which stands for long *ā* as the Avesta form now used for the *shortened a*, as the equivalent of which it now stands, for they were just inventing all the now prevalent regular signs for the shortened vowels, they (the short vowels) having never before been expressed in writing, so far as we are now aware. All the short vowels (and not merely the short 'a', as in Indian) have been always inherent in the consonants of the Pahlavi Alphabet, save the 'a' privative which has no consonant before it. The usage, therefore fluctuated, as a matter of course, at the formative, or reformative, period of reconstruction, when the Avesta Alphabet was just emerging from the Pahlavi. And the Avesta Alphabet partook and still partakes to some degree of the notorious characteristic of its parent, the Pahlavi Alphabet, which was polyphonic in the extreme. That the Avesta Alphabet partook only to a slight degree of this characteristic of its mother was all the more natural because it (the Avesta Alphabet) was especially invented for the purpose of removing the original and long prevalent ambiguities, though it could not be expected to have retained no lingering trace of the agitation.

Another objection should be at once pointed out, which is that by this rectification we are left with a redundant '*y*'. We have already here in our erroneous forms, *-yẹimi*, etc. before us the fully written Avesta '*y*' of the *-ya* verb; when therefore we decipher our character (until lately mistaken for an *ẹ*) as being simply in fact our needed *y* + *ā*, an expected relic of Pahlavi usage, we have on our hands an additional unnecessary and redundant '*y*'; for beside the fully written Avesta '*y*' we have our ancient compositum with the same '*y*' in its meaning, which meaning is *y* + *ā* (or '*y* + *a*').

To this the answer is that here we have an instance of a

[1] As well as in my Gāthas, Vol. II, and IIIa; see also at many places in the Latin notes to the texts in Vol. I.

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redundancy not nearly so irrational as some others which appear in the still halting Zend alphabetical forms, with our still more imperfect transcriptions of them.

For our lingering and redundant '*y*' was originally by no means so useless as one might at the first glance suppose. It was obviously left in its place in the endeavor to save us from the very error into which we have fallen. The intention to abandon the use of our compositum for $y + \bar{a}$ (or '$y + a$') was beginning to be formed within the scattered schools of Avesta Philology, and an Avesta $y + a$ was purposely inserted before our character here *to guide* the readers *against the coming use of this sign for ę*, which use was not applicable here in the first, second, and third personals of the *-ya* verbs, and therefore not to be written with that slight prolongation of one extremity which alone distinguishes the form at present known as '*ę*' from its fellow character of the same shape; that is to say, from the actual Pahlavi original of our $y+\bar{a}$ (or $y+a$) and from the same form when standing for '*š*', sh.

The fully expressed Avesta and later characters for $y + \bar{a}$ were inserted to save us from writing '*yę*', just as the otherwise so irrational '*a*' was left before '*ę*' in *Daęva*, etc. (as to which see Gāthas Vol. IIIa, p. xv). This correctly written Avesta '*y*' is a portion of that once wisely inserted '*yā*', and it has been left in the word like other fragments as débris, and just as also a now useless and extinct '*a*' has been left clinging to our sign for *ñ*, which originally represented an '*an*'; see also the unnecessary nasalism long *ā* before *m* in *yām* = *yām*, etc. This last is especially useful as an illustration; for the redundant nasalisation once pointed to the now so well expressed nasal '*m*'. The *ā* which originally stood after our redundant '*y*' disappeared in consequence of its having been already and originally expressed in the sign which we have mistaken for an *ę* (in the falsely deciphered *yęimi*).

Or, *vice versa*, we might say (on the other hand) that the redundancy consists in the presence of the first half of this our sign till lately mistaken for '*ę*', but which cannot possibly mean anything but $y + \bar{a}$ here; so that we have in fact in either case a doubled '*y*' upon our hands as in *yyāmi*, *yyahi*, etc., just as we have a superfluous '*a*' in our sign for '*ñ*' which was originally '*an*', a superfluous anticipation of the nasalisation in our '*a*' for *a* before '*m*' in *-yām*, and in our '*a*' before '*ę*' in *d(a)ęva*, etc.

My answer is that we should simply do as our predecessors did with the superfluous *a* in our present sign for '*ñ*' which was '*an*';

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we should in our transcriptions ignore and *omit* our first superfluous sign for '*y*', or we should bracket it, as our form is *-yāmi*. There is most certainly no *-yẹimi* (nor *-yẹmi*) whatsoever, nor ever were there such forms, nor is there any *-yẹhi* (*-yẹihi*), nor any *-yẹiti*, nor *-yẹiñti* in any *-ya* verbs in the Avesta language. The words end in *-y(y)āmi*, *-y(y)ahi*, *-y(y)ati*, *-y(y)anti*; see Indian *-yāmi*, *-yasi*, *-yati*, *-yanti*; and also the actual Avesta forms quite rationally written as *-yāmi*, *-yahi*, *-yati*, *-yañti*; and all the forms should be so transcribed, if transcribed at all.

Although wishing to avoid statistics here, I cannot refrain from citing Avesta

jaiδyāmi	*zayayāmi*	*zayayāhi*
frāvayāmi	*saočayāhi*	*paiθyāiti*
verezyāmi	*frāvayāhi*	*išudyāmahi*

and the other nine (odd) forms of the first person pl.; so of the conjunctive e. g. *taurvayāma*, etc. all read -yā in the -ya verbs.

jaiθyañti	*yañti*	*ꞩyañti*
davayañti	*rāzayañti*	*ꞩyañti*
yañti		

So of the third pl. med. all (?) the -ya verbs have *-yañta*, each form being perfectly rational. How could an ancient Iranian have said *-yāmi* at one moment like his Indian kinsman, and then this *-yẹimi* at the next at the next (no dialectical influence being here present in any shape).

P. S.—Objectors should not ask for instances of absolutely pure Pahlavi of an unequivocal character in the Avesta Alphabet; yet we have these in the otherwise exclusively Pahlavi characters, in the compositum for *hᵛ* (or '*hw*', which in no sense requires the elevation of the *v* (or *w*)). Both the signs are absolutely pure Pahlavi, and both are otherwise totally excluded from the Avesta Alphabet, which has but one and a different sign for '*h*' (though at times abbreviated) and but one and a different sign for this particular interior *v* (or '*w*') in other occurrences.

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, *May*, 1903. L. H. MILLS.

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V.—VICA POTA.

In the Ludus de morte Caesaris, that scurrilous but amusing diatribe against the deceased Claudius, Seneca briefly mentions Vica Pota, one of the obscurest of the many obscure Roman deities. The passage in question occurs in 9, 4 and reads as follows: "Proximus interrogatur sententiam Diespiter Vicae Potae filius, et ipse designatus consul, nummulariolus: hoc quaestu se sustinebat, vendere civitatulas solebat."

The earliest reference to the goddess is found in Cicero, De Leg. II, 11, 28, "Virtutes enim, non vitia consecrare decet. araque vetusta in Palatio Febris et altera Esquiliis Malae Fortunae detestanda, atque omnia eius modi repudianda sunt. quod si fingenda nomina, Vicae Potae potius vincendi atque potiundi, Statae standi cognominaque Statoris et Invicti Iovis, rerum expetundarum nomina, Salutis, Honoris, Opis, Victoriae." Such at least is the reading of the codices, but the majority of editors would bracket as glosses the gerunds *vincendi*, *potiundi* and *standi*. Whether we grant or deny that Cicero derived the name Vica Pota from *vinco* and *potior* has little bearing on the aim of this investigation, for we have certain proof that in the early Empire the goddess Vica Pota was completely identified with Victoria. The evidence may be seen in the passages next cited. Livy II, 7, 12, after telling how, in the first year of the Republic, P. Valerius aroused suspicion by beginning to erect a house on the summit of the Velia, and how, in indignation at the fickleness of the people, he decided to build at the foot of the hill, says: "Delata confestim materia omnis infra Veliam, et, ubi nunc Vicae Potae est, domus in infimo clivo aedificata." Plutarch, Poplicola 10, gives the same tradition (ὅπου νῦν ἱερόν ἐστιν Οὐίκας Πότας); and Asconius, in his commentary on Cicero's oration In Pisonem 52, shows the popular identification of Vica Pota and Victoria by his statement: "Iulius Hyginus dicit . . . P. Valerio Volesi filio Publicolae aedium publice locum sub Veliis, ubi nunc aedis Victoriae est, populum in lege quam ipse tulerat concessisse."

Without exception, every scholar who has treated the subject identifies Vica Pota with Victoria and follows the lead of Cicero,

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or the interpolator of Cicero, in deriving the name itself from √vik, seen in *vinco*, *victor*, etc., and √po-t, seen in the Sanskrit *patis*, Greek πόσις, Latin *potis*, *posse*, *potior*. That is to say, Vica Pota is the victorious possessor, or the goddess powerful in victory.

But how explain "Diespiter Vicae Potae filius"? So far as I know, there is no myth which names Victory as the mother of Jupiter (or rather Diespiter, for Seneca distinguishes the one from the other). It might be possible to identify Vica Pota with Victoria, and at the same time explain "Diespiter Vicae Potae filius", by recalling the Greek myth according to which Zeus supplanted his father, Kronos, and in so far might be called the son of Victory. Yet if Seneca had a Greek myth in mind, why did he give the two deities distinctively Latin names?

Buecheler, in his annoted edition of the Apocolocyntosis, says that the point of the jest seems to lie in the double reference to victory in war and victory in private gain. Diespiter is not only victorious in war, he is also a kind of money-broker, who gets rich by selling the rights of citizenship. In a word, he is one of the Emperor's freedmen, who employed their great influence to acquire wealth. Buecheler also thinks that the god is called Diespiter because under that name he was worshipped by the Fetiales, whose ritual Claudius restored (cf. Suetonius, Claud. 25), and that his relation to war is manifested by the genealogizing addition, "Vicae Potae filius." Preller, Röm. Myth. II, 245, follows the usual tradition in identifying Vica Pota with Victoria, but admits that in the Seneca passage she seems to be a goddess of gain. His theory that Vica Pota may possibly be identical with the Etruscan Lasa Vecu has little probability and no helpfulness. Ball,[1] following Schenkl, points out the fact that Cicero apparently identifies Dispiter and Pluto with Plutus, and that Phaedrus calls Plutus the son of Fortuna. He further suggests that "Seneca ... may have held a reminiscence of some of these associations in view of Diespiter's financial dealings."

The comments of Buecheler and Ball, however plausible they may be, certainly fail to give a satisfactory explanation of the jest in its entirety. I wish to offer an interpretation, radically

[1] The Satire of Seneca on the Apotheosis of Claudius, p. 201. He cites Cicero, De Nat. Deorum II, 26, 66, "Terrena autem vis omnis atque natura Diti patri dedicata est, qui Dives, ut apud Graecos Πλούτων, quia et recidunt omnia in terras et oriuntur a terris"; Lactantius, Inst. Div. I, 14; Phaedrus IV, 12, 5; and others.

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different in its nature from those already mentioned, and based primarily on the etymology of Vica Pota.[1] According to my view, Vica Pota is derived from √vik and √po-t, the former not the root meaning "to conquer", but that meaning "to enter", as seen in Skr. viç = settlement, community, people, and veça = village; Gk. οἶκος; Lat. vīcus. Vica Pota, then, is the same as Skr. viçpati (Epic viçām pati) = lord of the people (epithet of Agni), and fem. viçpatnī (Vedic, as applied to the fire of attrition); Zend vīçpaiti = master of the people; Lith. vëszpatis = lord (only of god and the king); Old Pruss. Waispattin (fem. acc.) = matrem familias.

In seeking to trace the history of the word down to its transformation into the classical Latin form, several possibilities present themselves. From the pro-ethnic nature of the word we might have expected it to come down as vicpotis; but it would have been difficult for such a form to survive unchanged, as the combination *cp* was apparently unknown to the Latin language[2] and, therefore, must have sounded harsh to the Roman ear. Again, we have seen that in Sanskrit there was a form with the first member inflected, viçām pati, as well as the compounded viçpati. So we might postulate a Latin form vicōm potis, weakened to vicŏm potis. Finally, the word may have been, according to the regular laws of composition in Latin, vicopotis, weakened to vicupotis or vicipotis. Whether it was vicom potis or vicupotis, we must suppose that it was corrupted to Vica Pota partly through the popular derivation from *vinco* and *potior*, partly from the analogy of such forms as Anna Perenna, Dea Dia, Fauna Fatua, Aius Locutius, etc.

If this etymology is correct, then Vica Pota means not "she who conquers and possesses", or "the victorious possessor", but "the mistress of the people", or "the mistress of cities".[3]

[1] In his Religion u. Kultus d. Römer, Müller's Handbuch V, 4, 196, Wissowa seems to me to be far astray when he says that some of the ancient grammarians derived Vica Pota from *vinco* and *potior*, others from *victus* and *potus*, and that Seneca probably had the latter derivation in mind. On the contrary, the "Victua et Potua" of Arnobius (III, 25) have nothing to do with Vica Pota, but are analogous in formation and meaning to those other deified abstractions, Educa, Cuba, Statina, etc.

[2] I have been unable to discover any native Latin word with the combination *cp*.

[3] Following the proposed etymology, it is probable that the *i* is long—Vīca Pota. Cf. οἶκος, vīcus.

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It is quite possible that the Romans of Cicero's time and later were mistaken in identifying Vica Pota with Victoria. Now to what goddess above all others should the epithet "Mistress of Cities" be applied? And what goddess was the mother of Jupiter (or Diespiter)? The evident reply is Cybele, the Great Mother, of whom Lucretius II, 606–7, says,

> Muralique caput summum cinxere corona
> Eximiis munita locis quia sustinet urbes.

We have already seen that Claudius restored the ritual of the Fetiales, whose patron god was Diespiter (cf. Buecheler, l. c.); and it is also known that he interested himself in the worship of Cybele.[1] With his scholarly and antiquarian leanings, so undeservedly ridiculed by ancient and modern writers, it is well within the bounds of probability that he may have identified Vica Pota with Cybele, and thus afforded Seneca an opportunity for his jest, "Diespiter Vicae Potae filius".[2] In "Diespiter . . . et ipse designatus consul, nummulariolus", we see a probable reference to one of the Emperor's rich freedmen, who used his high position for financial gain (cf. Buecheler, l. c.). The additional explanation is then volunteered that he made his living by selling the rights of citizenship, than which nothing would more naturally be at the disposal of the son of Vica Pota, the Mistress of Cities.[3]

UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER. CHARLES HOEING.

[1] Cf. Showerman, Trans. A. P. A. 31, 58, and The Great Mother of the Gods, Bull. No. 43 of University of Wisconsin, p. 270.

[2] From the first introduction of the rites of Cybele into Rome, she seems to have been connected with Victoria. When the sacred image was brought from Pessinus in 204 B. C., it was deposited in the temple of Victoria on the Palatine, and remained there until 291, the date of the dedication of the temple newly erected for Cybele. Was this merely a prophecy of victory over the Carthaginians? Probably, though it has occurred to me that in the minds of the people Vica Pota may have been the connecting link between the two goddesses.

To identify the temple of Vica Pota "infra Veliam" with the shrine of Cybele shown in the relief on the tomb of the Gens Hateria (cf. Showerman, The Great Mother, p. 313) would be a conjecture altogether too rash.

[3] It is hardly necessary to remark that the identification of Vica Pota with Cybele may be rejected without affecting the acceptance of the proposed etymology.

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VI.—A MEDICAL PAPYRUS FRAGMENT.

Among the writer's Greek papyri there is one, unfortunately mutilated, which, while not precisely literary in character, presents some points of more than ordinary interest. Like the Oxyrhynchus papyrus CCXXXIV, it contains a series of medical prescriptions. Where alternative remedies for the same ailment are given, they are introduced by ἄλλη, much as in the Oxyrhynchus papyrus, which employs ἄλλο. Parts of three remedies are preserved in the fragment. It is not clear for what the first was designed, but alum (στυπτηρία) and a sort of wax ointment scented with rose (κηρωτὴ ῥοδίνη) were among the drugs recommended. The previous wiping (προαποσμήχειν) of the part affected or of some instrument or utensil used, is also enjoined. The second disorder prescribed for seems to have been leprosy; no other way of completing λεπρ[seems more probable. It is doubly annoying here that the lines should be fragmentary, in view of the interest attaching to this disease and to ancient methods of dealing with it. Two treatments are prescribed. Of the second of these practically nothing remains. The first seems to have consisted in part at least of external applications, perhaps of some ointment in which dry pitch and possibly the blossom of some plant were ingredients. It is possible, however, that the word partly lost before τοῦ ἄνθους was χ]αλκοῦ and that the reference is to that ἄνθος χαλκοῦ, as the ancients called the scaly 'efflorescence' formed on the cooling surface of the heated metal; cf. the scholium on Nicander, Th. 257. As in the first prescription, the instructions include a wiping (περιμάσσειν), here probably of the part affected, perhaps to remove any excess of the substance applied that might remain. Or as the noun lost before ψυχρῷ seems to have modified περίμασσε, the wiping may have been intended to cool and soothe the diseased parts. Galen's expression, περίματτε σπόγγῳ θερμῷ (14, 424, 3) suggests σπόγγ]ῳ ψυχρῷ περίμασσε here; but the last trace before ψυχρῷ cannot belong to ω. It might be ι of σπογγωι, but adscript ι does not appear elsewhere in the papyrus.

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As in the case of the Oxyrhynchus prescriptions, these are written on the *verso* of a papyrus the *recto* of which had previously been used for some document, probably an account, as several amounts in artabae of grain are clearly legible on the *recto*. While the *recto* preserves no date, the hand is of a sort common in the second century A. D., and the later use of the papyrus for the medical prescriptions probably fell in the second or third. It thus belongs in time as well as in subject matter, with the Oxyrhynchus medical papyrus already mentioned. The papyrus came from Kôm Ushîm in the Fayûm. It measures cm. 6 by 16. The hand is a well-formed and fairly regular semi-uncial, not of the best literary type, but very far removed from the ordinary cursive hand of Roman documents. The spaces, such as are sometimes called "half-paragraphs", in ll. 6 and 13, seem further to favor the view that the manuscript was not a mere private copy, made for the writer's own use, as many literary works written on the *verso* of old documents doubtless were, but a more careful and formal writing, perhaps designed for sale. The only punctuation is a high point in l. 6, at the end of the first prescription. A blank space of cm. 2 is left after it before the beginning of the second prescription, and a similar space seems to have been left (l. 13) before the third. The lines are from the upper part of the column, and cm. 1. 7 of the upper margin are preserved. Little if anything is lost from the right-hand margin of the column; at the left something is lost, but how much cannot be certainly determined; hardly less than four or five letters, however, for the lost beginning of l. 8 pretty certainly contained the concluding letters of ξη[ρᾶς and the opening letter, or letters, of ?χ]αλκοῦ, and probably some intervening word or words, besides.

] δις μ̣ε̣ν̣ος̣ στυπτηρ
ιας?]ς̣ κεκαυμενης δι
]η̣ κηρωτη ροδινη[
]μα προαποσμηξ[
5. ας]θ̣ει̣ τ̣η̣ν̣ επειφανεια[ν?
]ε̣π̣ει̣ δει· λεπρ[
] . . υρου λ ⌊ πισης ξη[
ρας ?χ]αλκου του ανθους
]κοψας εμβαλε εις κ[

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10.]λκου πυρος χρωτι[
]ξη ενχριε εις δερ
]ι ψυχρω περιμασσε[
] αλλη πυ[.]ιτυ.ιν
]αιου παλαι
15.].( ) ... ομιθιν ( ) π[
]ν λι
]υρι
]αν[

Here the papyrus breaks off.

5 *l.* ἐπιφάνειαν

7 *l.* πίσσης

Many forms and sorts of στυπτηρία (alum) were known to Greek writers on medicine; σχιστή, στρογγύλη, ἀστραγαλωτή, χαλκῖτις, τριχῖτις, πλινθῖτις, πλακῖτις, ὑγρά, Αἰγυπτίη, Μηλίη, are some of the names applied to them. The first letter of l. 2 might belong to στυπτηρ[ια]ς, were it not that ll. 7 and 8 lead us to expect a greater lacuna at the beginning of lines. Even as it is, κεκαυμένης probably limits στυπτηρ[ίας. Κηρωτὴ ῥοδίνη (l. 3), the *ceratum rosaceum* of Appuleius, seems to have been a recognized preparation of the ancient pharmacopoeia. Προαποσμήχειν too (l. 4) is met with in Dioscorides (1, 144) Oribasius (2, 417, 9) and Galen (13, 374 C). Ἐπιφάνεια (l. 5), while not primarily a medical term, is used by medical writers in describing symptoms. Paul of Aegina, for example, says that leprosy manifests itself in τραχυσμὸς ἐπιφανείας. The restoration πίσσα ὑγρά is suggested by Dioscorides (1, 95), who speaks of πίσσα ὑγρά and πίσσα ξηρά: ἡ δὲ ξηρὰ πίσσα ἑψομένης τῆς ὑγρᾶς γίνεται· καλεῖται δὲ αὐτὴ ὑπ' ἐνίων παλίμπισσα. That Theophrastus too recognized the same distinction, though under a different terminology, is implied in his πίττα ὠμή; and the corresponding πίσσα ἐφθή occurs in Hippocrates. The imperatives ἔμβαλε and ἔνχριε, ll. 9 and 11, recall some of the directions of Galen and of the Oxyrhynchus prescriptions, where imperatives singular and aorist participles largely constitute the verbal mechanisms.

A third medical fragment, of a more formal character than the two mentioned, is preserved in the Cairo Museum (No. 10160) and will be found in the University of Chicago Decennial Publications, Vol. V, pp. 5, 6.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO. EDGAR J. GOODSPEED.

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REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES.

CARLO PASCAL, Prof. nella R. Università di Catania: Studii Critici sul Poema di Lucrezio: Roma-Milano, Società Editrice Dante Alighieri di Albrighi, Segati & C., 1903. Pp. viii + 218.

The study of Lucretius is still in its infancy. Excesses which would not be condoned in treating of other authors are applauded in an editor of the Roman philosophical poet. One who can stand aloof and consider dispassionately the almost countless modifications introduced into the text of Lucretius by Brieger and Giussani, cannot well help being perplexed. Taken singly, most of the changes seem plausible; viewing them in the mass, reason revolts. The first duty of the scholar is to understand and interpret the text as it stands. This is, to be sure, no easy task in the case of Lucretius; for he is not one of those writers who are their own best interpreters. The subject-matter is often obscure, and the allusions must necessarily be lost to one who has not an intimate knowledge of the common stock of philosophical ideas current in the schools of the first century B. C. That fund of ideas was derived from the entire course of Greek thought from Thales onward; chiefly, indeed, from the pre-Socratics, but also from Plato, Aristotle, and their successors.

There remains much to be done in the way of interpreting the traditional text of Lucretius, even after the successful labors of Munro, Brieger and Giussani, not to mention lesser names. Pascal, as we shall presently see, has shed light on some dark places where others had despaired. But what shall be done when one meets insuperable difficulties? The answer of our generation has been that the text must then be reconstructed, chiefly by means of transpositions. If a reasonable number of such changes satisfied the critical judgment, we should welcome the expedient; but the transpositions are so many and the plausible reconstructions are so conflicting that they must give us pause.

Nevertheless we are not to conclude that the criticism to which the De Rerum Natura has been subjected has proved to be futile. It has changed the aspect of the work, even if not one of the proposed alterations should be adopted. This new Ptolemaic system of cycles and epicycles has naturally produced a reaction, and many sober-minded scholars now either abandon or at least reduce to a minimum the resort to the makeshifts of the interference of a putative editor, of the confusion created by copyists, and of detached paragraphs written by the poet and wrongly placed when entered into the text.

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What we most need at present is clearly a more fully defined conception of the method followed by the poet in the composition of his treatise. The story that he wrote parts in lucid intervals is a theory in regard to the composition of his work. Further suggestions were made by Lachmann and Munro, but their views were not worked out sufficiently in detail to account for all of the difficulties encountered. More recently the direction of the inquiry has changed; but we need now to return to the old question, deriving suggestions for its solution from the rich store of observations collected in the newer literature.

The last decade has been productive of much good work in elucidation of Lucretius and of the Epicurean philosophy of which he is an exponent. Italy is conspicuous for the honorable part she has borne in these contributions: not to speak of matters of less importance, the elaborate edition of Lucretius by the lamented Giussani, and these critical studies by Pascal deserve to be counted with the best work done in this field.

Indeed, comparison of these two scholars is inevitable and I am tempted to characterize them, but refrain. Suffice it to say, that, though Pascal has not touched upon so many points in controversy, his work, possessing as it does the distinction of sound learning and sober judgment, is quite as valuable as that of his countryman. This mental balance is perhaps best seen when Pascal is engaged in defending the text. Editors are agreed in indicating a lacuna after I. 43. Brieger and Giussani regard vv. 50–61 as part of an older recension of the poem. Brieger is unable to find a place for them; Giussani assigns them a position after v. 145. Pascal (p. 1 ff.) shows how within the space of the six verses crowded out by the intrusion of II. 646–51 the gap *may* be bridged and the thought satisfied. It is not necessary to maintain that the connection was really such as Pascal assumes; but it is enough to have shown that, admitting a lacuna, the text may stand without further change.

Another illustration will serve to show the intimate knowledge Pascal has of the earlier systems. In I. 784 f. the MSS show:

> hinc *ignem* gigni, terramque creari
> ex *igni*, retroque *in terram* cuncta reverti . . .

Here all recent editors substitute *imbrem* and *imbri* for *ignem* and *igni* and *a terra* for *in terram*. Pascal adopts the last-mentioned change as unquestionably necessary, but defends the rest of the text by citing Heraclitus, fr. 76 (Diels) apud Max. Tyr. XII. 4, p. 489: *ζῇ πῦρ τὸν γῆς θάνατον καὶ ἀὴρ ζῇ τὸν πυρὸς θάνατον, ὕδωρ ζῇ τὸν ἀέρος θάνατον, γῆ τὸν ὕδατος.* Diels has interchanged *ἀέρος* and *γῆς*, and it may be that in so doing he correctly reproduces the thought of Heraclitus; he may be right also in assuming that the addition of *ἀήρ* was due to the Stoics; but these considerations cannot affect the text of Lucretius. It is clear that the MSS correctly report what the poet wrote. Whether

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Maximus Tyrius and Lucretius are authentic witnesses to the doctrine of Heraclitus is another question.

This leads me, however, to speak of a point at which Pascal seems to me sometimes to be wanting in caution. When he has shown in regard, say, to Heraclitus or Empedocles, that the account of Lucretius tallies with the report of the doxographers, he at once concludes that the doctrine is authentic, because, as he asserts, our poet had first-hand knowledge of their writings. But some of the statements in question are clearly not direct reports but interpretations of what was actually said. Hence, when in such cases Lucretius agrees with the doxographic accounts it is hardly to be assumed that he is speaking on his own authority. However familiar Lucretius may have been with the primary sources of early Greek thought, he must have had also some secondary sources for his knowledge of it. These secondary sources were doubtless the writings of Epicurus and the doxographic tradition. Hence, instead of asserting categorically that a given tenet was a part of the philosophy of Heraclitus and not an accretion of the Stoics, on the ground that Lucretius so stated it, it would be wiser to claim only that such was his opinion: the possibility of error must be conceded to be quite as great on his part as on the part of the doxographers.

But there are matters of greater moment to which we must now proceed. Pascal believes that the teachings of Aristotle exerted not a little influence in shaping the doctrines of Epicurus. In this he is clearly right. However we may discount the learning of Epicurus, it is self-evident that one who attempted to reassert the atomic philosophy would be confronted by the strictures which Aristotle had so lavished upon it. Indeed, numerous instances could be adduced of the revision of the doctrines of the Atomists by Epicurus in consequence of Aristotelian criticisms. One such has been clearly pointed out by Pascal (p. 49 ff.). It relates to the difficult chapter of the *partes minimae*, Lucr. I. 599–634. Pascal accounts for this curious innovation by referring to the reiterated declaration of Aristotle (*de anima* 409^{a} 13 ff., *de gen. et corr.* 326^{b} 1 ff., *phys.* 240^{b} 8 ff.) that the ἀμερές—that which has no parts—cannot have motion, or if it have, only κατὰ συμβεβηκός. But motion is of course an indispensable property of the atoms; hence, if one allows the force of Aristotle's arguments, the atoms must have parts. Yet, to remain atoms, they cannot have separable parts: hence the singular doctrine contrived by Epicurus. This view I now accept as correct, although I had myself looked to other criticisms of Aristotle for an explanation of the point.

The influence of Aristotle made itself felt also in other ways. The *coniuncta* and *eventa* are a case in point. Pascal (p. 16 ff.) has vindicated the assertion of Munro (note on I. 449) that in Epicurus συμβεβηκός and σύμπτωμα are synonyms, and that '*coniuncta* and *eventa* appear to have been devised by Lucretius

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himself to distinguish the two kinds of *συμβεβηκότα* or *accidentia*, the *καθ' αὑτά* or *per se*, and those not so.' The distinction thus practically coincides with the Aristotelian, which divides qualities into essential (permanent) and non-essential (transient). In the Atomists the difference between qualities primary and secondary nearly, but not quite, coincided with the difference between essential and non-essential qualities resulting from the Platonic-Aristotelian logic. The intention was the same; the points of view differed. The Atomists took for their point of departure the conception of physics which recognizes the validity of no qualities but the universal properties of mass; the Socratic ethics, from which conceptual logic sprung,—in this agreeing with the science of chemistry,—accorded permanent value to properties distinctive of a class of beings not absolutely all-inclusive. It was not unnatural that, in an age when all schools acknowledged the primacy of ethics, the Epicureans should have adopted the view of the Aristotelian logic.

It is an opinion stoutly maintained by many scholars that the doctrines of the Epicureans made no progress during the continuance of the school, the system remaining precisely as it sprang from the head of the founder. Pascal pronounces the view sheer nonsense (*una fola*, p. v.), and finds evidence to disprove the notion in the notorious doctrine of the declination of atoms (Lucr. II. 217–293). He holds (p. 131 ff.) that the conception of the declination set forth by Lucretius and Cicero is a later development, due in part to error and in part to the criticisms and suggestions of the Stoics. He discovers a reference to the original form of the doctrine, as propounded by Epicurus, in Laert. Diog. X. 61: *οὔθ' ἡ ἄνω οὔθ' ἡ εἰς τὸ πλάγιον διὰ τῶν κρούσεων φορά, οὔθ' ἡ κάτω διὰ τῶν ἰδίων βαρῶν. ἐφ' ὁπόσον γὰρ ἂν κατίσχῃ ἑκάτερον, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἅμα νοήματι τὴν φορὰν σχήσει, ἕως < ἄν τι > ἀντικόψῃ, ἢ ἔξωθεν ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου βάρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πλήξαντος δύναμιν.* According to Pascal the declination was merely the curve resulting, by the composition of forces, from the action of gravity upon a body moved laterally by the impact of another. The swerve would be the infinitesimal deviation from a right line of the body so moving and approximating a path straight downward.

The theory is cleverly conceived, but rests upon too slight a foundation, especially in view of the entirely different conception presented by Lucretius and Cicero. As I read the argument presented by Pascal, I wondered whether he had carefully considered Lucr. II. 288 f.

> pondus enim prohibet ne plagis omnia fiant
> externa quasi ui.

The passage, taken in connection with the context, would seem to offer a slight support even in Lucretius for the view extracted from the letter of Epicurus. Yet, even so, the theory appears too hazardous. Epicurus has been so much abused for his supposed

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origination of the doctrine of the declination of atoms, that more arguments are hardly needed to prove it illogical and inconsistent with the remainder of the system. Against all this we can only refer to the well-known fact that Epicurus was extremely concerned to assure man of freedom of action, and to the equally notorious fact that philosophers, ancient and modern, especially such as accepted the fundamental conceptions of materialism, have, in their efforts to escape fatalism, resorted to many a *salto mortale*. Hence this would seem to be a clear case for the exercise of the sceptic's ἐποχή.

However that may be, Pascal is clearly right in insisting, with Giussani, that the last phrase in the passage just quoted—πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πλήξαντος δύναμιν—should not be set aside as a scholion, as Usener proposed. He accepts (p. 213) the reading αὐτοῖς γνωστὰ in Laert. Diog. X. 68, proposed by me (A. J. P. XXIII, p. 193). In the difficult passage X. 43, discussed by me, ibid. p. 189, he thinks (p. 113 f.) to maintain the MSS reading, only supposing a lacuna after εἰ μέλλει τις μή. His interpretation, however, is not satisfactory. I may be permitted here to state that Professor Diels assures me that Bruns' report of the MSS reading in X. 43 (Lucrez-Studien, p. 32, n. 1), as εἴτε τὰς αἰσθήσεις, is incorrect (see A. J. P. XXIII, p. 185); but Professor Diels accepts the correction κατὰ πάντα, which I there proposed.

It is hardly fair, with Pascal (p. 27), to interpret Laert. Diog. X. 69 οὔθ' ὡς ἕτερ' ἄττα προσυπάρχοντα τούτῳ ἀσώματα by saying 'cioè espressamente è affermato che quegli ἀίδια sono nell' intima struttura del corpo.' Epicurus merely desires to affirm that qualities are not *additions to* a body, acquired, as e. g. in Plato, by μίθεξις with an incorporeal idea; but are of the essence of the body, depending upon its atomic composition. He also misinterprets the words of Zeno, Laert. Diog. VII. 140 ἀσώματον δὲ τὸ οἷόν τε κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ σωμάτων οὐ κατεχόμενον, when he says (p. 33) 'definiva il vuoto come l' incorporeo che può essere occupato dai corpi, ma che non è *dentro* i corpi.' The whole point lies in the opposition of οὐ κατεχόμενον to οἷόν τε κατέχεσθαι.

On p. 54, n. 2, Pascal makes Democritus, according to Laert. Diog. VII. 35, charge Anaxagoras with plagiarizing from him the doctrine of the Νοῦς as the fashioner of the universe. It is of course only an amusing slip due to hasty reading. In VII. 34 Democritus is reported to have said that the notions of Anaxagoras touching the sun and moon were old and had only been appropriated by him; in 35 it is stated that he scoffed at the opinions of Anaxagoras regarding his διακόσμησις and the Νοῦς. On p. 124 Pascal misapplies the Stoic term φύσις in Laert. Diog. VII. 156. The word has there its widest signification, applied to the universe as matter possessed of the potency of development. There are also many minor errors of the compositor, as when we read *porta* for *poeta* Agrigentino (p. 89), *posse* for *porro* in Lucr. I. 587 (p. 105), Hirschel for Hirzel (p. 115).

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I cannot take leave of the book, which I have endeavored to represent fairly, without expressing my opinion that it is one of the best dedicated in recent years to the study of Lucretius, and also my hope that its author will continue the work he has so well begun.

IOWA COLLEGE, GRINNELL,
July 9, 1903. W. A. HEIDEL.

Aeli Donati quod fertur Commentum Terenti. accedunt Eugraphi commentum et Scholia Bembina. recensuit PAULUS WESSNER. Vol. I. Leipzig, Teubner, 1902, pp. L. 542.

The world has waited long for a critical edition of Donatus' commentary. Schopen, who as early as 1821 published his dissertation, 'De Terentio et Donato eius interprete', began to accumulate the materials for such an edition. Reifferscheid and Wissowa continued the work and their collations have been generously placed at the disposition of Wessner, a pupil of Goetz, whose competency for the present undertaking had been shown by his articles, "Die Ueberlieferung von Aeli Donati Commentum Terenti", Rhein. Mus. LII (1897) pp. 69–98 and "Untersuchungen zur Lateinischen Scholienlitteratur", Bremerhaven, 1899. Noteworthy investigations and contributions to the text have been made by Dziatzko, Sabbadini, Rabbow and other scholars to whom Wessner makes due acknowledgment. In the preface 36 MSS are enumerated, some of which have been used for the first time by Wessner. The text is based in the main on the seven superior MSS which are free from the interpolations and corrections of the Itali. The oldest of these is A, the codex Parisinus 7920 of the eleventh century, the next oldest B, the codex Vaticanus Regin. 1595 of the thirteenth century, both unfortunately incomplete; the rest being of the fifteenth century, as are all of the inferior MSS.

Having made, myself, many years since a collation of A, I can attest the extreme accuracy of Wessner's report of its readings (in Euanthius II 2, p. 16 he does not note that A has *quinq; ptito* for *quinquepartito*). The relation of the MSS to each other is fully discussed in the preface and a rather intricate stemma is given on p. xxxiii. The earlier editions of Donatus are passed in review, and the various bodies of Scholia examined in their bearing on Donatus. Perhaps not sufficient attention is paid to the Scholia Parisina of codex Parisinus 7899, which have never been published *in extenso*. Wessner admits that they were derived from a more ancient MS than A, but he rarely cites them. In many cases however they contain readings which are elsewhere found only in A, and so help to establish the authority of that MS. A conspectus of the variants of these scholia would, it seems to me, have added to the value of the edition. I give here a few readings from my own collation, citing page and line of

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Wessner's edition. 37, 18 *temptat* omitted by A, *teneat* TC, *tentat* V. 19, *periculumque* with A. 38. 10 *orbem* with A. 40, 1 *actu* with A, perhaps to be accepted as a dative. Wessner prints *actui* as he does *adventui* 323, 16 where B has *adventu* elsewhere found as a dative. 40, 10 *Chremen* with A. 44, 1 *nunc animum advertite non nunc vitio dent.* 44, 11 *de eo* with A. 50, 9 *adulatrix* with A, 52, 9 *moderata aequalitas* with ATCV which makes against Wessner's emendation *aequa levis.* In the appendix he accepts Rabbow's emendation to *aequa talis.* 54, 11 *mandamus* with A, 15 *adverbialiter* with A, 56, 14 *quo* with A, 60, 5 *extra natum* with A 69. 19 *collisus* with A, 75. 9 *stringitur* with A, 80, 2 *ex coniectura* with A, 84, 17 and 19 *confidit* with A, 96, 15 *fas nefas velis nolis* with A, 99, 9 *sumite* 102, 8 *nam nec sic consentiret ad nuptias* 10, *dolet autem se non habuisse spacium consilio,* 103, 1 *pro axiomate more suo.*

The present volume contains only the commentary on the Andria and Eunuchus. For convenience of reference the editor has put on the margin the number of the line of the play. In an appendix of over forty pages he refers more fully to the discussions and views of other scholars, showing that little has escaped him, which bears directly or indirectly upon Donatus. We note that two American scholars, Hendrickson and Kirby Smith, "Archaisms of Terence" are referred to, while Dr. Hoeing is thanked for putting his collation of T (codex Vaticanus 2905) at the service of the editor. The great improvement made in the text can best be judged by comparing it page by page with that of Klotz. While on the whole very conservative, Wessner has admitted many conjectures of other scholars, and not a few corrections of his own, but his judgment is uniformly good. Many asterisks remain however in passages, where all attempts to restore the original text seem to Wessner unconvincing. E. g. Eun. 689, *at ego *edesionum sequor,* where various scholars have suggested *Helenium, Acronem, Aelium Stilonem, Suetonium, Isidorum,* the asterisk stands to tempt still further inquiry. Schoell's proposal to read Αἰδέσιον (*aedesion*) is noted with apparent approval in the appendix. And. 54, we find '*metus magister' *is quoque*.* Cannot *is quoque* perhaps be a corruption for *isagogus* which has intruded itself into the text as a gloss on *magister*? cf. Corp. Gloss. IV. 102. 2. *Isagogus instructor litterarum.* Eun. 939, we find in the text *cui contrarium Sallustius *fuit de deliciis militum loquens.* Comparing Donatus on Andria 36, *cui contrarium Vergilius ait, fuit* would seem to be a corruption of *ait.* Cf. also the commentary on Ad. 1. 1. 47, 4. 5. 8; Hec. 5. 2. 3; Phorm. 1. 1. 11; in all of which *ait* is used with *contra.* Porphyrion however, Horace C. 1. 20. 10, has *Huic contrarium Plautus in Trinummo fecit* so that *fuit* may be a corruption of *fecit* as it evidently is in Lucan in the subscriptio to the scholia of Liber I. SIDONIVS SUBDIAC FVIT. In And. 337. Wessner following Stephanus reads FUGIN HINC *comminantis est et abigentis a se;*

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argueatis is the reading of A. *arguentis* BTCV. Perhaps Donatus wrote *arcentis*, as *arceo* and *arguo* are often confused in MSS. Eun. 315. Wessner reads *quam accuraverit fames*. Some may prefer the emendation of Goetz, *maceraverit*, or Sabbadini's *attenuaverit*, but as Terence in the next line uses *curatura*, I think Wessner is justified in keeping *accuraverit*.

On p. 14 the emendation *appotis* credited to Leo, belongs also to Bentley. Andria 473 we find a note not given by Klotz IVNO LUCINA *Iunonis filia. Graece* Εἰλείθυια. *Latini Nixos dicunt.* This must be added to the few references given by the Dictionaries for *Nixi*. Cf. Festus pp. 174 and 177 and Roscher's Dictionary. The new edition also furnishes some new words And. 788, *subpalpatio*, Eun. 236, *morologia*, Eun. 240, *obiurganter*, Eun. 537 *amusus*. We have also a new instance of *oricula* = *auricula* in Eun. 539. Whether *intersumptam* is to be accepted, And. 286, on the evidence of TC. may be doubted, for A has *interfunctam* (= *interpunctam*?) V, *interruptam* which through the vulgar form *interrumptam* may have given rise to *intersumptam*.

The quotations from other authors embedded in Donatus especially from Sallust and Lucilius are often improved in form, and in the case of passages still doubtful, we have at any rate now a reliable apparatus from which to proceed to further conjectures. All in all we congratulate Wessner on the way in which he has accomplished his difficult task, and we await with impatience the concluding volume which will contain not only the commentary of Donatus and the other plays, but also the commentary of Eugraphius and the Scholia Bembina.

MINTON WARREN.

Sénèque le Rhéteur Controverses et Suasoires, Traduction Nouvelle, Texte Revu par H. BORNECQUE, 2 tomes, Garnier Frères, Paris.

The assiduous labors of Leonard Spengel in the field of Greek Rhetoric, begun just seventy-five years ago, promised to give a lasting impulse to this long neglected branch of philological research, but his influence practically died with him, and the great bulk of his own work now possesses little more than a historical interest and value. This apathetic attitude of classical scholars was doubtless the direct outcome of that indifference to beauty of form and stylistic elaboration for its own sake which generally distinguishes the latter half of the last century. Rhetoric was all but synonymous with bombast and affectation, and it cannot be denied that something of this connotation in malam partem still clings to the term, but the last two decades have witnessed a remarkable revival of rhetorical studies in all directions, and the movement thus inaugurated bids fair to continue unabated.

While the despotic sway which Rhetoric exercised over literary expression in antiquity was too conspicuous to be lost sight of,

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its profound influence was perhaps more felt than demonstrated. The area, so to speak, in which it moved, the stylistic manifestations which it produced, the means, as it were, which it employed to realize its objects and the effect which it had upon the development and character of literature in general, all these problems had not been exhaustively studied or methodically analyzed. This is happily true no longer and, in consequence, we to-day possess a far deeper insight into the forces and elements which to so large an extent made classic literature what it is. With many of the secrets of its irresistible fascination already disclosed, a juster and fuller appreciation and a more unclouded, critical perspective than had hitherto been possible has been acquired.

This great advance was brought about in the first place by the appearance of scientific and up-to-date editions of works like Cicero's Orator and de Oratore, the Rhetorica ad Herennium, Quintilian and the Dialogus of Tacitus, of Aristotle's Rhetoric, Dionysius περὶ ὕψους and the de elocutione. Minute investigations into the nature and scope of prose rhythm and the utilization of its laws for textual criticism, no less than the attention bestowed upon rhetorical features in the exegesis of classical authors generally, also reveal the progress and intensity of modern rhetorical research. On the other hand the comprehensive and exhaustive works of Volckmann, Gerber, Blass, Peter, Norden, to mention only these, give a vivid idea of the manner in which our horizon has been extended within less than a generation.

Among the works rescued from the disastrous tidal wave that has swept away so many of the masterpieces on Ancient Rhetoric, the Controversiae and Suasoriae of the elder Seneca have always occupied a unique position as a priceless source of information for the history, development and influence of Roman Rhetoric, and yet no commentary has appeared for more than two centuries, although readable texts have repeatedly been published.

It was, therefore, natural to look forward with a keen expectancy to the work under notice, written, as it was, by a scholar favorably known by his accurate and acute researches into the *numerus* in Cicero, Pliny and Tacitus, and the fact that this new edition of Seneca Rhetor had been crowned by the French Academy augured well for the book.

A careful examination of its contents has, however, rudely shattered these expectations. A satisfactory exegetical edition of Seneca Rhetor still remains as great a desideratum as ever.

While this criticism is made deliberately, it may yet involve an injustice, in that M. Bornecque may possibly maintain that it was not his intention to supply an exhaustive commentary. In his preface, at least, he disclaims originality for his notes and no reference to them is made in the title page. Moreover, the collection of French translations of Latin classics to which this work belongs doubtless precluded a scientific and elaborate treat-

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ment of the subject. But even on this plea, it were difficult to say, what class of readers the editor can have had in mind. It may fairly be questioned that there exist, even in France, many men of general culture who, though incapable of reading the Latin original, will be fired with an irresistible desire to peruse a work like that of Seneca Rhetor. But even if such there be, the Latin text printed below the translation, in so small a type as almost to preclude its perusal, seems a gratuitous addition, and yet it alone has chapter and paragraph numerals and all the lemmata of the notes refer to it.

The introduction is doubtless designed solely for this hypothetical lay reader, for it is elementary, superficial and commonplace, with the possible exception of a long passage virtually paraphrased from the Dialogus of Tacitus, although all reference to this fact is wanting, while a citation from G. Boissier to whom the book is dedicated, is duly credited.

The translation itself, though somewhat free, is, if a foreigner can presume upon an opinion, an admirable piece of work. The text upon which it is based, deviates from that of Müller in some 600 places[1] and, so far as I have compared the variant readings, Bornecque has shown a sound critical method and good judgment.

It is in the very brief commentary that M. Bornecque seems to have been quite unmindful of the question, 'Quis leget haec?' His notes can be of no possible use to the reader for whom the Introduction and Translation are evidently designed, for there are pages filled with citations which will presumably be unintelligible to one in need of the translation, not to mention a great number of bald references to authors not readily accessible, even supposing that they were known to him. If, on the other hand, these notes are intended only for scholars, as, indeed, stray citations from a German dissertation, an allusion to Otto, Sprichwörter, to an article by Morawski, to the Roman Prosopographia, to Mommsen's Strafrecht and others seem to suggest, they are wholly inadequate. Thus not the slightest attempt is made to analyze the style of Seneca with a view to determining whether the diction as revealed in the prefaces is any way differentiated from the language which the rhetoricians are made to use, for only in this way can we discover to what extent the author's marvellous memory has succeeded in reproducing the original discussions. There is scarcely a trace touching upon the problems connected with the sources of the rhetorical themes themselves, and this is the more inexcusable, as Bornecque might have found considerable material on the subject in Simonds' The Treatment of the Themes in Seneca Rhetor.[2] The commentary,

[1] B. has given a list of these deviations and, in several instances, a special justification of his readings in the Rev. de philol. XXVI, pp. 360–378; XXVII, pp. 53–63

[2] It is possible that the editor touched upon these matters, in his 'Les declamateurs et les declamations après Sénèque le père', a book not accessible to me.

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in fact, virtually consists of a mass of more or less relevant parallelisms in thought, culled chiefly from Cicero, Valerius Maximus, Seneca, and Quintilian. The entire collection is useful in that these passages are now made easily available, there being also not a few which we owe, so far as I can see, to the editor's own reading.

In matters of detail, Bornecque's comment is often open to criticism. Thus 'Sénèque le poète' and 'Sénèque le philosophe' are constantly distinguished from 'Sénèque le rhéteur'[1] and he shrewdly suggests that these cognomina were devised to differentiate the *three* authors. That is, of course, true, only these epithets were given in *modern* times! Ancient authors[2] and our MSS know of no such distinction between the poet and philosopher, nor am I aware that any scholar of repute now denies their identity. In contrast with this unwarranted scepticism Bornecque still ascribes to Quintilian the Declamationes which have indeed passed under his name, but his authorship is now well recognized as an impossibility.

Quite a startling discovery is revealed by the citation, (e. g. Vol. I, p. 298) *l'auteur* des Gesta Romanorum and l'auteur du Violier des Histoires Romaines (e. g. Vol. I, p. 303), but their names are unfortunately still withheld.

Lucretia and Virginia, we are told, are often quoted by the rhetoricians as stock examples of virtue, the former is, however, mentioned more frequently as being of an earlier date!

In Contr. II 1, 26 the phrase '*amorem describere volo*' occurs, on which the editor remarks (p. 317), that it is probably an imitation of Anacreon's, θέλω, θέλω μανῆναι—θέλω, θέλω φιλῆσαι—θέλω λέγειν Ἀτρείδας, but these Anacreontics were not composed till centuries after Seneca's time!

But there is no use in multiplying illustrations of this exegetical nature, and I conclude by repeating that an adequate edition of Seneca is still to be written. In this work only the translation and the care bestowed upon the text can be conscientiously praised.

I believe Bornecque to be capable of better things, and it is devoutly to be wished that he will yet utilize his wide knowledge of Seneca Rhetor by giving us an exhaustive edition of the author that will satisfy modern scientific demands. It is not a Herculean task and, in any case, one that is "des Schweisses der Edlen werth."

CORNELL UNIVERSITY, ITHACA, N. Y. A. GUDEMAN.

[1] Bornecque prefers 'le père' on the ground that Seneca never taught rhetoric!

[2] With the one exception of Sidonius Apollinaris who is notoriously untrustworthy in such matters.

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REPORTS.

REVUE DE PHILOLOGIE, Vol. XXVI.

No. 3.

1. Pp. 257–62. Κόρου Πεδίον. Acute and interesting discussion, by Bruno Keil, of the position of this place, mentioned in two inscriptions on the monument of a Bythinian named Μηνᾶς, who was killed in the battle between Lysimachus and Seleucus. The gaps in the inscriptions are convincingly filled.

2. Pp. 263–71. H. de la Ville de Mirmont publishes an article, to be continued, on the Nenia. See below, No. 4, pp. 335 ff.

3. Pp. 272–8. Isidore Lévy discusses the significance of the term πατρόβουλος, reaching the conclusion that it does not mean "patronus" (see above, pp. 224 ff.), but designates the son of a βουλευτής.

4. Pp. 278 f. F. Hiller de Gaertringen publishes for the first time an inscription in which πατρόβουλοι are mentioned in connection with βουλευταί. (See pp. 224 ff., pp. 272 ff.)

5. P. 279. C. E. Ruelle cites a hitherto unpublished example of the word ἀπότολμος, in which it means "audax" (not "inaudax").

6. Pp. 280 f. Franz Cumont adds a note to his article (pp. 5–11), incidentally explaining the expression "ubi ferrum nascitur", which appears in Greek as ἔνθα ὁ σίδηρος τίκτεται, as referring to a belief (cf. Strabo v. 2, 6, p. 224 c) that as iron was removed from the earth in certain localities, fresh iron grew in its place.

7. Pp. 282–90. The conjunction "cum", by F. Gaffiot. An animated reply to the article of Lebreton (pp. 192 ff.). These articles throw no light upon Latin syntax, and a *précis* of them may well be omitted.

8. Pp. 291–300. A new document relating to the confederation of the Cyclades, by J. Delamarre. The document is an inscription found on the island Heraclea in 1860, but now on Amorgos. The date is probably in the second half of the third century B. C. The author gives a fac-simile, the text in ordinary Greek, and a translation, and then draws several interesting conclusions from it as to the confederation.

9. Pp. 301–325. The Macedonian influence in the Cyclades in the third century B. C., by J. Delamarre. An elaborate investigation based on eight inscriptions, six of which are reproduced.

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10. Pp. 325 f. Book Notices. 1. Academicorum philosophorum Index edidit Segofredus Mekler. Berlin, 1902. Favorably noticed, and analyzed, by Pierre Bovet.

No. 4.

1. Pp. 327–34. Critical notes on the letters of Alciphron, by Mondry Beaudouin, apropos of an edition as a doctor-dissertation by M. A. Schepers.

2. Pp. 335–48. H. de la Ville de Mirmont concludes his discussion of the Nenia begun pp. 263 ff. In these articles the author, starting out with the fact that the Senate at Rome rejected the proposition of certain senators that the *nenia* should be sung at the funeral of Augustus (Suetonius, Octavius Augustus C), gives an elaborate and instructive account of the origin and history of the word and of the things that it denoted.

3. Pp. 349–53. L. Parmentier discusses Soph. Oed. Tyr. 10 f. Though he reads v. 2 τάσδε μοι, he says the stress is to be placed on μοι. Others, reading τάσδ' ἐμοί, have correctly taken the same view. What seems to be new in this discussion is that in v. 11 δείσαντες, ἢ στέρξαντες (without οὐ) present the alternatives contained in τίνι τρόπῳ in v. 10, and that ὡς θέλοντος ἂν κτέ. is to be construed with στέρξαντες = "par amour (ou, pour rendre plus spécialement le sens de στέρξαντες, par affection filiale) dans la pensée que je suis disposé à vous prêter toute assistance".

4. Pp. 354–9. The adjective ἐξάντης (Plat. Phaedr. 244 E), by L. Parmentier. An examination of all the known examples of this adjective (which, as is well known, is employed chiefly as a medical term to denote recovery from disease) leading to the conclusion that probably it was first employed in mystic, religious phraseology.

5. Pp. 360–77. The text of Seneca the Elder, by Henri Bornecque. An enumeration of the six hundred departures of the author's text from that of H. J. Müller, with some explanations of the reasons for the readings adopted.

6. Pp. 378–91. The Parisian MSS of Gregory of Nazianzus further discussed (see pp. 44 ff.) by A. Misier.

7. Pp. 392–9. Critical discussion of five passages of Tibullus, by A. Cartault.

8. Pp. 400–403. Latin studies, by F. Gaffiot. The author remarks that sometimes the words that form set phrases (*locutions fixes*) may happen to be grouped as in those phrases, while each word really has its ordinary separate signification. He thus explains the exceptional constructions of "quid est quod", "ut qui", and "praesertim cum". [The Hellenist will recall δεινὰ ποιεῖν, μὲν οὖν, etc.]

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9. Pp. 404–18. Book Notices. 1. Robert Brown, Researches into the origin of the primitive constellations of the Greeks, Phoenicians and Babylonians. Vol. II, London, 1900. Reviewed by Paul Tannery, who finds this volume characterized by the same qualities and faults as the first volume. He points out several special errors and regrets that the author fails to distinguish between hypothesis and established fact. 2. Euripidis Fabulae ediderunt R. Prinz et N. Wecklein. Vol. I, pars III. Hecuba. Editio altera quam curavit N. W. Leipzig, 1901. Quite favorably mentioned by E. Chambry, who finds a few things in which he does not agree with the author. 3. Euripidis Fabulae ediderunt R. Prinz et N. Wecklein, vol. III, pars V, Troades. Leipzig, 1901. Brief criticism by E. C. similar to the preceding. 4. Euripide Alcesti con introduzione e note di V. Brugnola. Torino, 1901. Briefly, but favorably, mentioned by E. Chambry, as a work exhibiting thorough acquaintance with modern scholarship without pretension to originality. 5. Lysiae orationes. Recensuit Theod. Thalheim. Leipzig, 1901. Both editions ("maior" and "minor") reviewed very favorably by Albert Martin. 6. Syntaxe latine d'après les principes de la grammaire historique par O. Riemann; 4e éd. revue par Paul Lejay. Paris, 1900. Highly commended in a few words by L. D. 7. Topographie der Stadt Rom, by Otto Richter. 2 edition. München, 1901. Brief and commendatory account of the work by Ch.-Ant. Dubois. 8. Religion und Kultus der Römer, by G. Wissowa. This work, forming part of the great manual of I. von Müller, is analyzed and highly praised by J. Zeiller. 9. Caesar's conquest of Gaul, by T. Rice Holmes. London, 1899. L. Laurand finds this work exceedingly valuable, and advises all students of Caesar to read it. 10. Paul Monceaux: Histoire littéraire de l'Afrique chrétienne depuis les origines jusqu' à l'invasion arabe. I. Tertullien et les origines. II. Saint Cyprien et son temps. Paris, 1901–2. J. Lebreton reviews this work at some length. He commends the author for not following the German method of placing philological above literary matters, and yet complains that he has not given more complete philological information, especially in regard to the Latin Bible of Africa, which the author has shown to be of African origin and not an importation from Italy. The reviewer regrets also that the author seems not to be versed in other departments of Christian literature, but recognizes his admirable knowledge of that literature in Africa. 11. Joseph Fabre. La pensée antique de Moïse à Marc-Aurèle. Paris, 1902. Reviewed by J. Lebreton. The work is the first volume of a series that is to bring the history of human thought from Moses to Tolstoï; and it is what one would naturally expect it to be. The reviewer cites some painfully amusing examples of the sad results of so ambitious an undertaking. 12. Incerti scriptoris Byzantini Saeculi X Liber de Re militari.—Recensuit R. Vari, Budensis. Leipzig, 1901. Favorably mentioned by

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Paul Tannery, who makes some comments on the MSS of the work.

The Revue des Revues, begun in No. 1, is completed in this number.

MILTON W. HUMPHREYS.

HERMES XXXVII 1, 2 (1902).

First Fascicle.

Die Familie des Alkibiades (W. Dittenberger).

Alcibiades the colleague of Cleisthenes 510 B. C. cannot have been the grandfather of Alcibiades the famous son of Cleinias. Isocrates is right in stating, XVI 26, that he was the greatgrandfather, and we must recognize an intermediate generation: Cleinias I, trierarch 480 B. C. and Alcibiades II, father of Axiochus and Cleinias II. The *latter* was father of the famous Alcibiades III. The identification of Cleinias II with Cleinias I by Plutarch (Alcib. I) is certainly an error. Alcibiades II is referred to in Plat. Euthyd. 275 A. the epithet ὁ παλαιός notwithstanding; also in Thuc. V 43, 2 and elsewhere.

Vergil und die Ciris (Friedrich Leo).

Franz Skutsch in 'Aus Vergils Frühzeit' (Leipzig, 1901) has undertaken to prove that the Ciris is a work of Gallus, and that the verses and passages common to it and Vergil's poems were borrowed by the latter. The Gallus-hypothesis is not new, but Skutsch's presentation has revived interest in it, and so Leo tries to show that the incongruities S. finds in Eclogue X do not exist. Gallus the warrior, placed in bucolic surroundings, is the key to the understanding of the poem, and the verses, which according to Servius (v. 46) were taken from Gallus, could just as well be Vergil's. Likewise, Eclogue VI is not a 'catalogue' poem and admits of a perfectly satisfactory interpretation. Gallus' poem on the Grynian grove is indeed cited (v. 72); but there is no proof that the other myths enumerated represent so many *epyllia* of Gallus. The number alone makes this wholly incredible. The crowning argument of S. is that Eclogue VI 74 ff., refers to the Ciris; but Vergil cites the form of the Scylla myth, which the Ciris rejects. A detailed comparison proves the priority of Vergil's works. The Ciris then must be placed shortly after 19 B. C. It is an excellent example of a belated Neoteric. The style of Catullus and Lucretius is plainly imitated, at the same time the author shows the influence of Vergil's genius.

Demokrits angebliche Leugnung der Sinneswahrheit (Adolf Brieger). To show in how far we may trust our senses Democritus wrote his κρατυντήρια. Nevertheless, that he distrusted the evidence of the senses was believed from the time of Sextus

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Empiricus until Hirzel in 'Untersuchungen über Ciceros philosophische Schriften I' (1877) showed that there was an essential agreement between Epicurus and Democritus in this matter. P. Natorp's 'Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnissproblems im Alterthum' (1884) revived the old charge. Against him Brieger contends that D. placed a rational trust in the senses. The difficulty lies less in the conflicting and largely ex parte testimony than in D.'s psychology. For his doctrine that thought is produced by the direct influx of images independent of ordinary sense perception, coupled with his distinction of *γνώμη γνησίη* and *σκοτίη* apparently supports the view that he rejected the evidence of the latter. Hasty generalization led D. to believe that we think in pictures; but, unaware of the difficulty of the problem, he did not attempt to show how. Epicurus failed in this very attempt, and too much stress must not be laid on the picture-thoughts. Sextus and Natorp err in calling them the *γνώμη γνησίη* or *λόγος*, which they say was the *κριτήριον* of D. instead of the *αἴσθησις*. For D. recognized *τὰ φαινόμενα* as *κριτήρια* (cf. Sext. VII, 140). By *γνώμη σκοτίη* he must have meant the crude acceptance of things just as they seem; whereas he believed that the errors of sense should be controlled by reasoned observations, and that the sum of facts thus established, such as weight, heat, mobility, etc., furnishes the material for the *γνώμη γνησίη*.

Ein neuer Brief Hadrians (Ulrich Wilcken).

The Imperial decree, marked No. 140 among the 'Griechische Urkunden' of the Museum of Berlin, and hitherto attributed by W. to Trajan, turns out to be by Hadrian, with interesting results.

Die Bauinschriften des Heiligthums auf dem Djebel Shêkh Berekât (Wm. K. Prentice).

This epigraphical study reveals a form of worship by which the walls of a Temenos were built (circa 69 A. D.–137 A. D.) in sections, by families and individuals, in striking analogy with Nehemiah, ch. 3. Each section had its inscription Διὶ Μαδβάχῳ καὶ Σελαμάνει κ. τ. λ.; the former identical with Διὶ Βωμῷ, the god worshiped in a similar way at Burdj Bâḳirḥâ near by (the Syriac word madhbaḥ means altar); the latter the same as the Assyrian God Shalmânu; a curious union of a local with a foreign god.

Relief von dem Grabmal eines rhodischen Schulmeisters (F. Hiller von Gaertringen und C. Robert).

This joint publication has for its subject a relief (vid. plate p. 121), which seems to have served as an ornamental facing to the doorway of a tomb near ancient Ialysus. On the left Hieronymus, a teacher, surrounded by his pupils, then follows the world of the blessed with H. again next to Pluto, thirdly Nemesis commanding the wicked to depart to Tartarus. The first scene resembles the two mosaics interpreted as the Platonic Academy (Mittheil. d. röm. Inst. XII, 1897). An epigram on the base of a stele found south of Rhodus, beginning with the

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words [Γ]ρά[μμ]α[τ'] ἐδίδαξεν ἔτεα πεν[τήκ]ον[θ' ὅδε] | δύο τ' ἐπὶ τούτοις, καὶ εὐσεβῶν [χ]ῶρός [σφ' ἔχει] bears such a number of striking analogies with the frieze, that it seems not unlikely that this base once stood at the entrance of the same tomb. Hiller v. G. adds a note on the Tloians.

Eine lateinische Babriosübersetzung (M. Ihm).

Among the few Latin pieces of the Amherst Papyri the most important, No. XXVI, contains a Latin translation of two fables of Babrius, with the Greek text of three, written in the third or fourth century. Apart from a number of gross errors, the papyrus furnishes a glossary of some value.

Miscellen.—Wilhelm Crönert discusses the name and certain inscriptional forms from Ormela, a populous district of imperial times, on the confines of Phrygia and Pisidia, a region carefully explored by J. R. S. Sterrett.—O. Seeck adduces a new point to prove the date 324 A. D. for the overthrow of Licinius, which, however, Mommsen, in a subjoined note, does not admit (vid. Hermes XXXVI, p. 602–5); Seeck also discusses recently discovered coins, which show that Constantinople had its name as early as 325 A. D., hence the date 328 A. D. adopted by Th. Preger (Hermes XXXVI, p. 336) on the authority of late and untrustworthy Byzantine writers is wrong, but see Miscellen below.—Georg Wissowa declares the monthly sacrifice in Vergil Ecl. I, 42 ff., to be a birthday celebration according to a Hellenistic custom.—Max Ihm. Zur römischen Prosopographie.

Second Fascicle.

Aus Vergils Frühzeit (P. Jahn). Skutsch tried to show *inter alia* that vv. 31–69 of Ecl. X were in the main selections from Gallus (vid. F. Leo above). But vv. 31–43^{a}, 65, and 67–68 are direct imitations of Theocritus, whom Gallus probably did not even know (vid. Ecl. VI 1). On the other hand in vv. 43^{b}–64, all imitation of Theocritus suddenly ceases with the introduction of Gallus' Lycoris. These indeed may be due to Gallus (vid. Servius, v. 46), interspersed, however, with Vergil's own. As regards the Ciris it is clear from passages common to it and Vergil's Eclogues and Georgics, studied in the light of Theocritus and Homer, that the Ciris was not by Gallus, but by a later poet, who imitated Vergil.

Die griechischen Personennamen bei Plautus (Karl Schmidt).

A contribution to a comprehensive study of proper names in P., begun by Fr. Ritschl and continued by E. König.

Philitas von Kos (Wilhelm Crönert).

Φιλίτας and not Φιλήτας (or Φιλητᾶς) was the name of the *Coan* poet.

Karneades' Kritik der Theologie bei Cicero und Sextus Empiricus (C. Vick). It is generally accepted that Cicero's De Nat.

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Deor. bk. III and Sextus Empiricus' Adv. Mathem. IX 137–193 were drawn from Clitomachus, the expounder of Carneades' philosophy. A comparison reveals that each gives only an extract of Clitomachus and that Sextus on the whole is more reliable. Cicero used his source freely, often carelessly, and not only adds illustrations to suit Roman taste, but expands the Academic arguments. Similar studies of the De Divinatione, De Fato and the Academica are promised, with a view to reconstruct a picture of Carneades' philosophy.

Thymele und Skene (Wilhelm Doerpfeld). In answer to E. Bethe (vid. A. J. P. XXIII, p. 338) D. shows that the terms *ἀγῶνες θυμελικοί* and *σκηνικοί*, which occur in inscriptions anterior to the first cent. B. C. instead of proving that *θυμέλη* meant orchestra and *σκηνή* stage, merely indicate a distinction, recognized by Aristotle, of performances with the *σκηνή* (i. e. play-house) as their ideal centre, from others that were grouped about the *θυμέλη*, placed in the centre of the *ὀρχήστρα*; although both performances alike, in classical and Hellenistic times, took place in the *ὀρχήστρα*. The *θυμέλη* was strictly the raised pavement beside or around the altar, on which the sacrificing priests stood. This pavement was also termed *πρόθυσις*, *ἔδαφος* and *δάπεδον*. *Θυμέλη* was not a general term for foundation like *θεμέλιον* (vid. Hermes XXXII, p. 441); but was restricted to its connection with the *βωμός*, with which it was often synonymous. That *θυμέλη* should also at times have designated the circular orchestra was due to its location and significance; not because it was a general term for foundation or pavement, as Robert and Bethe maintain. This use was neither as common nor as certain as Bethe supposes. The well-known verses of Pratinas he cites, may be merely a case of pars pro toto. *Θυμέλη* and *ὀρχήστρα* were never real synonyms. Later, when the orchestra was divided into a raised *σκηνή* and the *κονίστρα*, the terms *θυμέλη* and *ὀρχήστρα* were used indiscriminately, now of the stage now of the lowered half; but this confusion is made clear by D.'s History of the Theatre.

Eine Corruptel im Ion des Euripides (Franz Studniczka). All attempts of ancients and moderns to explain the word *γοργόνες* in Eur. Ion 224 are unsatisfactory. Nowhere else in literature or art are Gorgons associated with the filleted omphalos. On the other hand the golden eagles of Zeus (Pind. Pyth. 4. 4.) were a most important adjunct to establish the claim of the Delphic *ὀμφαλός* over all other *ὀμφαλοί*. So we learn of their presence in Strabo 9, 3, 6, so we find them on the Cyzicene stater and on a marble relief in Sparta (Journ. of Hellen. Stud. IX, 1888, p. 295 ff.). But *γοργόνες* cannot refer to these eagles, Verrall (Ion, p. xlvii) notwithstanding. Still the adjective *γοργός* could be so applied, as it is in Anth. Pal. VII, 161. Hence Studniczka, together with Robert, suggests as an improvement of the text in question:

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222 Chor. ἆρ' ὄντως μέσον ὀμφαλὸν
γᾶς Φοίβου κατέχει δόμος;
Ion στέμμασί γ' ἐνδυτόν, ἀμφὶ δὲ γοργὼ
<χρυσοφαέννω Διὸς αἰωνά.>
Chor. οὕτω καὶ φάτις αὐδᾷ.

Zur Notitia Dignitatum (Joh. Schoene). Seeck and Mommsen have demonstrated that this was compiled by different hands at different times. Schoene now points out the variations in the bureaucratic formalism of the style, and shows that the Notitia Dig. per Occidentem was later and largely determined by the N. D. per Orientem. The latter is stricter in preserving stereotyped formulas, the former shows a tendency to individuality. The Codex Spirensis, or rather its latest archetype, was probably derived from two documents, a N. D. per Orientem and a N. D. per Occidentem.

Die Zeit des Heauton Timorumenos und des Kolax Menanders (E. Bethe). Thraso in Ter. Eun. vv. 397, 401, a character derived from Menander's Κόλαξ, probably refers to Pyrrhus (vid. v. 783) who did not receive an independent command until 296 B. C., hence the Κόλαξ was one of the late works of Menander. One of the earliest was the Ἑαυτὸν τιμωρούμενος, for in Terence's play the king referred to in v. 117 must have been Alexander.

Zur Frage nach der Composition der sechsten Rede des Dion Chrysostomos (Karl Praechter). This oration exhibits the growth and blending of the Diogenes legends. The introduction can be clearly separated from the rest.

Encheirogastores (G. Knaack).—Ἐλαφόστικος (W. Dittenberger).—Lesefrüchte (cf. Hermes XXXV, p. 533) (Ulrich v. Wilamowitz-Möllendorff).

Miscellen.—F. Leo shows that Vidi in the sense of "I have visited" was used as the Perfect of viso.—Th. Preger admits the evidence of the coins adduced by Seeck (see above) to show that Constantinople was so called as early as 325 A. D., but harmonizes this with the statement in Πάτρια (Vol. XXXVI, 338 ff.) that C. became the imperial residence in 328 A. D. For we read in Origo Constantini (ed. Mommsen, Chron. min. I, p. 10, 19), after an account of the overthrow of Licinius (323/4 A. D.): Constantinus autem ex se Byzantium Constantinopolim nuncupavit ob insignis victoriae <memoriam, add. Mommsen>. Hence the *naming* of C. preceded its selection as the imperial residence by several years.—C. Robert conjectures that the wall painting recently discovered in Pompeii, which represents the favorite love scene between Ares and Aphrodite, contains the figure of Alectryon who had been appointed Ares' watchman.

HERMAN L. EBELING.

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RHEINISCHES MUSEUM. LVII. Parts 3 and 4.

Pp. 320–327. F. Bücheler. Coniectanea. In Porphyrio on Hor. Carm. 1, 2 for '*antea enim* Anieni matrimonio iuncta est' read '*Antemnis* Anieni, etc.'.—Ciris 132. 367 for Lachmann's 'Minoa' read the alternative form 'Minon'. Ibid. 156: 'etsi' is defended. It is used like 'quamquam' in 'quamquam quid loquor?' In v. 262: change of mood from 'oportet' to 'lateat' is worthy of the author.—In Cic. ad Att. XIII 25 extr. for 'tam enitar ergo at' read 'tam *ἐν παρέργῳ*—at'.

Pp. 328–336. F. Solmsen. Die Berliner Bruchstücke der Sappho. S. gives the text of the first two fragments. The third is hopeless. Of the first fragment, one is tempted to say in its own words: *δειμ' ὡς δεῖνα πεπόνθαμεν, | Ψάπφ', ἦ μάν σ' ἀέκ[ων] ἀπυλιμπάνω.* The second, which, by the way, reappears in Jurenka's recently published 'Römische Lyriker' is worth a volume of essays on 'Das Gefühl für die Natur bei den Alten'. Solmsen is quite alive to the charm of Sappho's poetry, but his remarks deal chiefly with matters grammatical, such as digamma, augment, form of the imperative middle.

Pp. 337–362. L. Gurlitt. Facetiae Tullianae. Cicero was the wittiest man in Rome, and, like most other witty men, he was sometimes tempted beyond the limit of becoming mirth. These occasional coarsenesses the partisans of Cicero have tried to veil over or explain away, but such processes are not in the interest of truth. Cicero himself says ad Fam. IX 22: Amo verecundiam vel potius libertatem loquendi, where 'libertas loquendi' means 'the right of free expression in private intercourse'. We cannot expect the same self-restraint in the letters that we have in the speeches (ad Fam. IX 21, 1); and Gurlitt discusses a number of Cicero's freedoms, among them ad Att. XVI 11, 1, where he has emended 'hasta' (= *φαλλῷ*) and stands up for '*φαλλῷ* Luciliano'. (See Philol., 1898, p. 403).

Pp. 363–391. R. A. Fritzsche. Der Magnet u. die Athmung in antiken Theorien. At the close of the long account Lucretius gives of the magnet (VI 906–1089) Munro says: 'After dwelling at inordinate length on the early parts of this question he hurries on at the end, and finishes abruptly, as if he felt, what is indeed the truth, that he had after all quite failed in clearing up the mystery'. But Fritzsche proceeds to show that the failure is on the part of the expositor and not on the part of the poet, and unfolds the antique view of the action of the magnet and the process of respiration.

Pp. 392–421. M. Manitius. Aus Dresdener Handschriften. I. Scholia of the X Century on the Epitoma rei militaris of Vegetius, not very old and some of them nonsensical. II. Scholia on Statius' Thebais, which go back either to a fuller text of Lactantius Placidus than we have or to more abundant extracts.

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Pp. 422–436. Karl Fuhr. Zu griechischen Prossaikern. I. Corrections. Plato, Gorg. 522 A: *πόσον οἴει ἂν ἀναβοῆσαι τοὺς τοιούτους δικαστάς*; read *πόσον τι κτέ.* Cf. Dem. 23, 210: *πηλίκον τί που' ἂν στενάξειαν οἱ ἄνδρες ἐκεῖνοι*; The TI is elicited from the *ποιεῖ* of T, TI being often changed into Π. Isokr. 5, 46 for *σκεψαίμεθα* read *σκέψαι. σκεψαίμεθα* is a thoughtless assimilation to *διεξέλθοιμεν.* II. ΕΘΗΚΑΝ and ΕΔΩΚΑΝ in the orators. Of the 49 forms of the 1. aor. 42 are found in the Demosthenean Corpus. In the oldest speeches (27–31), there are sixteen forms without *κ* and only one with *παρεδώκατε* (28, 8). In the Leptinea we find *ἔδομεν* and *ἔδοτε* three times, *ἐδώκαμεν* and *ἐδώκατε* six times. Meantime, Demosthenes has learned to avoid the cumulation of three shorts. Incidentally this shows that our tradition of the Demosthenean text is far from being bad. III. Notes on Sudhaus's ed. of Philodemos with emendations and restorations.

Pp. 437–448. R. Kunze. Unbeachtete Strabofragmente. The considerable break at the close of the seventh book of Strabo is all the more felt because it concerns such important regions as Epirus, Macedonia and Thrace; and Kunze tries to make the loss good so far as possible from Eustathios' Commentary on Dionysios Periegetes (Müller's Geogr. Graeci Minor II p. 201 sqq.).

Pp. 449–459. Joannes Raeder. Analecta Theodoretiana. A discussion of the MSS of Theodoretus by way of supplement to the author's dissertation 'De Theodoreti Graecarum affectionum curatione' (1900).

Pp. 460–480. Miscellen.—Gustav Wörpel detects in Kallimachos, Hymn 1, 79: *ἐκ δὲ Διὸς βασιλῆες κτέ*, an allusion to the deification performances of Ptolemy Philadelphos; Theophanes Kakridis maintains that the Amphitruo of Plautus is a 'comoedia contaminata' and Schultess indulges in a number of marginal notes on Horace. Perhaps some lovers of Horace will regret that his margin was so broad. Carm. 3, 4, 10 he reads for 'Apuliae' 'apud viam' and 3, 6, 22: 'matura virgo', becomes 'matura *vix el.*' R. Wünsch has an interesting note on the 'defixio' or *κατάδεσμος* in the Ciris 369–77, in which he tries to prove that the witchcraft of Carme follows the orthodox ritual. Rossbach restores the latter part of the inscription on the Delphic tripod mentioned Plin. N. H. VII 210 thus: *τὰν δεκάταν <ταύταν>. ἁ δ' ἄξιον ὄνον ὄνασε.* Neuhaus discusses Trog. Pomp. Prol. X, Kirchner comments on CIA II 966 and Radermacher translates Ar. Ran. 265: *κἂν με δῇ δι' ἡμέρας*, 'auch wenn er (oder man) mich für einen Tag einsperst', *δῇ* being from *δέω* 'I bind' with regular contraction.

Pp. 481–497. A. Brinkmann. Ein Schreibgebrauch u. seine Bedeutung für die Textkritik. Not only are marginal notes taken up into the body of the text, a familiar and fertile source

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of corruption, but the same thing happens to catchwords that call attention to these notes and such directions to the reader as *κάτω* and *ἄνω*.

Pp. 498–505. L. Ziehen. ΙΕΡΑ ΔΕΥΡΟ. In Philostrat. Vit. Apoll. Tyan. IV 18, 155 *ἱερὰ δεῦρο* is a cry, which like *ἄλαδε μύσται*, has given its name to one of the days of the Epidaurian festival.

Pp. 506–516. v. Domaszewski. Untersuchungen zur römischen Kaisergeschichte. This paper deals with the assassination of Caracalla and the celebration of the decennial of Gallienus.

Pp. 517–533. A. Enmann. Die älteste Redaction der Pontificalannalen. According to Mommsen it was in the fifth century of the city, or, about the time of the Samnite wars that all the extant annalistic material was collected in the bosom of the pontifical college and supplemented by the early history of the Republic and the Story of the Kings. According to Enmann, who accepts Mommsen's views as to this earliest redaction, the working member of the pontifical college was the first plebeian Pontifex Maximus who was consul in 474 A. U. C. (280 B. C.), Tiberius Coruncanius; and the glory of founding the national history of Rome and Latin prose literature belongs to him and not to his townsman, Cato.

Pp. 534–548. Max Fränkel. Epigraphische Beiträge. I. CIG 1511. The war referred to in this important list of contributions to the Lacedaemonians is clearly the Peloponnesian War and the time is about 406, when Kallikratidas (Xen. Hell. 1, 6, 7 sqq.) made his urgent appeal for help. II. The Aphaia IS. CI Pel. 1580. The *οἶκος* of Aphaia was not a *ναός*. It was only a chapel. Artemis was the great divinity of Aigina.

Pp. 549–558. P. v. Winterfeld. Satzschlussstudien zur Historia Augusta. Peter's contention that large sections of Spartianus's Vita Hadriani are based on the emperor's autobiography is doubtless correct but v. Winterfeld goes farther and maintains that the absence of the rhythmical close of the sentence, so characteristic of the Scriptores historiae Augustae, shows where Spartianus has excerpted the original documents.

Pp. 559–598. Friedrich Reuss. Zur Ueberlieferung der Geschichte Alexanders d. Gr. No more tangled, no more thankless controversy, thinks Reuss, than the controversy about the sources of the history of Alexander the Great, and, by way of clearing the ground, he undertakes to explode the Timagenes hypothesis. Timagenes, an Alexandrian, who lived at Rome towards the close of the republic and in the beginning of the empire, is supposed by Landgraf to be the source of the 'Epitome rerum gestarum Alexandri magni': published by Wagner in the J. f. cl. Phil., Supplbd. 26, pp. 91–167. Nothing s known to us of a History of Alexander by Timagenes, and

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there is no evidence that Livy IX 17 alludes to him, that Trogus Pompeius took his Historiae Philippicae from him. Livy's harsh judgment of Alexander is not due to Timagenes; and Curtius' criticism of the great king is due to Livy, not to Timagenes, and the same may be said of Trogus, whom Curtius may have known and may have used. In short, we know too little of Timagenes, his likes and his dislikes, to build elaborate combinations on the scant notices that survive. Timagenes having been disposed of, Reuss sets up Eratosthenes as the common source of much that we find in Plutarch and Arrian. What they are supposed by some to have taken from Strabo goes back to the geographical work of the great πένταθλος of Alexandria. Finally, Kleitarchos, a very popular writer among the Romans, drew on Aristobulos, not Aristobulos on Kleitarchos.

Pp. 599–609. F. Wilhelm. Zur römischen Elegie. I. Jealousy is an inexhaustible theme in Roman elegy, and the chastisement of the mistress recurs perpetually. This special feature is not necessarily taken from Greek comedy immediately. It may have come from the elegiac poets of Alexandria, who in their turn borrowed from Menander and the rest. II. A discussion of Tibullus I 2 and the consolation that lovers seek in drink.

Pp. 610–623. L. Radermacher proves the existence of Μυκήνησιν. O. Neuhaus. Der Vater der Sisygambis. Sisygambis was not a daughter of Artaxerxes II but of his brother Ostanes.

Pp. 624–640. Miscellen.—W. Schmid concedes the attractiveness of Hense's guess that in Soph. Antig. 524 foll. Ismene appears in a new mask, but maintains that the mask represented not the flush of grief but the bloody traces of her nails, the ἀμυχαὶ παρειῶν.—A. Körte. Ein Gesetz des Redners Lykurgos.—H. Schöne. Ein Blattversetzung bei Galen.—W. Sternkopf. Zu Cicero ad Q. fr. II 3. In A Kal. Febr. omit A.—A. Schulten. Zur lex Manciana.—H. Lietzmann. Prodecessor, not 'praedecessor'.—A. Zimmermann maintains that Roman names in Pop(b) and Pup(b) are baby names, 'Lallnamen'.

B. L. G.

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BRIEF MENTION.

Maeterlinck opens his 'Trésor des humbles' with a rhapsody on silence, prompted by that all-too vocal Preacher of Silence, Thomas Carlyle. But apart from Maeterlinck's esoteric doctrine, the significance and the power of silence are proverbial. Indeed, Goethe seems to think that we exaggerate its potency:

> Es ist ein eigner, grillenhafter Zug,
> Dass wir durch Schweigen das Geschehene
> Für uns und Andere zu vernichten glauben.

Still 'todt schweigen' is a recognized process in German polemics; and I have long sympathized with the unfortunate French pamphleteer who wrote a reply to the silence of his adversary. Why all this obviousness? Simply because the course of my studies has led me of late to consider more particularly certain groups of syntactical silences in Greek; and I have been tempted to give some of my meditations on this subject the Farraresque title, 'The Silences and the Voices of Greek Syntax'. Every investigator, it is true, notes the emergence and disappearance of constructions, but emergence and disappearance do not mean birth and death; and the absence of a construction does not mean that it is not yet born. What is set down to non-development may be due to suppression. Hence the especial interest of the syntactical silences of Homer. How these silences are to be interpreted will depend largely on one's aesthetic code. How far back shall we push the reign of conscious art, how far the evolution of the epos? Thus a mere syntactical inquiry brings us face to face with the Homeric Question; so that in reading M. BRÉAL'S brilliant brochure, *Un problème de l'histoire littéraire*, I have been reminded more than once of such problems as the absence of the historical present, of the articular infinitive, of the consecutive sentence, to cite only some of the most familiar instances.

Homeric theory is a rough shore, and one shudders when one thinks what might have happened, if one had followed the fashionable guides of fifty years ago and had insisted on landing:

> ἔνθα κ' ἀπὸ ῥινοὺς δρύφθη σύν τ' ὀστέ' ἀράχθη,

whereas your floater can pass readily from the unitarian preachment of TERRET (A. J. P. XX 87) to the remorseless analysis

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of ROBERT (A. J. P. XXII 467), or else allow himself to be rocked κυμάτων ἐν ἀγκάλαις by M. BRÉAL'S attractive handling of the Homeric Question, in which the silences of Homer receive due attention. In the brief summary, the brief neutral summary I shall give here, the brilliance of M. BRÉAL'S essay will be lost, but the practical lesson will abide. On M. BRÉAL'S theory the young student will be able to enjoy his Homer without the importunate intrusion of many problems that are forced on the schoolboy before he can fairly enter on the most precious literary heritage of the ages. In short, M. BRÉAL'S student will be as happy as some of us were in the first half of the last century when we read Homer, Vergil, Ariosto and Tasso without much concern for literary theories.

M. BRÉAL does not believe with Schlegel that the epos simply grew, nor with Jakob Grimm that it made itself. He refuses to be mystified by 'organic growth' and the word 'dynamic' has no charm for him, nor does he show any acquaintance with Professor Gummere's lucubrations. Even the excavations of Hissarlik, Mykenai, Tiryns leave M. BRÉAL cool, if not cold. Ever since Schliemann began to dig, the grave-digger's song in Hamlet has been the burden of the Homeric scholar. But 'a pickaxe and a spade, a spade', is followed by the call for a 'shrouding sheet', and that shrouding sheet has shrouded much besides the 'solar theory'. Nothing more tragic to me than the traces of Schliemann's eager demolition of the real Troy, the real Troy of to-day. Now, according to M. BRÉAL, the great lesson taught by these layers of pre-Homeric civilization is the nearness of Homer to our own times. What used to be very distant is but the past of yesterday.

The true Homer, continues M. BRÉAL, is to be sought not in the narrative, nor in the imaginative part of the poems, but in those portions in which the poet addresses himself to men and not to grown-up children, desirous of being diverted and amused; and he thinks it quite as extravagant to suppose that Homer's audience believed the fairy tales of the Homeric narrative as to suppose that the Italians of the fifteenth century accepted the adventures of Orlando as a chapter of their history. And so, in the teeth of Homeric scholars, he contends that we are not to discard the Πρεσβεία πρὸς Ἀχιλλέα and the Ἕκτορος λύτρα in favor of any Ur-Ilias. Not that M. BRÉAL believes that there has been no interpolation. Much has been added to the original stock, whole books, in fact, mere repetitions of old phrases, old situations. But the passages that forward the action, that bring about the necessary conclusion, that paint situations or reveal

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characters—these are not additaments, and M. BRÉAL protests against the criticism that would rob us of the best things in Homer under the pretext of carrying us back to the primitive form.

The primitive effect, according to M. BRÉAL is due partly to the *mise en scène*, partly to modern theories; and the *mise en scène* has to do with the silences of Homer. Of the great antiquity of writing there can be no question. True, only a few years ago it might have been said that the incontestable existence of writing in Egypt and Assyria proves nothing for Greece. But Evans has made that position forever impossible. The mention of writing is suppressed, and suppressed in order to keep up the heroic atmosphere. The obscure mention of those 'characters of hell', the σήματα λυγρά, shows nothing but the embarrassment of the poet. Statues and paintings are found in the palace of Minos centuries and centuries before Homer. Why does Homer simply leave us to infer their existence? For they must have existed in his time. The Apollo of Chryses was doubtless a statue, and the knees of Athene, on which Andromache spread the precious πέπλος (Il. 6, 303), were the knees of a statue. Decorative art abounds. Why should there be no religious art? Why the elaborate adornment of the shields of Achilles and not a single statue of a deity? As there is no direct mention of sculpture, so there is no direct mention of painting. But χρυσόθρονος Ἥρη and κυανοχαῖτα Ποσειδάων and the nimbus about the head of Achilles are evidences that painting was known to Homer. So the Homeric poems affect to be ignorant of coins. It is pure affectation. Coins had been in use three thousand years before the Christian era and M. BRÉAL refuses to accept payment in kind. It is a mere tradition of the school; and so imperative is the tradition that in the youngest part of the Iliad, the twenty-third book, tripods and basins are employed as the medium of exchange and not money current with the merchant.

Fénelon's 'aimable simplicité du monde commençant' is a pretty phrase, but it is nothing more. Odysseus builds his bridal couch with his own hands, and proceeds to adorn his backwoods bed with gold and silver and ivory and purple. He is as inconsistent as Vergil in his description of the humble cottage of good Evander, as Fénelon himself in his description of the grotto of Calypso. The equipment does not match the abode in either case. Nausikaa, the divine washerwoman, is the daughter of a king who is surrounded by a splendid court and holds games like those of Olympia and of Delphi. It is time for us to stop laughing at Mme. Dacier, who, in translating the

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Iliad, saw everywhere nobles and princes. She was nearer the truth, she was more in touch with the spirit of Homeric society than those who make of the Greek and Trojan warriors contemporaries of an age of blood, the coarse types of a period of barbarism and murder.

The heroes of the Iliad were not only valorous as became warriors of such lofty lineage. They were eloquent. The eternal antithesis of word and deed is present in Homer. Cheiron δικαιότατος Κενταύρων, the master of Achilles, and the undying type of the teacher, taught both, taught what was afterwards known as μουσικὴ καὶ γυμναστική. The life of the ἀγορά is fully established. The ceremonial is fixed. The herald puts the staff in the hands of the orator who has the floor. The styles of the various speakers, Menelaos, Odysseus, Nestor, are characterized by Homer himself. ἀγορεύειν, 'to harangue' becomes so common a word for speaking that Penelope 'harangues' her nurse in secret. There are schools and schoolmasters. As Achilles is the pupil of Cheiron, Telemachos is pupil of Mentor, Aineias of Alkathoos. The Iliad is full of types and models. It is a mirror of magistrates, of kings. <When Robert Stephens dedicated his Homer to Francis I, ἀγαθῷ βασιλεῖ τ' ἀγαθῷ τ' αἰχμητῇ, he justly recognized the typical character of Agamemnon>. We are not far from gnomic poetry in Homer.

But after all there is a decided antique coloring, and great part of this is due, as M. BRÉAL insists, to the style of fighting. The military art of Homer is very different from what we find in the literary remains of the seventh and sixth centuries, Archilochos, Alkaios, <not to say> Tyrtaios, <who is not in very good repute just now>. The cavalry arm is notoriously absent. We have only war chariots, and these war chariots are descended in more or less direct line from the monuments of Egypt and Assyria. Even the swift-footed Achilles mounts a chariot occasionally. Agamemnon, Menelaos, Idomeneus, become heroes after the Egyptian pattern. The consequence is that at a time when large and disciplined armies were operating in Asia, the Homeric battles resolved themselves into a series of single combats. <ROBERT recognized the fact that some of the Homeric armour was Brummagem stuff> (A. J. P. XXII 468). According to M. BRÉAL it is all Brummagem. The minute description of contemporary equipment belongs to a much later stage of art.

In the Homeric style there are two factors, the one the poet, the other tradition. To the poet we owe the greatness of the

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framework, the truth of the characters, the harmony of the whole; to tradition the measure of the verse, the abundance of the vocabulary, the wealth of grammatical forms, the use of formulae for all the affairs of life, standing epithets and consecrated phrases. These things are the sediment of ages, and the hexameter alone is a proof of a long development. It is one of the strictest of verses, as Wilamowitz has remarked. It admits none of the licenses of folk-poetry, protraction, correption, syncope. The structure of the hexameter alone is fatal to any Lachmann ballad theory. The language itself has no counterpart in any spoken dialect. It is full of diverse elements, Ionian, Aeolian, Cypriote. However fashioned, it had long been a mixed language, a 'Kunstsprache'. The rhapsodes may have modified the original form to suit their audiences, but that does not solve the difficulty. So for two centuries, says M. BRÉAL, French troubadours composed their poems in a Limousin dialect, larded with Catalan, Provençal and Italian forms. The digamma, of which so much has been made since Bentley's time, fails as a test of the age of the different books, fails as a proof of antiquity. There are dialects in which the digamma was preserved long after the period assigned to Homer. And the text is uncertain. Witness Plato (A. J. P. XXIII 233), witness the Greek papyri. One scholar goes so far as to maintain that we cannot be certain that we have a single verse that runs as it did in the original text.

M. BRÉAL'S next contention pertains to the difference between 'Volksepos' and 'Kunstepos', and here he emphasizes especially the jerkiness of the ballad and the sustained flow of the Homeric poems, the continuity of the narrative, the serenity of the thought. But in claiming this distinguishing excellence for Homer, M. BRÉAL does not undertake to say that Homer had no predecessors. Others had sung the stories of Meleager and Bellerophon. He does not undertake to say that there are no interpolations. The temptation of the rhapsodists to interweave local legends was too great. A Cretan audience was only too ready to welcome the adventures of Idomeneus. The style was copied and the soldering was more or less successful.—A Cretan audience—but what was the character of that audience? Are we to say, as has been said, that the Odyssey is the sailors' poem, the Iliad the soldiers'? No, if by these characteristics we are to explain the origin of the poems. The common people do not figure much in Homer. <D—n the public, said an American capitalist.> *δλέκοντο δὲ λαοί* is about as much notice as the herd gets in the Homeric poems. It is court poetry with which we have to deal <in the Odyssey>. The singers are court poets and queens preside over the performances. The audience is cultivated. It does not need a mythological dictionary. It is

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liberal. It does not take its gods too seriously. It is frankly amused at the 'spats' of Zeus and Here, at the trap set to catch Ares and Aphrodite, at Athene's mocking comment on the misadventure of the Goddess of Love in her encounter with Diomed.

The tone is free, but it is never low or vulgar. The invectives exchanged by the two chiefs in the Iliad are words spoken not only in anger but by anger; and anger is always vulgar. Achilles recovers his poise. Agamemnon makes the *amende honorable*. Hektor and Aias are as courteous as any mediaeval knights. No wonder that Hektor became a type of chivalry in the middle ages. The warriors of Homer are as enamored of glory as if they were Frenchmen. 'Military honor' was not invented then; *αἰδώς* must serve for it in Homer <as *αἰσχύνη* serves for it in Thukydides>. As for the portraits of women, I am quite in accord with M. BRÉAL in his admiration of Homer's mastery. Helen is a real woman as well as a real goddess. Andromache I have personally known as a Confederate heroine, and the man that does not understand the moods of Penelope does not know the elements of a study that is even more interesting than the study of Homer.

But what was the audience? we ask again. It was made up, says M. BRÉAL, of the *ἀριστῆες*, of the old families, say of Smyrna and Miletus, of adventurers by land and sea, successful freebooters, rich merchants, ship-owners, active, intelligent men, curious, cultivated men who knew life and loved the arts. The poems were recited at the great festivals. < The epos season might roughly be compared with the opera season >. As has been said, M. BRÉAL thinks that this audience was not very exacting as to the historical basis. Nor, if M. BRÉAL is right, need we be. True, there must have been some historical basis, some expedition that set out for Europe against a powerful Asiatic Kingdom. About this adventure crystallized a number of legends, the fellows of which we find again in other peoples of the Indo-European race. There are some vague topographical traditions, and King Priam, with his wealth, his wives, his sons-in-law and daughters-in-law is a typical Grand Turk. As for the poet himself we know nothing. Absolute silence as to his country, as to his time. The Lydians are not mentioned. Carians are *βαρβαρόφωνοι*. Phrygians are mentioned because they are allies of the Trojans. The Phoenicians are sly merchants. Even the Greeks have no one name. It is as if it were dangerous to call names. As for Homer's time, M. BRÉAL rejects the statement of Herodotos. He will not allow two centuries, or even one, between Homer and Alkman. He has no sympathy with attempts to reconstruct the 'Ur-Ilias', to

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lop off the branches and strip off the foliage of this Ygdrasil of poetry. True, on this theory the Iliad ceases to be incomprehensible in itself and unique in its class. Those who are inclined to mystery, he says, will perhaps regret a poetry that emerges from the popular soul like the lotus from a pond of India, but those who have clear ideas will not enjoy the Homeric poems less for having been composed in a period of culture and art, in in the midst of a population fond of legend and poetry.—The Iliad is only the first and the most beautiful of epopees.

The first volume of KROMAYER'S *Antike Schlachtfelder in Griechenland* (Berlin, Weidmann) opens a series of monographs that will attract wide and respectful attention. It is the fruit of an expedition undertaken in the year 1900 by two military men, Col. JANKE and Capt. GÖPPEL, and by the scholar whose name the volume bears. The period embraced extends from Epaminondas to the intervention of the Romans and the battle-fields studied are Mantineia (362); Chaironeia (338); Sellasia (221) and Mantineia again (207). Of course, this is not the first attempt to study ancient battle-fields with the help of autopsy, but it is only too true that most of the work in this domain has been chimney-corner work. What were the history of a modern campaign without maps? And yet we are left by the ancient historians to fight the battles of the past without these visual resources. No wonder that Frederick the Great thought little of the value of Caesar's military memoirs. True, there are noteworthy exceptions to this mere book-work, and Herr KROMAYER pays a deserved tribute to Napoleon the Third, to Stoffel, to Grundy. In fact, the present activity in this topographical study is one of the causes of the limitations of the present undertaking. The earlier periods, the period of the Persian War and the period of the Peloponnesian War have already enlisted the energies of competent men and where so much is to be done, there is no sense in duplication.

The advantages of the study of Greek battle-fields are great, and Herr KROMAYER does not fail to emphasize them. One great trouble that we have to encounter elsewhere is the difficulty of ascertaining where such and such a battle was fought. The historian has a serious bit of work to do before the cartographer can set up his drawing-board. Think of the dispute over the battle with Ariovistus, over the defeat of Varus. In Greece we are better off. Greece is a land of ancient culture, thick-sown with towns. The name of the place fixes the battle-field within a few square kilometers. Then there are few plains. The mountains are so steep and rocky that they may be left out of the

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account; and the zone of hills is narrow. Moreover, in the dry and thirsty land of Greece, water becomes an important element and helps to determine the battle-field, and if we ask, whether the millennia that have intervened may not have changed the face of the earth beyond recognition, we have the assurance of Moltke that all the changes of civilization, of desolation, affect only the epidermis of our great Mother, not her features. 'The Bedouin', says Moltke, 'waters his horses and camels at the same sources and pastures his herds on the same green stretches as did Abraham and Mohammed.' 'The Akropolis of Athens', adds KROMAYER, 'presents to us the same rocky surface that it did to Perikles, and the walls of Mykenai look down on the same unclimbable scaur.' Nature has wrought her will, it is true, but undisturbed by man. There is some comfort to be derived from two thousand years of neglect.

Greece, then, seems to be especially favored for researches of this kind and the period that KROMAYER and his associates have selected especially important. It is a 'congenial' period. 'The inner and outer conditions of the life of the modern state are more like those of the last period of Greek history than those of all that go before'. This gives an American citizen of the old school the shivers, however it may delight the student of the military art, which, it seems, does not become a real science until there is no freedom to fight for.—Chaironeia has been a name of evil omen to republican life for all these centuries, and Milton has branded it forever with the name of 'dishonest victory'. But that does not keep the work of KROMAYER and his associates from being honest work and the book is full of enlightenment. Very interesting is what is said of Diodoros, the butt of so many critics, very interesting the effort to extract a nucleus of fact from the floscules of Ephoros, the great source of Diodoros.

The 'so-called' iterative optative is a favorite theme of discussion. Somebody has recently written a tract of 50 pages on the iterative optative in Thukydides, and in the last volume of the *Transactions of the American Philological Association* (XXXIII 101), there is a rehandling of the well-worn subject by Dr. JAMES TURNEY ALLEN. That there is no notion of iteration in the optative itself, that the notion arises from the combination with an imperfect tense or iterative past tense, and that we might as well speak of an iterative subjunctive in combination with a universal present, that we might as well speak of an iterative perfect indicative, an iterative pluperfect indicative in Latin, is, or ought to be, sufficiently clear by this time (L. G.[3] § 567). Iterative optative is a dangerous expression, I grant, and optative in iterative

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sentences would be safer, but there is danger in the use of many of the convenient phrases that we employ in the school-room. When we say that ὅταν with subjunctive 'becomes' ὅτε with optative after a past tense, we are simply dealing with descriptive, not with genetic syntax. The ἄν of oratio obliqua is never lost. It is the original ὅτε with the subjunctive that 'becomes' ὅτε with the optative, as I set forth many years ago (A. J. P. III 442); and 'becomes' itself is a so-called 'becomes'. So of the process called 'repraesentatio'. We say that the original subjunctive construction is retained after ἵνα, ὅταν and the like, after a past tense by 'repraesentatio'. And then some one points out triumphantly that the iterative optative is always retained. Yes. But why? On the simple principle that you cannot eat your cake and have it too. And this profound maxim I impressed on my beginners in Greek wellnigh fifty years ago. You cannot have *repraesentatio* and a distinct reference to the past in the same breath. As to the origin of the 'Modusverschiebung' I have nothing more to say here (A. J. P. XXIII 129). That the iterative or frequentative optative did not originate in the conditional sentence, if we may judge by Homer (Monro, H. G. § 311) is an old story, but old, old stories have a fascination for the grammatical soul and I find myself too often guilty of the same vain repetition that I find fault with in others.

When the apostle says: 'I am a debtor both to the Greeks and to the Barbarians, both to the wise and the unwise', he is not rhetorical, he is effusively natural. The combination of opposites or complements to form a totality is common to all languages, if one dare generalize in such matters. So we of English speech inherit a host of such expressions as 'man and woman' = 'mankind', 'up and down' = 'everywhere', 'small and great' = 'everybody', 'rich and poor' = 'society'. We make a goodly number to suit emergencies and, as is the shameless way of our piratical speech, we help ourselves to foreign prefixes, if need be, such as 'anti-' and 'non-', 'revolutionist', and 'anti-revolutionist', 'union' and 'non-union', 'Catholic' and 'non-Catholic'. The psychological process of this polarization, as it has been called, is not uninteresting, and the manifestation of it in different languages is not uninstructive. Why are the poles of the same contrast reversed, say in English and in German as 'soul and body' 'Leib und Seele'? Why are polarizations familiar in one language and not familiar in another? Why do the Germans say 'Er kennt Gott und die Welt' whereas we have nothing exactly equivalent? Then there is the emergence of contrasts such as λόγῳ and ἔργῳ, the fixing of synonyms by 'antonyms', as they have been called. There is the use of the pair when only one is strictly appropriate, as in the passionate words of Kreon, Antig. 1108–09: ἴτ', ἴτ' ὀπάδοντες, οἵ τ' ὄντες οἵ τ' ἀπόντες. In this light it is not so absurd after all to say, 'Now

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parents that have children dear and eke ye that have none'. These are all points that have always attracted the student of semantics, and it is not surprising that with the increasing interest in the psychological side of syntactical studies, the last few years should have brought us two treatises on the subject: one by Henrich, *Die sog. polarische Ausdrucksweise im Griechischen*, 1899; the other by Dr. ERNST KEMMER (Würzburg, Stuber, 1903). The former has not reached the Journal; the latter is No. 15 of SCHANZ'S *Beiträge zur historischen Syntax der griechischen Sprache*. The author labors or seems to labor heavily in the elaborate psychological part. In what is for me the practical part, the material will be welcome to the student of Greek, but Dr. KEMMER lacks the lightness of touch that is so desirable in handling the mass of facts. One thinks what a master like BRÉAL would have made of the subject, and sighs.

H. L. W.: Students of Latin epigraphy have long needed a collection of the most important and interesting inscriptions in two or three handy volumes which one could carry on a journey or use during a summer vacation as a substitute for the *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*. The first volume of such a collection was issued eleven years ago by H. Dessau (*Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae*, I, Berlin, 1892) and contains 2956 inscriptions classified in ten chapters each of which—with one or two exceptions—is concerned with a special class of individuals. The first part of the second volume (Berlin, 1902, pp. 736) now brings the total number of inscriptions to 7210, adding four chapters, *Tituli sacri et sacerdotum* (XI), *Tituli pertinentes ad ludos* (XII), *Tituli operum locorumque publicorum. Termini. Tituli nonnulli aedificiorum privatorum* (XIII), *Tituli municipales* (XIV). Scattered through these chapters are many inscriptions not yet published in the *Corpus*, notably the archaic inscription of the Roman Forum discovered in 1899 (No. 4913). As in the first volume, the text is accompanied by a brief but scholarly and helpful commentary. It is sincerely to be hoped that the remainder of the second volume as well as the third, which is to contain the indices, will appear long before another decade has elapsed.

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I.—CHARACTER-DRAWING IN THUCYDIDES.[1]

"Thucydides aims," says Bruns,[2] in substance, "in a strictly objective way to represent the course of history itself, not to give a succession of individual pictures. To only a few preferred individuals does the historian give such distinctive features, and these sparingly touched, as lift them from the mass. The private life and personal character of historical personages come into consideration only as these influence the course of public events. He avoids passing judgment in his own name on historical characters; hence independent characterizations of individual men, apart from the narrative, are excluded. Thucydides' abstention from characterizations is at first a disappointment to us; his exclusion of social and literary affairs from his narrative is a cause of regret to all, and of anger to Mr. Mahaffy. And yet, the more we think of it, the more we are inclined to justify Thucydides, at least as to the matter of characterizations. Besides, it is greater art to make the narration and grouping of facts convey judgments, whether of commendation or condemnation, than to pronounce opinions. If we can only be sure of the facts, the rest will take care of itself. The clear and truthful statement of events is history herself pronouncing judgment. In the long lapse of ages that is the safest plan. More light on events, changed points of view, may reverse the judgments of even the greatest and best-intentioned historian; facts stand and carry their judgment with them. Some such

[1] Presidential address at the meeting of the American Philological Association at New Haven, July 7, 1903.

[2] Ivo Bruns, Das Literarische Porträt der Griechen, 1896.

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austere view of the historian's function Thucydides seems to have held, and when we read the whole history with this idea in mind we can but admire his reserve and self-restraint. He "knew how to make great events tell their own story greatly; and the dramatic power of the immortal history is heightened by its dramatic reserve."

Thucydides concentrates, then, his whole power on the presentation of the kernel of events and refrains from characterizations. And yet he does give us very real pictures of some of his men. How does he accomplish this? Two ways are open to him—narration of their deeds and the dramatic presentation of the motives at work, in their speeches. "Thucydides gives us distinct portraits of the chief actors of the Peloponnesian War, but these portraits are to be found in the clearly narrated actions of the men; the words ascribed to them rarely do more than mark the stronger lines of character."[1] This remark of Jebb's is doubtless true in general; but in some cases, as even Bruns agrees, the speeches seem to be a dramatic presentation of this or that speaker's individual views and meant to bring the speaker's personality before us, in other words, to be in effect a characterization.

To the small list of preferred characters whom the historian treats not as types, but as individuals of clearly marked features and impressive personality, belong, on the one side, especially Pericles, Cleon, Nicias, Alcibiades, Demosthenes, on the other, Archidamus, Brasidas, Gylippus, Hermocrates. To these might be added a few minor—at least by comparison minor—characters, e.g., the Athenians Phormio and Paches, and the Spartans Alcidas and Sthenelaidas; though the very distinct portrait of the last-named—given in a single short speech—seems intended rather as typical of the Spartan ephor as such than as representing the individual. Still three others Thucydides makes to stand out from the mass, either by narration of facts or by brief characterizations, namely, the Spartan Pausanias and the Athenians Themistocles and Antiphon; the first two of course not as belonging to the war, but as chief factors in the events which led to the supremacy of Athens. The characterization of Themistocles indeed gives more directly than in any other case the subjective judgment of the historian, and is measurably full, as was allowable

[1] "The Speeches of Thucydides," in Hellenica, 1880.

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perhaps, seeing that Themistocles was the founder of Athenian naval supremacy, on which the fortunes of the war depended.

But the exigencies of space and time compel me to choose even among these few especially preferred characters of the history. And so I shall attempt to point out Thucydides' method of character-drawing, and to give a clear idea of what he thereby accomplishes, by four chief personages: Brasidas and Cleon, Nicias and Gylippus. These are so set counter to each other in the history as to bring out more effectively by contrast each other's strength and weakness.

I may be pardoned, however, for digressing for a moment from this plan, in order to cast a glance at the greatest character of Athenian political history, as Thucydides represents him. The rule of the history—the march of events with no especial emphasis upon the individual—applies to the great Pericles just as to lesser characters.[1] In Book I his name occurs several times as leader of the Athenian troops (I. 111, 114, 116, 117). There he is a part of the course of events. Suddenly history thrusts him forward as the dominant factor. The Lacedaemonian ambassadors, in the negotiations preceding the declaration of war, demand that the Athenians "drive out the pollution of the goddess." They did this, according to Thucydides, nominally in behalf of religion, but really because they knew that Pericles was connected with the Cylonian matter on the mother's side, and because they thought if he should be banished what they hoped from the Athenians would readily come to them. They did not, however, expect that he would suffer this so much, as that he would come into ill-repute with the state, in that the war would be in part due to the misfortune of his relationship. For, being the most influential man of his time and the leader of the state, he opposed the Lacedaemonians in all things, not permitting the Athenians to yield, but urging them to war.[2] "At this moment," says Bruns, "history is concentrated in this one person, because the opposing party single him out as their most dangerous enemy, and the situation becomes not Sparta against Athens, but Sparta against Pericles." We are told presently that Pericles, fearing that Archidamus, the traditional guest-friend of his family, out of good-will, or the Spartan state, out of malice, may spare his estate and thus bring him into

[1] See Bruns, p. 4 ff.

[2] i. 126 f.

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discredit, turns his property over to the state;[1] this is told, however, not to glorify Pericles, but as an historical fact. Beyond this we shall learn nothing directly of his personal character and private life more than of lesser personages; indeed, not so much as of Cleon and Alcibiades. For Pericles' public action is not influenced by personal interests, as in their case; in him we see simply the intellect at work in the sphere of politics.

From this time to his death Pericles is the most prominent figure in the history, and the narrative becomes in reality a valuation of the great statesman's ideals and of his policy. And yet, in conformity with the law of style imposed upon himself, Thucydides gives us, even in the three speeches, only historical facts; so grouped, however, that the resulting picture of the man is more vivid and permanent than the characterization recorded in Book II, c. 65. "Thucydides has herein accomplished," says Bruns, "a masterpiece in objective historical composition. Three historical moments when Pericles is the speaker are realistically reproduced, but through the choice of these occasions and the inner connection given to them, there comes out behind the questions of the day that are discussed a definitive and convincing picture of the man's spiritual being."

We can but marvel at the historian's economy in the disposition of the materials at his disposal for representing Pericles as supreme political factor. There are only three significant occasions in which Pericles speaks: (1) to show that war is inevitable and to outline his policy;[2] (2) to defend that policy and himself, and to hearten his despondent countrymen;[3] (3) in the Funeral Oration,[4] "that splendid monument of his grave enthusiasm for Athens," to show what manner of state they are fighting for, to give "a picture of Athens in her social glory well calculated both to rouse the pride and nerve the courage of her citizens." "Seeking ground of consolation for the survivors, he could not avoid," says Bruns, "setting forth the moral worth and the cultural significance of the state, the 'School of Hellas' for whose honor and preservation these men had offered their lives." "Fix your eyes," says Pericles, "upon the greatness of Athens until you become filled with the love of her, and in the presence of the spectacle of her glory reflect that this empire has been acquired by men who knew their duty and dared to do it." What an im-

[1] ii. 13. [2] i. 140–144. [3] ii. 60–64. [4] ii. 35–46.

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pression we get from this great speech, not only of the glory of the state, but of the dignity of the man! "Every reader of the Funeral Oration must be aware," says Jebb, "of a majesty in the rhythm of the whole, a certain union of impetuous movement with lofty grandeur, which Thucydides has ascribed to Pericles alone." In book II. c. 65, on the announcement of the death of Pericles, the historian gives a subjective characterization, masked it is true as an explanation of an historical fact, which summarizes and to some extent supplements the qualities embodied in the speeches. This characterization and the three speeches, if repeatedly and carefully studied, give an impressive and abiding picture of Pericles the statesman. But tempting as it is to dwell upon the character and qualities of Pericles, I must proceed to the discussion of the four characters selected to exemplify the historian's method of drawing character.

After Pericles, Brasidas seems to be the favorite character of the historian. "Brasidas," says Classen, "whom Thucydides distinguishes as the most capable general of the Spartans, is from the first portrayed with warm interest even in minor details of his activity." He first appears in a minor exploit, but one thoroughly characteristic, and we feel at once the historian's sympathy with the man. An Athenian and Corcyraean force, disembarked from 50 ships, was attacking Methone. "Now Brasidas, son of Tellis, a Spartan," says Thucydides, "happened to be in those parts keeping guard, and, seeing the danger, came to the aid of the inhabitants with a hundred hoplites. He made his way through the scattered parties of Athenian troops, whose attention was occupied with the fortress, and threw himself into Methone, suffering a slight loss; he thus saved the place. The exploit was publicly acknowledged at Sparta, Brasidas being the first Spartan who obtained this distinction in the war." The real Brasidas is now before us. His great career begun on that occasion is not more conspicuous in deeds during the next nine years (431–422) than their representation through bare recital of facts in Thucydides' austere history is life-like and effective.

In his next brief appearances the same Brasidas is always before us, whether in the speech of the Lacedaemonian commanders (II. 87)—in which I seem to detect the Brasidean ring; the feigned attack on Naupactus (ii. 90) which drew the shrewd Phormio, against his will, into the narrow bay; or the

[1] ii. 25.

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audacious plan to surprise the Peiraeus (II. 93)—the plan, I say, not its execution, for what Brasidas planned he at least attempted to carry out; or in the single mention of him in book III (c. 79), where as adviser of the incompetent admiral Alcidas, he vainly urged a speedy attack upon Corcyra when there was much confusion and fear in the city.

At Pylos we see again the intrepid and desperate fighter. The Peloponnesian fleet is attempting to land in its attack upon the Athenian fort that had been established on Lacedaemonian soil. The situation is extremely difficult, since the narrow space allows only a few ships to come up at a time; and so, resting and fighting by turns, they make their attack with great spirit, loudly exhorting one another to force the enemy and take the fort. Brasidas distinguished himself above all others.—*πάντων δὲ φανερώτατος Βρασίδας ἐγένετο*, says Thucydides. He was captain of a ship, and, seeing his fellow captains, if they could not land anywhere, hesitating and afraid of running their ships on the rocks, he called out to them: "Don't spare timber when the enemy have built a fort in our country; wreck the ships and force a landing!" Thus upraiding the others, he compelled his own pilot to run his ship aground, and made for the gangway. But in attempting to disembark he was knocked down by the Athenians, and after receiving many wounds swooned away and fell into the fore part of the ship; his shield dropped off his arm into the sea, and, being washed ashore, was taken up by the Athenians and used for the trophy which they raised after their victory.[1]

In the year 424 occurs a daring exploit, the exact parallel of that at Methone: this time by a rush with 300 picked men he saves the city of Megara from the Athenians. A little later in the same year he is sent to Chalcidice to the dissatisfied allies of Athens, in order by a diversion to draw off the Athenians from the coasts of Laconia. Here[2] Thucydides works into the narrative a capital characterization, as an explanation of the Chalcidians' desire for Brasidas. "He was even more willing to go," says Thucydides, "than they were to send him. The Chalcidians too desired to have him, for at Sparta he had always been considered a man of energy. And on this expedition he proved invaluable to the Lacedaemonians. At the same time he gave an impression of justice and moderation in his behavior to the cities, which

[1] iv. 11 f. [2] iv. 81.

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induced many of them to revolt, while others were betrayed into his hands. Thus the Lacedaemonians were able to lighten the pressure of war upon Peloponnesus, and when shortly afterward they desired to negotiate, they had places to give in return for what they sought to recover. And at a later period of the war, after the Sicilian expedition, the honesty and ability of Brasidas, which some had experienced and of which others had heard the fame, mainly attracted the Athenian allies to the Lacedaemonians. For as he was the first who was sent out and proved himself to be in every way a good man, he left in their minds a firm conviction that others would be like him." Note the complimentary terms which Thucydides here applies to his hero, hiding himself under a Chalcidian mask: "man of energy" (*δραστήριος*), "just and moderate" (*δίκαιος καὶ μέτριος*), "honest and of clear insight" (*ἀρετὴ καὶ ξύνεσις*), "in every way a good man" (*κατὰ πάντα ἀγαθός*). Compare also a remark of Thucydides himself relative to Brasidas' cleverness in speech, as displayed in negotiations of this period. "For a Lacedaemonian he was not a bad speaker,"[1] says the austere historian, from whom a word of praise is a eulogy. Of Brasidas' expedition to Amphipolis (424), where he outgeneraled Thucydides and thus caused the banishment of that commander, the historian states the facts without a word of self-justification. But we learn that "the cities which were subject to Athens, when they heard of the taking of Amphipolis and of Brasidas' promises and of his gentleness, were more impatient than ever to rise, and privately sent embassies to him, asking him to come and help them, every one of them wanting to be the first."[2]

The next exploit of Brasidas was one to test to the fullest his courage and presence of mind. When he and Perdiccas had determined to withdraw from the country of the Illyrians, the Macedonians fell into an unaccountable panic and decamped *en masse* in the night. Brasidas quickly arranged his troops for an orderly retreat, and encouraged his men in a short speech which, whether ever made or not, clearly sets forth, we may accept, the motives underlying his conduct on this trying occasion. "Mobs like these," said he, "if an adversary withstand their first attack, do but threaten at a distance and make a flourish of valor; although, if one yields to them, they are brave enough to run after him when there is no danger."[3] The result was as he had anticipated, and his whole army escaped without loss.

[1] iv, 84. [2] iv. 118. [3] iv. 126.

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When Brasidas and Cleon are opposed to each other in the Amphipolis campaign, in September, 422, Thucydides attributes to the soldiers of Cleon sentiments which are undoubtedly his own. "The soldiers," said he, "drew comparisons between the generals; what skill and enterprise might be expected on the one side, and what ignorance and cowardice on the other."[1] It was as the soldiers expected. When Cleon, after his reconnoissance, was moving off with his army in disorder, Brasidas, having selected 150 hoplites to make the first attack, exhorted the army in characteristic style. "Do not show weakness, seeing what is at stake," he concluded, "and I will show you that I can not only advise others, but fight myself." Then, when he observed the general retreat of Cleon's army, he shouted, "Those men do not mean to face us; see how their spears and their heads are shaking; such behavior always shows that an army is going to run away. Open the gates and let us at them!"[2]

Brasidas' onset with his 150 hoplites upon the Athenian center, speedily supported by the main body, was entirely successful. The sudden attack at both points created a panic. "Cleon, who had never intended to remain," says Thucydides, "fled at once and was overtaken and slain." But unfortunately the brave Brasidas was fatally wounded in the melee, and, like Wolfe at Quebec, survived only long enough to learn that his army was victorious. Thucydides does not pronounce a eulogy upon, or even give a formal characterization of, the dead hero, though he does honor him with a full statement of facts, which amounts to a eulogy. "Brasidas was buried," he says, "with public honors in front of the agora. The whole body of the allies, in military array, followed him to the grave. The Amphipolitans enclosed his sepulchre, and to this day they sacrifice to him as a hero, and also celebrate games and yearly offerings in his honor."[3] This is the fullest statement of the kind in Thucydides.

If Brasidas is Thucydides' favorite character, Cleon is his especial aversion. In his case alone the historian abandons his constant attitude of self-restraint and impartiality. In all others he leaves to the facts of history the verdict of approval or condemnation; in the case of Cleon he breaks this reserve. Grote, who is inclined to defend Cleon, suspects the cause to be

[1] v. 7. [2] v. 10. [3] v. 11.

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personal—the fact that Cleon was the reputed accuser when the historian was sentenced to banishment. At any rate, Cleon is introduced on his first appearance with words that betray the historian's strong aversion: "Cleon, the son of Cleaenetus, who also had carried the former decree of death, being in other respects the most violent of the citizens, and by far the most persuasive at that time with the demos, came forward and spoke."[1] It was not his first appearance before the Athenian assembly, for he was already recognized, as seen above, as the speaker "most persuasive with the demos," and we know from Plutarch that he had risen into importance a few years earlier, during the lifetime of Pericles and as an opponent of his. Thucydides characterizes Cleon by making him at times an imitator of the language of the great Pericles. Classen says, "Thucydides probably purposely puts into the mouth of Cleon turns of thought and expression which are clearly echoes of the speeches of Pericles. Cp. III. 38. 1; 40. 4. Far as Cleon was removed from him in mind and mode of thinking, he had yet learned from him what was effective in a speech." Rather, it seems to me, a subtle and adroit way the historian has of characterizing the demagogue; for it is, as Professor Shorey remarks, "the seamy side of the Periclean ideal" that Cleon represents. Thucydides reserves him until a crisis in which he plays a thoroughly characteristic rôle, one which merits and meets with our unqualified horror and condemnation. The proposition which he had carried in the ecclesia and was now defending was to kill all Mitylenaeans of military age—about 6,000—and to sell as slaves the women and children. We shall find him two years later carrying a like decree "to destroy Scione and put the citizens to the sword." The speech of Cleon[2] is one of the most remarkable recorded in Thucydides and justifies the terms employed to characterize him, "most violent" (*βιαιότατος*) and "most persuasive with the people" (*τῷ δήμῳ πιθανώτατος*).

His next important appearance is in a rôle as characteristic as that against the Mytilenaeans. This time he is the blustering demagogue.[3] When the Lacedaemonians, in dismay at the situation of their troops in Sphacteria, offered very advantageous terms to the Athenians, these, reflecting that now it was in their

[1] iii. 36. [2] iii. 37–40. [3] iv. 21–23 and 26 ff.

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power at any time to make peace, followed Cleon and demanded more. But the blockade of the island spun itself out interminably, and the watch became harassing to the Athenians. Cleon, knowing that he was becoming an object of general mistrust because he had stood in the way of peace, first boldly challenged the reports from Pylos. Then, when he himself was delegated to go and inspect the situation, he urged rather to send a fleet against the island. "He declared sarcastically that if the generals were good for anything they might easily sail to the island and take the men; that he would do it if he were general." This was intended for Nicias, whom Cleon hated. Nicias promptly offered to resign in Cleon's favor, and he then tried to back out. "But the more Cleon declined the proffered command and tried to retract, the more the multitude, as their manner is, urged Nicias to resign and shouted to Cleon that he should sail."[1] So he had to undertake the expedition. But choosing as colleague, Demosthenes, who was in command at Pylos and the ablest Athenian general of the war, and already purposing an attack upon the island, he vauntingly said that in twenty days he would be back with the Lacedaemonians as prisoners or would slay them on the spot. "His vain words," says Thucydides, "moved the Athenians to laughter; nevertheless the wiser sort of men were pleased when they reflected that of two good things they could not fail to obtain one—either there would be an end of Cleon, which they would have greatly preferred, or, if they were disappointed, he would put the Lacedaemonians into their hands." Evidently the historian is giving his own feeling in the general sentiment. But the "mad" promise of Cleon was made good; for he did bring back the prisoners within twenty days.

Cleon's success at Sphacteria, however, was to be his own undoing. He persuades the Athenians, in 422, to send him in command of an expedition to the Chalcidian cities. His opponent was Brasidas. They met at Amphipolis, where Thucydides two years before had been outgeneraled by the same commander. His soldiers had no confidence in him and had unwillingly followed him from Athens; their mistrust was speedily justified. When Brasidas made his impetuous assault with 150 men upon the center of Cleon's army, the Athenians were terrified at his

[1] Perhaps the only passage where the serious historian allows himself to betray a feeling for humor.

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audacity, and "Cleon indeed, who had never intended to remain, fled at once, and, being overtaken by a Myrcinian targeteer, was slain."[1] "Brasidas and Cleon," says Thucydides by way of summary, "had been the two greatest enemies of peace—the one because the war brought him success and reputation, the other because he fancied that in quiet times his rogueries would be more transparent and his slanders less credible."[2]

Ingenious attempts have often been made to reverse the verdict of history in the case of one and another arch-sinner. The effort has been made to whitewash, at least to exculpate, Cleon, notably by Grote. But in Cleon's case more explicitly than in any other, Thucydides has departed from his rule to state facts, not pronounce judgments. In few words, but unmistakably, he has condemned Cleon; his aversion to him is as undisguised as his sympathy with Brasidas is apparent. The world has too long believed in the self-restraint and impartiality of Thucydides to be convinced now, that his aversion to Cleon was due to a personal grudge. Thucydides had suffered at the hands of both Brasidas and Cleon: by the former he had been outgeneraled; on the latter's motion he had been banished. The one he admires; the other he despises. The verdict of his history is likely to stand in both cases. As Thucydides represents him, Brasidas was not only a thunderbolt of war, but a military genius of the first order; he was a forcible and persuasive speaker, a winning personality, a magnetic man who inspired confidence and drew men to him, whether as military commander or as political ambassador. In the case of Cleon, the greatest historian and the greatest satirist of the world, who knew all the facts, have both branded him as the arch-demagogue; and their verdict will stand. Cleon is pilloried forever.

We have been allowed to know more of the personality of Cleon than of Pericles or of Brasidas. The reason is doubtless, as Bruns says, that the personality of Cleon influences his public actions: hence we are permitted to know not merely the politician and soldier, but the rude, violent, vain, swaggering man. We have, too, a psychological analysis of his motives, because we could not otherwise understand his historical rôle. We shall find this still more marked in the case of Nicias.

Of the chief men in the Peloponnesian War, Nicias is perhaps relatively the least important, as far as real ability and force of

[1] v. 6–11. [2] v. 16.

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character are concerned; but we have a fuller psychological analysis, we are allowed to see deeper into his soul than any other man's. The reason is that his is a more complicated nature; in him the most varying motives cross each other. Fate makes him play a conspicuous rôle; for by reason of his wealth, his public spirit, his consistently just conduct, his reputation for success, the people have confidence in him. He is the exponent of the peace party. Fate and the people's faith make him, against his will, the leader of the fateful Sicilian expedition, and, because he is unequal to the task, he becomes the cause of his country's overthrow. Because therefore of the rôle he had to play, if not for his ability and force of character, the history should give a full and clear picture of him; and it does.

Nicias first becomes prominent in the history when, answering Cleon's taunts in the Sphacterian matter, he offered to yield the command to him. We have seen the outcome above. As the representative of the peace party at Athens and the chief opponent of Cleon, he becomes still more prominent after the other's death. "Nicias, the son of Niceratus, who had been the most fortunate general of his day," says Thucydides,[1] "became more eager than ever to make an end of the war. He desired whilst he was still successful and held in repute, to preserve his good fortune; he would have liked to rest from toil, and to give the people rest; and he hoped to leave behind him to other ages the name of a man who in all his life had never brought disaster on the city. He thought that the way to gain his wish was to trust as little as possible to fortune and to keep out of danger; and that danger would be best avoided by peace."

Here, under the form of an explanation of his position as representative of the peace party, we have really a characterization. Up to this point, he has played an important rôle in a worthy manner; but for the Sicilian expedition he would have come down to us, not indeed as a great statesman and general, but as a safe leader who had deserved well of his country. It is the irony of fate that Nicias, who saw so clearly the folly and even the danger of this expedition—so complete a departure from Pericles' policy—, that Nicias, chief representative of the peace party and anti-imperialist as he was, should have been forced by the people's confidence in his integrity and ability, to take the

[1] v. 16.

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chief command in that imperialistic enterprise, and should not only become the chief cause of the failure of the expedition, but lose his own life and reputation.

Five days after the expedition had been voted, in an assembly called to consider its immediate equipment, Nicias, who had been elected general against his will,[1] thinking that upon slight and flimsy grounds they were aspiring to the conquest of Sicily, which was no easy task, said, among other things:[2] "I tell you that in going to Sicily you are leaving many enemies behind you, and seem to be bent on bringing new ones hither. We should not run into danger and seek to gain a new empire before we have fully secured the old. On behalf of our country, now on the brink of the greatest danger which she has ever known, I entreat you to hold up your hands against it." But the people were the more resolved upon war, and Nicias, thinking that he might possibly change their minds by the magnitude of the equipment asked for, demanded a force more magnificent and costly than had ever been sent out by any single Hellenic power. "The result disappointed him. Far from losing their enthusiasm at the disagreeable prospect, they were more determined than ever; they approved of his advice, and were confident that every chance of danger was now removed. All alike were seized with a passionate desire to sail, the elder among them convinced that they would achieve the conquest of Sicily; at any rate such an armament could suffer no disaster; the youth were longing to see with their own eyes the marvels of a distant land, and were confident of a safe return; the main body of the troops expected to receive present pay, and to conquer a country which would be an inexhaustible mine of pay for the future. The enthusiasm of the majority was so overwhelming that although some disapproved, they were afraid of being thought unpatriotic if they voted on the other side, and therefore held their peace."[3]

The chief cause of the fateful expedition was Alcibiades; but in the conduct of the enterprise the destiny of Athens came to rest in the unwilling hands of Nicias. Alcibiades, after he had become a traitor, did what resentment and diabolical cleverness could avail to damage his country; but the unhappy Nicias was the chief instrument of fate in the disaster. "The simple course of historical events becomes an indirect characterization of the

[1] vi. 8. [2] vi. 9–14. [3] vi. 24.

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man." The narration and grouping of events show unmistakably the historian's condemnation of the unfortunate general whom he never blames in word. And why should he condemn in word, when the facts do it inevitably and irrevocably? The historian's narrative of facts makes only too plain that Nicias was over-cautious, irresolute, procrastinating, afraid of the demos, superstitious. The one excuse that could have been urged for Nicias was that he was suffering from an incurable disease. But as Thucydides does not accuse, so he does not excuse; he simply mentions the fact.[1]

Perhaps it is allowable to see in the summary of Nicias' views,[2] given in the council of Athenian commanders after the defeat on Epipolae, a masked characterization and even condemnation of the unfortunate Nicias. Demosthenes had urged instant withdrawal from Syracuse; Nicias acknowledges that the situation is bad and that it is best to retreat, but is loath to admit this openly; he tries to persuade himself that the affairs of the Syracusans are even worse off than their own; besides he fears the demos at Athens. Overcautiously weighing all the pros and cons, he is inclined both ways. Against withdrawal he sets probable accusations of treachery on the part of hostile orators at home. Not knowing what to do, he did nothing; though it was more important to come to some positive conclusion than that the conclusion should be right.

Let us now summarize briefly the cardinal mistakes of Nicias, as they may be gathered from Thucydides' narration of facts. (1) Nicias rejects Lamachus' advice to sail direct to Syracuse and fight as soon as possible under the walls.[3] Formidable at first, by wasting the winter at Catana he fell into contempt and allowed time for succor to come from Peloponnesus. (2) Learning of Gylippus' approach and despising the small number of his ships, at first he set no watch; then, when he did send four ships to intercept him, was *too late*.[4] (3) Lets Gylippus get into Syracuse by way of Euryâlus.[5] (4) Allows Gylippus to surprise and take the fort Labdalon.[6] (5) Sends twenty ships to waylay at the Porthmus the Corinthian succors for Syracuse, but *too late*.[7] (6) Allows Gylippus to build in the night the Syracusan crosswall past the Athenian wall of circumvallation.[8]

[1] vii. 15. [2] vii. 48. [3] vi. 49. [4] vii. 1.
[5] vii. 4, 7. [6] vii. 3. [7] vii. 2. [8] vii. 6.

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(7) Permits Gylippus to surprise and capture Plemmyrium, with the result that the Syracusans were henceforth "masters of the mouth of the harbor on both sides, so that not a single storeship could enter without a convoy and a battle."[1] (8) Allows Gylippus and the Syracusans to send to southern Italy and cut off a supply fleet meant for the Athenians.[2] (9) Is deceived by a ruse and drawn into a seafight when the men are unprepared and hungry.[3] (10) Rejects the proposition of Demosthenes and Eurymedon to leave Sicily immediately after the failure of the night-attack on Epipolae.[4] (11) Having finally consented, in view of matters getting worse and worse, to lead off the army, he is frightened by an eclipse of the moon and gives orders, obeying the injunction of the soothsayers, to wait still twenty-seven days.[5] (12) Fooled by the messengers of Hermocrates, on the night after the great seafight, he postpones immediate departure.[6]

That is the last mistake. All had been made that were possible, or necessary to, the catastrophe that was now inevitable. The expedition was one series of costly errors committed with the best motives on the part of a brave and patriotic but not great man. On the retreat, Nicias behaves heroically and energetically, but it avails nothing. "He had hoped," says Thucydides, "to leave behind him to the ages the name of a man who in all his life had never brought disaster on the city." But note the Sophoclean irony in those other words with which the same historian sums up the disaster of the last expedition which Nicias led: "Of all the Hellenic actions which are on record, this was the greatest—the most glorious to the victors, the most ruinous to the vanquished; for they were utterly and at all points defeated, and their sufferings were prodigious. Fleet and army perished from the face of the earth; nothing was saved, and of the many who went forth few returned home."

Does this Thucydidean picture of Nicias, as gathered from the facts narrated, comport with the historian's remark that "Nicias of all the Hellenes of his time least deserved so to perish, on account of the whole course of his life regulated according to virtue?"[7] Jebb thinks, "The fate of Nicias seemed to Thucydides a signal example of unmerited misfortune, since Nicias had been remarkable throughout life for the practice of

[1] vii. 22, 23. [2] vii. 25. [3] vii. 39–41. [4] vii. 48, 49.
[5] vii. 50. [6] vii. 73, 74. [7] vii. 86.

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orthodox virtue." But the facts as narrated make it impossible to accept this as Thucydides' view. It is simply a statement by the historian of the popular impression of such a life, as Bruns expresses it; or, it may be, as Professor Shorey puts it, that the famous words "convey quite as much irony or sense of dramatic contrast as moral affirmation;" or it may be an expression of skepticism.

The character of Gylippus, the Spartan commander at Syacuse, is in marked contrast with that of Nicias. Doubtless Thucydides intended by this contrast that we should feel the more strongly the essential weakness of Nicias—his over-cautiousness; his incapacity to seize unerringly, and utilize instantaneously the critical moment for action. Gylippus, in courage, energy, coolness, resolute and prompt action, is a second Brasidas. He was probably not, though we have no means of knowing, also a diplomat and statesman, as Brasidas was. Alcibiades, after turning traitor, had said to the Spartans (vi. 93): "A Spartan commander I conceive to be even more indispensable than an army," i. e., for the Syracusans. Gylippus was just the man for the crisis. He began instantly to make energetic preparations, and was soon at Tarentum and Thurii, thinking to save South Italy at any rate, since all reports were that the Athenian lines round Syracuse were now complete. "Nicias heard of his approach, but despised the small number of his ships, thinking it a privateering expedition, and set no watch (vi. 104)." Landing at Himera, he began at once to draw allies to him, for "the impression got abroad," says Thucydides, "that he had come full of zeal (viii. 1)." A Corinthian ship-captain, who slipped into Syacuse at that time and announced Gylippus' approach, found the citizens on the point of holding an assembly about giving up the war, and when Gylippus forced his way in shortly after by way of Euryâlus, he found the Athenian wall of circumvallation all but complete. So near was Syracuse to destruction (c. 2).

How must Nicias have been startled at the arrogance of Gylippus' communication on the day of his arrival—"offering a truce if they were willing to quit Sicily within five days, taking what belonged to them (c. 3). Nicias in contempt made no reply, but some of his soldiers derisively asked the herald, "Does the presence of a Spartan cloak and staff make you so strong as to despise Athenians?" (Plutarch, *Nicias* 19). The next day Gylippus surprises and takes the fort Labdalon (c. 3). Defeated

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a few days later in his first collision with the Athenians, he tells his troops, as General Lee told his after Antietam, "the fault was not theirs, but his," then leads them again next day to battle, and is victorious (c. 5 f.). The following night the Syracusans build their crosswall past the Athenian wall, thus forever preventing the circumvallation. Next the Corinthian Erasinides, eluding Nicias' guardships, sailed into Syracuse; Gylippus was off into various cities of Sicily to collect land and naval forces; ambassadors were despatched to Lacedæmon and Corinth asking for reinforcements; and the Syracusans were now manning a navy and practising with the intention of trying their hand at this new sort of warfare (c. 7). Verily a marvelous change had been wrought in the situation in an incredibly short time, in painful contrast to Nicias' course of action during the whole preceding winter; so that Nicias must presently confess in a letter to Athens, "We who are supposed to be besiegers are really the besieged (c. 11)." The next spring Gylippus attacks Plemmyrium from the land side, while the Syacusan fleet is engaged with that of the Athenians, and takes the three forts, this loss being one of the severest blows that befell the Athenians, causing discouragement and dismay throughout the army (cc. 22, 23). When the Syracusan fleet again attacks that of the Athenians in the Great Harbor, Gylippus lends material aid by a similar attack upon the Athenian fortifications (c. 37). After Demosthenes' failure in the night-attack on Epipolæ, Gylippus goes again into the rest of Sicily to get still more troops, "being now in hopes to carry the Athenian fortifications by storm (c. 46)."

In the speeches of the rival commanders on the eve of the final seafight in the Great Harbor, Thucydides portrays most effectively, by contrast, the situation and the mood of the two armies. Nicias (vii. 61–64) sums up the whole meaning of the supreme crisis in these words: "Stand firm, therefore, now if ever, and remember, one and all of you who are now embarking, that on you hangs the whole state and the great name of Athens; for her sake, if any man exceed another in skill or courage, let him display them now." That is the note of desperation. But the note with which men win battles is that of Gylippus (vii. 66–68): "You have set men the example of withstanding that invincible navy, which you have now defeated in several engagements, and which you will probably defeat in this. For when men are crippled in what they assume to be their strength, any

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vestige of self-respect is more completely lost than if they had never believed in themselves at all. When once their pride has had a fall, they throw away the power of resistance which they might still exert. Far otherwise is it with us. Our natural courage, which even in the days of our inexperience dared to risk all, is now better assured, and when we go on to reflect that he is strongest who has overcome the strongest, the hopes of everyone are doubled. And in all enterprises the highest hopes infuse the greatest courage." "They are come," he adds, "into the desperate strait of risking a battle in such manner as they can, trusting more to fortune than to their own strength." In the measures taken to block the progress of the Athenians on the fatal retreat, Gylippus and Hermocrates are the joint leading spirits; their plans are conceived with skill and executed with merciless precision until at last the remnants of the whole vast host have been bagged or butchered.

We are accustomed to admire among Thucydides' great qualities as an historian his impartiality, his trustworthiness, vivid description, sense of contrast, conciseness, epigrammatic sententiousness, reserve, pathos. He is never a partisan, and the unsophisticated reader might at times wonder what his nationality was did he not frequently subscribe himself Thucydides the Athenian. Historians sometimes criticize his attitude, but they all accept his facts. His descriptions of battles read as if he himself had been present. He dramatizes history by placing events in such juxtaposition that a world of moral is conveyed without a word of comment; for example, when the funeral oration with its splendid eulogy of Athens is followed by the description of the plague, the disgraceful Melian episode is succeeded by the Sicilian disaster, the holiday-like departure from Athens is set over against the distressful flight from Syracuse. He packs his language so full of meaning that at times a sentence does duty for a paragraph, a word for a sentence. His political wisdom finds expression so epigrammatic and weighty that the Earl of Chatham might well call his work "that eternal manual of statesmen." "Of all manifestations of power, self-restraint impresses men most," and however much we may regret his reserve,—since for much that he might have told us we have no other witness,—I have come to regard this as really great art. As for pathos, no historian ever excelled such passages as those where the utter defeat of a hitherto invincible navy is

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portrayed (VII. 71), or the misery and dejection of the departing Athenian host is described (c. 75), or the final catastrophe in the river Assinarus seems to occur before our eyes (c. 84), preparing us for the final sentence: "Fleet and army perished from the face of the earth; nothing was saved, and of the many who went forth few returned home." In the exhibition of all these qualities Thucydides is supremely great. Is it too much to claim that also in the drawing of characters like Brasidas and Nicias—not in what he says, rather in what he does not say, but makes facts say—Thucydides is a great master?

CHARLES FORSTER SMITH.

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II.—TEMPORAL SENTENCES OF LIMIT IN GREEK.

Schanz's 'Beiträge zur historischen Syntax der griechischen Sprache', which began shortly after this Journal was founded, have not moved forward very rapidly of late, and the Historical Syntax, which was to have resulted in seven or eight years after the first 'contribution', does not seem to be much nearer completion than other syntactical work of much more recent inception. In all these years scientific syntax has not stood still, and the rebellion against the arrangement followed by Schanz's staff is in full swing. We are, it seems, to do away with such abstractions as final sentences and conditional sentences, or, if final and conditional relations are mentioned at all, they are to be subordinated to the introductory particles. The body, say, of ὡς, is not to be broken up and scattered among half a dozen categories. ὡς is one. To be sure, as a matter of practice, the categories reäppear under the various introductory particles, and the whole matter resolves itself into a question of, say, 6x4 or 4x6. Nor was the old way without its advantages. The observation of the phenomena under this or that metaphysical category, if you choose, sets one thinking. It certainly means something that the consecutive sentence in Greek was so late in its development. The final infinitive is much more primitive than the consecutive; and it is significant that the road to the consecutive lay through the final. The purposefulness of the consecutive is ingrown in the constitution of things. 'There be gods many', says the apostle, no matter how he means it. 'The universe is full of gods', says the earliest of the Greek philosophers, and to the primitive man every consequence looks as if it were a purpose. The developed consecutive is a quasi-final and the simple infinitive becomes ὥστε with the infinitive (A. J. P. VII 164). But, not to lose myself in illustrations, I do not think that the traditional lines of syntactical research have lost all their usefulness and therefore welcome No. 14 of the 'Beiträge', which the author, Dr. Fuchs, has styled: Die Temporalsätze mit den Konjunktionen 'bis' und 'so lange als'. The title is long and awkward, and in English I should use 'Temporal Sentences of Limit'. Extent may be subsumed under Limit. Extent is the positive of which Limit is the

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negative, and whereas in modern English and in German the introductory particles are different, 'so long as', 'so lange als' and 'while', 'während' for extent and 'until' 'bis' for limit, in Greek and in Latin they are largely the same, ὄφρα, ἕως, ἕστε, 'dum', 'donec'. Nay, even in English 'while' is used dialectically as 'until'. 'Farewell, Luellen, while we meet in heaven' (Peele). Extent takes, as a rule, the durative or 'paratatic' (A. J. P. XXIII 106) tenses, Limit the aoristic or 'apobatic' tenses, but there are occasional divergencies. Sometimes 'until' does not stop at the goal, but pushes over the line and takes the durative tenses just as πρίν (οὐ πρίν = ἕως) sometimes pushes over the line and takes the durative tenses (A. J. P. II 481). Like all other temporal particles (S. C. G., § 366, p. 146), the conjunction of limit, when used with the present indicative, regularly takes on a causative connotation, when there is only partial coëxtension. For partial coëxtension ἐν ᾧ is, strictly speaking, the proper form, but sometimes ἕως is used loosely for ἐν ᾧ. Compare our English 'during'. On ἐν ὅσῳ = ἕως, see the commentators on Thukyd. 3, 28, 1 and 8, 87, 1—not noticed by Fuchs.

The dominant particle is ἕως, all others are poetical or dialectic or erratic; and as the behaviour of ἕως has been set forth in the conspectus published A. J. P. IV 416, I might content myself with arranging Dr. Fuchs's results under the categories there established. The fact is that this class of temporal sentences is used with such mechanical regularity through large stretches of the language that there is very little to interest the hunter after 'sports'. It is positively refreshing to find ἄν omitted and to be forced to ask 'why?' In Attic prose ἕως is so regular that we thank Plato for giving μέχρι a chance and for putting ἕστε into the mouth of a ξένη Ἀρκαδική (as I noted in my L. and S. article twenty years ago), the same poetical ἕστε that the *condottiere* Xenophon uses so often and may have heard daily from the Arcadian soldiers of fortune in the ranks of the Ten Thousand.[1]

[1] It is, I confess, rather daring to assume that ἕστε is specifically Arcadian, because Plato puts it in the mouth of the Mantinean, Diotima. Yet Plato was not unobservant of such matters, as he shows by the Ἴττω Ζεύς of Kebes (Phaed. 62 A). μέστ(α) = ἕως occurs in an inscription of Tegea (Meister II 119, Brugmann Gr. Gr.[3] p. 548). Later in life, the Elean ἕστα must have been familiar to Xenophon from his residence in Skillus, with which the ἕστα inscription has to do (Meister II 26, Brugmann Gr. Gr.[3] p. 548). But in Xenophon it is not always easy to decide between poetical reminiscence and

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Why, one asks, in the midst of all this regularity is ἕως 'so long as' with the present optative so very rare? Dr. Fuchs gives no answer, but does what is better and gives us one example from classic Greek (Xen. Hell. 5, 4, 37); and another is to be found in the Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία of Aristotle (A. J. P. XII 123).

In these few words I have given the sum of the whole matter, and under these depressing circumstances a monograph on the temporal sentences of limit lacks the charm of surprise. The rule comes back over and over again, and, apart from the use of varying particles in different spheres, there is little to note in the whole range of classical Greek. Of course Dr. Fuchs tries to show the paratactic origin of the temporal sentences of limit. ὄφρα and ἕως were originally indefinite 'for a while' and belonged to the leading sentence with which the following sentence was afterward welded, but he himself is forced to grant that all consciousness of the process was soon lost. But I am not satisfied with this concession. In our earliest documents the correlative feeling, the hypotactic feeling is perfectly established; the welding, if there ever was a welding, belongs to a time beyond our ken, beyond the Homeric κεν. It is absolutely impossible that the Homeric singer should have felt κε with the subjunctive as the beginning of a new sentence, and this is what the paratactic scheme demands. When we are dealing with Homer we are dealing with a highly developed, highly cultured language, and I, for one, am not concerned about what may be called cave-dwellers' Greek.

Under these conditions it is inevitable that I should consider Dr. Fuchs's monograph somewhat spun out; his 130 pages might have been reduced to a much narrower compass, and in the interest of those who have not the time for such matters I will make a summary of his treatise, which, of course, will not be all a summary, and we start with HOMER.

Time, says Dr. Fuchs, may be expressed by a participle, an adjective, e. g. τριταῖος (A. J. P. XXIII 14), by an adverb,

the jargon of the camp. Unfortunately for Fuchs, unfortunately for my article in L. and S., the reading ἔστε in the Platonic passage seems to have no MS warrant, a fact that Schanz, as the editor of Plato, ought to have pointed out to his disciple. Stallbaum, though he notes that Plato uses ἔστε nowhere else, declines to surrender it in favour of ἕως because Xenophon uses ἔστε! Surely statistical syntax has done some good, even if statistical syntacticians do not always scan their MS authority so closely as they might.

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νῦν, τότε, by prepositional combinations like *μέσφ' ἠοῦς ἠριγενείης* (Il. 8, 508). Participles with prepositions occur in certain formulae. *ἐς ἠέλιον καταδύντα* occurs four times in the Iliad, nine times in the Odyssey, the peculiar significance of which statistic it is hard to see. *ἅμα* occurs repeatedly with the participle as a temporal designation as in *ἅμ' ἠοῖ φαινομένηφι*, only once without the participle, Od. 16, 2, *ἅμ' ἠοῖ*. Then *μένω*, says Dr. Fuchs, may be translated by 'until', but it is a translation and nothing more. *μένω* with the infinitive belongs to the verbs that used to be called *προαιρετικὰ καὶ ἐφετικά*. With *πάρος* and *πρίν* we are already sufficiently acquainted (A. J. P. IV 89). To Dr. Fuchs *πάρος* and *πρίν* with infinitive are still quasi-prepositions, and he does not seem to know how lustily other scholars have been battling for a treatment of *πρίν*, which is much more in accordance with the method pursued by Fuchs himself in regard to temporal sentences of limit. Compare C. Hentze in Bezzenberger's Beiträge XXVII, p. 133. Next in order Fuchs takes up those paratactic expressions, in which 'until' is an inference, sometimes < how rarely! > without a conjunction, as in the often cited Il. 6, 340, *ἀλλ' ἄγε νῦν ἐπίμεινον, ἀρήια τεύχεα δύω* < in which everybody feels the impatience, not to say breathlessness, of the asyndeton > but more frequently with a conjunction, as Od. 2, 434, *παννυχίη μέν ῥ' ἦ γε καὶ ἠῶ πεῖρε κέλευθον,* | *ἠέλιος δ' ἀνόρουσε*.[1] Of course, we can pump an 'until' conception into the combination of an imperfect and aorist just as we can pump a 'while' conception into the combination of an aorist and imperfect, as has been done by way of illustrating the Homeric use of the imperfect. So Il. 7, 303: *ὣς ἄρα φωνήσας δῶκε ξίφος ἀργυρόηλον . . . Αἴας δὲ ζωστῆρα δίδου φοίνικι φαεινόν*, we are told to translate the paratactic *Αἴας δὲ δίδου*, 'while Aias gave'. But we must beware of setting up a genetic connection. So Il. 19, 142: *ἐπίμεινον . . . δῶρα δέ τοι οἴσουσ(ι)* cannot be the genesis of a construction that does not normally take the future indicative. Once for all, the preference for parataxis even as early as

[1] To bring the paratactic expression into genetic relation, or at any rate into conscious genetic relation, with the hypotactic form seems as unnatural as to ascribe the genesis of the *ὥστε* sentence to such an asyndeton as Hdt. 3, 12: *αἱ δὲ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων <κεφαλαὶ> οὕτω δή τι ἰσχυραί, μόγις ἂν λίθῳ παίσας διαρρήξειας*. Observe that he had used *οὕτω ὥστε* just before. We, who are born to the English tongue, find it hard to appreciate the asyndeton, 'I would lie so light, so light, I scarce should be unclasp'd at night.'

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Homer is a matter of style and art, not a mere matter of linguistic development.

The relative sentence may be looked on as the mother of hypotaxis and precedes the other sentences genetically. When we analyze a relative and call it final, conditional and the like, we are simply using convenient categories; categories which may be misleading. In the relative sentence purpose is not expressed as it is in the final sentence (A. J. P. XXIII 257); and it would be a mistake to derive the iterative optative of the relative sentence from the conditional sentence, for the original home of the so-called iterative optative is not in the conditional sentence, if we may judge by Homer, but in the relative (Monro, H. G. §§ 306, 311). ἐάν may be particular in prose, ὅς ἄν is always generic. And here it must be confessed that categories have done harm. We are all too apt to take our pigeon-holes for pilgrim shrines. Still the relative is entitled to precedence and we are not surprised to find Dr. Fuchs begin with the Homeric εἷς ὅ κε which even then had become a fixed formula so that a masculine antecedent makes no difference. εἷς ὅ κε 'until' is used 50 times in Il. and Od., always with the subjunctive except Il. 15, 70 (optative) and always preceded by a futural sentence.[1] The tense is always the aorist of antecedent action except in five passages in which the present subjunctive is used, Il. 5, 466; 9, 609 = 10, 89; 11, 666; 23, 244; passages, which Dr. Fuchs seems to find some difficulty in explaining and which he slumps together. In Il. 5, 466: ἐς τί ἔτι κτείνεσθαι ἐάσετε λαὸν Ἀχαιοῖς; ἦ εἰς ὅ κεν ἀμφὶ πύλῃς ἐυποιητῇσι μάχωνται; there is overlapping (A. J. P. II 481) 'until (ye find that) they are fighting.' And so Il. 11, 666: εἷς ὅ κε δὴ νῆες . . . θέρωνται and 23, 244: εἷς ὅ κεν αὐτὸς . . . κείνθωμαι. In Il. 9, 609 = 10, 89: ἦ (sc. Διὸς αἶσα) μ' ἕξει παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν, εἷς ὅ κ' ἀντμὴ | ἐν στήθεσσι μένῃ καί μοι φίλα γούνατ' ὀρώρῃ the only natural translation is 'so long as'. The preposition is used as in εἰς αὔριον and the present tense gives the extent. It is a very good illustration of the way in which a particle originally used for the negative side, limit, may be used for the positive side, extent. Of course, to the theorist this early development is unwelcome, but he who has penetrated into the spirit of the Homeric poems will find evidence enough of syntactical finesse and will not be ready to cry out 'Interpolation!', as Dr. Fuchs does when he

[1] Of course, neither here nor elsewhere am I responsible for Dr. Fuchs's figures.

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encounters εἰς ὅ κε with the optative; Il. 15, 70: ἐκ τοῦ δ' ἄν τοι ἔπειτα παλίωξιν παρὰ νηῶν | αἰὲν ἐγὼ τεύχοιμι διαμπερὲς εἰς ὅ κ' Ἀχαιοὶ | Ἴλιον αἰπὺ ἕλοιεν. The optative with κε is not assimilated to the preceding optative w. ἄν as Dr. Fuchs maintains. The optative with κεν shows the speaker's conviction that Ilios will be taken, nay, must be taken; and the loose relative structure makes this use much easier than if we had ἕως. See my remarks on Pind. P. 9, 129. True, interpolation is suspected on other grounds, but εἰς ὅ κε with opt. cannot be considered confirmatory evidence.

If εἰς ὅ κε is rigidly 'until', as Dr. Fuchs maintains, ὄφρα has a varied translation of 'so long as', 'while', 'until', 'up to the time that', 'in order that'. These renderings are various but the fundamental meaning of ὄφρα can be but one; and that one, according to Dr. Fuchs, is 'a while', 'irgend eine Zeit lang' = *aliquamdiu*. As to the etymology of ὄφρα he does not deign to say a word, though that is pardonable, but, which is less pardonable, he disregards the correlative use of τόφρα, which gives ὄφρα a relative character, whatever the etymology. The fact that ὄφρα is used occasionally in an indefinite sense like τόφρα, just as ἕως is used occasionally in an indefinite sense like τέως, suffices him and what I must call the paratactic παράνοια, which could make no headway against the relative εἰς ὅ κε, has full sway henceforth until we get into Attic territory. Here is a specimen. Il. 6, 112: ἀνέρες ἔστε φίλοι, μνήσασθε δὲ θούριδος ἀλκῆς | ὄφρ' ἂν ἐγὼ βείω προτὶ Ἴλιον. 'Seid Männer, ihr Freunde, gedenket der stürmenden Abwehr die Zeit über irgendwie; ich will nach Ilion gehen'. The first sentence, therefore, ends with ὄφρα and the second begins with ἄν, regardless of the fact that ἄν is postpositive everywhere in Homer. So Il. 6, 258: ἀλλὰ μέν' ὄφρα κέ τοι μελιηδέα οἶνον ἐνείκω 'wohlan, bleib noch eine Zeit lang! Ich will dir honigsüssen Wein bringen.' This is in my judgment analysis run mad and finds no support in the examples already cited, in which the combination of a durative and aoristic permits, but does not require, the translation 'until', Od. 14, 502: κείμην ἀσπασίως, φάε (= aor.) δὲ χρυσόθρονος ἠώς. But Dr. Fuchs evidently himself feels how hopeless this sort of thing is and concedes the subordinate feeling for post-Homeric times.

In the Iliad, ὄφρα 'so long as' occurs 24 times, in the Od., 15, not a very significant fact, in view of the relative length of the two poems (A. J. P. VI 399). The imperfect indicative is used in both members of the past, the present indicative in both members of the present. The present subjunctive, regularly with

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κεν or ἄν, is used of the future preceded by a futural sentence, but κεν and ἄν being mere 'grammatical signs' of dependence are not necessary and the omission means nothing. Comp. Il. 22, 387: ὄφρ' ἂν ἔγω γε | ζωοῖσιν μετέω and Il. 23, 47: ὄφρα ζωοῖσι μετείω. And yet the ἄν does mean something. It is the sign of dependence on condition and gives a note of exactness, of caution, that is to make itself felt far down into Attic speech, that is to differentiate ὅπως and ὅπως ἄν (A. J. P. IV 422) and, which is still more important, is to bring everything that deals with the future into subjection to ἄν.

Next comes ὄφρα with partial coextension 'während', 'while'. Compare Latin *dum*. Here the ὄφρα clause takes the imperfect, the leading clause the aorist. When the action is future, the subjunctive is employed. There are six of these 'while' ὄφρα's in the Il., one in the Od., and in addition to these, Il. 14, 358, already cited under ὄφρα, 'so long as', might be translated 'while'. The passage runs: καί σφιν κῦδος ὄπαζε μίνυνθά περ, ὄφρ' ἔτι εὖδει. The profane person who is not imbued with a paratactic reverence for Homer will at once think of Ar. Eq. 109: τοὺς χρησμοὺς ταχὺ | κλέψας ἔνεγκε τοῦ Παφλαγόνος ἔνδοθεν, | ἕως καθεύδει, 'while he is asleep', 'now that he is asleep', with the inevitable causal connotation 'because he is asleep'.[1] ὄφρα, 'until', takes the indicative of a fact and the tense is the aorist. The leading verb is the imperfect, the action being interrupted by ὄφρα. In the three passages in which the leading verb is the aorist, the durative sense lies in the participle, Od. 7, 140: ἔχων, 7, 275: νηχόμενος, or is otherwise intimated. Il. 10, 570, θῆκε = ἔκειτο, according to Dr. Fuchs, but ὄφρ' ἑτοιμασσαίατ' is semi-final and the Δολώνεια is late. ὄφρα with the optative occurs in four passages, Il. 10, 570, just cited, Od. 12, 437; 23, 31 and 17, 298 ὄφρ' ἂν ἄγοιεν. The use of the optative is due, says Dr. Fuchs, to the 'expression of expectation or wish', and he ignores any difference brought about by ἄν, as we have just seen. The indefinite frequency that he recognizes in the optative does not lie originally in the optative but in the leading verb (A. J. P. XXIV 361).

The optative passages are followed by the subjunctive passages. This reversal of the usual order is, I take it, a protest against 'Modusverschiebung'. In the beginning, doubtless, the associa-

[1] "ἕως sometimes passes over into a causal or semi-causal sense (compare ὅτε and ὁπότε) 'while', 'now that', 'since'. So especially <and uniformly> with the present indicative" (A. J. P. IV 417).

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tion of the optative with the past tenses and the association of the subjunctive with the present and futural tenses were separate processes; but, unwelcome as the fact may be to the genetic syntactician, this 'Modusverschiebung' had established itself firmly in Homer, so firmly that it was almost a mechanical tradition, and the departure from the sequence became a manner of revolution. Great is the goddess Μίμησις! Deep are the ruts of language! ὄφρα, 'until', with the subjunctive stands in 29 passages, all futural. The aorist is the only tense. It is by implication the tense of antecedent action. κεν or ἄν is used 19 times, omitted 10 times, 'without any difference of signification'. There is no established formula, such as we recognized in εἰς ὅ κεν, as we shall have to recognize in ἕως ἄν and πρὶν ἄν.

Then the temporal significance retreats, and ὄφρα is translated by 'in order that', 'damit', 'auf dass'. The final implication in the futural side of the temporal sentence of limit is plain enough. So the Latin 'dum', so the English 'until' with the subjunctive. The past tenses are followed by the optative, sometimes by the subjunctive, the present and futural tenses by the subjunctive. There are 106 final ὄφρα's in the Iliad, 116 in the Od., a disproportionate increase, as all Homeric scholars have known for a generation or two. Weber gives (p. 30) 117 for the Il., 120 for the Od. (See A. J. P. IV 122). The occasional use of κεν or ἄν is due, says Fuchs, to the transfer from the temporal ὄφρα sentences in which ὄφρα κε or ὄφρ' ἄν has its justification (Weber, pp. 36, 37). In admitting a blend, he admits a difference.

ἕως (εἷος, εἶως) is treated in the same way as ὄφρα. Like ὄφρα, its etymology is ignored, as with ὄφρα we begin with the *aliquamdiu* sense, which is fixed by the succeeding sentence. The welding takes place, the consciousness is lost in time. To be sure, there are very few *aliquamdiu* ἕως's left, that function being almost uniformly discharged by τέως (τεἰως). In one respect, however, the treatment of ἕως differs from that of ὄφρα. The order is changed and 'während', 'while', is put first. The imperfect is used of an action during the course of which another action takes place, that other action being regularly in the aorist, once only in the imperfect, Od. 5, 424: εἷος ὁ ταῦθ' ὥρμαινε—τόφρα δέ μιν μέγα κῦμα φέρε. In this φέρε Fuchs sees a 'psychologisches Moment'. But the use of the descriptive imperfect is a matter of psychology at any rate, and this 'psychologisches Moment' need not detain us.

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ἕως, 'so long as', with imperfect indicative in both members, with present indicative in both, is not very common. Nothing is said here or elsewhere in the treatise of the causal connotation of the temporal particles with the present indicative. Comp. Od. 17, 390: *οὐκ ἀλέγω εἴως μοι ἐχέφρων Πηνελόπεια ζώει*, and Od. 22, 106: *οἵσε θέων, εἴως μοι ἀμύνεσθαι πάρ'* (sc. *εἰσὶν*) *διστοί*. No one needs to be told how different these sentences are from those with which they are slumped on p. 32, viz.: Od. 13, 315 = 15, 153 and 19, 530, though it would be possible to read a causal significance into the last-cited verse.

ἕως, 'until', is used with the indicative, and with the subjunctive on the same principle as ὄφρα. The few optative passages are thought worthy of special study. So Od. 2, 77: *τόφρα γὰρ ἂν κατὰ ἄστυ ποτιπτυσσοίμεθα μύθῳ | χρήματ' ἀπαιτίζοντες, ἕως κ' ἀπὸ πάντα δοθείη*, where *κε-δοθείη* is explained as potential optative, correctly enough, if we know what potential means. Here *κε* gives the calculation of the speaker who says to himself (in Attic): *πάντ' ἂν ἀποδοθείη* 'everything must be returned, is bound to be returned' (S. C. G. § 447). At a later period of the language we may boggle at such an explanation, for the precession of the moods has become more mechanical, and one suspects that the shift has gone on despite the *ἕως ἄν* (S. C. G. § 448).

In Od. 9, 375: *καὶ τότ' ἐγὼ τὸν μοχλὸν ὑπὸ σποδοῦ ἤλασα πολλῆς | εἴως θερμαίνοιτο* Dr. Fuchs recognizes the optative of wish, as well he may. 'Ich trieb dann den Pfahl unter den Aschenhaufen so lange, bis er warm würde, (eigentlich . . . eine Zeit lang, möchte er warm werden)'. Now no Greek of any period known to us ever analyzed in that way. The sentence is semi-final, and the durative tense is used because of 'the psychological interest in the process', the same psychological interest that gives us so many present imperatives in the cooking scene of the Acharnians (S. C. G. § 405). We see Odysseus watching the stake getting warmer and warmer and wondering whether it would ever get warm, a very different effect from the normal *θερμανθείη*.[1] Another optative of wish is recognized in Od. 23, 150, which is mere precession of the moods.

In futural sentences *εἴως κε* with aoristic subjunctive occurs four times, *εἴως* without *κε* once in Il. 13, 141: *ὃ δ'* (sc. *χειμάρροος*) *ἀσφαλέως θέει ἔμπεδον εἴος ἵκηται | ἰσόπεδον*. Now I am not disposed to repine

[1] A. J. P. XXIII 250.

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at the absence of κε, but the winter torrent is personified, and if any one feels a final touch in the clause, I shall not object. In earlier days I wrote and felt:

> The truant brooklet wanders through the mead,
> But runs to meet his lord, the sea, at last.

I say, a final touch, for ἕως does not become a purely final particle until we reach the Odyssey, and then always with the optative (Fuchs, p. 36). As I have repeatedly said that I do not sympathize with all these laborious efforts to make out parataxis in sentences in which parataxis is wholly lost to the consciousness, it will be readily understood that I receive without effusion Dr. Fuchs's concession that hypotaxis is gaining on parataxis, as is shown by the use of εἷως, 'während', five times paratactically with δέ in the Iliad, and only three times in the Odyssey. As the Iliad is longer than the Odyssey (roughly, 16 : 12), one is tempted to burn all one's books of the 'curious art' of statistics.

When we come to final ἕως, Dr. Fuchs asks in despair, 'Good Heavens! Why a new final particle? Insatiate Greeks! Did they not have ὄφρα and ἵνα, ὡς and ὅπως?' O yes! but language coquets with a variety of expressions until it finds one on which it can safely specialize, and the coquette Language, like the coquette in real life, often chooses a dull thing that does not radiate, and ἵνα was chosen. Why did the English language settle on 'in order that'? 'In order that' is a perfect Philistine, a perfect ἀμνοκῶν.

After we leave Homer and pass over to HESIOD and the HOMERIC HYMNS, the genetic interest diminishes sensibly. The bulk is comparatively small and the phenomena neither numerous nor striking.

εἰς ὅ κεν appears once in Hesiod (O. et D. 630). In Hymn XXVIII 14, not XXVII, as Fuchs has it, Abel reads what by the light of Homeric usage we may be permitted to call the bad grammar εἰσόκε κούρη εἵλετ(ο), where most persons would prefer to read with Gemoll (1886) and Goodwin (1893) εἰσότε, and restore the normal syntax rather than assume that the feeling for κε had been entirely lost. In Hesiod and the Hymns, ὄφρα is generally final, never 'until'. In Pindar as we shall see, as some of us have seen for years (Weber, p. 72; A. J. P. IV 431; Pindar, I. E. cvi), ὄφρα is always final, never temporal.

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εἷως does not appear in Hesiod and but once in the Hymn to Aphrodite in the sense 'so long as'. In Hesiod the new temporal particle of limit ἕστε emerges Theog. 753: ἕστ' ἂν ἵκηται, and then disappears, though Fuchs recognizes its existence in prepositional form O. et D. 720: αὐτὰρ ἐπεί κε δύῃ, μεμνημένος, ἕστ' ἀνιόντα. That ἕστε is not for εἷς ὅτε needs no elaborate setting forth at this time of day. Dindorf long ago paralleled it with ὅστε and Brugmann considers it an extended preposition and compares its conjunctional use with μέχρι. μέχρι and ἄχρι are indeed flagrant examples of the conjunctional use of prepositions. So in English 'until' was originally a preposition; 'without' was a preposition before it was a conjunction and we can say 'against he come' as well as 'against his coming'.

In the LYRIC POETS, μέχρι and ἄχρι, originally adverbs, are construed with the genitive as μέχριος is in Homer and become quasi-prepositions. There are seven 'until's', three expressed by the doomed ὄφρα, one by ἕστε, one by μέχρι οὗ, one by ἕσκε for which some read ἕστε.[1] There is little to note except the omission of ἄν with ὄφρα + subjunctive, Mimnermus 12, 9, and Theogn. 1353 a Κύρνε-fragment. Fuchs, however, slurs over the tense in ὄφρα τέλειος ἔῃ. This is one of those passages in which the two senses meet. 'So long as it is getting' = 'until it gets'. μέχρι οὗ occurs Philox. 2, 2. Of 'so long as' expressions, there are twelve, six of the futural cases omit ἄν and only four have it. The explorer of Greek syntax need not be told that the lyric fragments are a most unremunerative territory. According to Fuchs ἕως occurs but once in lyric poetry. If that once is Pind. O. 10, 51, he ought to have mentioned the form, which is ἄς. Bindseil, it may be remembered, in the innocence of his heart, puts this ἄς down under ὅς. Let us hope that Dr. Fuchs did not overlook it.

More satisfactory are the SCENIC POETS, and first of Tragedy. AISCHYLOS uses ἕστε, ἕως, ὄφρα, these three. The seven instances of ἕστε are all 'until' and in future complexes always take ἄν. There is the same tendency to formula that is observable in ὅταν. Ag. 308 Fuchs notes ἐσκήψεν in the leading clause where we have had thus far the imperfect (see above), and gives himself unnecessary trouble to explain it. The character of the action

[1] Gr. Gr.[3] p. 254, Brugmann divides ἔσκε μάχηται ἐς κε μάχηται and gives the equation ἐς κε : ἐς δ κε (εἰς δ κε) = μέχρι ἀν : μέχρι οὗ ἀν.

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excludes the imperfect. There is no watching it.[1] ἕως 'until' Aischylos uses five times normally. In Pers. 709: ζηλωτὸς ὢν . . . διήγαγες gives the desiderated continuative for ἕως ἔλευσσες, as Fuchs remarks. On Cho. 1026: ἕως τ' ἔτ' ἔμφρων εἰμὶ κηρύσσω φίλοις he ignores, as everywhere else, the causal connotation and wastes words. ὄφρα 'so long as' occurs once, Cho. 360, ὄφρ' ἄν 'until', once, Eum. 339, both in lyric passages.

For 'until' SOPHOKLES uses ἕως (6), ἕστε (4), μέχρις οὗ (1). ἕως is used only of the future, ἄν is omitted four times, employed twice. Again we have the doleful iteration of the proof that there is no difference between ἕως . . . μάθῃς, Ai. 555 and ἕως ἂν μάθῃς. Comp. O. R. 834: ἕως δ' ἂν . . . ἐκμάθῃς. It is as if one were to write now 'until thou learn' and then 'until thou learnest.' The subjunctive in English has a fine old flavor, and so has the simple subjunctive in Greek. The formula has been fixed and we must not look too narrowly for an intimation of finality. ἕστε 'until' is used in Sophokles four times, once Ai. 1183: ἔστ' ἐγὼ μόλω of the future, thrice of the past. μέχρις οὗ Ai. 571 is obelized. Phil. 1076: χρόνον τοσοῦτον εἰς ὅσον . . . εὐξώμεθα follows the analogy of ἕως and the rest. ἕως 'so long as' has the imperfect indicative once, El. 951: elsewhere it is used in futural sentences with the present subjunctive and always with ἄν in contrast to ἕως 'until' in which an element of finality is apt to lurk. ἑωσπερ occurs O. C. 1361 but Fuchs fails to note that ἕως is a conjecture of Reiske for the MS ὡς. Comp. the commentators on Ar. Pax, 24.

ὄφρα, 'so long as', occurs once in a lyrical passage without ἄν, El. 225—'Moriturum nos salutat'—ἔστ' ἄν, 'so long as', once in another lyric passage, El. 105. ἡνίκα, El. 1167, may be translated 'so long as', as if that signified anything.

EURIPIDES yields Dr. Fuchs very little. He has to count μένω with the infinitive (4 times), as in Andr. 255: οὐ μενῶ πόσιν μολεῖν, which *pace Fuchsii* does not mean ἕως ἂν πόσις μόλῃ, and calls attention to ἅμ' ἡμέρᾳ. The conjunctions used are: ἕως 'until' (6), 'so long as' (3), ἕστε 'until' (3), 'so long as' (2). In Rhes. 614: κατηύνασεν . . . ἕως ἂν νὺξ ἀμείψηται φάος there is an implication of command in κατηύνασεν. In Hipp. 1232 we have an antecedent, εἰς τοῦθ' ἕως with aorist indicative. ἕως, 'while', with the present indicative, calls forth nearly a page of reflections. It is the semi-causal ἕως, 'while', 'now that'. Or. 238: ἕως ἐῶσί σ' εὖ φρονεῖν

[1] But why should I spend my time in explaining a conjecture? ἔστ' is due to Stanley. The MSS have εἶτ'.

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Ἐρινύες. ἕως, 'until', of the future always takes ἄν. The ἄν formula has become mechanical. ἔστε, 'so long as', is always used of the future and always takes ἄν.

The syntax of ARISTOPHANES is in the main the syntax of prose with the comic reserve of mischief, and there is little even for Dr. Fuchs to note. As usual, he stops to call attention to the 'Homeric' μένω with the infinitive, Lys. 75, but the most remarkable thing to him is the exclusive rule of ἕως. Of the future, ἕως ἄν with subjunctive is always used except in Pax 31: ἕρπιδε, μὴ παύσαιο μηδέποτ' ἐσθίων | τέως ἕως σαυτὸν λάθῃς διαρραγείς, with which the commentators have made themselves busy. τέως ἕως is absurdly formal, and one is tempted to write λάθοις with Reisig and restore the regular sequence. Cf. Sobolewski, Syntaxis Aristoph., p. 146. In Eq. 133: κρατεῖν . . . ἕως γένοιτο, the optative is explained on account of the wish involved. It is, of course, very old-fashioned to speak of the shift of the moods in obedience to the shift of the tenses, but it may be worth considering that this oracle of Bakis is regarded as a revelation from a venerable past—compare the solemn reflexion, v. 124: πολλῷ γ' ὁ Βάκις ἐχρῆτο τῷ ποτηρίῳ—and the rare ἕως γένοιτο gives the mind of Bakis. The two present indicatives, Eq. 111: ἕως καθεύδει, Eccl. 83: ἕως ἔτ' ἐστὶν ἄστρα κατὰ τὸν οὐρανόν, have the usual causal connotation.

HERODOTOS uses the prepositions ἐς and μέχρι to designate the 'until' limit, e. g., ἐς ἠῶ and μέχρι μέσου ἡμέρης. In the dependent clause there is great variety, ἐς ὅ (ἐς ὃ ἄν), ἕως, ἔστε, ἔστ' ἄν, μέχρι οὗ and ἄχρι οὗ, a variety that is significant for his composite style. In Homer εἰς ὅ κε is used of the future and there is no εἰς ὅ of the past. Herodotos uses ἐς ὅ of the past as well as ἐς ὃ ἄν of the future. ἐς ὅ of the past (49 times) follows the principal clause, as εἰς ὅ κε does in Homer. The leading verb is in the imperfect, the verb of the ἐς ὅ clause is in the aorist. The exceptions in the ἐς ὅ clause are few and easily explained. In 3, 48; 4, 160; 6, 113 the participle carries the aoristic notion. In 9, 94: ἐς ὃ κατέβαινον there is overlapping, a phenomenon still too much neglected in the treatment of temporal sentences. See my L. G. 562 (S. C. G. § 223). In 4, 160: ἐς ὃ ἐγίνετο should be, according to Dr. Fuchs, ἐς ὃ ἐγένετο.[1] In the leading clause the aorist is found five times instead of the normal imperfect, but here again the durative participle is at work, and when it is not we can easily read the

[1] No change is necessary. Note the shift of subject. ἐς ὃ ἐν Λεύκωνί τε . . . ἐγίνετο ἐπιδιώκων καὶ ἐδοξε τοῖσι Λίβυσι ἐπιθέσθαι οἱ.

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durative into ἀσπαστῶς (4, 201) and the iterative into αὖτις (6, 24). In 3, 104 and 4, 181 ἐς ὅ is used with the present indicative. This, according to Dr. Fuchs, is due to the emphasis laid on the facts. ἐς ὅ is a relative, and the relative is freer than the temporal particles in the designation of repeated actions. That is all. Contrast ὁπότε and ὁσάκις and compare S. C. G. §§ 365, 366. In futural sentences ἐς ὅ regularly takes ἄν. In 6, 86 γ, εἰς ὅ κε occurs in a quotation from an oracle and does not count. In 9, 58 we have for the first time the indicative of the future about which Dr. Fuchs makes a great ado; διωκτέοι εἰσὶ (οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι) ἐς ὃ καταλαμφθέντες δώσουσι ἡμῖν τῶν δὴ ἐποίησαν πάντων δίκας. The unusual construction is brachylogical and the aorist participle is responsible for the shift—'until they are caught and then they will pay for it'. The shift is helped further by the use of the future indicative as a final in relative sentences, e. g. ὅπως. Fuchs sees in the construction certainty, I see in it grimness. In 3, 31; 8, 108 ἄν is omitted—Fuchs says 7, 108, one of the not infrequent false references in the book. In the latter instance there may be a shade of purpose. Finally, ἐς ὅ, 'until', takes the *oratio obliqua* infinitive in 1, 94, 202; 2, 102; 5, 85, 86. This *oratio obliqua* slurring of dependent constructions is not common in Greek, more common in Herodotos than in most authors. It is another manifestation of his genial *laisser aller*.

In Herodotos ἕως is usually 'so long as', with the imperfect six times, with the present indicative once, 3, 134: ἕως νέος εἰς ἡλικίην with the usual connotation—'seeing that—still'. In its 'primitive sense' 'a while'—suppressed correlative—it occurs 1, 173; 9, 6. ἕως, 'until', occurs twice with aorist indicative (7, 23; 7, 100), once, 4, 42, with the present infinitive in *oratio obliqua* (like ἐς ὅ, above), ἀπικνέεσθαι, where ἀπικέσθαι might be expected. But notice the plural πλοίοισι. ἔστε, 'so long as', is always used of the future (four times) and always takes ἄν; ἔστε, 'until', three times, always with ἄν. ἔστε, 'until', with the present infinitive, occurs in a foreshortened *oratio obliqua* sentence, 7, 171: ἔστε . . . νέμεσθαι. Fuchs explains the passage: ἔστε τὸ δεύτερον ἐρημωθείσης Κρήτης . . . αὐτὴν νῦν νέμεσθαι Κρῆτας as = ἔστε Κρήτην ἐρημωθῆναι ὥστε νῦν νέμεσθαι Κρῆτας. Straightening out *oratio obliqua* is not always profitable business even in Greek, in which *oratio obliqua* is more simple than it is in Latin (L. G. § 649, note). The case is not unlike 9, 94. A. J. P. III 515. μέχρι is used as a preposition, ἄχοι much more rarely. Odd is the quasi-fusion of μέχρι οὗ as a preposition,

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as 2, 19: μέχρι οὗ τροπέων τῶν θερινέων. It is a good lesson in thoughtlessness. μέχρι occurs twice as a conjunction, once, 'while', with imperfect indicative (4, 3), with a shift in the structure of the sentence, once, 'until', with ἴδωμεν, no ἄν (4, 119). Elsewhere μέχρι οὗ, 'until', with the normal aorist. The optative in the whole group is so rare that it is worth noting (2, 179) due to indefinite frequency, 'Modusverschiebung', or what you will. μέχρι ὅσου occurs 8, 3: μέχρι ὅσου κάρτα ἐδέοντο. It is a case of overlapping. ἄχρι οὗ is found ἄχρι οὗ τελευτήσῃ (no ἄν) 1, 117.

We now come to the irregular genius about whom so much grammatical scandal is afloat, THUKYDIDES, to wit. In Thukydides also we have prepositional expressions of limit μέχρι Πυθίων, we have ἐπιμένω and τηρῶ with infinitive, 3, 2, 2; 4, 26, 7. We have ἅμα with the dative, ἅμα ἡμέρᾳ and with the participle 2, 6, 3: ἅμα τῇ ἐσόδῳ γιγνομένῃ. The conjunctions of limit are ἕως, μέχρι, μέχρι οὗ. Our irregular genius spurns, as it would seem, the irregular ἕστε. Statistics are idle. In futural sentences ἕως ἄν 'until' with aorist subjunctive is the inflexible rule.[1] Of the past the 'until' limit is given by ἕως with aorist indicative. There are two optatives, both of the 'partial obliquity' order, one in the aorist, 5, 35, 4, the other 3, 102, 7: ἕως ... τοῖς Ἀμπρακιώταις ... δέοι βοηθεῖν, = ἕως πύθοιτο δέον, overlapping, as already explained. Fuchs puts the thing otherwise.

ἕως, 'so long as', of the future takes the present subjunctive with ἄν. There are eight passages in which we find ἕως with present indicative, 1, 78, 4; 3, 70, 6; 5, 9, 6; 6, 17, 1; 6, 49, 1; 7, 47, 3; 8, 40, 3, and Fuchs repeats his formula 'and it is really so', and I call attention to the invariably causal connotation. ἕως 'so long as' occurs six times with imperfect indicative. The leading clause has the aorist three times instead of the normal imperfect, not an unparalleled irregularity (see above, p. 399). μέχρι 'until' occurs once, elsewhere μέχρι οὗ with aorist indicative (9 times). μέχρι οὗ 'until' with the present indicative 1, 76, 2 may be translated 'until now when' (that). μέχρι οὗ with the aorist subjunctive is used of the future three times with, twice without ἄν. According to Fuchs μέχρι 'so long as' occurs three times, μέχρι οὗ once, but strangely enough he counts here 1, 137, 2: μέχρι ... γένηται where μέχρι is clearly 'until'. In 3, 98, 1 there is a trace of the original

[1] No notice is taken of 1, 90, 3: ἕως ἂν αἱρωσι, where ἀρωσι is an unnecessary emendation of Bekker's. See Shilleto ad loc. and Morris's ed. of Classen Appendix, p. 327 and A. J. P. IV 417.

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parataxis—to the great joy of Fuchs. After all, then, even Thukydides could not withstand the pressure of formula; and with the exception of an occasional omission of ἄν, after the manner of his forbears, he behaves surprisingly well.[1]

The ORATORS offer little sport. They are wearisomely regular and Fuchs lumps them all except Lysias, Isokrates and Demosthenes. Under the head of the minor orators, then, Fuchs thinks it worth while to record μέχρι χρόνου and πρὸ ἡλίου δεδυκότος and ἐπιμένειν and περιμένειν with infinitive. In Andok. 1, 81: τέως is used as it is Soph. Ai. 558 'up to the time' mentioned. All this is uninteresting, as is the fact that ἕως 'until' takes the aorist indicative with the leading clause in the imperfect. As usual, Fuchs agonizes over an occasional summarizing aorist, Andok. 3, 29: παρέσχεν . . . πεντακισχίλια τάλαντα ἕως κατέλυσεν ἡμῶν τὴν δύναμιν. On the aorist with definite numbers, see S. C. G., § 243. Cf. Aischin. 3, 104 (false reference in Fuchs). In futural sentences, ἕως 'until' takes the aorist subjunctive with ἄν, which is never omitted. The optative after a past tense occurs three times, Andok. 1, 81; Isai. 1, 10 and 7, 8 but under Andok. 1, 81: ἕως αὖ οἱ νόμοι τεθεῖεν, Fuchs should have mentioned that αὖ is due to conjecture. In an Attic writer one is inclined to suspect adherescence, S. C. G. § 448. The ἄν is perfectly explicable—'until such time as in all likelihood the laws would be (and they must be) made.' See above, p. 393. In Isaios we have 7, 8 the oddity ἕως οὗ instead of the simple ἕως just as we have seen μέχρι οὗ for the simple μέχρι. It is very suspicious. μέχρις ἄν 'until' with aorist subjunctive occurs just once, Dein. 1, 91. One wonders whether the κρίθινος Δημοσθένης brought it over with him from Corinth in his portmanteau. ἕως 'so long as' takes the imperfect indicative of the past; ἕως ἄν is found with the present subjunctive of a universal principle. Citation unnecessary. ὅτε, Aisch. 1, 102, Isai. 11, 26 may be translated 'so long as' and so may ἡνίκα Andok. 3, 3—but that is beside the mark.

Lysias has τέως 7, 12; 21, 19 in the phrase ἐν τῷ τέως χρόνῳ 'up to date'; ἀναμένω and περιμένω take the infinitive, but 33, 8 we find οὐδ' ἀναμεῖναι ἕως ἂν ἔλθωσιν. ἕως is perfectly normal although Fuchs emphasizes the solitary use of an aorist in the leading clause of an 'until' ἕως. In a futural sentence it takes ἄν. In 13, 25 we have the optative. This is due to 'innerliche Abhängig-

[1] Cf. A. J. P. XXIII 140.

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keit.' Doubtless true. But the old-fashioned grammarian notices that the optative follows a past tense and omits the ultimate explanation, such as it is. Not without interest is the statement that instead of the formula οὐ πρότερον—πρίν, we have οὐ πρότερον—ἕως (A. J. P. IV 91)—an illustration of the progress of formula. The conception is 'until' and the expression becomes 'until'. So we find at a later period οὐ πρότερον—ἐὰν μή.[1] On Lys. 33, 8: ἕως ἔτι ἔξεστι it is not necessary to waste words.

Under ἕως, 'until', we learn that ISOKRATES is guilty once of the aorist indicative instead of the normal imperfect in the leading clause. It is the very passage in which οὐ πρότερον—ἕως occurs for οὐ πρότερον—πρίν (17, 12), and the aorist is accounted for by the negative. ἕως ἄν w. aorist subjunctive is perfectly regular. ἕως 'until' has the optative (17, 15) 'innerlich abhängig.' Fuchs forgets to state that the MSS have ἕως ἂν τἀληθῆ δόξειεν. The omission of ἄν is due to Dobree. Under ἕως, 'so long as', only four instances are recorded—all normal. ἕως ἄν with present subjunctive is found in a generic sentence (4, 6)—another false reference in Fuchs![2] 16, 37: ἕως is part of an unreal condition. ὅτε 'so long as' is a mere matter of translation, as I have said before.

When Fuchs comes to DEMOSTHENES, the heart of the statistician beats higher. There are 25 prepositional combinations with μέχρι and a number with ἄχρι and we actually find 27, 2: μέχρι τοῦ διεξελθεῖν and 21, 189: ἄχρι τοῦ μηδὲν ἐνοχλεῖν (A. J. P. VIII 332) and τέως also has its innings. 1, 7 ἕως 'until' of the past is normal, with the exception of the intrusion of the aorist into the leading clause. In 44, 24: ἕως καταλειφθεὶς τετελεύτηκεν = κατελείφθη καὶ τετελεύτηκεν with which comp. 3, 7. In 18, 32 ὠνεῖται . . . ἕως . . . ποιήσαιτο, the leading verb is an historical present. In 4, 1: ἐπισχὼν ἂν ἕως οἱ πλεῖστοι . . . ἀπεφήναντο, the ἕως clause is a part of the unreal situation. ἕως, 'until', in futural sentences is perfectly normal. ἄν is used without exception. The optative occurs under the usual conditions, 27, 5; 29, 43; 33, 8.

ἕως, 'so long as', of the past takes the imperfect. 39, 13: χρώμενον ὁρᾶτε = ὁρᾶτε ὅτι ἐχρῆτο. The aorist intrudes twice out of twelve times in the leading clause. ἕως with indicative of the present and ἕως ἄν with the present subjunctive are used in

[1] Diphilus (4, 394 M.): οὐ γὰρ βαδίζω πρότερον ἂν μὴ δοκιμάσω τίς ἐσθ' ὁ θίων.

[2] Fuchs's false references seem to be largely due to the use of Roman numerals. They are none the less irritating.

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accordance with the observations already made. ἕως with the present indicative has the causal connotation ('now that'), ἕως ἄν is generic. ἄχρι οὗ is found in the spurious 10, 51 and μέχρι in a law cited in 21, 47. ἡνίκα Fuchs chooses to translate 'so long as', 18, 46; 23, 120; 24, 111, and he notes the relative expression, ὅσον χρόνον = ἕως, 4, 21; 59, 29.

The high hopes with which we approached Demosthenes are dashed. Not only Demosthenes but other members of the Demosthenean corpus are perfectly well-behaved. How is it with PLATO and his mobile genius? He uses τέως as 'up to that time', Lach. 183 E[1]; Symp. 191 B. τέως is used like ἕως, Symp. 191 E. Noteworthy is ἕως, 'until', with aorist indicative in an unreal sentence, Cratyl. 396 C. In Phaedo 59 D we have the optative of indefinite frequency, the so-called iterative, the optative of partial obliquity. ἕως, 'until', takes the aorist indicative of the past, the aorist subjunctive (antecedent action) of the future. The 46 'until' ἕως's in futural sentences are in the main uninteresting—a monotonous series of ἕως ἄν's with the aorist subjunctive. Once we have the optative in an ideal conditional complex, Leges 752 C: εἰ δὲ μείναιμέν πως τοσοῦτον χρόνον ἕως . . . κοινωνήσειαν. Instead of the aorist subjunctive we find occasionally the overlapping present subjunctive, as Lys. 209 A: οὐκ ἀναμένουσιν ἕως (reference not given by Fuchs) ἂν ἡλικίαν ἔχῃς ('until and after'). In Soph. 239 C: ἕως ἂν ἐντυγχάνωμεν. In Phil. 55 C the participle (κατιδόντας) causes the switch and ἄν is switched off with it. ἕως, w. aorist optative, Rpb. 600 E, is passed over lightly by Fuchs. It depends on an unreal imperfect. Comp. A. J. P. IV 441. ἕως, 'so long as', is used once with ἀφειστήκη pluperfect indicative = imperfect. In futural sentences ἕως ἄν is used with present subjunctive. There are three present indicatives. Apol. 37 E: ἕως ἔξεστιν; Phaed. 89 C; Parm. 135 D ('while' and 'because'). Ellipsis of present indicative is found, Legg. 789 E. Old-fashioned περ occurs with ἕως six times.

μέχρι is less frequently employed than ἕως and only in a small number of dialogues. Symp. Protag. Kritias, Soph. and Phil. once each, in the Republic twice, in Timaeus and Politicus three times, and, which is significant, fourteen times in the Laws against eleven instances of ἕως. It is a wonder that some one has not

[1] In the Laches passage, the point of reference follows, τέως μὲν . . . ἐπεὶ δὲ δή, and Ast translates *aliquamdiu*, a good illustration of the demonstrative origin of the indefinite use.

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scented in this use of μέχρι a deliberate flout at the orators, who avoided the conjunction so scrupulously. The simple μέχρι is used but once, Symp. 220 D: εἱστήκει μέχρι ἕως ἐγένετο, where ἕως ἕως would have been artistically impossible. μέχρι περ occurs 22 times, μέχρι οὗ twice, μέχρι οὕπερ once.

μέχρι, 'until', occurs once with the aorist indicative (l. c.); elsewhere in futural sentences, fourteen times with the aorist subj., five times with the present. The present tenses are worth noting as examples of overlapping, and they ought not to be slumped with the others, as Fuchs has done. They are Polit. 260 B; Legg. 723 E, εἰρῆσθαι δοκῇ, where the perfect infinitive helps; 807 B: ᾖ . . . κατεσκευασμένα, 933 E (cf. Lys. 209 A), 947 B. Comp. A. J. P. XXIII 472. In Tim. 56 D we find: γῇ . . . φέροιτ' ἄν . . . μέχριπερ ἂν αὐτῆς πῃ ξυντυχόντα τὰ μέρη . . . γῇ γένοιτο. The neighborhood of αὐτῆς makes ἄν a suspicious character. μέχριπερ (μέχρι οὗ) 'so long as' occurs six times, once with the imperfect indicative, five times in futural sentences, always with ἄν. ἕστε, as we have seen, occurs but once if even once, Symp. 211 C.

XENOPHON is the naughty boy of Attic syntax and we expect him to misbehave, but even he is fairly conventional. μέχρι τριάκοντα ἐτῶν is not a novelty, and we have met μέχρι with the articular infinitive before, so that we are not surprised at μέχρι τοῦ συγκαταμιγνύναι, Hiero, 6, 2, (false reference in Fuchs). μέχρι and ἄχρι are further used to strengthen ἐπί and εἰς, and ἕστε is so used once, Anab. 4, 5, 6: ἕστε ἐπὶ τὸ δάπεδον. ἅμα ἡμέρᾳ, ἅμα ἡλίῳ δύνοντι require no comment. We find ἀναμένειν with ἕως, Hell. 6, 4, 26. We also find the accusative of a verbal noun, Hell. 5, 4, 13, τὴν βοήθειαν and the articular infinitive, Symp. 4, 41: τὸ δεηθῆναι. <Add περιμένειν with μέχρι, Hell. 1, 3, 11, ἀναμένειν with ἕστε, Cyr. 8, 1, 44>.

The conjunctions employed by Xenophon are ἕως, ἕστε, μέχρι, μέχρι οὗ, ἄχρι οὗ. ἕως, 'until', of the past takes the aorist, according to the rule, which Fuchs always calls lovingly 'our' rule, as if it were made in Aschaffenburg and were not the common property of all Grecians. There is, however, one notorious exception. Cyrop. 1, 3, 7: τοιαῦτα ἐποίει Κῦρος ἕως διεδίδου πάντα ἃ ἔλαβε κρέα. This imperfect Fuchs explains as due to the notion of repetition. If this is so we should have expected the aorist optative, διαδοίη. 'Overlapping' would answer. 'Until he saw that he was distributing' or 'so long as' (see A. J. P. IV 417). In the leading clause the imperfect is the rule (11 times), but the aorist occurs four times and the historical present once. After

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futural expressions and futural implications we have ἕως ἄν with the aorist subjunctive as a rule. Two exceptions are cited, ἕως ἂν ἥκωσι, which, in view of the familiar use of ἥκω is no exception, and ἕως ἂν ἀνὴρ ὦ, where we have overlapping.[1] In Hell. 4, 4, 9. Fuchs accepts the traditional reading, ἕως δὴ οἱ σύμμαχοι βοηθήσοιεν αὐτοῖς, where one is tempted to write βοηθήσαιεν, but βοηθήσοιεν is supported by Cyrop. 7, 5, 39: ἄνδρες φίλοι περιμένετε, ἕως τὸν ὄχλον διωσόμεθα where the indicative future—of which βοηθήσοιεν is supposed to be the *oratio obliqua*—is explained as expressing certainty. It is a wonder that this simple device had not occurred to Xenophon elsewhere. ἕως, 'so long as', takes the imperfect indicative of the past. ἕως ἄν is used in futural sentences. The indicative present occurs four times and there is one (*oratio obliqua*) optative, see above, Hell. 5, 4, 37, the one that had escaped me.[2] ἕως occurs twice with πέρ and in four passages ἕως is = ἐν ᾧ, not ἐν ὅσῳ, Cyr. 3, 3, 4; 6, 1, 1 ἕως—ἐν τούτῳ; 6, 3, 21; Hell. 4, 7, 3.

Most distinctly manifest is the naughtiness of Xenophon in his abounding use of ἕστε, which he employs 25 times, 21 times in the sense of 'until', four times in the sense of 'so long as', Anab. 3, 1, 19; Mem. 1, 2, 18; 3, 5, 6; De re eq. 11, 9. The anomalous aorist in Mem. 3, 5, 6: ἕστ' ἂν δείσωσι, Fuchs does not succeed in explaining. Read δεδίωσι. Moods and tenses are normal. μέχρι is more common (11 times) than μέχρι οὗ (3 times). ἄχρι ἂν σχολάσῃ occurs, An. 2, 3, 2; ἄχρι οὗ ὅδε ὁ λόγος ἐγράφετο, Hell. 6, 4, 37, overlapping, of which Fuchs makes no note.

For the Attic Inscriptions Fuchs depends on Meisterhans. I do not give an abstract of the chapter on results, because from my point of view there is nothing of vital importance to record. The scheme of ἕως, which I published twenty years ago, holds now as it did then, and the light that comes from parataxis is darkness.

BASIL L. GILDERSLEEVE.

[1] The third to which he refers but which he does not cite is X. Cyr. 3, 3, 18, explained A. J. P. IV 417.

[2] A. J. P. XII 123.

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III.—LIVY'S USE OF ARUNT, ERUNT AND ERE.

Livy's fondness for the form in *ere* has often been commented upon in a general way. To him, who in the love of Livy holds communion with the commentaries and grammatical treatises which have appeared "since first the flight of years began," they do not speak a various language. There is no commentary or treatise where the same voice is not heard. "Semper ego auditor tantum?"

If we turn for information to the recognized standard authority upon the subject, Neue's Formenlehre d. lat. Spr., revised by Wagener, we find the same unsatisfactory statement. Here, again, the form in *erunt* is not taken into consideration, the relative frequency of the form in *ere* in the various books and decades is not taken into account, and unless such a comparison is made, our knowledge profiteth us nothing.[1] The statement made on III[2] p. 192 is clearly open to criticism not only for this reason, but, as will appear later, for another as well. He says: "nicht selten ist bei Livius ere statt erunt, so z. B. besonders aus dem 21 Buch." This book was probably "besonders" mentioned, because it is so often read in the schools, but other books illustrate his fondness for this form in a more decided way. As a matter of fact, in XXI *ere* = only 42.7% of all the forms possible, but in III *ere* is as high as 77.2%, in II *ere* = 73.6%, in VI *ere* = 64.7%, in IV *ere* = 64.1%. In fact all of the bks. of the 1st decade have a higher percentage except VII, VIII and IX. While one could hardly expect Neue-Wagener to give a complete list of all the verbs in the Latin language together with all their occurrences, one can at least expect that, if a certain book of Livy is selected, and certain verbs are given, such a list would be complete. Such a list would have some value. But in the bk. selected there are 12 passages omitted, and in the verbs selected there are 228 occurrences in the other books not cited.[2]

[1] In this investigation we have used the Weissenborn-Mueller edition, with the exception of bks. I to VI, and XXXI–XL, where Zingerle's edition was used.

[2] For Bk. 21 the following are omitted: *contendere* 25, 13; 56, 5; *excidere* 28, 12; *evasere* 28, 12; *insidere* 34, 9; *pervenere* 47, 3; *recepere* 49, 12; *detractavere*

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As is well known, Livy's style is different in the 3rd decade, and later, from that in the first (cf. e. g. Archiv für lat. Lex. IV, 207 f. and especially X, 64 f.). Livy's use of *ere* further illustrates this difference: in the 1st decade *ere* = 54.7%, dropping however to 25.7% in the 3rd, and to 13.5% in the 4th. This regular decrease of about a half is noteworthy. The explanation will be given later. The following table will show the number of times Livy uses the forms in *runt* (*erunt* and *arunt*) and in *ere* in each book and decade, and the percentage of *ere* forms in each.

FIRST DECADE			THIRD DECADE		
runt	ere	% ere	runt	ere	% ere
1....28	41	59.4	21....51	38	42.7
2....33	92	73.6	22....64	38	37.2
3....26	88	77.2	23....80	19	19.2
4....37	66	64.1	24....81	23	22.1
5....45	58	56.3	25....70	25	25.3
6....24	44	64.7	26....77	17	18.1
7....46	31	40.3	27....72	42	36.9
8....50	29	36.7	28....72	14	16.3
9....74	30	28.8	29....63	16	20.3
10....48	42	46.6	30....58	14	19.4

49, 13; *fuere* 50, 5; 59, 2; *constitere* 58, 3 and *mansere* 58, 11 (= 12). The verbs mentioned also occur in: *decrevere* 5, 15, 2; 26, 28, 3; 27, 37, 7; 35, 41, 2; 43, 15, 4; *quievere* 8, 7, 20; 13, 8; 40, 30, 7; *detractavere* 3, 60, 6; 26, 11, 11; *turbavere* 27, 30, 11; 38, 13, 2; *excivere* 1, 28, 3; *complevere* 29, 3, 8; *implevere* 45, 31, 6; *accepere* 1, 60, 2; 3, 60, 8; 4, 8, 5; 31, 3; 5, 37, 4; 8, 27, 2; 9, 40, 14; 43, 13; 10, 5, 8; 25, 5; 27, 2, 7; 28, 33, 13; 29, 14, 12; 30, 8, 6; 37, 42, 6; 38, 3, 5; 42, 63, 12; 44, 12, 2 (only 3 were given instead of 18): *fecere* 1, 23, 3; 37, 2; 41, 3; 2, 31, 10; 34, 10; 49, 9; 3, 1, 8; 4, 35, 3; 40, 2; 5, 31, 2; 48, 3; 6, 9, 11; 10, 1, 8; 27, 1, 6; 27, 5; 37, 53, 28 (only 2 given instead of 16): *gessere* 6, 1, 1; 28, 4, 1; 38, 53, 11; *descivere* 45, 25, 11; *scripsere* 3, 4, 1; 6, 38, 9; 7, 18, 2; 10, 11, 9; 30, 5; *evasere* 2, 42, 10; 59, 8; 3, 3, 8; 10, 17, 7; 21, 28, 12; 22, 6, 8; 28, 11, 14; *petiere* 3, 1, 8; 4, 2; 5, 38, 10; 8, 2, 9; 9, 13, 4; 10, 37, 4; 31, 41, 7; 45, 15; 42, 62, 10; 45, 4, 6 (10); *tulere* 2, 40, 12; 3, 6, 5; 9, 30, 3; 27, 4, 8; 10; 31, 27, 7; 35, 7; 34, 20, 7; 35, 51, 9; 36, 24, 10 (10); for *fuere* but 3 are cited, and 21, 19, 11 for 21, 5, 11; *fuere* occurs 39 times in the 1st decade, 26 in the 3rd, 20 in the 4th, and 8 in 41–5; for *venere* 5 are omitted in the 1st decade, 4 in the 3rd, and 1 in the 4th (cf. p. 414); *convenere* (4, 6, 25 is cited where *attulere* is read), 1, 9, 7; 47, 9; 6, 28, 4; 24, 18, 10; 12; 25, 10, 7; 33, 16, 3; 38, 41, 6 (8); *pervenere* 8, 13, 4; 30, 2, 10; 45, 11 (cf. also p. 422); *iere* 10, 33, 6; 25, 38, 21; 31, 37, 8; 12; *rediere* 8, 23, 10; 26, 5; 22, 59, 18; 24, 16, 15; 27, 26, 6; 29, 35, 1; 30, 25, 4; 34, 46, 7; 35, 38, 12; 38, 3, 6; 39, 24, 5; 42, 60, 2 (only 3 given instead of 15); *subiere* 8, 10, 3; (*audiere* cited for 25, 39, 1 instead of 38, 23; *iere* 3, 36, 6 for 66, 6; *abiere* 2, 7, 2 for 2, 7, 3; *proiere* 1, 37, 2 for *periere*). There are in all 228 passages omitted.

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FOURTH DECADE			XLI–XLV		
	runt	*ere*	% *ere*	*runt*	*ere*	% *ere*
31...	80	32	28.6	41... 58	2	3.3
32...	69	9	11.5	42...105	11	9.5
33...	91	15	14.1	43... 57	7	10.9
34...	90	15	13.5	44.. 55	6	9.8
35...	73	18	19.8	45... 58	12	17.1
36...	84	6	6.6			
37...130		23	14.4			
38...176		24	12.0			
39...120		5	4.0			
40...133		11	7.6			

(For the relative number of *arunt* forms cf. p. 415 infra).

NOTES.

1) It is only in the first 6 books that Livy prefers the form in *re* to that in *runt*, the average for these books being 65.9%, while in the last four books of this decade *ere* averages only 38.1%.

2) Livy's usage of *ere* shows some interesting contrasts. In III it reaches to 77.2%, in II to 73.6%, but in XLI it has fallen as low as 3.3%, in XXXIX to 4%, and in XXXVI to 6.6%.

3) Books XLI to XLV, which have not been recently revised, form an exception to the general tendency for the *ere* forms to drop to about a half. While the average for *ere* in the 4th decade was 13.5%, in XLI–XLV instead of being half, it is 10.1%. This difference will also be considered later.

4) An interesting contrast occurs between Livy's usage and that of the author of the Periochae. In the 1st decade *ere* = 54.7%, but in the Periochae to these books *ere* = only 17.6% (*runt* = 14, *ere* = 3); so, also in Books 21–45 Livy uses *ere* 1955 times, but in the Periochae it was not used at all. It is worthy of note that *ere* is found but once in the Periochae from 9–143 and that is in 116, *praestitere*.

I. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

As remarked above, Livy shows a decided preference for the *ere* forms in the 1st decade, and later his attitude changes. In order to discover the explanation of this phenomenon, three different factors were taken into consideration.

A. THE ARCHAIC INFLUENCE.

The preponderance of the forms in *ere* in the 1st decade is in part explained by the preponderance of these forms in the archaic

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sources which Livy employed for this decade. The form *ere* is without doubt to be regarded as an archaism. In Cato the citations usually show *ere* (cf. Neue–Wagener III[3] p. 190). Cato was Sallust's model, his "bevorzugtes Muster" (Archiv X. 22), Sallust used *ere* 114 times (Cat. = 53, Iug. = 61) to the form in *erunt* only 8 times (Cat. = 4, Iug. = 4). Since *ere* was a favorite form in Sallust, to the extent of even 93.4%, we may safely conclude that *ere* was a favorite form in Cato also, that is, that it was not only common in that writer, but also in the Archaic sources Livy had before him (The S. C. de Bacch., which appeared during Cato's life time, has *ere* 4 times, but *erunt* only once. On the other hand, the Lex Anton. de Termess. of 71 B. C. has only the form in *erunt*). As Cato influenced Sallust's style, so Sallust influenced Livy's style; Schmalz, Synt. u. Stil.[3] cites at least 15 phrases which Sallust coined and Livy adopted, and at least 22 which are common first in Sallust and Livy.

The conclusion is clear that, as the great stylists of the golden age, Cicero,[1] Cæsar,[2] and Nepos, either did not use the form at all or very rarely, Livy's use of the form *ere* is partly due to the sources he used, partly due to the influence of Sallust. But this is not all, there still remains

B. The Poetic Influence.

The influence of the poets upon Livy's style has been ably discussed in Archiv X, 17 f. Schmalz, Synt. u. Stil.[3] cites at least 55 poetic constructions which Livy introduces into prose, and this list could be easily further extended. As Ennius had an influence upon Livy's style, it is interesting to note that in the fragments, *ere* was used 13 times to *erunt* 4 times.[3] Poetical usage may be better illustrated from Vergil.[4] Vergil uses in all *ere* 224 times

[1] Cf. Arch. f. Lat. Lex. III, 297; Neue–Wagener III[3], p. 191, say for Cicero that but 2 passages are certain, Fam. 10, 192 and Lig. 1, 2, 6.

[2] Cf. Arch. f. Lat. Lex. XI, 508.

[3] Lindsay, Lat. Lang. p. 532 says: "Ennius, however, seems to prefer erunt to ere in his Annals." As a matter of fact in the Annals ere is found 3 times as often as erunt, 12 to 4 (*ere:* fr. 24, 141, 144, 155, 232, 246, 290, 298, 299, 326, 392, 443 to *erunt* fr. 73, 315, 412, 448, Baehr. Fr.).

[4] Neue–Wagener III[3] p. 196 cite Wotke, Wiener Studien 1886 p. 131, but Wotke does not give the relative frequency of the *ere* and *erunt* forms and omits 6 passages for *erunt;* Æn. 3, 47; 363; 10, 139; 443; 11, 300; and 12, 710.

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to *runt* 45 times, i. e. *ere* = 83.3%. It is interesting to note that there is a steady increase in the use of the form in *ere;* in Ecl. *ere* = 55.5%, $\begin{cases} runt = 8; \\ ere = 10; \end{cases}$ in Geo. *ere* = 76.4%, $\begin{cases} runt = 13; \\ ere = 42; \end{cases}$ and in Æn. *ere* = 87.8%, $\begin{cases} runt = 24. \\ ere = 172. \end{cases}$ This decided preference for *ere* in Vergil is even more marked than would at first appear from the above. The fact of the matter is, he only uses the longer form *metri gratia*, or at the end of the 4th ft. (bucolic diæresis). It is noteworthy that *ere* was used only 17 times at the end of the verse, 15 of these being *dedere*[1] and 2 *tulere*. The form *dederunt* was not used at all by Vergil, and *tulerunt* only in Ecl. 5, 34; Geo. 2, 422 (Geo. 2, 454 is bracketed by Thilo).

The preference for the form *ere* in Ennius and Vergil, and the additional fact that poetic forms and phrases are more frequent in the 1st decade, lead one to conclude that the preponderance of the *ere* forms in this decade are the resultant of two forces, the archaic and the poetic, and the regular decrease in their use in the later decades by the change in Livy's style from a poetic to a prose style and to the stricter forms and norms of classicality.

C. The Influence of the Sermo Familiaris.

This can be dismissed in a few words. Although colloquialisms were continually making inroads into the higher forms of literature, and some are found in the language of Livy, colloquial influence can not be called in to explain his use of the form *ere*.

The *sermo familiaris*, here as elsewhere, preferred in general the fuller form. A few illustrations may be cited: in the Bell. Afr. $\begin{cases} runt = 46, \\ ere = 2, \end{cases}$ i. e. *ere* = 4.2%; in Bell. Hisp.[2] $\begin{cases} runt = 74, \\ ere = 2, \end{cases}$ i. e. *ere* = 2.6%; and in the prose of Petronius[3] $\begin{cases} runt = 74, \\ ere = 11, \end{cases}$ i. e. *ere* = 12.9%; in his verse only *ere* was used (11 times); so Vitruvius has only the form *erunt*. Cf. also the Romance form.

[1] Of the 6 forms in *ere* at the end of the verse in Ovid, Met., *dedere* constitutes 5.

[2] Neue-Wagener III[3] p. 192 cite Bell. Hisp. 24.8 instead of 24.1 for *convenere*. Cf. also Archiv XII (1902) p. 166.

[3] Neue-Wagener III[3] p. 197 cite for *ere* only one passage, *quaesivere* 124, 265; 21 are omitted: *abduxere* 114; *accessere* 33; *concurrere* 54; *consonuere* 78; *dedere* 74; *divisere* 33; *excipere* 113; *exclamavere* 34; *intermisere* 109; *inunda-*

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As a striking illustration of a complete change in attitude toward these forms may be cited 36, 17, 9; 41, 27, 8; 38, 38 f.; 34, 5, 7; 38, 1, 6, etc., where the form in *runt* is used a number of times, but the form in *re* not at all. Such passages clearly show that with Livy other considerations had greater weight, the return to the norm established by Cic. and Caes., than a fondness for variety of expression, which, in general, may account for his retention of the *ere* form. The two forms are often used in the same sentence, making it clear that no rule can be formulated to the effect that the *ere* form is preferred in more elevated, more poetical passage, as some have maintained.

As a general thing, the fuller form is preferred at the end, as, e. g. *runt* is used here 24 times in XXII to *re* but 6, in XXIX, *runt* 27 times to *re* only 4 times. This is particularly the case when both forms are used in the same sentence, as, e. g. 21, 15, 5; 25, 12; 22, 1, 3; 27, 37, 6; 29, 2, 2; 31, 15, 11, etc.

Many passages could be cited to show that Livy had emancipated himself from the laws that govern the rhythmical clausula (cf. Norden, Kunstprosa, p. 936), e. g. *in castra* is followed by 4 long syllables in 21, 56, 5 and 22, 18, 4, but by ⏑ ⏑ — ⏑ in 21, 56, 7, and ⏑ — — — in 22, 60, 25; cf. *venerunt* in 21, 24, 5; 22, 20, 9; 21, 3 with 21, 20, 1; 18, 3, etc. The same rhythm, however, occurs with *Placentiam* in 21, 47, 3 and 56, 5; with *tumultus* in 21, 25, 3 and 22, 48, 4; and with *Cannas* in 22, 49, 13 and 60, 18.

The following letter, whether a vowel or a consonant, was also considered in seeking for an explanation of the use of the vocalic or consonantal ending of the verb form. The conclusion has been that the influence exerted, if any, was slight, as, e. g. in the 3rd dec. *re* was used before a vowel 39 times, and almost as often before a consonant (34); in the 4th dec., the difference was slightly greater, 35 to 27.

II. Livy's Usage in Detail.

The conjugation to which a verb belonged had some influence in determining the form used. Excluding such irregular verbs as *sum*, *do*, *coepi*, etc., the following peculiarities were observed:

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vere 113; *procurrere* 114, and in poetry *cecidere* 109; *emisuere* 127; 136; *fregere* 119: 123; *incaluere* 123; *meruere* 108; *patuere* 122; *stupuere* 108; and *surripuere* 119.

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a) In all the decades from 61 to 67% of all the forms in *erunt* belong to the 3rd conj., and about 62% of all the forms in *ere* in every decade except in first half of 5th. The majority of all the verbs in *runt* and *re* belongs to the 3rd conj., and, with the exception of the 1st decade, the *runt* forms are always preferred to the *re* forms.

b). While in the 1st and 2nd conj. the *ere* forms outnumber those in *runt*, in the 4th conj. they were less used. The use of *venio* and its compounds will appear in the following table:

Decade.	erunt.	ere.	% ere.
1st	29	12	29.3
3rd	61	16	20.8
4th	91	7	7.1
41–5	35	1	2.8
Total	216	36	14.3

It is clear from the above that with *venio* and its compounds the form in *erunt* was preferred to that in *ere*.[1] It may be noted that the great majority, 89.7% of the verbs of the 4th conj. in *erunt* in the 3rd decade and in 41–5 are of *venio*, and 76.2% in the 3rd dec. in *ere* are of the same verb.

Livy's detailed usage of the various perfect endings in the different conjugations is as follows:

A. AVERUNT, ARUNT, AVERE.[2]

The relative frequency of each of these forms in the different decades is shown in the following table:

[1] To Neue-Wagener III[3], p. 193, we add the following occurrences of *ere*: *venere* 3, 38, 1; 4, 9, 12; 5, 19, 5; 10, 7; 38, 1; 21, 20, 7; 25, 18, 6; 26, 39, 19; 27, 20, 3; 37, 13; 35, 13, 6; *advenere* 8, 38, 2; 25, 36, 8; 37, 38, 6; 38, 6, 2; *convenere* 1, 9, 7; 47, 9; 6, 28, 4; 21, 21, 8; 24, 18, 10; 12; 25, 10, 7; 33, 16, 3; 38, 41, 6; *evenere* 28, 42, 5; *invenere* 6, 9, 7; 9, 2, 9; 25, 39, 8; 42, 28, 12; *pervenere* 8, 13, 4; 21, 35, 5; 47, 3; 22, 54, 1; 29, 2, 2; 31, 2, 10; 45, 11.

[2] *Sterno* and its compounds is excluded from the table; *straverunt* 10, 23, 12; 21, 28, 7; 41, 27, 8; 9; *prostraverunt* 9, 6, 4; 45, 20, 9; arunt and avere were not used.

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Decade.	averunt.	arunt.	avere.
1st	39	37	56
3rd.....	45	23	16
4th.....	43	56	11
41–5	7	34	5
Total	134	150	88

Notes.—(1) Livy to the end of the 3rd decade prefers the form *averunt* to *arunt*, but in the 4th decade he prefers the *arunt* forms = 56.6% and in 41–5, 82.9%.

(2) There are in all 11 verbs which have all the three forms, *abdico, creo, comparo, conclamo, impetro, iuvo, loco, muto, nuntio, pugno* and *turbo*. It may be noted that in the verbs having three forms *averunt* was preferred (48 times) to *avere* (27 times) and *arunt* (25 times); but after the first decade the ending *runt* rises to 80%, *re* falling to 20%. *Creavere* and *locavere* occur only in the 1st decade, while later *locaverunt* is found 12 times and *locarunt* twice.

c). With the following 16 verbs Livy uses only the ending *runt: adfirmo, armo, coniuro, curo, damno, dimico, immolo, nego, pronuntio, postulo, renuntio* (contr. 6, unc. = 1), *recito, regno, rogo, tolero, and triumpho.*[1]

d). It is worthy of note that with *nuntio* the ending *ere* was used but twice (4, 46, 9; 40, 19, 2), and the compounds have only the form in *runt*.

e). The verbs in *-lo* and in *-ro* prefer the ending *runt:* in *lo* { *runt* = 20; *re* = 2; in *ro* { *runt* = 42; *re* = 19. They also prefer the contracted form: *-lo* { contr. = 18; unc. = 2; and in *-ro* { cont. = 22; unc. = 20.

f). The ending *arunt* is not near so common as *erunt:* in 1st dec. { *arunt* = 37; *erunt* = 374; i. e., *arunt* = 9%; in 3rd dec. { *arunt* = 23; *erunt* = 665, i. e., *arunt* = 3.3%; in 4th dec. { *arunt* = 56; *erunt* = 990; i. e., *arunt* = 5.4%; and in 41–5 { *arunt* = 34; *erunt* = 300; i. e., *arunt* = 10.2%. In all, *arunt* = 150 to *erunt* 2329.

[1] Neue-Wagener III[3], p. 480, cite Drakenb. to Livy 21, 44, 7, and make a statement regarding the reading of the latest editions, which is true of but 2 out of the ten passages cited.

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B. EVERUNT, ERUNT, EVERE.

In Livy *everunt* { II conj. = 8 / III " = 45 }; *erunt* { II conj. = 1 / III " = 0 }; *evere* { II conj. = 6 / III " = 13 }; that is *-runt* = 54, *re* = 19.

The following forms are used: *compleverunt*, 3 times; *expleverunt*, 3 times; *impleverunt*, twice; in *ere: complevere*, twice; *delevere* and *explevere*, once each; *implevere*, twice; the form *erunt*, only once, *delerunt* 24, 42, 11. Several of these are omitted by Neue-Wagener, III[3], pp. 192 and 496.[1]

In the 3rd. conj. *decreverunt* occurs 36 times,[2] and *decrevere* 6 times,[3] the contrast being a striking one. So *quieverunt* was used 9 times to *quievere* 7 times.[4] These two verbs illustrate the fluctuating style of the 1st decade as compared with the more settled style later on: in the 1st decade he uses *decreverunt* 3 times, *decrevere* twice, but later he decides for the form in *erunt*, using it 33 times to *ere* only 4 times; and while *quieverunt* was used twice to *quievere* 5 times in the first dec., later he uses the form in *erunt* 7 times to the form in *ere* but twice.

C. *Viderunt* was preferred to *videre*, probably on account of the possibility of confusion in the use of the latter with the infin. form. While *ere* is the predominant form in the first dec., *viderunt* was used 10 times to *videre* 3 (3, 62, 6; 6, 8, 1; 37, 12). After the 1st dec. *viderunt* was used 26 times to *videre* but 10 times.[5]

D. OVERUNT, ORUNT, OVERE.

Moverunt was used 18 times, *movere* only 3 (2, 58, 3; 25, 23; 31, 38, 5). This use of *movere* is to be compared with *videre*.

[1] The following are to be added: *compleverunt* 42, 61, 6; *impleverunt* 34, 12, 8; *complevere* 22, 16, 1, not 32, 16, 1, as given; 29, 3, 8; *implevere* 45, 31, 6.

[2] Neue-W. III[3], p. 494, cite only 4; add: 4, 58, 7; 6, 21, 3; 7, 3, 2; 23, 34, 13; 26, 14, 2; 32, 5; 28, 21, 5; 29, 19, 5; 30, 2, 4; 31, 4, 1; 8, 3; 9, 8; 13, 6; 49, 1; 32, 8, 1; 28, 8; 32, 21, 9; 34, 21, 8; 35, 41, 7; 37, 1, 10; 55, 7; 38, 31, 5; 42, 5; 50, 3; 52, 8; 39, 33, 3; 40, 19, 4; 52, 2; 43, 4, 11; 45, 12, 10; 17, 1; 25, 7.

[3] Id. p. 495 for *decrevere* add: 26, 28, 3; 27, 37, 7; 35, 41, 2; 43, 15, 4.

[4] Id. p. 496 omit: *quieverunt* 32, 13, 15, and cite 24, 19, 13 for 24, 19, 5, and omit for *quievere* 8, 7, 20; 13, 8; and 40, 3, 7.

[5] No examples of *videre* are cited by Neue-Wagener; cf. 22, 1, 2; 23, 29, 14; 25, 26, 13; 26, 39, 18; 28, 15, 10; 30, 18, 13; 35, 36, 3; 37, 27, 5; 30, 7; and 40, 40, 9.

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Summoverunt is found in 25, 3, 16, *summovere* in 4, 17, 11; and *amovere* occurs in 5, 32, 7.

Livy does not use *noverunt*, but *norunt* in 26, 22, 14 and *novere* in 3, 67, 5. *Cognoverunt* was used twice and *cognovere* 3 times. *Agnovere* was also used 3 times,[1] all being in 1st decade.

E. UERUNT = 297, UERE = 196.

These endings may be classified according to conjugations, as follows:

Conj.	uerunt.	uere.	
1st.....	3	1	and
2nd.....	110	69	*fuerunt* = 74
3rd.....	106	31	*fuere* = 93.
4th.....	4	2	

It may be noted that, while in the regular conj. *-uerunt* is found from 2 to about 4 times as often as *-uere, fuere*, on the other hand, outnumbers *fuerunt*. It is also interesting to note that *fuere* occurs relatively more frequently than the other *ere* forms: in the 1st decade *fuere* runs 16.2% higher than the general average of the *ere* forms; strange to say, in striking contrast to the general tendency of the *ere* forms to decrease by half, *fuere* rises to 42.7% higher than the general average in the 3rd, and then drops in the fourth to 24.9% higher and in 41–5 to 26.2% higher.[2]

In regard to the different conjugations the following peculiarities may be noted: Livy prefers *censuerunt* (31) to *censuere* (4), in the fourth dec., using only the fuller form; *pono* uses only the form in *erunt*, and its compounds prefer this form (7) to *ere* but twice (24, 36, 4 *exposuere;* 5, 5, 5 *opposuere*). Livy's fondness for compound forms in general is illustrated by the fact that he uses *rapio* but once, *rapuere* 2, 34, 10, the compounds, however, 11 times { *runt* = 7, *re* = 4. Cf. also *curro*, p. 420, *duco*, p. 418, and *eo*, p. 419.

[1] Id. III[2], p. 497, omit: *cognoverunt* 37, 23, 5; *cognovere* 24, 30, 14; 27, 32, 3; 34, 20, 6; *agnovere* 5, 36, 7; 7, 39, 13; 40, 1; and *novere* 3, 67, 5.

[2] Id. p. 193 cite only 3 passages for *fuere*, but there are in all 93! (21, 19, 11 is cited for 21, 5, 11). Cf. also footnote, p. 409.

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It is noteworthy, too, that both with *volo* and with its compounds Livy uses only the fuller form: with *volo* 7 times, with *nolo* twice, and with *malo* 6 times.[1]

F. SERUNT (-SS, X) = 396, SERE (SS, X) = 155.

It is interesting to note that the *S* form of the perfect, in all probability the older form, showed a strong preference for the archaic form, *ere*, in the first decade, *serunt* occurring only 35 times to *sere* 86 times, that is, *sere* = 71.1%. Later, however, these forms are made to conform to the general law: in the 3rd dec. *serunt* = 114, *sere* = 39, that is *sere* drops to 25%, in the 4th, *serunt* = 184, *sere* = 26, *sere* dropping to about ¼, 12.4%, and in the bks 41–5, it again drops to about ¼, 5.9%, *serunt* occurring 63 times to *sere* only 4. After the 1st dec. $\begin{cases} serunt = 361 \\ sere = 69 \end{cases}$; i. e. *sere* = 16%.

The following peculiarities are worthy of note. Livy prefers *iusserunt* (28) to *iussere* (2), both in 1st dec. (2, 32, 2; 6, 26, 3); So *manserunt* (13) to *mansere* (2; 1, 35, 9; 21, 58, 11); *iubeo* and *manseo* thus show a decided preference for the fuller form. The compounds of *cedo* also prefer the fuller form, 45 to 32. After the 1st decade Livy uses only the form *dixerunt*, so also with *duxerunt*. The compounds of *duco* prefer *xerunt* (27) to *xere* (2). While the simple verb occurred 7 times, the compounds were used 29 times. Livy also preferred *miserunt* (62) to *misere* (7, of these 5 in the 1st dec.); and after the 1st dec. the compounds have *erunt* 16 times to the form in *ere* only 5 times. The compounds of *scribo* have only the form in *erunt*.

The 4th conj. has but one verb in this category, *senserunt* = 12 to *sensere* 9, and after the 1st decade the form *runt* = 9, *re* only 5.

G. IVERUNT (19), IERUNT (11), IVERE (20) and IERE (4).

There is a striking contrast between the verbs of the 3rd conj. and those of the 4th. While in the 3rd, *iverunt* = 10 to *ierunt* 1, in the 4th, *iverunt* = 9 and *ierunt* one more. So in the 3rd, *ivere* = 8, to *iere* = 0; in the 4th, *ivere* = 11 to *iere* = 4. There are

[1] To Id. III[2] p. 492 we add the following: *iuverunt* 33, 20, 12; *adiuverunt* 29, 1, 19; 32, 21, 16; 34, 5, 10; and *adiuvere* 3, 62, 7; 5, 34, 8; 7, 22, 9; 44, 10, 11. Here again the simple verb does not occur as often as the compound, cf. p. 417.

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all together 19 verbs with these endings in the 3rd conj.[1] against 34 in the 4th. *Petierunt* was used 27 times to *petiere* 17 times,[2] and after the 1st decade the *erunt* forms (24) were used 4 times as often as the *ere* forms (6).

It is interesting to note that the 4th conj. is richest in these forms, being the only one equipped with four, and that in Livy there is but one verb, *audio*, that enjoys this distinction. *Nequeo* is not quite so well off, having three, but the rest have only two. The 1st conj., however, although it can not show any more than three forms, can boast of 11 verbs (cf. p. 415). *Audiverunt* occurs 4 times, *-ierunt* 7 times, *-ivere* 5 times, and *-iere* twice.[3] After the 1st decade *runt* = 8 to *re* = 4. *Nequiverunt* occurs once, 33, 18, 7;[4] *nequivere* 4, 51, 3, and *nequiere* 29, 34, 12.

H. EO AND ITS COMPOUNDS.

Here the syncopated form is the only one Livy uses. It occurs as follows:

Decade.	ierunt.	iere.	% iere.
1st	16	21	56.8
3rd.....	21	8	27.6
4th.....	29	10	25.6
41–5	19	2	9.5
Total	85	41	32.5

[1] Id. III[2] p. 453 omit: *asciverunt* 30, 45, 7; *consciverunt* 39, 17, 5; 45, 10, 14; 24, 6; *desciverunt* 26, 31, 3; 38, 28, 7; *lacessierunt* 28, 12, 1;—*iere* 10, 27, 6 (not 1, 27, 6).

[2] Id. only 6 are cited for *petierunt* and 6 for *petiere*. Add the following to *petierunt* 7, 26, 9; 8, 1, 8; 10, 16, 3; 23, 35 3; 25, 5, 3; 26, 31, 3; 30, 25, 3; 43, 5; 32, 17, 3; 23. 13; 33, 6, 8; 15, 12; 27, 5; 34, 43, 2; 35, 24, 4; 36, 20, 5; 43, 8; 37, 57, 9; 38, 36, 5; 39, 37, 21; 40, 25, 4; 35, 4; 40, 13; 47, 4; 42, 38, 8; 43, 2 Neue-W. cite 10, 6, 3 for 16, 3 and 26, 31, 11 for 31, 3 (26 omitted). To *petiere*: 1, 37, 6; 3, 1, 8; 4, 2; 4, 6, 10; 9, 4; 46, 6; 58, 2; 5, 38, 10; 8, 2, 9; 9, 13, 4; 10, 37, 4; 21, 56, 4; 22, 7, 2; 31, 41, 7; 42, 62, 10; 45, 1, 5; 4, 6 (17 omitted). There is also omitted: *repetivere* 31, 21, 5; *triverunt* 23, 34, 17; *trivere* 37, 27, 8; and *obtrivere* 28, 33, 6.

[3] Id. III[2] p. 450 f. omit: *audiverunt* 28, 8, 5; 30, 19, 12; 38, 12, 5 (34, 11, 3 is cited instead of 34, 11, 5, but here Weissb.-Müll. read *audierunt;* and 9, 25, 5 also has *audierint*); *audierunt* 9, 7, 6; 34, 11, 5; 41, 19, 8; 42, 44, 5 (27, 8, 5 is given for 28, 8, 5); *audivere* 2, 38, 4; *audiere* 4, 1, 4; 25, 38, 23 (5, 39, 1 — ?).

[4] Id. omit this example; also *acciverunt* 35, 34, 7; *exciverunt* 27, 50, 9; *excivere* 1, 28, 3; *muniverunt* 24, 44, 6; *communiverunt* 28, 16, 7.

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The table shows that this verb does not follow the general tendency (cf. p. 409). While in the simple verb the *runt* forms (11) and the *re* forms almost balance, in the compounds the *runt* form (75) is greatly preferred to the *re* form (29); in fact those compounded with *ad*, *inter*, *trans*, and *prae* employ only the ending in *runt*. Of the other compounds, *abierunt* = 32, *abiere* = 15; *inierunt* = 17, *iniere* = 3; *perierunt* and *periere*, each = 5; *redierunt* = 32, *rediere* = 15; and *subierunt* and *subiere* occur each twice. Ἅπαξ λεγόμενα are: *coiere* 4, 7, 7; *praeierunt* 43, 13, 11; and *prodiere* 3, 36, 3.[1]

I. Curro and its Compounds.

The simple verb does not occur in these forms, the compounds, however, were used 41 times, and, with the exception of 2, all have the fuller form. With the exception of 3, all have the non-reduplicated form. Livy's usage is as follows: *concucurrerunt* is used once, 29, 18, 10, to *concurrerunt* 16 times; *decucurrerunt* once, 22, 4, 6, to *decurrerunt* twice, 26, 51, 4; 38, 8, 3, and *decurrere* once, 24, 36, 4; *incurrerunt* twice, to *incurrere* once. The other reduplicated form is *excucurrerunt*, 1, 15, 1.[2]

J. The irregular verb *coepi* on the whole used the form in *erunt* about as often as the form in *ere*. In the 1st decade, however, he uses only the form in *ere*, which does not appear again until 27, 12, 14. In all, the form in *erunt* = 10, in *ere* = 11.[3]

[1] Neue-Wagener's lists, pp. 193 and 453, are not complete here also; add: *iere* 22, 10, 8 (in 37, 31, 7 it is bracketed); *iniere* 2, 30, 11; *periere* 1, 37, 2; 10, 33, 6; 25, 38, 21; 31, 37, 8; 12; *rediere* 8, 23, 10; 26, 5; 22, 59, 18; 24, 16, 15; 27, 26, 6; 29, 35, 1; 30, 25, 4; 31, 37, 8; 12; 34, 46, 7; 35, 38, 12; 38, 3, 6; 39, 24, 5; 42, 60, 2; *subiere* 8, 10, 3.

On p. 193 *iere* is cited for 3, 36, 6 instead of 3, 66, 6; *abiere* 2, 7, 2 for 2, 7, 3; *iniere* 5, 22, 3 for 5, 22, 5; *proiere* for *periere* in 1, 37, 2; and *transiere* for *fuere* in 4, 22, 1. In all, 22 are omitted, and 5 incorrect citations are given.

[2] Id. III², p. 358, cite only 8 passages for *occurrerunt*, and omit 8, as follows: 2, 6, 9; 28, 15, 3; 29, 9, 5; 32, 24, 2; 38, 2, 12; 3, 5; 40, 6, 6; 46, 10 (22, 20, 11 is cited for 22, 20, 10 and 23, 47, 7 for 23, 44, 7; in 28, 15, 3 Weissb.-Müeller read *concurrerunt*). Two verbs are omitted entirely, *discurrerunt* 25, 25, 9; 34, 37, 1; and *occurrerunt* 2, 19, 13; 10, 12, 4; 43, 9; 27, 30, 1; 31, 18, 9; 29, 2; 35, 46, 3; 38, 14, 4; 33, 6; 40, 57, 3; 42, 22, 3; 43, 6; 45, 12, 3 (13). *Incurrerunt* also occurs in 42, 59, 3. In all 24 forms are omitted.

[3] Neue-Wagener omit this verb. *Coepere* occurs in 4, 6, 10; 12, 7; 5, 17, 1; 10; 22, 3; 30, 4; 7, 2, 5; 27, 12, 14; 28, 26, 11; 31, 42, 6; 35, 35, 10.

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SUMMARY.

A. General Observations.

1) The form *ere* is most common in the 1st decade, and decreases by about one-half in the later decades (cf. p. 409).

2) Livy's first decade has been appropriately called a prose poem, and is especially characterized by a more liberal use of archaic and poetical forms and phrases. His extensive use of the form *ere* in this decade is, therefore, partly due to archaic, partly due to poetic influences. Here, while being influenced by the archaic sources he used, he was also influenced by the norm established by Sallust. In the later decades he turns to the norm of Caesar and Cicero (cf. p. 412).

3) In the later decades Livy did not use the form in *ere* to give an archaic or poetical coloring to the passage. Its use here is to be accounted for chiefly from his fondness for variety in expression, often to avoid a rhyme between the two clauses. When the two forms were used in the same sentence, he, in general, preferred the fuller form at the close (cf. p. 413).

4) The break in the use of *ere* occurs with book VII. Before this *ere* is used more often, after less often.

5) The form *ere* is most common in III, 77.2%, and most rare in XLI, 3.3%.

6) There is a striking difference between Livy's use of the form *ere* and that of the author of the Periochae (cf. p. 410).

B. Detailed Usage.

1) There are 11 verbs in the 1st conj. which have the three forms, so also *nequeo*, while *audio* has four (pp. 415; 419).

2) Verbs in *lo* and *ro* prefer *runt* (p. 415).

3) After the 1st decade the form *arunt* is preferred to *averunt* (p. 415).

4) It is interesting to note that, while Livy in the first conj. avoided entirely perf. forms which are identical with the infin., probably on account of the confusion that might thus arise, he felt no hesitancy about such ambiguous forms in the 2nd and 3rd conj.: *videre* occurs 10 times, *movere* and its compounds 5 times (cf. p. 416 f.); so also *invidere* 30, 30, 30; *incidere* 3, 5, 10; *vertere* 33, 9, 7 and *avertere* 3, 7, 2; *portendere* 31, 7, 15.

5) Several verbs appear only in compounds, as *pleo* (p. 416) and *curro* (p. 420).

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6) *Volo* and its compounds have only the form in *runt* (p. 418).

7) Compound verbs in general prefer the fuller form, as *nuntio* (p. 415), *cedo*, *duco* and *scribo* (p. 418), *eo* (p. 420) and *venio* (p. 414).

8) The ending *uerunt* is preferred to *uere*, except in *fuere* (cf. p. 417).

9) The *s* perfects (*s*, *ss*, and *x*) prefer the ending *erunt* to *ere* (cf. p. 418 f.).

10) *Fuere* was used more often than any other form in *ere*. Neither this verb nor *video* and *venio* and its compounds follow the general tendency for the use of this form (cf. p. 414 f.).

[In summarizing the results of this investigation regarding Livy's use of these two forms, another kind of summary is suggested. In the course of this article many errors, both of omission and of commission, have been incidentally pointed out in Wagener's revision of Neue's Formenlehre. Besides those above mentioned others occur,[1] as, e. g. in Vol. III, p. 468 f. only 6 passages are cited for *audisset* instead of 21, only 3 for *petisset* instead of 6, and only 4 for *audissent* instead of 16; and on p. 473, only 5 for *audisse* instead of 13, and neither the verb *petisse* nor its 15 occurrences are cited. Besides this 125 forms of *eo* and its compounds are omitted; on p. 192 f., 228 passages are not given. It is with a feeling of disappointment that we record the fact that a book of such high standing as Neue's Formenlehre should contain so many errors. But the fact remains that as far as completeness or accuracy in regard to Livy's usage is concerned, it has been weighed in the balances and found wanting. Although the 3rd edition is a decided improvement over the 2nd, and has been enlarged to quite formidable dimensions, still for an exact account of Livy's usage the book is untrustworthy and unreliable, and needs a thorough revision. Let us hope that his treatment of this small chapter in Livy's usage is not typical of the whole book.]

EMORY B. LEASE.

THE COLLEGE OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK.

[1] Cf. Class. Rev. 1898, p. 30; 1899, p. 130 and p. 251; 1904, p. 27 f., where the author has pointed out omissions for Martial's use of *licebit*, Quintilian's use of *igitur*, *itaque*, and contracted forms of the perfect found in that author and in Livy. Cf. also Archiv XI, p. 10, for omissions of *licitum est*, etc.

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IV.—STUDIES IN SUPERSTITION.[1]

Pindar and Bacchylides.

Not that there is so little of superstition in Pindar's work should surprise us, but that there is so much. Truly, Pindar's bent of mind was not that of the lowly and the humble; the pride which caused him to link his name with that of Hiero as of equal worth did not incline him to seek the farmer's cottage and there, another Grimm, to listen to goblin-tales. The pessimistic bias of his thoughts, to which the words *σκιᾶς ὄναρ ἄνθρωπος* give such a gloomy expression, might lead him into the Pythagorean conventicles, but could not make him seek help and protection from the evils of this life, at the feet of some shadowy figure of divine origin. The few nuggets, therefore, which can be found in the remnants of his poems are all the more valuable, because they allow us to infer that the beliefs mentioned by Pindar, must have exercised great power over the Greek mind.

I have no such estimate to offer of Bacchylides. The few passages, which I have been able to cull, are highly interesting indeed. But even the new finds leave his genius too indistinct to allow of giving their proper place to his religious views.

The following notes on Pindar will simply justify the insertion, into the "Catalogue", of the passage dealt with. As for the remainder, the Index must be taken for what it is meant to be, viz. building-material for the coming historian of Greek religion.

Pindar, Fgm. 107 Chr(ist): The Eclipse.

This noble passage has been frequently quoted without receiving its proper place. Yet, I think that it is of some value for Greek superstition. I shall not speak here of the threatening significance which the poet ascribes to the obscuring of the sun[2]

[1] A. J. P. XVIII, 189.

[2] *ἐλαίνεις τί νεώτερον ἢ πάρος, . . . πολέμου δ' εἰ σᾶμα φέρεις τινός, ἢ καρποῦ φθίσιν, ἢ νιφετοῦ σθένος ὑπέρφατον, ἢ στάσιν οὐλομέναν, ἢ πόντου κενέωσιν, ἢ παγετὸν χθονός, ἢ νότιον θέρος, ἢ γαῖαν κατακλύσαισα θήσεις ἀνδρῶν νέον ἐξ ἀρχᾶς γένος . . .*

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nor will I press the meaning of the word κλεπτόμενον.[1] The fact that this poem preserves for us the only trace of a very old ritual is of much greater importance.

Written on the occasion of a solar eclipse, it is classed among the Ὑπορχήματα.[2] These were choral songs, sacred to Apollo, accompanied by pantomimic gestures. In other words, they were hymns to the 'Averter' of evil,[3] accompanied by a δρᾶσις or representation of some adventure. To talk plain, ethnological English, they were "medicine-dances."

Going further, we may, conjecturally at least, retrace the contents of this special dance. When light is born, it is greeted by a dance of armed πυρριχισταί, the Curetes.[4] During their dance these spirits beat on their shields, in order to make as great a noise as possible. This is done in imitation of earthly rites; for just so the evil spirits threatening the new babe are driven away by the noise of metal instruments.[5]

Now the eclipse of the sun is due to evil spirits which must be driven away by the noise of bronze instruments.[6] This notice of Pliny's evidently must be brought to bear upon our passage, and we are thus enabled to state that during solar eclipses superstitious people tried to help the endangered god by a dance in which the fight with the evil spirit and its defeat was symbolically represented.

But was this done by the superstitious only? For whom did Pindar write his ὑπόρχημα? Did he put his proud pen at the disposal of some conventicle?

One, at least, of his Ὑπορχήματα was of a higher character, as it was, if not written for Hiero, certainly addressed to him. Neither are indications wanting to show that our ὑπόρχημα, too, had an official character. The dancers, whoever they are, pray, not for their own salvation but for that of Thebes, their native city.[7] Nor is it imaginable that the exalted sentiment touching the feared disasters would have been acceptable to the adherents of those superstitious θίασοι which we know existed in Pindar's age. With

[1] ἄστρον ὑπέρτατον ἐν ἁμέρᾳ κλεπτόμενον.
[2] Cp. Boeckh. de metris Pind. p. 270. Athen. 630 d.
[3] H. Usener, Götternamen, 302–312.
[4] Idem, Pasparios, Rhein. Mus. XLIX, 464.
[5] E. Rohde, Psyche[1] 248, 2.
[6] Pliny, N. H. II, 54; Pauly-Wissowa I, 41, 13.
[7] ἀπήμον' ἐς οἶμόν τινα τράποιο Θήβαις.

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good reason, it seems to me, may we assume that this poem was composed as an official song to accompany the expiatory rites by which the city of Thebes tried to avert the portent.

We are vouchsafed but seldom an insight into the position which a great thinker took towards the feelings that pervaded the souls of his contemporaries. Such an opportunity, however, seems to be offered here. "Whether," Pindar says, "whether thou portendest war, or ruin of the crops, or overwhelming snow, or destructive revolution, or the flooding of the plains by the sea, or a freeze, or heat from the South; or whether thou art going, by a deluge, to renew from the beginning the race of men: I do not wail, for I shall but suffer in company with all." And again, if fgm. 142 Chr. has been correctly assigned to the same poem as 107: "God has the power to raise unblemished light from black night, and again to wrap in black-clouded darkness the pure sheen of day."

If the first words betray an almost stoical resignation to the common fate, the latter breathe an almost Christian confidence in God's omnipotence. Views which are not altogether incompatible. But even if they were, their apparent contradictoriness would not be surprising in a poet who proclaimed two mutually exclusive views of the life after death.[1] Yet we must try to find the relation of the poet's belief to that of his compatriots. Was Pindar simply an unbeliever who adapted his thoughts to the demands of the hour? Did he simply yield to the orders of his employers when he wrote this *ὑπόρχημα*? And what was his attitude toward the faithful and their apotropaic rites? He himself has given the answer to these questions. Just as he has treated the Pelops-legend, not rejecting any feature of the popular myth, but purifying and ennobling it, so he has done here: under the touch of his genius the plain medicine-dance has acquired a nobility of sentiment in which the common herd had no share, but which may have contributed, on its part, to give new ideas to these simple folks, however unconsciously imbibed.

PINDAR, OL. I, 73–76; VI, 57 FF.: THE CONJURING OF SPIRITS.

"Popular beliefs", says E. Rohde,[2] "twine themselves round almost the whole theology of Pindar's. A true poet, as a faithful

[1] E. Rohde, Psyche[1] 496–514.
[2] Psyche[1] 508.

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steward of the popular myth, he does not reject it, but purifies and ennobles it."

The two passages to be considered likewise have been built upon a foundation of popular belief. Both describe the invocation of a god whose help is to be asked for, and both employ all the salient features of a *κατάδεσμος*. How lasting these features were, how deep-rooted in the beliefs of the Greeks, is proved by the fact that every one of them is found again in the Magical Papyri, over six centuries after Pindar. I shall let the parallel speak for itself:

Pelops goes *οἷος ἐν ὄρφνᾳ* (Iamos goes *νυκτὸς ὑπαίθριος*) *ἐγγὺς ἁλὸς πολιᾶς* (*Ἀλφεῷ μέσσῳ καταβάς* : Iamos).[1] Both call here upon Poseidon, who *πὰρ' ποδὶ σχεδὸν φάνη*.	The magician goes *πρὶν ὁ ἥλιος ἀναβαίνῃ πρὸς τὸν Νεῖλον* (the river takes, for the Egyptians, the place of the sea) *μηδενὸς ἄλλου κατιόντος* (Pap. Paris, 26–40); he invokes the god and immediately *φανήσεται, ὃν φωνεῖς*, Pap. Par. 249 (Wessely, Denkschr. Wien. Ak. XXXVI.

The comparison ought to be convincing. Pindar has evidently made use of material available in the superstitious rites of his age. But he has molded this material so skillfully, and has harmonized it with its surroundings so artistically that nobody would suspect the humble birth of his verses, were it not for the irrefutable testimony of the papyri.

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—— ——————: Iamos is fed with honey: Pind. Ol. VI 45 ff.; cp. Honey, Snakes.

——, abhor 'res venereas', Plut. *αἴτ. φυσ.* 36; but cp. Christ's note to Pind. fgm. 252.

Charm, figuratively, Pind. Ol. XIII 68; 84 ff.; Pyth. III 63–65; cp. Love-charm, Music.

[1] This disproves Böhmer's contention that Pelops goes to the sea because Poseidon lives there. For Iamos, too, calls upon Poseidon.

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Dance, during an eclipse of the sun, Pind. fgm. 107 Chr.; cp. Eclipse, Sun. See p. 424.
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———, have a road of their own, Pind. Ol. II 77. See E. Rohde, Psyche[1] 505, 1.
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IV.

THEOCRITUS.

To the folk-lorist the study of Theocritus is a disappointment. The master and, practically, the εὑρετής, of bucolic poetry should, we expect, abound in those rare traits of popular belief which certainly filled the souls of those very herdsmen and vintners whose life and love he was singing. Yet, a glance at the Index will show that the yield is very meagre. Not, indeed, in quantity; for the number of items is considerable. But they are of minor importance. This will appear paradoxical to the reader who is accustomed to hear the praises of Theocritus sung. Let us, then, seek the reasons for this phenomenon.

What was the point of view from which Theocritus approached his subject? Living for some time in Cos, the pupil and friend

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of poets who are nothing, if not artificial, a guest at the court of the Ptolemies with its hyper-refinement, he felt with the instinct of the littérateur the attractive novelty of those rural scenes, in the midst of which he probably passed his boyhood. His are not idyls in the modern sense, sprung from a feeling of satiety, of loathing caused by the vices and exactions of an artificial society, but genre-paintings for the connoisseur of art. When his poems first appeared they must have exercised a charm upon his reading public, similar to that which Kipling's tales exercise over our minds. But we must find in his work the same faults as in those of Kipling: we see everywhere the poet behind his creation, and not for one moment do we lose the feeling that the author himself, the masterly painter of scenes from low life, moves, and delights to move, in circles far above those to which he introduces us. It was the aim of Theocritus, as it is that of Kipling, to blaze out a trail hitherto untrodden, to present to his readers a novel life, the life of those whom his friends ordinarily contemplated with a mingled feeling of repulsion and curiosity. Naturally, the religious thoughts of his heroes and heroines had to be left in the dim background. It is significant that we know of no work of his contemporaries treating of folk-lore, however eagerly they sought for that which Panofka has aptly termed "Verlorene Mythen". The reason for this is manifest. This was not novel, it was a sphere of belief in which probably a great many even of the educated shared, and which, therefore, seemed not to be especially noteworthy. This statement seems to be contradicted by the Second Idyl. But it will be remembered that the magical detail therein was borrowed from Sophron's Mimus. The other items of superstition, catalogued by me, can hardly be said to present any new aspect, and they cannot have been new to the Coan or Alexandrian reader who was familiar with the material which Theophrastus used for his Δεισιδαίμων.

Secondly, not only from the standpoint of the littérateur, but also from that of the artist, Theocritus could feel no call for filling his poems with allusions to popular beliefs. His seems not to have been the modern method of collecting characteristic data, and then working them into a carefully planned 'realistic' picture. He can certainly not be charged with the excess of erudition which mars the painful work of some of his contemporaries. While this contributes to the charm of his poetry, and

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lends it the character of simplicity, yet it detracts from his archaeological value.

Nor, thirdly, does it seem to have been in the character of the *man*, to devote himself to a careful observation of detail. Quite contrary to our expectation, he can, by no means, be called one of the "Kleinmeister", or, as he would have said himself, perhaps, a *ῥυπαρογράφος*. He cannot be said to have gone into tedious detail in any one of his poems. It is interesting, in this connection, to compare his Adoniazusae, for example, with the poems of Herondas, especially in regard to the language in which the mistresses address their slaves.[1]

In closing this introduction, I wish to say expressly, that I am far from censuring Theocritus for his failure to impart antiquarian information. For the loss of the student certainly has been the gain of the lover of art.

1. The Goddess Ἀνάγκη? (XVI, 82–85).

Our passage is mentioned neither in Roscher's Lexicon nor in Wissowa's Encyclopaedia. Nor does Dieterich, who speaks of the "demon Ἀνάγκη",[2] refer to it. Ἀ. was certainly worshipped in Corinth,[3] a city maintaining relations with Sicily. Now, Theocritus connects here Syracuse with Corinth (82–84). This seems to confirm an assumption of the worship of Ἀ. in Syracuse. Monumental proof, however, is lacking. I can find no mention of a goddess, Ἀ. in the Inscriptiones Graecae Italiae et Siciliae.

2. The Poem Ἁλιεῖς (Ps. Th. XXI).

I shall not enter upon the question of the time of this spurious poem. But the reader's attention deserves to be called to its strange conformity to the rules of Dream-interpretation as laid down by Artemidorus of Daldis. Thus, in lines 40–41, we hear that the dream just related must be true. "For I had not eaten much; as you remember, we dined early and sparingly". Compare with this, Art. I, 8: "in all dreams whose cause one cannot find, we must consider, whether the dreamer went to bed after a moderate meal or after an ample dinner. For with a burdened stomach one cannot expect to see a true vision". This was the generally accepted theory, as is borne out by Plutarch.[4]

[1] This has been done by Legrand, in his Étude sur Théocrite, p. 134, who has also discussed in detail his lack of erudition (p. 128), and his failure to observe accurately (p. 140).

[2] Abraxas 101 f.; Nekyia 124.

[3] Pausanias II, 4, 6.

[4] Plut. Quaest. Conv. VIII 3, 1 (734 F.).

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But it is further to be noted that the dream itself—of the catch of a golden fish—and its interpretation follow the rules. After a prolonged struggle a golden fish has been brought up. According to Artemidorus[1] this falls under the heading of subjective dreams, which form the first of the five classes into which allegorical visions are divided, namely, dreams in which we see ourselves acting or suffering. Whatever these dreams mean, they refer to the dreamer alone. Just so the fisherman of our poem announces that the good luck to come will come to himself. Secondly, he does not doubt that he is destined to become rich, since the fish has been golden. Now, it is true that gold portends death to a sick man,[2] its color, temperature and weight being related to death, but it also signifies good luck.[3] "Gold does not forebode on account of its material, as some say, but, on the contrary, it brings luck. It does this, however, only, if it neither surpasses the limits nor is unsuitable in form, as chains for a man, nor is beyond one's position, as crowns and plate for a pauper". And again:[4] "To catch many, and large, fish is good and profitable for everyone, not of sedentary habits, (since fish are always moving), nor a sophist (i. e. a professional lecturer of the kind described by E. Rohde[5]; for to him, fish, as voiceless, would be unlucky".[6] Lastly, as the *ἐσθλὸς ὀνειροκρίτης* cuts down the hopes of our dreamer,[7] just so we read in Artemidorus,[8] that every *θαῦμα* or impossibility causes deception and vain hopes.

In marked contrast with these instances of agreement, and yet bearing out the judgment of Artemidorus, are verses 32 and 33: *οὗτος ἄριστος ὀνειροκρίτας, ὁ διδάσκαλός ἐστι παρ' ᾧ νοῦς.*

3. The Grateful Bees (VII, 78–82).

While scholars have always recognized, that this narrative belongs to the scanty stock of Greek fairy-tales, yet it seems never to have been assigned to its proper type, that of the "Grateful Animal". A. Marx, indeed, to whom we owe the best investigation of the series, expressly denies the existence of such tales concerning bees,[9] and seems to ascribe the relation between men and bees to the mantic character of the animals. Neither does Olck, in his article,[10] refer to our passage, although he adverts to the connection of the bee with the Muses.

[1] Art. I 7. [2] Art. I, 37. [3] II, 5. [4] II, 14.
[5] Griech. Roman 288 ff. [6] Cp. with this Petronius, Cena Trimalch. 39.
[7] XXI, 63 ff. [8] II, 44. [9] Märchen von dankbaren Tieren, p. 124[3].
[10] Wissowa's Encyclopaedia, sub Biene.

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Now the tale, as told by Theocritus, runs as follows: a herder of goats was shut up by his master in a wooden box, having incurred his displeasure. Bees, however, came flying, and fed him on their honey, because the Muse had poured sweet nectar on his lips, i. e., because he was a poet. The tale was known in the fourth century B. C., as we learn from the scholia. These also add the happy solution, omitted by Theocritus, how, after two months, the master opens the box, only to find the man still living and his prison filled with honeycombs. The scholia also give a reason for the behavior of the bees, differing from that of Theocritus: ἔθυεν ἐπὶ συχνὰ ταῖς Μούσαις. This statement contains the key of the situation. The bees are the incarnation of the Muses themselves, who show their gratitude for the herder's piety by coming to his aid at the critical moment. The identity of the bees and the Muses is clear from the many passages connecting them.[1] Even Marx, rationalist though he be, has conceded that the identity of animal and god is the underlying "mythical motif" of all the tales treating of the "grateful animal".[2] They all, as far as their mythical content can be understood, belong to the same type as the story of the rescue of Simonides by the Dioscuri, and, ultimately, fall under the "Contract" view of the relation between god and man, of which I have spoken elsewhere.[3]

4. The Lullaby (XXIV 7, 9).

It is interesting to observe how felicitous Theocritus has been in striking the popular note. The verses under consideration are from the cradle-song of a mother who rocks her babies, Hercules and Iphicles, to sleep. No one, I imagine, can read these lines without being reminded of modern lullabies. There is, however, an element of unconscious superstition, if I may say so, in the way in which a perfectly natural element is expressed. At all times, man has been afraid that Sleep, this miraculous, temporary suspension of the activities of life, may pass over into the everlasting suspension of Death. In praying for sleep, therefore, one must be very careful to express also the desire of waking again, else the sleep may be continued beyond awakening. To this superstitious fear, I am inclined to ascribe the peculiar expression[4] ἐγέρσιμος ὕπνος. That this vague fear is

[1] Olck, l. c. [2] L. c., p. 20.
[3] Transact. Am. Philol. Assoc. XXVII, 15 ff. [4] Vs. 7.

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really uppermost in the mother's mind is shown by the reiteration of the sentiment in verse 9: "Sleep safely, and safely see the dawn again!" It is this careful choice of well-omened words in prayer which characterizes ancient religion of the popular mind as against the prayer of a philosopher, like M. Aurelius, and, more still, as against the fervid effusion of the adherents of revealed religions.[1] Here, it seems to me, the boundary line between the prayer, welling up straight from the heart,—and such prayers assuredly the best among the ancients prayed no less than we—and the prayer of the δεισιδαίμων—and the majority of the ancient believers were δεισιδαίμονες in the literal sense of the word—is most sharply drawn.

5. The Demon: Old Age (XXIX, 26–27).

"We grow old more quickly than one can spit".

The idea is plain enough. But why should the action of spitting be especially expressive of speed? "Morbos despuimus," says Pliny,[2] and the use of this phrase has been well explained by Mr. Nicholson in his excellent pamphlet on "The Saliva Superstition."[3] Spittle is prohibitive in its action, keeps away the evil spirits, and prevents their doing mischief. Such an evil spirit Old Age is also. There are still existing a number of Vase Paintings, on which Herakles defeats an old man, ugly of face, whom the artist has designated as Γῆρας.[4]

But, according to Theocritus, old age is too quick for the remedy to take effect. Here, a similar belief about another 'demon' comes to our help. If you meet a wolf, don't let him see you first, or you will lose your power of speech.[5] Evidently, the same idea prevailed about Old Age. Were it possible to see the enemy approach, we should be safe from his attack.

6. Threatening the God: Theocr. VII 106–114.

This is one more passage from our poet which finds its analogy in the Magical Papyri.[6] Simichidas invokes Pan to

[1] Where, in revealed religion, prayer adopts formulas, such superstitious character may creep in. I remember a childish evening-prayer, in which the emphasis is laid upon the "straight limbs of the child", expressing the hope that he may rise the next morning, with "all his limbs still straight"!

[2] N. H. XXVIII, 35. [3] Harvard Studies in Class. Philol. VIII, 23 ff.

[4] All conveniently collected in Furtwängler's Bronzen von Olympia, text to no. 699.

[5] Wissowa, Encyclop. I 81, 50. Demons in animal shape: Bienkowski, Malocchio, in Eranos Vindobonensis.

[6] Cp. Wessely, Denkschr. Wien. Akad. Phil. Hist. XXXVI, 27 f.

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come to the aid of his unhappy friend Aratos. "If you do so", he says, "then the boys in Arcady shall not whip your sides with σκίλλαι because they have been short of meat.[1] But, if you help him not, may you be torn by their finger-nails, may you live in the regions of extreme northern cold in winter, and of extreme southern heat in summer!"[2] Just so there are in the Magical Papyri many instances of threats uttered against the god or demon, if he refuses to help the sorcerer.[3] The underlying idea, in both cases, is of course the same. And a very strange one it is, that the power of the worshipper is greater than that of the god he worships, and that it is possible for him to make the god suffer. This idea, so repugnant to us, and, be it said, also to the more elevated minds among the ancients, can yet claim a very great antiquity. For, ultimately, it must go back to the idea of a covenant in which the two contracting parties are, at least, equal.

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[1] I cannot go here into a discussion of the original meaning of this peculiar treatment. It is possible that the interpretation of Theocritus is a late attempt to explain the survival of an obsolete "Fertility-Charm", about which Mannhardt's Wald- und Feldkulte ought to be consulted. Though the idea, as in Theocritus, is simple enough, and has survived in our own age. So Italians heap indignities upon the statue of their patron saint, if he refuses to grant their prayer.

[2] The confusion of ideas is interesting. The first threat can apply only to the statue of the god which is thought of as animated and inhabited by the god himself, while the second threat can apply only to the invisible, bodiless god who roams the fields at his sweet will. Such a confusion is decidedly popular ('volkstümlich') and another example of Theocritus's power of observation.

[3] Cp. e.g. Papyrus Anastasy Brit. Mus. XLVI, l. 254 ff. (Wessely, l. c. p. 133).

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V.—THE NOMINATIVE OF THE PERFECT PARTICIPLE OF DEPONENT VERBS IN LIVY.

The nominative of the perfect participle of deponent verbs in Livy is followed by a dependent noun construction in about one-fourth of the instances. In addition to these, some transitive participles take an accusative conjointly with the finite verb, e. g. 2, 20, 3 Valerium ... ex transverso quidam adortus transfigit. Of the fifty-nine occurrences of *adortus* twenty are like this, while in nine other passages there is a dependent infinitive, e. g. 44, 12, 8 eam quoque oppugnare adorti ... irrito incepto Demetriadem petunt.

The participles which are used with a case other than the accusative are not put into the absolute construction. The genitive is used with *miseratus* 22, 55, 5; and 31, 30, 11; cf. 33, 48, 2 ita Africa Hannibal excessit ... saepius patriae quam suum eventum miseratus. Twelve of the occurrences of *oblitus* are with the genitive, e. g. 32, 21, 11 o. societatis ... reliquit. The accusative is used 22, 58, 8 veluti aliquid oblitus; and a dependent clause 36, 11, 2 o. quantas simul duas res suscepisset. Of the deponents regularly taking the ablative, *usus* occurs eleven times, e. g. 7, 28, 6 consules dictatoris exercitu ... usi Soram ... ceperunt; *functus* and compounds twelve, e. g. 4, 57, 12 quattuor creati sunt, omnes iam functi eo honore; 22, 47, 9 Romani defuncti nequiquam uno proelio ... integram pugnam ineunt; 22, 51, 1 ut tanto perfunctus bello ... quietem ... sumeret. *Potitus* takes the ablative in eleven passages, as in 3, 8, 11 victor consul, ingenti praeda potitus ... rediit; and once the genitive 34, 21, 5 huius potitus loci consul eos ... liberos esse ... iussit. The participles of *nitor* and its compounds are used somewhat freely: 2, 50, 9 nisi corporibus; 26, 9, 7 and 43, 2, 2 nixae genibus; 44, 36, 5 n. pilis. In 27, 34, 15 adnisi omnes cum C. Claudio M. Livium consulem fecerunt, *adnisus* is used without an immediately dependent noun as is *conisus* in most of the ten occurrences, though there is an accompanying ablative 3, 70, 5; 31, 21, 10; and 33, 19, 9 viribus conixus, as also with *enisus* 30, 24, 8 ingenti remigum labore e. Apollinis promunturium tenuit. The accusative is used 40, 4, 4 plures e. partus ... decessit. *Innixus* is found 4, 19, 4 hasta

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i.; 6, 1, 4 eodem i. . . . stetit; 9, 16, 19 quo i. . . . staret; 8, 8, 10 i. humeris; 8, 9, 14 genu i.; 28, 15, 5 scutis i.; and 3, 26, 9 fossam fodiens palae innixus. *Obnixus* was noticed 7, 33, 12; 8, 38, 11; and 34, 46, 10 nec dextris magis gladiisque gerebatur res, quam scutis corporibusque ipsis obnixi urgebant. *Subnisus* occurs 39, 53, 8 inflatior redierat s. erga se iudiciis senatus. There is an example of *operatus* 10, 39, 2 hostes o. superstitionibus concilia secreta agunt. Both *confisus* and *diffisus* are used with dependent nouns: 28, 42, 12 c. Carthaginienses consensu Africae, fide sociorum regum, moenibus suis; 39, 51, 4 odium in se cernens, et fidei regum nihil sane confisus; *diffisus* 1, 2, 3 d. rebus; 21, 25, 3 d. moenibus; 40, 49, 3 d. praesidio; and with dependent statement 10, 33, 10 d. resisti posse; 21, 26, 6 d. arceri posse.

The larger part of the nominatives of the participles express motion, owing to the frequency with which *profectus*, *secutus* and the compounds of *gressus* are used in the descriptions of military movements. There is less demand for other participles, and the following divisions indicate in a general way the frequency of different forms of activity.

Delay and Motion.—Livy has *cunctatus* 4, 32, 10; 10, 19, 16; 26, 38, 7; 42, 53, 7; and *moratus* forty-six times. The latter is frequently limited by *dies*, or by a *dum*-clause, occasionally by both, as in 28, 34, 12, paucus moratus dies dum . . . pernumerarent. A *cum*-clause is used 42, 55, 5 m. dies cum audiret. *Tantum* occurs in connection with *moratus* 25, 18, 12; 29, 2, 9; 37, 12, 6; 40, 48, 5 t. m. ut . . . sineret. Similar to these is 23, 47, 1 id modo m. ut consulem percunctaretur. *Tantum* . . . *quantum* accompanies 29, 34, 9; and 33, 2, 7 t. Thebis m. q. Attali repens casus coegit. In one passage *moratus* is used transitively 24, 7, 5 m. turbam Dinomenes, tantum intervalli fecit, ut . . . confoderetur.

Profectus (314), and the compounds of *gressus* are the forms occurring most frequently. *Egressus* (57), usually taking the simple ablative, has the preposition *ex* 2, 48, 10; 5, 55, 2; 7, 31, 11; 45, 20, 7; and *ab* 24, 40, 11; 27, 17, 8 ab Tarracone e. . . . pergit. The landing place is indicated by the accusative with *in*, e. g. 22, 45, 3 turbam cum vixdum in ripam egressi . . . fugassent. Notice, in an indirect statement, 2, 61, 4 modum dumtaxat in certamine egressum iratae obici plebi. The construction with *degressus* (12), and *digressus* (4) is the same, *a* occurring 23, 9, 3 digressi a colloquio; and *ex* 5, 52, 3 degressus ex arce; and 35,

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38, 11 ita digressi ex colloquio legati ad suos, Thoas et Aetoli ... domum rediere. *Congressus* generally has *cum* with the ablative of the antagonist, as in 8, 36, 8 cum hoste c. . . . fugavit Samnites, but also has a conjoint accusative 8, 24, 9; 32, 21, 19 c. fudit fugavitque regem. *Praegressus* (15) takes an accusative 21, 35, 8 p. signa; 28, 1, 6 non solum nuntios sed etiam famam adventus sui p.; and 36, 31, 7 p. agmen. *Progressus* (49) is used with *iter* 33, 6, 2; 43, 21, 9; and 44, 2, 5; while *regressus* (25), usually followed by *ad* or *in*, has the terminal accusative 36, 6, 6 Chalcidem r.; 38, 2, 3 Gomphos regressus.

The transitive compounds occur as follows: *Adgressus* (24) takes a direct accusative nine times, as in 6, 8, 10 moenia undique a. oppidum cepit, and conjointly in ten passages, e. g. 6, 2, 14 non castra modo sed urbem etiam a. primo impetu cepit. *Ingressus* (53) has forty-four direct and two conjoint accusatives 36, 28, 3; and 39, 30, 5; and is followed by *in* 9, 7, 10; and 10, 10, 4 i. in urbem. *Praetergressus* (3) governs the accusative 35, 4, 4; and 45, 33, 8, as does *supergressus* 33, 7, 3 s. tumulos . . . posuerunt castra. *Transgressus* (56) takes the accusative in thirty-one passages, and of the remainder, nineteen have *in*.

Secutus (52) is one of the participles freely used,—thirty-six times with the accusative. It is especially noticeable with the accusative of another participle, as in 23, 1, 9 cedentes secutus cecidit. The compounds occur as follows: *Adsecutus* 4, 14, 6 haec eum vociferantem a. Ahala Servilius obtruncat; 9, 38, 3 redeuntes . . . a. agrestes exuerunt praeda; 25, 34, 10 a. pugnantes; 25, 35, 8. a. Numidae. *Consecutus* 31, 24, 15 vulneratos c.; 3, 23, 5 hos . . . se recipientes Romanus consul c. ad unum omnes cecidit. *Executus* 27, 12, 6 imperata e. *Insecutus*, (14), has the accusative six times, e. g. 8, 8, 13, cum velut victos i. novam repente aciem . . . cernebant. *Persecutus* (17) takes a direct accusative excepting 29, 29, 1 paucos in ipso certamine, plerosque fugientes p. . . . occiderunt. *Prosecutus* is found 7, 33, 4 adhortationem p.; 5, 28, 4 legatos. . . p. Romam inde sospites restituit; and intransitively 44, 28, 5 ut in tutum p. redirent Tenedum. *Subsecutus* 8, 35, 2 inclinatam rem in preces s. orare dictatorem insistunt. *Consectatus* has a conjoint accusative 38, 23, 5; and 40, 27, 12 fugientes . . . c. ceciderunt. *Inter emensus* occurs 26, 41, 16; and 35, 34, 9; Thraciam e. 38, 17, 16; and altitudinem permensus 25, 23, 12. *Aversatus* 8, 7, 14 filium a. contionem classico advocari iussit. Other verbs of motion are intransitive: *obversatus* 2, 36, 4;

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23, 27, 1; and 33, 47, 10; *lapsus* and compounds (27); *palatus* (18) and *vagatus* (7), though the latter at times have adjectival force rather than participial.

Saying.—There is considerable variety in the verbs of saying used, though the occurrences of any one are not especially numerous. *Abominatus* 30, 25, 12; 40, 4, 8 a. mentionem. *Argumentatus* 33, 28, 8 multa . . . a. *Aspernatus* 1, 22, 7; 1, 23, 6; 29, 34, 5; 34, 40, 2 quem Quinctius a. excedere castris iussit; 42, 44, 1 societatem a. Romanis se adiungebant. *Causatus* 5, 15, 6; 36, 10, 12 hiemem instare apud suos c. . . . moratus . . . recessit. *Comminati* 44, 9, 7. *Contionati* 4, 9, 7. *Criminatus* 3, 9, 2 patrum superbiam ad plebem c. . . . invehebatur. *Detestatus* 40, 8, 11 d. exempla. *Execratus* 10, 28, 18 haec e.; 25, 14, 5 e. seque et cohortem; 39, 51, 12 e. in caput regnumque Prusiae. *Fassus* with compounds (13), usually *professus*, has the acc. 37, 55, 1 errorem f. *Fatus* (7) is also less frequently used than its compounds, *praefatus* (5), e. g. 33, 12, 3; and 34, 27, 6 pauca p., *effatus* (*pass.*) 10, 37, 15; *interfatus* 32, 34, 2; 36, 27, 3; and 36, 28, 4 prope dicentem interfatus Romanum . . . inquit. *Gratulatus* 21, 50, 8; 44, 13, 10. *Gravatus* 9, 3, 9. *Hortatus* and compounds (15) generally *adhortatus* or *cohortatus*, take the accusative in twelve passages. *Iocatus* 32, 34, 3. *Iuratus* 32, 22, 7. *Locutus* and compounds *ad-*, and *con-* (19) occur about the same number of times. Haec l. is found 1, 16, 8; 2, 37, 8; 10, 28, 14; pauca l. 23, 24, 3; and 27, 9, 10 locuti magis quam ausi tantum nefas; 26, 36, 9 multa c. *Adlocutus* has a personal object 25, 10, 8 Tarentinos; 27, 10, 6 eos; 35, 31, 3 Thessalos; and conjointly 22, 58, 2 cum socios a. dimisisset. *Mentitus* 24, 5, 12. *Miseratus* 31, 30, 11; and 33, 48, 2. *Orsus* (17) and *exorsus* (3) take the accusative 36, 6, 3 orationem exorsus, though *est* has perhaps fallen out; 2, 38, 2 or. exorsus; 7, 36, 9 orsus laudes. *Percunctatus* (10) has the acc. six times, as in 6, 34, 8 percontatus . . . avertentem causam doloris . . . elicuit. *Pollicitus* is used transitively 5, 46, 8 operam pollicitus; and 41, 20, 9 templum . . . pollicitus . . . non perfecit. *Precatus* in twelve passages is found with the accusative, usually *haec* or *deos*, but the thing prayed for in 21, 50, 8 transitum; 39, 10, 5 pacem; and a double accusative 10, 24, 18 Fabius nihil aliud precatus populum Romanum . . . abiit. *Questus* (10) is used a little more freely than *conquestus* (8), the latter with the accusative 10, 23, 6 and 35, 12, 4 iniuriam; 25, 28, 6 inopiam; 29, 3, 1 clades; 39, 3, 2 id, though here *inde* is also read. *Recordatus* 25,

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37, 8. *Sciscitatus* 7, 26, 2 s. voluntatem. *Testatus* 25, 10, 8 t. quae praestitisset; 28, 8, 2 t. deos; *obtestatus* 7, 41, 7 o. patres; 32, 22, 6 o. filium. *Vaticinatus* 9, 2, 1; and 35, 33, 7 haec nequiquam velut v. *Vociferatus* 4, 1, 6 pauca in senatu v.; 6, 14, 3; 40, 7, 9.

Mental Action.—Ratus (280) is the only participle of this class of frequent occurrence. The compounds of *fisus* (7) generally have the dative, and *oblitus* (14) takes the genitive. The remaining examples are as follows: *admiratus* 3, 26, 9 admiratus rogitansque; 39, 10, 3 a. cum verba tum perturbationem. *Adsensus* 23, 6, 3; 29, 20, 1; 31, 32, 1. *Commentus* 22, 16, 6 ludibrium ... c. *Indignatus* 30, 37, 8 i. Hannibal dici ea; 31, 31, 12 i. se obsederi. *Ominatus* 29, 35, 1 and 42, 30, 8. (*Perosus* 3, 58, 1 p. scelera.) *Praemeditatus* 38, 3, 8 nihil ... p.; 40, 23, 6 p. quae in Macedonia ab Roma renuntiarent. *Suspicatus* 27, 47, 2; and 33, 15, 15 s. id quod erat; 35, 38, 1 seu ipsi per se suspicati, seu indicata re. *Veritus* (20) commonly followed by a clause is used with an accusative 5, 28, 4; 5, 39, 3; 8, 7, 15; 35, 33, 9; 1, 48, 5 nec reverita coetum virorum evocavit virum e curia.

Seeing.—These participles take the accusative excepting 3, 28, 1 contemplatus qui tractus castrorum quaeque forma esset. *Contemplatus* (11) occurs most frequently, e. g. 9, 36, 11 inde c. opulenta Etruriae arva milites emittit. *Conspicatus* is found 2, 20, 1; 2, 20, 8; and 25, 16, 23 c. Lucanum hospitem inter hostes ... confertos invasit. *Speculatus* 22, 42, 5 s. omnia cum cura renuntiat insidias esse.

Of the remaining participles *usus* (11), *functus* (12), *potitus* (12) regularly take the ablative; and *nisus* (29) occasionally. *Conatus* (16), *epulatus* 33, 28, 2, *natus* (15); *ortus* with *co-* and *ex-* (62), *pactus* (17), excepting 21, 61, 11; and 24, 47, 8 are intransitive. Some others have the acc. of a noun in the smaller part of the occurrences. *Adortus* (59) is used with the acc. twenty-three times, and *passus*, generally followed by acc. and inf., takes a neuter object 28, 19, 12 omnia foeda atque indigna passi; 31, 30, 1 foeda p.; 4, 29, 7; 4, 58, 8; 32, 17, 9 id aegre p., and with a noun 6, 22, 5 rem aegre p. Romani ... tribunum creavere; 4, 24, 7 censores aegre p. Mamercum ... tribu moverunt. *Ausus* (38) has the acc. seven times, e. g. 8, 24, 9; and 8, 35, 6 facinus ausus. Other participles in all instances, or with but few exceptions, take the accusative. *Adeptus* (10). *Amolitus* 25, 36, 11. *Imitatus* 3, 52, 3. *Amplexus* and *complexus* have ten direct, counting 24, 16, 10 complexi inter se, and seven conjoint accusa-

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tives, e. g. 2, 40, 10 complexus suos dimittit; 22, 47, 3 vir virum amplexus detrahebat equo. *Expertus* (20) has a dependent clause 24, 31, 14 e. quam vana aut levi aura mobile volgus esset; 25, 20, 7 e. qualis sub inscio duce exercitus esset; 37, 18, 5 e. . . . se parem esse; with a conjoint acc. 1, 36, 4 cum ille in augurio rem expertus profecto futuram dixisset. *Frustratus* 2, 13, 6; 27, 42, 11; 27, 44, 9; 31, 38, 10; 41, 2, 4. *Metatus* 36, 10, 11. *Nactus* (29) most frequently with *spem*, has a conjoint acc. 24, 31, 14 militem n. . . . subornant; and 34, 61, 2 Aristonem quendam Tyrium nanctus . . . mittit. *Partitus* 9, 12, 9 p. provincias; and 33, 35, 1 p. munia. *Periclitatus* 6, 15, 1. *Populatus* (*p.* 5, *de-* 16, *per-* 44, 27, 3 p. Thraciam) is intransitive 3, 38, 3; and 28, 11, 13. *Sortitus* 36, 36, 1 provinciam s. *Tutatus* 36, 17, 9 neutram t. refugerunt; and 39, 2, 4 paulisper t. se, mox . . . concesserunt.

The number of distinct verbs given—77, or 134 counting compounds—includes *perosus* because of its resemblance to the other participles. A few doubtful examples have been counted, as *aspernatus* 1, 23, 6; and 29, 34, 5, though on the other hand the entire number would be considerably increased by including the accusative of the participle in indirect statements. The number of deponents which like other participles have gone their way into the ablative absolute are comparatively few in number, and the nominative has for the most part maintained itself in spite of the attractiveness of the other construction.

VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY, NASHVILLE, TENN. R. B. STEELE.

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VI.—HISTORY OF THE USE OF ἐάν FOR ἄν IN RELATIVE CLAUSES.

The seventeenth edition of Winer's N. T. Grammar states in connection with the use of ἐάν for ἄν in relative clauses, that the editors of the text of the N. T. have not yet ventured to change ἐάν to ἄν in these cases. Grammarians have made no attempt to explain this peculiarity of the later Greek language which is prevalent in the Septuagint.[1]

In classical Greek there is MS authority for its usage in two places; Xenophon, Memorabilia, 3, 10, 12; Lysias, 17, 18, whose dates may be placed at 400–375 B. C., at least one hundred and twenty-five years before the earliest translations of the LXX. Fischer, Becker, Dindorf and many others correct to ἄν; Athenaeus 12, p. 517 (date 228 A. D.) and Achilles Tat. (date 500 A. D.) give instances of late classical usage.

In the first translation of the Hebrew Bible (250 B. C. ca.) the usage is very common. It occurs sixteen times in Genesis, twelve in Exodus, thirty in Deuteronomy, very frequently in Leviticus and throughout the prophetical books. There are more examples of this usage in one of the books of the Pentateuch than in the entire works of Polybius, Philo and Josephus. The usage is common in the Gospels and in the Pauline writings. We have therefore in the LXX data covering the period 250 B. C. to 100 A. D. at least. Grenfell and Hunt's three volumes of Papyri yield many examples of the usage. Volume I of the Oxyrhynchus Papyri yields examples dating 81 to 600 A. D. Volumes one and two of the Egyptian Papyri give but one case dating 400 A. D. The Byzantine writers show an occasional usage of ἐάν for ἄν. It is common in Polycarp, Clement of Rome and Origen, but rare in Josephus and Philo.

Winer's suggestion that the peculiarity is based upon popular usage is supported by the evidence of its use in the non-literary Papyri as early as 81 A. D. Among the Papyri dating 127 B. C. to 81 A. D. the relative conditional clauses have invariably the classical form with ἄν. On the other hand, the fact that nearly

[1] Comp. Jannaris. § 1774 gives more; e. g. Mem. 4, 2, 29; Hiero 1, 14.

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all the examples of the usage before the first century A. D. are found in the translations of Hebrew or in writings which are under Hebraic influence is a strong argument for suspecting that the peculiarities of the Hebrew language had something to do with this peculiarity of the later Greek.

Only two cases occur before the LXX. If these two cases in Xenophon and Lysias represent a popular usage, it would seem, then, that there was something in the idiom which appealed to the Septuagint translators as expressing something which the regular form with ἄν did not express, and as suitable for translating some idiom of Hebrew which could not be expressed by the regular construction.

We are confronted at the outset of our study of the usage in the LXX by the enormous number of variant readings of ἐάν and ἄν. The Vatican manuscript B shows an inconsistent use of ἐάν. Codex Ambrosianus persistently corrects to ἄν, while no one of the texts is consistent with itself as a whole. However, by separating all the cases which have variant readings from those cases wherein all the MSS agree, and by studying the latter cases by themselves we can arrive at a consistent usage of ἐάν for ἄν in the LXX.

Genesis 6/17 and 26/2 furnish good examples of the distinction of ἐάν and ἄν in relative clauses.

1) 6/17; ὅσα ἐὰν ᾖ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς τελευτήσει

2) 26/2; κατοίκησον δὲ ἐν τῇ γῇ ᾗ ἄν σοι εἴπω

The distinction in these two relative clauses is due to an effort to distinguish between the complete and the incomplete relative clause in Hebrew. The Hebrew of 6/17 is כֹּל אֲשֶׁר בָּאָרֶץ יִגְוַע and of 26/2 שְׁכֹן בָּאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר אֹמַר אֵלֶיךָ

A distinction is here made between a relative clause which has an antecedent in Hebrew and that which has no antecedent; the former with antecedent is known as an incomplete relative clause and the latter without antecedent is known as a complete relative clause. כֹּל can not be regarded as the antecedent of אֲשֶׁר in the first example. The relative clause is therefore treated as complete. Now this assumes on the part of the translators a feeling for Semitic idiom. אֲשֶׁר like ša in Assyrian is not a relative pronoun but merely a particle of relation and much weaker than ὅς or ὅσα which carry with them a pronominal as well as a relative force. The אֲשֶׁר of the complete relative clause having no antecedent

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to define it is thus in the feeling of a Greek doubly weak, hence the Septuagint translator strengthens the translation of a complete relative clause by using the stronger form *ἐάν* regarding his *ὅσα* as representing a word too weak to begin the condition. In other words *ἐάν* is used in translating the Hebrew relative clause which has no antecedent and *ἄν* in translating the Hebrew relative clause which has an antecedent. Compare also Genesis 2/19; 21/22; 24/41; 30/33; 41/45 with 24/14; 26/2; 48/6.

A complete statement for the LXX of Genesis is:—

ἄν with antecedent 5 times.	*ἐάν* with antecedent 2 times.
ἄν without " 0 "	*ἐάν* without " 8 "

This table applies only to cases without variant readings. The Alexandrian MS, which is the best authority for the text of Genesis, translates every case of אֲשֶׁר with antecedent by *ἄν* and is corrected to *ἐάν* by MSS F, E and D in four places. MS A yields two more cases of *ἐάν* without antecedent, making the number of such cases in Genesis ten. DE and DF each yield one, making the number in Genesis twelve. I am inclined to agree with the more difficult reading *ἐάν* in cases where respectable MSS offer variant readings. This would give, as stated above, twelve cases of *ἐάν* without antecedent against two cases where it is used with antecedent as in Genesis 15/14, *τὸ δὲ ἔθνος ᾧ ἐὰν κτέ.* and 20/13 *εἰς πάντα τόπον οὗ ἐὰν εἰσέλθωμεν.* Philo, Quis Rerum Div. Heres, 55, quotes Gen. 15/14 with *ἄν* which may be based on upon some unknown MS or may be a correction by him.

The table for Deuteronomy is:—

ἄν with antecedent 29 times.	*ἐάν* with antecedent once.
ἄν without " 2 "	*ἐάν* without " 10 times.

F changes four of the cases of *ἐάν* without antecedent to *ἄν*. B writes *ἐάν* in thirteen cases with antecedent, all of which are read *ἄν* by A and F. A and F disagree with B in most cases in the Pentateuch. After F drops out in Joshua the variants between A and B grow less and less, although throughout the LXX there is a tendency in B to use *ἐάν* indiscriminately. In the entire LXX, however, there are but thirteen cases of *ἐάν* used with antecedent and ninety-one cases of its use without antecedent in undisputed readings.

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That the usage was suited to translate this idiom of Hebrew is shown by the different treatment it receives in the books of the Maccabees. First Maccabees is based upon a Hebrew original (ca. 105–50 B. C.) and yields no cases of ἐάν with antecedent against three without. Third Maccabees uses ἐάν once with antecedent.

Outside of translations from Hebrew the use of ἐάν in relative sentences is rare. The Logia of Jesus, written originally in Aramaic, yield over two-thirds of the relative conditional clauses with ἐάν in the New Testament. There are no examples of ἐάν with antecedent in the N. T. which are without variant readings. Codex D has consistently corrected ἐάν to ἄν in over half the cases where ἐάν occurs in relative clauses, repeating the example of F in the Hexateuch. No single MS is consistent with itself. It is only by eliminating the variants that the law of the usage can be fixed.

The Logia of Jesus are about evenly divided between ἐάν and ἄν. Compare Matthew 5/22; 5/31; 20; 27 with 5/32; 12/32; 16/19; 18/18. The versions of Symmachus, Theodotion and Aquila yield seven cases of ἐάν in relative sentences, all of which are without antecedent. Compare in Field's Hexapla Dt. 26/2; Ez. 3/1; Gen. 11/6. Philo and Josephus follow the classical usage almost wholly, even correcting ἐάν to ἄν in their LXX quotations. In the entire works of Philo there are only five cases of ἐάν in relative clauses, and these are all without antecedent; cf. Lex Alleg. bk. 3/16 and 3/195, also Volume two of Cohn's edition, pages 16, 20 and 236.

In Josephus the usage is classical. I have collated only Volume one of Niese's edition, in which every case has a variant reading. Irenaeus, Eusebius, Origen and Clement of Alexandria follow the usage of the LXX. Compare Vol. 8 of Migne's Patrologie, page 187, ὃς ἐάν without antecedent, also page 358. In Irenaeus, Vol. 7 of the Patrologie, page 657, footnote, a passage of Irenaeus is reproduced as misquoted by the Heretics. In the text of the Heretics ἄν without antecedent of Irenaeus is quoted as ἐάν, pointing again to popular usage. In Clement of Rome ἐάν is used frequently in clauses without antecedent. Compare Ad Cor. 12/6; Epistle of Barnabas 7/11 and Hermas Pastor 3/4.

Enough evidence has been produced to prove that the influence of Hebrew upon the Greek relative clause has been extensive

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and consistent. The usage begins to be frequent with the translations from Hebrew and is continued in Jewish Christian writings. On the other hand, there are evidences pointing to its origin in the popular idiom. This origin I conjecture to have been caused by the effort to emphasize the abstract conditional aspect of the relative clause. This would of course occur much more frequently with relatives without antecedent than when they were defined by an antecedent. Both of the cases in classical Greek are without antecedents. This popular idiom met the necessity which the LXX translators felt in their effort to distinguish between the complete and incomplete relative clauses when translating from Hebrew. The transcribers of A, and especially of F, objected to this vernacular expression and corrected to the classical form.

The construction known as casus pendens doubtless had something to do in influencing the translators to use *ἐάν* in relative clauses. Compare II Chron. 6/29 where *πᾶσα δέησις* represents כָּל תְּחִנָּה in the casus pendens construction, which is therefore unconnected with the following construction. The אֲשֶׁר in this sentence is therefore treated as having no antecedent and is translated by *ἤ ἐάν*. The usage therefore depends upon two things, 1) the presence or absence of an antecedent, 2) the conditional force of the relative clause.

In the N. T. the rule of using *ἐάν* in sentences without antecedent is invariably followed, almost invariably in the O. T. and in Christian Greek writers. Beginning with relative pronominal clauses the usage spread to relative 'adverbial' clauses. *ὡς ἐάν* occurs once in LXX, Judges 7/5; several times in Clement of Rome and later writers, and the use of *ἄν* or *ἐάν* with *καθότι, καθώς, ὡς, οὗ* ('where'), depends in LXX largely upon whether the original Hebrew אֲשֶׁר, בַּאֲשֶׁר, etc., have an antecedent or not, although the usage with relative adverbs is generally classical in LXX.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK. STEPHEN LANGDON.

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VII.—CACOPHONY IN JUVENAL, HORACE AND PERSIUS.

The student of Latin occasionally meets with that species of alliteration known as "cacophony." Quintilian (Inst. IX, 4, 41) says care should be taken that the final syllables of a preceding word, and the initial syllables of that which follows may not be the same: videndum etiam ne syllabae verbi prioris ultimae sint primae sequentis.

And Servius, commenting on "Dorica castra" of Vergil (Aen. II, 27) says it is bad style to begin a word with that syllable with which the word before it was ended: mala est compositio ab ea syllaba incipere qua superior finitus est sermo. It is a principle, however, which even the best writers have violated. This may be seen not only in the actual final and initial syllables of successive words, but also in the repetition of two or more letters not constituting identical syllables.

An article by Biese on this kind of alliteration may be found in the Rheinisches Museum, XXXVIII, p. 634.

Biese deals chiefly with examples taken from Lucretius, Vergil, Ovid, Propertius and Tibullus. He cites 34 examples from Lucretius, 7 from Vergil's Georgics, 60 or more from the Aeneid, and 1 from the Eclogues. He also cites more than 30 examples from Ovid, but makes no mention of Horace, Juvenal or Persius. Mayor cites some 9 or 10 examples from Juvenal in his edition of this author, and some other editors make brief mention of a few examples.

My own interest in the subject led me to work it out more thoroughly for Juvenal, and to extend my investigations to Persius, and to the Satires, Epistles, Ars Poetica, and dactylic Odes and Epodes of Horace. In comparing my results with those obtained by Biese some striking differences in the several authors examined may be seen, as regards the use of this figure.

Biese has observed that the majority of instances in Lucretius is the repetition of the syllable 're.' Since this is found most often in the fifth dactylic foot, Biese concludes that Lucretius did not shun the repetition of the same syllable, but rather sought it that he might have short syllables for forming the fifth dactyl. In Lucretius

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there may be found also single examples of the repetition of such syllables as 'ra' 'ne' 'se' 'te' 'de' and 'que.' Even so finished a poem as Vergil's Georgics, as mentioned before, shows faults of this kind. Most of these are made by the repetition of 're' in the fifth foot. Of the 60 examples in the Aeneid 47 are the repetition of 're', and these, like the most of the other examples, are found in the fifth foot. Vergil exhibits a slightly greater variety of repeated syllables than Lucretius. It would appear that, if Lucretius permitted cacophony for the sake of getting short syllables for the fifth foot, Vergil, and likewise Ovid, did the same. For part of the 30 examples which Biese cites from Ovid are found in the Metamorphoses, and most of these are in the fifth foot. But Ovid and the other writers of elegy — Catullus, Tibullus and Propertius — employ this repetition sparingly and cautiously.

In the Satires of Juvenal I have observed the following examples; if there are others, I failed to notice them in twice going over the writings of Juvenal with that subject in mind:

Satire II, 1 libet et; 33 solveret et.
III, 54 tanti tibi; 92 licet et; 144 habet et and licet et; 284 iubet et.
IV, 34 licet et (some MSS have licet hic); 129 memoraret et; 146 traxerat at.
V, 58 te teneam; 101 sedet et; 141 licet et.
VI, 101 prandet et; 149 calet et; 237 latet et; 238 pavet (or silet) et; 250 nisi si; 283 licet et; 541 scilicet et; 546 implet et; 635 scilicet et.
VII, 105 gaudet et; 124 libet (or licet) et; 131 solet et; 162 quicquid id.
VIII, 59 fervet et; 152 sumet et; 154 solvet et; 190 sedet et.
IX, 96 ardet et; 108 audiet et; 142 notet et.
X, 1 Gadibus usque; 87 neget et; 320 fiet et.
XII, 14 iret et; 20 crederet et.
XIII, 36 peieret et; 91 peierat atque.
XIV, 30 implet et; 156 scilicet et; 195 adnotet et; 199 piget et; 263 licet et; 315 si sit.
XV, 71 ridet et; 74 audet et.

None were found in the first, eleventh and sixteenth Satires. The total number of examples here given from Juvenal is 48, of which 40 are the repetition of 'et'. He does not once repeat 're', which is so often repeated by Lucretius and Vergil.

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It is also worthy of notice that only 5 of the 48 examples cited are used in forming the fifth dactylic foot alone. These 5 are all made by the repetition of 'et,' and are the following: IV, 129; VI, 101; VII, 105; IX, 96; XV, 71. The others are distributed throughout the remaining feet of the verse as follows: ten are used in the first foot alone, and all but one are the repetition of 'et'; eight in the first and second feet; six in the second and third; one each in the second and the fourth; four in the third and fourth; ten in the fourth and fifth; three in the fifth and sixth.

If we assume with Biese that Lucretius, and if Lucretius, so Vergil and Ovid, sought this repetition in order to find short syllables to form the fifth dactylic foot, we must admit that Juvenal did not feel that need to the same degree. For, as we have shown, the repetitions in the fifth and sixth feet together do not equal those found in the first foot.

As we have already remarked, Juvenal never repeats the syllable 're,' which is so often repeated by Lucretius and Vergil; and only very rarely do the other writers cited by Biese repeat 'et,' which Juvenal repeats 40 times. I think Biese mentions no such use of 'et' in the writers he discusses, although there are a few examples (cf. Lucretius II, 32 adridet et; and Vergil, Georg. I, 493 scilicet et). Evidently to Juvenal's mind the repetition of 'et' was no more offensive than the coming together of 'at et,' 'it et,' 'et at,' and 'et ut,' all of which are common in Juvenal, Horace, Persius, and indeed all Latin writers.

In the tenth Satire of Juvenal, verse 122, is an example of the repetition of two syllables of the same word. This is a verse quoted from what is supposed to have been a poem of Cicero on his consulship, but now lost. The verse runs as follows: *O fortunatam natam me consule Romam.* Quintilian (IX, 4, 41) quotes this verse as an example of disageeable alliteration, and adds another from a lost letter of Cicero: *Res mihi invisae visae sunt, Brute.* Cicero never grew tired of making puns, and that fact may account for such expressions as those last cited, and also for the following from his writings: *pleniore ore*, de Off. I, 18, 61; *acer acerbus*, Brut. 221: *moles molestiarum*, de Or. I, 2. Terence furnishes a few good examples, as *pannis annisque*, Eun. 236; *tudisti isti*, Heaut. 382 (not by all MSS). Another well-known passage in Terence is *Taedet quotidianarum harum formarum*, Eun. 297, where, as Lewis remarks, the repetition adds beauty. Afranius, 246, has *In collum plorat orat occurrit nepos.*

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There are a few instances of cacophony in Horace's dactylic verses—the only ones I examined. They are as follows:

Sat. I, 1, 66 sibilat at; 99 metuebat at: 5, 82 stultissimus usque.
II, 2, 126 saeviat atque; 6, 73 pertinet et.
Epis. I, 1, 95 occurri rides.
II, 1, 89 nos nostraque: 247 dilecti tibi; 2, 20 proficiscenti tibi; 194 discrepet et.
A. P. 33 exprimet et; 40 potenter erit; 355 caret et.
Epod. XII, 19 in indomito.

Of these 14 examples less than half are used in forming the fifth foot. It will be observed that Horace repeats 'et' four times and 'at' three times.

From the 650 verses of Persius' Satires the following six examples are taken: III, 42 si sibi; 62 ferat atque; 95 quidquid id; V, 25 crepet et; 81 dixit ita; VI, 65 quidquid id. Not one of these is found in connection with the fifth foot; but they are found in the first, second, third or fourth foot. A characteristic feature of Persius' style is the repetition of the same word in many places. This does not produce cacophony but tends rather toward emphasis and vigor. Examples are Sat. I, 11 tunc, tunc; 87 hoc! hoc; 111 omnes, omnes; 120 vidi, vidi; II, 50 iam, iam; III, 23 nunc nunc; 41 and 42 imus, imus; VI, 58 and 59 unum, unum; 68 nunc, nunc.

It might be interesting to know how far cacophony was permitted by all writers of hexameter verse during the empire. I have observed that it is permitted by Lucan and Martial to some extent, but I am unable to give the data for these authors.

In the treatment of this subject the word "syllable" has been used somewhat loosely. It is thus used by others who have referred to the subject of cacophony. If we adhere strictly to the rule for the division of words into syllables, we will find that only five of the examples cited from Juvenal really illustrate the repetition of the same identical syllable.

In Horace the proportion is greater, for five of the fourteen examples cited show exact repetitions. The sound of 'licet et' is not quite so harsh as that of 'licet cet' would be, yet the succession of similar sounds in 'licet et' is such as to bring it under the head of cacophony. The same may be said of each of the other combinations exhibited.

BLOOMINGTON, ILL. F. M. AUSTIN.

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REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES.

Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker Griechisch und Deutsch von HERMANN DIELS. Berlin, Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1903. Pp. x + 601.

By his long and fruitful labors in this field Professor Diels had proved his unrivalled fitness for editing the fragments of the pre-Socratics; hence, while few were aware that the work conceived twenty years ago was nearing completion, the publication of it is sure to be welcomed everywhere with the highest anticipations. The author, indeed, speaks sadly of his inability, by reason of circumstances beyond his control, to realize his long cherished ideals and of the change in his plans thereby entailed. He had hoped to be enabled to base his work upon solid foundations provided by adequate critical editions of those authors to whose writings is chiefly due the preservation of the fragments. But such editions do not exist, and in some instances have not even been undertaken.[1] Hence we possess only a manual designed to serve as a basis for lectures and as a guide for the use of beginners in philology and philosophy.

It will be well, first of all, to glance at the contents of the volume. That which the author by the title designates as of prime importance is the editing and translating of the fragments themselves. To these he has added the 'essential' biographical and doxographical records. The number of names presented is surprisingly large. Professor Diels himself tells us that there are more than four hundred. Besides the long succession of pre-Socratics proper from Thales onward, our author, herein following Zeller, has included the 'Ausläufer' of the Atomic school, albeit dating after the time of Socrates—Nessas, Metrodorus of Chius, Diogenes of Smyrna, Anaxarchus, Hecataeus of Abdera, Apollodorus,[2] Nausiphanes, Diotimus, Bion of Abdera, and Bolus.[3] There are also four appendices: I. Cosmological Poetry, treating of Orpheus, Musaeus and Epimenides; II. Astrological Poetry,

[1] While we are waiting for the edition of Laertius Diogenes promised by Martini, we are glad to note the great improvement made in the portions of the text here presented.

[2] Zeller, 1[b] 966, following Clem. Strom. II. 417 A, writes Apollodotus; but Diels is undoubtedly right in accepting the form found in Laertius and Pliny.

[3] Not mentioned by Zeller. On the other hand, Diels does not regard Diagoras as deserving of special treatment, and Zeller also is in doubt on that score. But it seems strange that Diagoras should be excluded and Polyclitus added (p. 237), for his Canon was certainly not more truly philosophical than the opinions of Diagoras.

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comprising Phocus and Cleostratus; III. Cosmological Prose, including Pherecydes of Syrus, Theagenes and Acusilaus; IV. The Older Sophists, embracing Protagoras, Xeniades, Gorgias, Prodicus, Thrasymachus, Hippias, Antiphon, Critias, the Anonymus of Iamblichus and the anonymous Dialexeis. The volume ends with an exhaustive list of names giving references to the passages where they occur.

In his preface Professor Diels promises 'in nicht allzulanger Zeit' a supplemental pamphlet in which he hopes to give a somewhat detailed justification of the text and the arrangement he has adopted, besides full indices to matters, words and sources. The admirable indices with which the 'Doxographi' was provided give ample assurance that the addition will greatly enhance the value of the book.

Of the collection of fragments one cannot but speak in terms of highest praise. Not only are we assured of a conservative and honest text,[1] but we are also measurably certain that no genuine fragment now accessible has been overlooked. Professor Diels has added a considerable number to those of the last previous editions; and special publications in Hermes and in book-form have afforded ample opportunity for additions, if any were to be noted. On the other hand, there is everywhere evidence of sober judgment in the exclusion of alleged fragments. The categories 'genuine', 'doubtful', 'spurious', as here applied to the groups of fragments, will certainly prove helpful to the neophyte.[2] Nevertheless, one can hardly free one's mind from the impression, however difficult it may be to maintain one's doubts, that too much rather than too little has been accepted as genuine in the fragments of Philolaus and in the moral sentences of Democritus.

Turning now to the translations, we find them simply but happily phrased without recourse to adventitious embellishment. It would be an easy matter to specify many passages where the rendering proves to be the best possible commentary. The translations of Parmenides and Heraclitus, previously published, had given us a foretaste of what was yet to come. Indeed,

[1] I have not been able to convince myself of the soundness of the form *παριστᾶται*, Parmen. fr. 16, 2. The transposition of *ἀέρος* and *γῆς* in Heraclitus, fr. 76, in accordance with the suggestion of Tocco, appears to me to be rendered rather doubtful by the comparison with Lucr. I. 783 ff. The conjecture *δίῳ δέει ἀρθρον* (Emped. fr. 32) for *διὸ δεῖ ὀρθῶς* is hazardous, although it bears the marks of genius.

[2] Like care has been exhibited in the doxographic reports concerning the Pythagoreans. The old stock is given and the later accretions rejected. I fancy, however, that more will be seen to be alluded to by Aristotle than has been suspected. For example, in Arch. für Gesch. der Phil., XIV. 395 ff., I labored to show that the conception of the *περισσόν* as the *μέσον ἐχον* might have been known to Aristotle, since it was reported by Aristoxenus (cp. Vorsokr. p. 280, l. 33 ff.). I did not then know, and apparently it has escaped the notice of Professor Diels, that Aristotle distinctly alluded to the notion Met. 1083^{b} 29 *διὰ τοῦτο ἰσως αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν ποιοῦσιν ἐν τῳ περιττῷ μέσον.*

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obvious improvement over those of Mullach, Tannery and Burnet may be noted at almost every turn; perhaps the most striking advance is to be recorded in the rendering of the Eleatics, where a singular blending of the concrete and the abstract has often foiled the translator. One instance will serve sufficiently to illustrate my point: Melissus, fr. 7 *εἰ γὰρ ἑτεροιοῦται, ἀνάγκη τὸ ἐὸν μὴ ὁμοῖον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἀπόλλυσθαι τὸ πρόσθεν ἐόν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὸν γίνεσθαι.* Here translators have regarded *ὁμοῖον* as the important word in its clause and have rendered accordingly: 'necesse est ens non simile esse' (Mullach), 'then the real must needs not be all alike' (Burnet); while Diels has rightly perceived the characteristic Eleatic stress on *εἶναι* and translates 'so muss notwendiger Weise das, was ist, nicht mehr gleichmässig vorhanden sein.' On the other hand, the rendering 'sich trennt' for *ἀπαλλαχθῇ* in Diogenes of Apollonia, fr. 4 (p. 348, l. 25), seems to me unfortunate: it suggests parting instead of departing.

We may now consider the treatment of the biographical and doxographical records, which, though receiving no express recognition in the title, occupy by far the greater part of the book. As we have above stated, Professor Diels does not here profess to be exhaustive, but promises to offer what is 'essential.' In regard to the biographical notices I have remarked nothing deserving of criticism. The author's well-known studies in the chronology of the early philosophers have preëminently fitted him for the task of making a just selection from the mass of unequal testimony. Indeed the task was at this point comparatively simple, because so clearly defined. The case stands very differently, however, with the doxographical reports. Here any attempt at exclusion, that is not based upon manifest untrustworthiness, is likely to provoke question or dissent. In the nature of the case, the principle of selection must depend upon a conscious or unconscious evaluation, and that in turn will depend on the range of interest the compiler may have in the problems considered. Indeed, no student could well be expected to have set like value upon all phases of the thought of a people in a period at once phenomenally active and many-sided. Hence what seems to one unimportant, may appear to another supremely essential.

The necessity of saving space and of keeping within the limits of a handbook was no doubt the determining factor in leading the author to present selections in lieu of the whole. Of the various notices in Aetius touching Thales only one (I. 7. 11) is reproduced. In the chapter on Heraclitus no reference is made to the numerous passages in Aristotle where the doctrine of the coëxistence of opposites is referred to as violating the logical principle of non-contradiction, nor to the statement of Theophrastus, *de sensu* § 1, that Heraclitus asserted the perception of things by their opposites. One might be inclined to think that Professor Diels had rejected

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the reading Ἡράκλειτον, long suspected,[1] were it not that the traditional text is printed in the chapter on Parmenides (p. 115). The notice possesses unusual interest because Heraclitus and Anaxagoras appear to be the only pre-Socratic philosophers to whom the doctrine is specifically referred, whereas Aristotle repeatedly speaks as if perception by contraries and interaction between the unlike were almost universally taught. Under Heraclitus A 6, we might have expected at least a reference to Lucr. I. 647 ff., 666, etc. Again, Lucr. I. 830 ff. is quoted (p. 315) for the doctrine of Anaxagoras, while no mention is made of I. 875 ff., a passage which is at least equally authentic and instructive. Professor Diels (p. 168, 13) quotes Arist. *phys.* 252 ª7 ἔοικεν Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἂν εἰπεῖν ὡς τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ κινεῖν ἐν μέρει τὴν Φιλίαν καὶ τὸ Νεῖκος ὑπάρχει τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἠρεμεῖν δὲ τὸν μεταξὺ χρόνον. Now there is another passage where the same subject is broached, and to my mind it is more clear and specific: *phys.* 250ᵇ 26 Ἐ. <λέγει> ἐν μέρει κινεῖσθαι καὶ πάλιν ἠρεμεῖν, κινεῖσθαι μὲν ὅταν ἡ Φιλία ἐκ πολλῶν ποιῇ τὸ ἓν ἢ τὸ Νεῖκος πολλὰ ἐξ ἑνός, ἠρεμεῖν δ' ἐν τοῖς μεταξὺ χρόνοις.[2] A somewhat similar instance occurs p. 315, l. 21, where Professor Diels breaks off in the midst of Aristotle's report (*phys.* 203ª 19 ff.) concerning Anaxagoras.

There are several additions which, as it seems to me, would have greatly enhanced the value of this handbook. Compared to that of Ritter and Preller cross-references[3] and references to additional passages are few. No doubt there is vastly more presented here in the text itself; but, being certain that all the materials for the history of early Greek thought were ready to the author's hand, we cannot but regret that the added space required to refer briefly to what could not be reprinted *in extenso* should not have been provided even at the cost of a second volume. The supplemental pamphlet might in some measure supply the loss; but the remedy would be tardy at best, as the value of a reference lies largely in being so obtruded as not to be overlooked. In like manner the admirable notes of Professor

[1] Philippson had proposed Democritus, Diels (Dox. p. 499) had thought of Clidemus; but there is now no suggestion that this opinion is still entertained. I believe that Theophrastus meant Heraclitus, though I also believe that he was in error. I cannot now develop this point.

[2] In Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta, p. 118 on fr. 26, the passage was given, and hence there was less need of a special reference to it; but in the 'Vorsokratiker' that passage, together with many others that give the context in which the fragments are cited, is omitted. It seems to me that this is much to be deplored. The fragments of Heraclitus, indeed, are generally printed without the context. Of course there are special reasons, obvious to every scholar, for this procedure in the case of Heraclitus, but it is none the less to be regretted.

[3] Such references are more frequent in the *adnotationes* to the fragments in Poet. Phil. Fragmen., and lead one to expect them in the supplemental pamphlet.

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Diels in his 'Herakleitos von Ephesos'[1] beget the desire that they and many others like them, might be made accessible without the necessity of consulting all the special studies and editions which preceded the publication of the present volume. Notes as extensive as those in 'Parmenides Lehrgedicht' would of course be out of the question; but Professor Diels has shown that he can put his point briefly.

In his preface the author says: 'Die Anordnung des Ganzen musste die einzelnen Persönlichkeiten möglichst getrennt halten. Gegenüber der pragmatischen Zusammenfassung der Schulen, wie sie für die eigentliche Geschichtschreibung nötig erscheint, hat es ein gewisses Interesse, nun auch einmal die Individuen als solche zu betrachten'. The idea is excellent and it has been admirably carried out; but there is involved in it, after all, a certain loss which might have been easily obviated. There are in Aristotle, in his commentators, and in the doxographers, many comprehensive statements which embrace either the whole range of 'physical' philosophers or a considerable number of them. Some of them refer to recognized 'schools' which are generally grouped together by Professor Diels. It would seem quite possible, therefore, to have added them without seriously disarranging the order as we now have it. The most sweeping generalizations might have been placed at the beginning of the volume, the others before the special groups to which they severally refer. Some of these statements have, to be sure, been admitted because they chanced to name a particular philosopher, but most of them, if I mistake not, have been excluded on principle. Apart from the incidental value of having such statements appear under the head of stated thinkers, it would certainly be productive of good results to regard them as a special body of testimony. I am not aware that any one has ever critically considered their value as a whole, although every historian of early Greek thought is led to infer from them individually more or less important conclusions.

As was inevitable with a work of such proportions, the book continued to grow even while passing through the press. The selection from the Persians of Timotheus (p. 491) was probably one of the contributions of the author's colleague, von Wilamowitz. Various minor points indicate that the whole was not altogether unified. P. 3. l. 23, Diels reads *αὐτᾶι*, whereas, in a later quotation of the same passage (p. 72, Heraclitus fr. 38), he prints *αὐτό*. Again, down to p. 166 marginal figures to number the lines of

[1] The note on fr. 108 on the *σοφὸν κεχωρισμένον*, it seems to me, must certainly be wrong. If, according to Heraclitus, all is Fire, and Fire is God, then God cannot be *κεχωρισμένον*. The case is different with Anaxagoras and Aristotle. With them the *Νοῦς* and God are separated from the world in order that they may touch it without being touched again; Plato also regards the Ideas as, indeed, the causes, but not the sum of all things. But there is no room in the system of Heraclitus for such a conception. It seems to me that there is no need to identify *σοφόν*, especially without the article, with the Deity.

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the page are confined to the 'Lives' of Laertius Diogenes; from that page forward they are used almost everywhere, greatly facilitating reference.[1]

In a number of passages Professor Diels corrects errors in his Doxographi. Thus p. 135 he now rightly attributes to Zeno the Eleatic Aet. IV. 9. 1, which he formerly ascribed to Zeno of Citium (Dox., Index p. 705); p. 283, l. 38, he now appears to look with some favor upon Reiske's conjecture, *ἀναπολοῦσιν* for MSS *ἀναποδοῦσιν*, though he cashiered the suggestion rather contemptuously, Dox., p. 51. P. 343, l. 9, he refers Aet. I. 3. 17, to Diogenes of Apollonia[2] rather than to Diogenes of Babylon (the Stoic), 'der in den Placita nicht vorkommt' (cp. Dox., Index, p. 676). P. 345, l. 43, he now rightly attributes Aet. IV. 9. 8 to Diogenes of Apollonia instead of Diogenes of Smyrna, 'der in den Placita nicht vorkommt'.

There are also several passages in which I have noted more or less important changes from readings formerly adopted by the author. P. 142 (de Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia, 974[a] 24) Diels now reads *εἰ τῶι μεμῖχθαι τὸ*, whereas, in his special edition of the tractate (Berlin, 1900), he printed *εἰ τὸ μεμῖχθαί τι*. Laert. Diog. VIII. 52 he now accepts Sturz's conjecture *Ἡρακλείδης* (of Pontus) for MSS *Ἡράκλειτος*. To be sure he had already pronounced it probable in Poet. Phil. Fragmen., p. 75, 1. In Theophrastus, *de sensu*, § 39, for *λεπτότατον δ' ἐν οἷς ἡ διάθεσις ἀσύμμετρος, καὶ* (Dox., p. 510, 16) he now (p. 344, l. 29) proposes *λεπτά, τὸν δ' ἐν οἷς <ἂν> ἡ διάθεσις ἀ. ἦι*. Ibid. § 41, for *μακροτέρου* he suggests *μικροτέρου* (p. 344, l. 39), and for *λεπταὶ καθάπερ* † he reads *λεπταί, <καὶ ἁ> καθάπερ* (p. 344, l. 43). In Aet. V. 15. 4 for MSS *ἐν θερμασίᾳ* (where he had suggested *ἐνθερμανθέντα*, Dox., 426, 6) he now proposes *ἔνθερμα* (p. 346, 15). Dox., 432, 23, Diels printed Aet. V. 20. 5 *Διογένης μετέχειν μὲν αὐτὰ τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ ἀέρος, διὰ δὲ τὸ τὰ μὲν πυκνότητι, τὰ δὲ πλεονασμῷ τῆς ὑγρασίας *, μήτε διανοεῖσθαι μήτε αἰσθάνεσθαι, προσφερῶς δὲ αὐτὰ διακεῖσθαι τοῖς μεμηνόσι παρεπταικότος τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ*. The passage was of course unintelligible. He now reads (p. 346, 22 ff.) *προσφερῶς δὴ* for *π. δὲ* and *παραπεπαικότος* (with Bernardakis) for *παρεπταικότος*, and omits the commas after *ὑγρασίας* and *αἰσθάνεσθαι*, thus giving what appears to be a sound text.

[1] The caption Aeltere Pythagoreer (p. 32) stands in such a way as to leave one in doubt what names it was designed to cover. Probably Cercops, Petron, Brotinus, Hippasus, Calliphon and Democedes, Parmiscus were intended. Similarly p. 340, l. 36, under the head Idaeus, Diels says, 'Damit setzt Zeller den Philosophen des *Μεταξύ* in Verbindung', etc. Perhaps it would be natural to conclude that Diels and Zeller identified the two philosophers, which is however not the fact, unless I am in error.

[2] In this Professor Diels is doubtless right; but I am not entirely convinced of the truth of the general statement that Diogenes the Stoic is not mentioned in the 'Placita.' At any rate Stein, 'Die Psychologie der Stoa,' II. 3, n. 2, makes it appear not unlikely that Aet. IV. 5. 7 *Διογένης ἐν τῇ ἀρτηριακῇ κοιλίᾳ τῆς καρδίας, ἥτις ἐστὶ πνευματική* (sc. *εἶναι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς*) does in fact refer to the Stoic, though Diels (Dox., Index p. 676, and Vorsokr., p. 345, 34 ff.) assigns it to Diogenes of Apollonia.

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In view of Professor Diels's intention to give the 'essential' doxographical material, the inclusion (p. 175, l. 47) of the report of Censorinus 6, 6 (ex dextris partibus profusa (read profuso) semine mares gigni, at e laevis feminas Anaxagoras Empedoclesque consentiunt) indicates apparently a change of mind on the part of the author. Dox., p. 192, he had wrongly, I think, endeavored to invalidate the testimony of Censorinus[1] on this point by showing that Empedocles accounted for the male and the female on the basis of temperature, the former being warmer, the latter colder (see Vorsokr., p. 175, l. 26 and fr. 67). It seems to me unquestionable that Empedocles in some way combined the two sets of ideas,—right and left with the hot and the cold. The connection of the male with the right and of the female with the left harks back to the *συστοιχίαι* of the Pythagoreans.[2] On the other hand, the physiological association of greater warmth with the right side is well attested by the words of Arist., *de gen. anim.* 666 b 6 *ἔστι δ' ἡ καρδία τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ζῴοις κατὰ μέσον τοῦ στηθικοῦ τόπου, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις μικρὸν εἰς τὰ εὐώνυμα παρεγκλίνουσα πρὸς τὸ ἀνισοῦν τὴν κατάψυξιν τῶν ἀριστερῶν.*[3] While Parmenides and Empedocles were in accord with the Pythagoreans in associating the male with the right, the female with the left, they disagreed in regard to the relative warmth of the sexes and the regions of the earth in which they were assumed to have first sprung into existence. Aet. V. 7. 1 'Ε. *ἄρρενα καὶ θήλεα γίγνεσθαι παρὰ θερμότητα καὶ ψυχρότητα· ὅθεν ἱστορεῖται τοὺς μὲν πρώτους ἄρρενας πρὸς ἀνατολῇ*[4] *καὶ μεσημβρίᾳ γεγενῆσθαι μᾶλλον ἐκ τῆς γῆς, τὰς δὲ θηλείας πρὸς ταῖς ἄρκτοις.* 2. Π. *ἀντιστρόφως· τὰ μὲν πρὸς ταῖς ἄρκτοις ἄρρενα βλαστῆναι (τοῦ γὰρ*

[1] It is corroborated by Oribasius, Vorsokr., p. 176, 28, and by Galen on Emped., fr. 67.

[2] For Parmenides, see fr. 17; for Anaxagoras, Arist. *de gen. anim.* 763 b 31 ff. I was not aware that the dependence of Parmenides, Anaxagoras and Empedocles in this particular on the teachings of the Pythagoreans had been observed, but now find that it was noticed (for Parmenides) by Gomperz, Griech. Denker, I., p. 149.

[3] Compare also the reference of the male to the south, the female to the north, of which I speak below. In view of the large measure of Aristotle's indebtedness to Empedocles, it is not improbable that this point of physiology also was derived from him, especially as Empedocles recognized a law of compensation in other matters. Cp. Vorsokr., p. 173, l. 36 ff., l. 40 ff.; p. 177, l. 10 and Theophr. de causis plant. I. 21 f. See also Clidemus, Vorsokr., p. 340, l. 20 ff.

[4] The reference of the males to the *ἀνατολή* causes some difficulty. According to Aet. II. 10. 1 Pythagoras identified the right side of the world with the *ἀνατολικὰ μέρη*. Cp. Vorsokr., 287, 20 ff., and Zeller I., 438 ff. Possibly the difference in the assignment of right and left to the earth may be due to the distinction between the real and the apparent motions of the heavenly bodies. The Pythagoreans may well have been divided in their opinions on this score (cp. Oenopides, Vorsokr., p. 240, 1 f.). In that case the same difference might be assumed between Parmenides and Empedocles, the latter naturally adopting the more scientific view. Cp. Aet. II. 10. 2. I do not know what, if any, connection Empedocles supposed to exist between *ἀνατολή* and *μεσημβρία*. Possibly it was nothing but the uncritical combination of two Pythagorean views concerning the identification of the 'right' with the regions of the earth.

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πυκνοῦ μετέχειν πλείονος), τὰ δὲ πρὸς ταῖς μεσημβρίαις θήλεα παρὰ τὴν ἀραιότητα.[1] Cp. Arist. de part. anim. 648ᵃ 9–33.

During my rather careful perusal of the book under review, a number of questions have thrust themselves upon my attention, only two of which I will here mention. In some respects it is to be regretted that almost all the secondary records we have of the early Greek philosophers are more or less directly due to Aristotle and his successor Theophrastus. There seems to be no doubt that the pre-Socratics, in their philosophy of nature, offered by preference *mechanical* explanations of the phenomena which they observed. The mind of Aristotle, however, was apparently quite incapable of conceiving a purely mechanical process; hence we may fairly expect a rather thorough-going restatement of earlier views in accordance with his mental bias. Aristotle, for example, deals freely in conceptions which belong to the category of ἀλλοίωσις. Here and there he does, indeed, betray his inability to find the notion purely conceived and employed by his predecessors;[2] but he makes no doubt that it is there in one disguise or another. I am not now prepared to state categorically that the pre-Socratics did not know what ἀλλοίωσις was, but it is my distinct impression that such would be found on investigation to be the case. If there exists a detailed consideration of the question, it has escaped my notice.

Another question, closely related to the foregoing, has to do with the significance of the κίνησις ἀίδιος attributed to so many of the earlier philosophers. The indications—not too numerous, nor too certain, I admit—of the doxographical records would seem to suggest that most of them postulated a vortex by which changes, apparently qualitative, were effected by means of the purely mechanical processes of condensation and rarefaction or of interchange and composition. Cp. Arist. de caelo 295ᵃ 7 ff. If this suggestion should prove to be true, the homogeneity and continuity of early Greek thought must have been vastly greater than is generally supposed. The apparent diversity of doctrine in fundamentals we should then have to explain on the reasonable assumption that the philosophers themselves were most inclined to emphasize divergencies in opinion from their predecessors, and that the doxographers would most naturally select for report the more striking points of difference. In this way we might find a justification for many of the otherwise unsupported generalizations of Aristotle and the doxographers which have commonly been dismissed as unworthy of credence.

[1] Here, as was common after Anaximenes, the rare is identified with the hot, the dense with the cold. Cp. Aet. II. 20. 8 and Parm. fr. 8, 57. Since θερμόν) (ψυχρόν were standing ἐναντιότητες, it is possible that they were admitted into one or the other Pythagorean table of συστοιχίαι. Cp. Alcmaeon, Diels, Dox., 442, 5.

[2] Cp. *de gen. et corr.* 314ᵃ 11 ὅσοι δὲ πλείω τὴν ὕλην ἑνὸς τιθέασιν οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ Λεύκιππος, τούτοις δὲ ἕτερον (sc. ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ γένεσιν ἀνάγκη εἰπεῖν). καίτοι Ἀναξαγόρας γε τὴν οἰκείαν φωνὴν (sc. ἀλλοίωσιν) ἠγνόησεν λέγει γοῦν ὡς τὸ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι ταὐτὸν καθέστηκε τῷ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι.

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To return now to the book under review, there are a few more matters which may receive brief notice. Professor Diels (p. 262) seems to credit the authenticity of Plato's Epist. VII. I confess that I do not share his hesitation (p. 91), in regard to Epicharmus fr. 3 (fr. 171 Kaibel), 'während 3, das der Form nach echt aussieht, dem Inhalt nach nicht dem Anfang sondern frühestens dem Ende des 5. Jahrh. anzugehören scheint.' To me it seems an evident forgery, as much from considerations of form as of matter. The entire machinery of question and answer is distinctly Platonic, and in particular the manner of asking a leading question, ἆρ' ἔστιν αὐληοίς τι πρᾶγμα; is clearly an imitation of a mannerism of Socrates reproduced by Xenophon (Mem. 2. 2. 1; 4. 2. 22) and Plato (e. g. Gorgias 454 C and *passim*). In the much-debated passage Cicero ad Qu. fr. II. 9. 3, Diels (p. 166) reads: Lucretii poemata ut scribis ita sunt: multis luminibus ingenii, multae *etiam* artis; sed (cum veneris) virum te putabo, si Sallustii Empedoclea legeris, hominem non putabo. I can best express my dissent from this text by referring with full approval to Professor Hendrickson's note in A. J. P. XXII., 438ff.

I have kept a list of the more important typographical errors which I chanced to note, and give it here, believing that it will be welcome. P. 17, l. 1, insert comma after ἐγεννήθη; p. 17, l. 28, read ζώωι for ζώιω; p. 18, last line but four, read *quaecumque*; p. 20, in Aet. IV. 3, 2 Professor Diels should not have abbreviated Ἀναξιμένης with Ἀ. under the head of Anaximander; p. 27, l. 3, read ὁ for δ; p. 27, no. 6, l. 1, insert comma after Θρασύλος; p. 31, l. 32, read τοὺς for τοὺ; p. 39, no. 8, read 620–16 for 620–61; p. 47, there are two sections numbered 41 without apparent reason; p. 89, l. 12, read μέρεος for μέρεις; p. 93, omit period at end of second verse; p. 119, fr. 2, l. 2, read νοῶν for νοῶνι; p. 122, in the passage Simpl. *phys.* 30, 13, the comma should follow σκότος instead of πῦρ; p. 126, de M. X. G. 976 ᵇ 36, a comma, not a period, after ἀκίνητον; p. 176, l. 44, omit comma after δύνασθαι; p. 237, l. 16, omit period at end of line; p. 239, l. 16, read Procl. for Ppocl.; p. 259, l. 30, read A. 4. 5. for A. 4. 6.; p. 249, l. 7, read ταὐτὸ for τἀτὸ; p. 264, l. 1, read *quin* for *quia*; p. 281, l. 9, read ταῖς for τοῖς; p. 295, l. 3, read αὐτῶι for αυτῶι; p. 313, l. 36, read σελήνηι for σελήνην; p. 339, l. 11, read fr. 4 for fr. 3; p. 369, l. 15, read 500–497 for 500–407; p. 369, l. 24, read γεγονὼς for γενονὼς; p. 379, l. 41, read *nullo* for *multo*; p. 395, l. 46, read ἰὰν for ἔαν; p. 474, l. 1, read πεπυκνωμένον for -μένων; p. 488, l. 15, read ΤΗΣ for ΤΠΣ; p. 489, l. 17, read comma for period after ϱσ.

I have taken exception to so much in Professor Diels's book that I fear I may seem to be trying to pick flaws where only the sincerest homage is due. The only adequate excuse for so extended a criticism of the book is that it deserves all the praise and all the study one can bestow upon it. Indeed, the work of so great a master is above all praise I might express. The book is destined to be the recognized handbook of pre-Socratic

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philosophy for generations to all those who are fitted to use it, and therefore, and for that reason alone, it has seemed well to indicate some of the needs which it does not meet. The faults which I have signalized are those which grew out of the plan, and touch the execution of the plan at only a few minor points. Indeed, Professor Diels himself will be the first to recognize that our disappointment is his own; namely, that he has not been able to give us the complete edition of the pre-Socratics for which we had hoped and has been compelled to content himself with issuing a handbook. Our gratitude for that which he has provided will be best shown by the diligent and intelligent use we make of it.

IOWA COLLEGE, GRINNELL. W. A. HEIDEL.

MARIUS HÆGSTAD. Hildinakvadet, med utgreiding um det norske maal paa Shetland i eldre Tid. Christiania, 1900. Pp. x + 108.

On his journey to the Shetland isles in 1774 the Scotch scientist, George Low, collected some Specimens of the Norse Language, among which was an old lay recited to him by William Henry, a peasant from the island Foula. The Specimens also included the Lord's Prayer in Shetlandic and a list of Foula words. On his return to Scotland Low wrote a book concerning his journey to the Shetlands and a journey which he made to the Orkneys. His manuscript, which is dated 1777, included the ballad, to which he gave the title, "The Earl of Orkney and the King of Norway's Daughter: a ballad." Low's manuscript, which is the only one we have of the lay, is preserved in the Advocates Library, Edinburgh. The lay was first printed in Barrie's History of the Orkney Islands, 2nd edition, by James Headrick, London, 1808, and again in 1838 in the 1st number of P. A. Munch's "Samlinger til det norske Folks Sprog og Historie." Low's work was first published in 1879 by Joseph Anderson under the title, "A Tour Through Orkney and Shetland," by George Low, Kirkwall, Orkney. Studies toward an interpretation of the linguistically so difficult lay have been made by Professor Sophus Bugge, for whom a phototype reproduction of the pages in Low's manuscript which contain the lay were made in 1884 by Professor Joh. Storm, who that year was in Edinburgh. An edition of the lay with a commentary and translation into Old Norse by Professor Bugge is soon to appear. The present edition, which is therefore the first critical edition, is also based on the copy of 1884.

Prof. Hægstad's work purports to offer a correct interpretation of the text with an examination of its phonology, but the age and character of the lay and its relation to other northern forms do not fall within the scope of the author's work.

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The manuscript reading of the lay is first given, together with the Lord's Prayer and the Norn word-list, with a chapter on the orthography and the general condition of the MS. This is followed by the corrected text (III), contents and notes to the text (IV), and the language of the lay (V) in which is discussed in detail the Old Norse vowels and consonants as they appear in the text, followed by a paragraph on Stress and one on Scotch-English influence. Chapter VI gives a resumé of results as to the language, and the position of the dialect in the Scandinavian group, which is followed by a glossary of Foula words occurring in the lay and the prayer and an autotype copy of the manuscript of the lay and Norn word-list. The author seems to have been fortunate in his interpretation of many difficult passages in the poem, and the work as a whole forms an interesting contribution to our knowledge of the history of Shetland "Norn." As the only literary relic in Old Norn, a dialect of West-Scandinavian which seems to occupy a position midway between Faroese-Icelandic on the one hand and West-Norwegian dialects on the other, it possesses considerable value linguistically and is not without interest as a piece of literature. The difficulty of interpretation has been due in large part to the extremely distorted condition of the language, but also partly to the numerous mistakes of the MS, which are of such a character as to show that Low himself could not have understood aught of what he wrote. Words are frequently split up and written as separate words, not only compound words, but also the preterite of verbs, where the preterite ending *de* is written as a separate word. Sometimes distinct words are written together as one, or a word is combined with a part of another word, as *voð lerdin* for *vodler din* (O. N. *vǫllr þinn*). Mistakes in the division of the verses are also common. The orthographic inconsistencies need, however, not always be attributed to Low. These may in part at least be due to the reciter of the lay, who could neither read nor write, but depended entirely on his memory of a lay, the meaning of which was not in all its parts clear to him, for he was unable to give Low a literal translation of it, though he gave the substance. At the time that the lay was written down Old Norn was in its last stages. William Henry, an old peasant of Foula, probably belonged to the last generation who had in youth been able to speak Norn. As late as 1700 the general character of the language seems to have been Norse.[1] In the eighteenth century the transition to Scotch-English became more rapid, and by 1800 Norn was no longer known, except by a few of the older generation living on the outlying isles to the North and the West, a form of Norn, however, that was undoubtedly more English than Norse, but which was called Norn by those who spoke purer English because of its archaic dialectal character. The

[1] Jakobsen, Det norrøne Sprog paa Shetland, København, 1897, pp. 4–10.

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language of the lay is almost absolutely Norse. Out of 35 four-line stanzas, about 700 words, less than half a dozen are English. The word *yift* is Sco. *gif* and *askar* is the English *ask* with Norse inflection. Influence of Sco. *haly* is, of course, as the author says, possible in *halaght* (O. N. *heilaght*), though not necessary, cf. the words *heljahwarf* < *heillarhvarf*, and *to hent* < *heimta*, and *hemɔlt* < Sco. *haimald*, where *e* < *ei* represents an open e-sound (Jak. 169 and IX), which is probably the sound represented by the first *a* in *halaght*. The word *nam* is O. N. *nafn*, and has probably nothing to do with Sco. *name*, cf. Norse diall. *nam*. The author fixes the language of the poem at about 1700, though the ballad itself is undoubtedly much older, and so may contain words and forms that are older than 1700. A comparison with the language of the Lord's Prayer would suggest that the latter represents a somewhat later stage of Shetland Norn. Out of 60 words 6, or 10%, are English, *but*, *gainst*, *tempa*, *delivra*, *puri* and *glori* (§ 75), to which we may also add *for* and *forgive*, and possibly *doi* and *vill*, are part English. The language of the lay is somewhat archaic, but that of the prayer was nearer the language of the time, and may represent the condition of the Shetland language at about 1750 as it was in the island of Foula.[1] Some of the chief phonological characteristics of the lay are: O. N. *a* becomes *o* before *ng*, e. g., *gonga*, *fong*, as in West-Norwegian dialects, Nordfjord *lǫngd*, Söndhordland. *lǫng*, Sogn *laongd*, Ryfylke *lǫngge*, cp. Voss *langu*. O. N. *á* usually becomes *o*, *bodin* (*báðrinn*), *grothe* (*gráti*). *É* > *i* before nasals, *in* (< *enn*), *linge* (< *lenge*), *tinka* < *þenkia*. cf. Söndmöre, Söndhordland and Sogn, Norway (author, p. 35). *É* sometimes becomes *ie*, *je*, as in *hien* < *héðan* and *lia* < *lé* < *leid*. Cf. modern Shetl. dial. *hjéla*. and Icelandic *hét* (pron. *hjet*). *Ó* usually becomes *u*, as *fur* (vb. 3. S. *fór*), *i muthi* < *i móti*. This change had begun before 1360 in the Orkney-Shetland dialects (p. 38). *Au* is preserved in *brau* (O. N. *brauð*), but simplified to *u* in *ru* < *rauð*. The monophthongation of *au* in Shetland dates back as early as 1299 (p. 43, § 23, Note 2). The simplification of diphthongs is general, *ei* > *e* (*hem* < *heima*, *mere* < *meira*) before 1307, and *ey* > *eu*, pronounced *ö* (*meun* < *meyna*, *lever* < *hleypr*. This last change is found as early as 1355 in Shetland and 1496 in Orkney. The *a* of final syllables is kept whether after a short or long stem syllable, just as in Western Norway, in Sogn, Voss, Hardanger, Hordeland, Ryfylke, Jæderen and Lister. Recurrence to the unumlauted vowel is seen in *silkisark* < O. N. *silkiserk*, and *garedin* < O. N. *gerðinni*. In the compound *silkisark* the last element may be due to Sco. *sark*. Voiced spirant *ð* > *d* where

[1] The Shetland Lord's Prayer reads: Fy vor o er i chimeri, halaght vara nam dit. La Konungdum din cumma. La vill din vera guerde i vrildin senda eri chimeri. Gav vus dagh u daghloght brau. Forgive sindorwara sin vi forgiva gem ao sinda gainst wus. Lia wus ekè o vera tempa, but delivra wus fro adlu idlu, for doi ir Konungdum, u puri, u glori, Amen.

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kept—as in Norse—and different from Icelandic and Faroese. Finally and medially between vowels it is lost, as also in Norse, e. g.: *spirde* < *spurði*, *laghdə* < *lagði*, but *asta* < *af stað* (cf. Sogn.-Hardanger *asta-austa*), *bo* < *bæði*, *lian* < *leiðina*, *menn* < *męðan*, *ro* < *rāða*. *Fn* > *mn* (and *m*) in *yamna namn* (*nam*), as commonly in Norse diall. *H* is frequently lost before a vowel, and has frequently developed initially before a vowel (cf. English, may be in part Sco.-Eng. influence). O. N. *hl. hr* > *l. r.* O. N. *hv* > *wh* on the East and *kw* on the West, the latter being pronounced *khw*. probably. An infixed *j* has frequently developed between an initial consonant and the following vowel, also frequently initially before a vowel, e. g.: *yilsa* < O. N. *heilsa*. This is very characteristic of the present dialects of Shetland. *K* has become voiced after vowel, e. g.: *bugin* < O. N. *búkinn*, *mege* < *mikit*, &c., so *tt* > *d*, e. g. *gede* < *getit*, as in Lister and Stavanger diall. in South-Western Norway. *Ll* > *dl* (*adlu*, *idlu*, *fodlin*, *godle*, *hadlin*, *spidla*, *vodlin*, *vodler*, as in Western Norway from Flekkefjord to Sogn. The combination *rn* > *dn*, as in Norway from Sogn to Jæderen. *Nn* > *dn* (*eidnar* < *hennar*, *idne* < *inni*, &c.), as is the case to a certain extent in Hardanger, Voss, Hordaland and Ryfylke in Norway (§§ 63, 3; 65, 3; 67, 3, and Larsen, Oversigt over De norske Bygdemaal, 1898, pp. 66–77). The language of the Hildina Lay seems to be most closely related to that of Ryfylke in Western Norway. In general character the language of Orkney has been very much like that of Shetland. The voiceless stops seem to have become voiced to *b*, *d*, *g*, earliest in Orkney, while the O. N. diphthongs have been simplified earlier in the Shetland language.

UNIVERSITY OF IOWA. GEORGE T. FLOM.

P. Ovidi Nasonis De Arte Amatoria Libri tres. Erklärt von PAUL BRANDT. Leipzig, Dieterich'sche Verlags-buchhandlung, Theodor Weicher, 1902.

Dr. Brandt dedicates his work to his friends in Leipzig and in his preface, which is also addressed to them, pays a warm tribute to the memory of Richard Richter.

The introduction of fifteen pages is mainly devoted to the contents of the poem itself and to some rather obvious conclusions and reflections suggested by them. It appears to have been written for the general reader. At all events, it is of no value to the scholar. This is somewhat disappointing when one considers the great importance of the Ars Amatoria as well as the number and variety of interesting questions which it suggests both as a document and as a work of art.

With the commentary, however,—which was, of course, the real object of the book—the case is different. It is written *con amore*. "Nicht weil es mir drängte, eine philologische Arbeit zu

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liefern," says Brandt on the first page of his preface, "habe ich diese Ausgabe besorgt, sondern nur um das Gedicht als solches war es mir zu thun: es schien mir reichlich zu verdienen, eine zwar umfassende, aber nicht bis in die tiefsten Tiefen philologischer Minierarbeit hinabsteigende Erklärung zu finden." So far, too, as one may judge from a hasty examination of its contents the commentary shows that the editor is well acquainted with the literature of his subject. He has performed his perilous undertaking with judgment and good taste and, in scope and thoroughness, often surpasses the standard which his own words might have led us to expect. "Nichts lag mir ferner" he says, "als der Gedanke einen das letzte und abschliessende Wort in der Erläuterung der Liebeskunst sprechenden Kommentar zu schaffen. Mir kann es zunächst einmal darauf an, das Rohmaterial zu verarbeiten, das Gedichte so zu erklären, wie es uns vorliegt, und andere sehr wesentliche Untersuchungen, wie z. B. die Darstellung der Beziehungen der Ars zur Komödie, müssen anderen Arbeiten vorbehalten werden."

I may remark in passing, if it is worth while, that several notes which, at first sight, appear insufficient (compare, for instance, I, 59) are enlarged and completed in the appendix.

A number of illustrations from the fifth book of the Anthologia Palatina might be added to the notes on I, 33 and II, 277. So, also, II, 26 and 92 receive striking illustration from the elegy of Propertius on the death of Paetus, lines 9–10 and 56.

In the list of those who have told the tale of Hylas (compare note on II, 110 and the appendix) should be mentioned Valerius Flaccus III, 481, f.

As misprints I note tessaras for tesseras, III, 355, note, and lievevoller for liebevoller, II, 49, note.

Each book is preceded by a table of contents and in the body of the text, every topic is separated by a space from its successor. The device is not only useful to the reader, but also brings into bold relief the clear and precise rhetorical method which is so characteristictic of Ovid, especially in this humorously scientific and didactic treatise.

A valuable appendix of over fifty pages contains a good bibliography, large additions to the commentary and indices of the proper names and of the notes. The text used is that of Ehwald.

Dr. Brandt's book is a genuine contribution to our knowledge of Ovid's work; it is also interesting in itself. The fact, however, of its mere existence is quite as interesting. This is, I believe, the first complete commentary for nearly two hundred years on one of the most remarkable books of any period. One should read—if he can—other works on the same theme in order to fully appreciate what Ovid succeeded in doing. The various Indian, Persian and Arabian artes amatoriae, as well as those mediaeval western compositions, founded, more or less, on Ovid himself, are all executed with that meticulous elaboration of details, that serious,

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almost reverential, feeling for the subject which is, likewise, so characteristic of gastronomic treatises from Archestratos to Brillat-Savarin. Ovid caught the tone to perfection, as, of course, he intended to do, and unites it with the dogmatic attitude (compare Tibullus, I, 4) of the university professor. Here is a code, so to speak, compiled from the complete set of reports furnished by the Elegy and the Comedy of all the conventional, and unconventional, situations of a love affair. A cleverer satire of the whole subject has never been written. But unfortunately for his posthumous reputation, his severest critics in the past did not understand, or else, did not relish, the spirit in which he executed his piece of exquisite fooling.

One's enjoyment of Ovid's Ars Amatoria is undoubtedly a question of temperament as well as of literary training, and of worldly knowledge, if not worldly wisdom. But it is also a matter of period and environment. From this point of view, Dr. Brandt's book is significant, inasmuch as it is the most pronounced symptom of that revival of interest in Ovid the poet which may fairly be considered as a sign of the times. Much of it, of course, is due to the scientific spirit of the age and the long series of minute investigations which have brought us to a better understanding of the man, his work, and his period. But this is not all. Both in his introduction and in his commentary, Dr. Brandt several times takes occasion to emphasize the modernity of Ovid. This is true to an eminent degree. Yet it is only in recent years that the modernity of Ovid has become obvious, or, at all events, that critics have begun to mention it. Why is this the case unless it is true that, for the first time since Ovid's day, the world is getting back to the point at which it mirrors in itself, and, therefore, appreciates, certain phases of thought and points of view as they were in the first century of the Roman Empire?

However that may be, it is certain that scarcely a generation has elapsed since critics began to realize that, whatever its tendencies may be, Ovid's Ars Amatoria is, without question, the masterpiece of a great author. As such, it undoubtedly deserved a commentary, and Dr. Brandt has done a real service to every mature and candid student of antique life and literary art.

KIRBY FLOWER SMITH.

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REPORTS.

HERMES, XXXVII.

Fascicle 3.

Lesefrüchte (U. v. Wilamowitz-Möllendorff). See Hermes, XXXVII, p. 302.

Διάκτορος Ἀργεϊφόντης (Carl V. Oestergaard). Connected with the Sanskrit stem kṣar διάκτορος means "destroyer." In Homer, with the exception of one late passage (μ 390), it is joined regularly with Ἀργεϊφόντης, a god of light. We have thus, parallel with Apollo, a divinity of past ages that destroyed with the sun's rays. However in Homer throughout he is identified with the Argos slaying Hermes. This confusion no doubt prevented the natural absorption of this divinity by Apollo. It would be interesting to find in Ἀργεϊφόντης a connecting link between Hermes and Apollo.

Zur Eisangelie in Athen (Th. Thalheim). Two new classes of cases subject to εἰσαγγελία were malfeasance in office and crimes pertaining to things that were under the especial care of the βουλή, such as the νεώρια and the Πελαργικόν. These cases were less important and required less expedition than cases of treason. As regards chronology, εἰσαγγελίαι were lodged against criminal officials and subverters of the state with the Areopagus before its powers were transferred to the βουλή and ἐκκλησία. Down to the revolution of 411 B. C., when εἰσαγγελία was suspended, the various crimes subject to it were not yet defined. About 410 B. C., the νόμος εἰσαγγελτικός was passed, which Hypereides cites in pro Eux., and which clearly reflects the historic events of 411 B. C. Subsequently three more classes of cases were made subject to εἰσαγγελία, viz.: false promises to the people, acts prejudicial to the naval alliance and παραπρεσβεία. Death and confiscation of property were not made the fixed penalties until the middle of the IV cent. This increased severity brought with it abuse of εἰσαγγελία and its remedy; 330 B. C. and later plaintiffs were liable to pay 1000 dr. if they failed to secure one fifth of the votes.

Die griechischen Personennamen bei Plautus II (Karl Schmidt). Whereas in the previous article (Hermes XXXVII 173 ff.) those Greek proper names were discussed which occur on Greek soil or differ from them only in their endings, in this the author examines those that do not occur elsewhere.

Οὐλοχύται (Ludwig Ziehen). Fritze tried to show (vid. Hermes, XXXII p. 235 ff.) that the ritual of the οὐλοχύται was a survival of a primitive form of sacrifice. Prott in Bursians Jahresb. Vol.

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102, p. 82, rejects this view and regards the cathartic meaning as probable. Stengel in the new edition of his Cultusalterthümer (p. 99 and 146 A. 7) grants the cathartic significance in the case where the sacrificial animals are sprinkled; but still believes that the οὐλαί were cast into the altarfire as an offering to the gods. Ziehen after rejecting Theophrastus' testimony, which favors Fritze's view, examines the illustrative passages in Homer, Aristophanes etc. and concludes that sprinkling the οὐλαί, touching and taking them up, and also casting them into the altarfire were all cathartic in symbolism. The analogy with the Roman *mola salsa* holds as the οὐλαί were mixed with salt (vid. Hermes, XXIX, p. 627 ff.).

Die Ueberlieferung des Diogenes Laertios (A. Gercke). The problem of the text criticism of Diog. L. consists in replacing the smooth readings of the Vulgata, due to conjectures of Byzantine and Humanist scholars, by the more difficult and at times corrupt text of the more authoritative older MSS. These are B (Naples, saec. XII), F (Florence, saec. XII) and P (Paris, saec. XIII/XIV), which are derived from an archetype X of uncertain date. Since all the rest [25 in Martini] depend on these three, they should be disregarded, as has been done by Diels in his Heracleitus. Martini, on the other hand, favors the Vulgata and believes in a tradition independent of B. F. P.

Zu den attischen Archonten des III. Jahrhunderts (Joh. Kirchner). By means of a fragment of Apollodorus, K. shows that the Chremonidean war lasted from the archonship of Peithidemus 267/6 B. C. to that of Antipater 265/4 B. C. and gives an intelligible outline of its course. The end of the war cannot have been synchronous with the death of the poet Philemon 263/2 B. C. as Droysen supposed. Beloch's arrangement of the list of archons for the first four decades is open to criticism, in that he seems to be guided too much by an assumed cycle of 19 years.

Sallustius = Salutius und das Signum (Th. Mommsen). M. recognizes his mistake (vid. Hermes, XXXVI, 216) in identifying the two praefecti praetorio of the IV cent., currently known by the name Sallustius. The fact is the prefect in the Orient was officially called Saturninius Secundus, though commonly known by his *signum* Salutius. This term, all but unknown to literature, occurs frequently in inscriptions and possiblyas early as Antoninus Pius. Examples are: M. Aur. Sabinus, cui fuit et signum Vagulus; M. Magius Sotericus signo Hilari. Many names were probably *signa*, even where it is not stated. The *signum* was perhaps originally not applied to individuals. It occurs chiefly as a designation of groups possessing a common burial ground; but these groups are not to be considered collegia. The ending is regularly -ius; but the names were evidently chosen to differentiate them from the nomen as well as from the cognomen. Originally

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distinct from these and not recognized officially, it came to be regarded as a cognomen. The commonest *signa*, owing perhaps to the aristocratic origin of to the frequent use in address, were much favored in later times, especially by Christians. This is probably the origin of such names as Eusebius, Gregorius, Innocentius, etc.

Die Berliner Fragmente der Sappho (F. Blass). With the aid of Schubart, who had already published these most important of the discoveries of Sappho fragments which began 1880, Blass is able to publish the text with a number of improved readings. He adds a critical discussion of the text meaning and meter.

Miscellen.—H. Diels argues in favor of Παρμενίδης alongside of Παρμενείδης, and explains Solon's designation of Mimnermus, λιγυραστάδης, [accepted by Wilamowitz. Timotheos S. 46] to mean "the clear-voiced singer"—W. Dörpfeld. Zur Tholos von Epidaurus.—W. Sternkopf. Zu Cicero Phil. XIII 17, 36.—Paul Stengel. Vogelflug—M. Ihm. Zu Suetons Vita Lucani.

Fascicle 4.

De Gitanis Epiri Oppido (Michael Krascheninnikov). Polybius (XXVII 16, 5) says that the Roman consul A. Hostilius Mancinus came to Phanotes; but upon the advice of Nestor proceeded εἰς Γίτανα. This is the reading of codex Peirescianus, not γίτονα as Valesius and Wollenberg read; hence the conjectures γείτονα and γείτονος are wrong. It is the same town mentioned by Livy (XLII 38. 1), where *ad Gitana* should not be changed as modern editors have suggested. As Livy places it ten miles from the sea it would coincide with the modern Dhélvinon, situated, according to Kiepert, that distance from the ruins of the ancient Onchesmus. Leake, followed as usual by Bursian, conjectured D. to be the site of Helicranon, which however should be sought for with Kiepert south of Phoinice, only nearer. Kiepert hesitatingly placed Phanotes at Dhélvinon, but its site, though near by, is uncertain.

Aus der Dresdener Hyginhandschrift (M. Manitius). The most important part of codex Dresdensis 183 saec. IX/X is the astronomical work of Hyginus. Collated with Bunte's edition (Leipz. 1875), it shows the unreliability of the latter, especially as he followed the corrections. This codex D is not merely to be used along with R and M; for in a number of passages it alone has the correct readings. Manitius offers to place his collation at the disposal of a future editor.

Von delphischem Rechnungswesen (Br. Keil). An examination of the two Delphic inscriptions published by L. Bourget in BCH 1900 XXIV 463–83 throws light on the system of finance employed at Delphi by the Amphiktyonic league. It appears that the collections taken up to rebuild the temple, burned 548 B. C., made it imperative to adopt a system by which the various

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forms of money could be more easily handled. Hence about 525 B. C. the Attic-Euboic talent and mina were adopted as the official standard and, based on the relative weight, the ratio of 10 : 7 officially recognized to regulate the exchange of Attic and Aeginetan drachmas. Although 3 : 4 soon became the commercial ratio, 7 : 10 remained official, and the difference was utilized to make their accounts give a more favorable showing and probably also to take unfair advantages. Later (336/5 B. C.) an Amphiktyonic drachma was issued, which was intended to restore the ratio of 7 : 10; but to insure circulation was rated 1/45 higher than the Attic, so that now 44 t 'Αμφικτυονικοῦ or καινοῦ = 45 t 'Αττικοῦ = 48 t 12^{m} 30^{m} Αἰγιναίου or παλαιοῦ. The influence of the Amphiktyonic system is shown by an Epidaurian inscription (BCH. 1896 XX p. 385), according to which an account in Athens of 6000 dr. is settled with 4200 Aeg. dr., that is to say at the ratio of 10 : 7.

Telephos der Pergamener Περὶ τῆς καθ' Ὁμηρον Ῥητορικῆς (Hermann Schrader). The treatise on Homer known as Περὶ τοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς ποιήσεως Ὁμήρου and attributed to Plutarch, contains a section (c. 161–174) on the art of rhetoric, which agrees with the τέχνη that bears the name of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, particularly the sections περὶ ἐσχηματισμένων, also with the ζητήματα of Porphyrius, with Homeric scholia independent of the latter, and finally with Hermogenes' περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος. As the above works are independent of one another, their agreements point to a work on Homeric rhetoric as a common source. This was probably the above named work of Telephos, who was born at the end of the first century A. D., and is known as a prolific writer and as a teacher of the emperor Verus. The supposition that Telephos was a source for remarks on Homeric rhetoric found in scholia etc. is not new; but S. has given it strength and a wider reach, besides showing the character of this particular work.

Das Mitgliederverzeichniss einer attischen Phratrie (Alfred Körte). The last number of the Ἐφημερὶς ἀρχαιολογικὴ 1901 publishes a list of 20 names from a stele found near Liopesi, 1899. The heading, in somewhat larger letters, reads Διὸς ⋮ φρατρίο ⋮ Ἀθηνᾶς ⋮ Φρατ[ρίας οἵδε φράτερες then follow the names, each accompanied by the name of the father. On the side one name is repeated as follows: Σώσιππος ⋮ Σωσιπόλιδος ⋮ ἀνέγρα[ψεν. The date of the inscription should be placed soon after 400 B. C. It is evidently a list of members of a Phratry. The style of the document and the fact that it contains several pairs of fathers and sons precludes the supposition that it is a list of new members. The remarkably small number illustrates the statement of Wilamowitz (Arist. u. Athen II 276) that there was a constantly growing number of citizens who belonged to no phratry.

Beiträge zur Textgeschichte des Sueton (M. Ihm). See Hermes XXXVI p. 344 ff.

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Zur Sage von Daidalos und Ikaros (G. Knaack). A discussion of this subject with reference to Holland's attempt in Programm der Leipziger Thomasschule (Leip. 1902) to distinguish the various versions of the legend.

Die griechischen Personennamen bei Plautus III (Karl Schmidt). The foregoing articles (Hermes XXXVII 173 ff and and 353 ff.) show that Plautus' names conform to rule. The so-called hybrid names have almost disappeared. Of the 269 Greek proper names examined, omitting four uncertain ones and those referring to historical or literary personages like Calchas and Demetrius, it appears that 14 names were taken from the originals, 80 occur in other comedies, 87 in inscriptions and elsewhere; the the remaining 88 are *ἅπαξ λεγόμενα*. Of the latter, 40 seem foreign to the New Comedy. This remnant shows that Plautus' names were largely due to his south Italian environment. Such names as Alcesimarchus, Agorastocles and Pamphilippus illustrate the practice, beginning about 400 B. C. of adding endings like -archus, -cles and -ippus to names whose significance had paled. Then besides other names foreign to the New Comedy, such as Epignomus and Palinurus, there are the imaginary compounds made for comic effect like Miccotrogus, Cercobulus, not to speak of the Plautine double compounds like Theodoromedes Polyplusius (Captivi). Very few, if any, of these compounds could have been derived from the New Comedy, which took its names from real life or made them similar. The names in Alciphron that are like those in Plautus were not derived from the New Comedy; but from older sources, such as the Batrachomyomachia, or are imitations of these. Neither were Aristophanes' creations the model, as Leo thinks. They show the same tendency to create comical names as we find in Homer, Archilochus, the Batrachomyomachia, Theocritus, on vases and elsewhere, which tendency was particularly active in southern Italy, the home of the *φλύακες*. The Pompeian names Scordopordonicus, Simicrito and Dinibales illustrate the Graeco-Italic folk wit, which Plautus shared with his audience. The New Comedy and its close imitator Terence lacked this creative force.

Miscellen.—Otto Kern publishes, with plates, inscriptions of an altar and votive relief of Heracles from Magnesia in Thessaly, indicating his worship, etc., also of a votive relief of Zeus and of another dedicated to some hero fond of the chase.—C. F. Lehmann. Zu den theraeischen Gewichten (cf. Hermes XXXVI p. 113 ff.).—F. Bechtel opposes Hoffmann's conjecture (Philologus N. F. XV 245 ff.) that the beginning ΕΣ of the Sotairos inscription forms the genitive ending of the last word ΦΕΡΕΚΡΑΤ.

HERMAN L. EBELING.

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ENGLISCHE STUDIEN, herausgegeben von Johannes Hoops. Volume XXVIII.

1. Stecher. Contributions to the Hermeneutic and the Textual Criticism of the Middle English Prose Romance of Merlin. Stecher deals with Part III of the romance, thus continuing the work of Kölbing and Richter (Eng. Stud. XX. 347 ff.). Wheatley's long-promised volume of critical apparatus has just been added to his edition in the E. E. T. S. publications.

Koeppel. Shelley's Queen Mab and Jones' Palace of Fortune. The metrical form of his poem Shelley owes chiefly to Southey; its philosophy in large part to Volney's Les Ruines (Eng. Stud. XXII. 9 ff.). The narrative element, with the characters Ianthe and Queen Mab, and certain details of diction, were apparently suggested to Shelley by Sir William Jones' Palace of Fortune, 1769. Jones' poem is based upon oriental tales, though it contains traces of relation to Pope's Temple of Fame.

Aronstein. Tennyson's Philosophy. An article intended chiefly for readers of Tennyson in Germany. The discussions of Tennyson's Art in Respect to Matter and Form, and Tennyson's Position with Reference to Society and the State, are, on the whole, the best parts of the article.

Hoops. *Wels* and *Walfisch*. The two words are probably related. Kluge (1881) derived them, through Germ. *hwal-*, from Indogermanic **ghal-*. Lédén (1892) connected them with Latin *squalus*, which pointed to an Indogerm. original **(s)qalo-* or **(s)qəlo-*. Sohnsen (1896) connected the words with Greek πέλ-ωρος through an Indogerm. root **qel-*: **qol-*. Hoops proposes to relate them to the Finnic group, which, in its several branches, retains words pointing to such relationship (cf. Finn. *kala*). If Indogerm. borrowed the word from the Finnic, it must have been done at a period long before the two branches could have met, supposing the former came from Asia. Hoops' theory, if correct, is a bit of evidence that the Indogerm. branch had its home in north Europe, where the word may have been borrowed. Or, according to Sweet's theory, that the Indogerm. and the Ugro-Altaic are of common origin, the word may have been derived by both from common stock.

The reviews include a long and detailed examination, by Wülfing, of Sedgefield's edition of Alfred's Boethius; unfavorable comment by Förster on Markisch's attempt to complete Zupitza's edition of the OE. Apollonius of Tyre; and notices of three recent publications on Burns.

Miscellanea. Kraeger publishes two notes on C. F. Meyer's use, in his lyrics, of Shakespearian verses.

2. Spies. The Material Available for the Study of Gower, with Suggestions for Further Research. Studies which serve

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as a reliable means of orientation in any subject are rarer than they ought to be, perhaps because they demand a peculiar and somewhat rare sort of selective and expository skill. On this account the present article deserves especial attention from any who are likely to be engaged or interested in work of this kind. It is at once idealistic and sane. It contains, with other matter, a list of the chief allusions to Gower down to the eighteenth century; a list of biographies of Gower; a discussion of the dates of the Confessio Amantis, especially of the B version (Spies inclines to the date 1393); lists of Gower's works, of editions, and of exegetical and critical studies. The last part of the article is devoted to the Confessio Amantis. It includes a good review of existing editions, especially the recent one by Macaulay, which is neither definitive nor critical. To this is added a tentative classification of the forty MSS and three early editions of the poem, now attempted in a thorough manner for the first time. In conclusion, the author sketches on imposing lines the edition of the text which he intends to prepare.

Bang. Studies in Dekker. The writer deals with the question of the composite authorship of Patient Grissell. His conclusions are that Chettle wrote a first version in 1599–1600; with the help of Dekker, Jonson, and Haughton, he later revised and augmented the plan. Of the additions, Sir Owen and Gwenthian are probably Dekker's, Emulo may be Jonson's, and the episode of Julia and her suitor, Haughton's. Incidentally the author touches upon a quarrel between Will Kemp and a 'Jansonus', who, he thinks, is Jonson. Kemp sneers at his opponent's complexion as being of 'so red a color, that all the soap in the town will not wash white'. Bang believes that Shakespeare's Sir Hugh Evans was suggested by Sir Owen. He adds a note on the date of the Spanish Tragedy.

Roloff. Iwan Iwanowitsch. A German rendering of Browning's poem.

H. B. Baildon. Robert Louis Stevenson (concluded). One striking sentence is sufficient: 'Like Thackeray, when he [Stevenson] does, so to speak, condescend on pathos, it is with a master touch and takes us fairly by the throat'.

Stoffel. *Must* in Modern English. I, *Must* as an Imperfect. The transition of *must*, from preterite meaning in Middle English to present, is through ME. use of *must* as a subjunctive-conditional; as in Piers Plowman B XIII. 314: 'Thi best cote, Haukyn, hath many moles and spottes, it moste ben ywasshe'; that is, it ought to have been, if all were as it should be. The writer concludes that, 'in Modern English, in principal sentences containing an independent statement which is not a latent *oratio obliqua*, *must* may be used as a past tense: (a) as a past conditional subjunctive in an apodosis; (b) as a past indicative mainly in

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cases where it has emphatic meaning, as "Something he must read, when he was not riding."' II, *Must* as a Present Tense. In OE. *ic mote* means (1) 'I am allowed', (2) 'I am able', (3) 'I shall perhaps', (4) it expresses the subjunctive and optative, (5) 'it is my duty to', (6) 'I cannot but'. In ME. (1), (2), (3), (4), are more frequent than (5) or (6). In Mod. E. only (5), (6), and (1) in negative expressions, are found.

Miscellanea. Vordieck proposes, in Macbeth I. 7. 28, to read:

> I have no spur
> To prick the sides of my intent, but only
> Vaulting ambition, which o'erleaps itself,
> And falls on *th' author*,

'the author' being Macbeth himself, and 'but only' equivalent to 'but I have only'.

3. Wetz. Remarks in Contribution to a Final Estimate of the Schlegel-Tieck Translation of Shakespeare. The credit which has been given to Tieck belongs really to Baudissin and to Dorothea Tieck, who translated respectively thirteen and six of the plays, while Tieck himself did little more than alter these translations here and there for the worse. The translation has been greatly overestimated by the Germans. Gildemeister has improved upon it with the use of more idiomatic and fluent German and greater faithfulness to character. Dingelstedt's rendering of the songs is much livelier. Revision can never convert the Schlegel-Tieck translation into a classic rendering. A new translation is therefore desirable, in which the best translators available shall co-operate.

Kroder. Studies in Shelley's Epipsychidion. A discussion of the following topics: The Genesis of the Poem; the Opening Lines; Traces of Platonism in the Poem; Personalia; Poetic Technique. The writer's critical skill may be judged from his statement that the value of Epipsychidion as a poetic creation is recognized unanimously by critics and general public 'as above all praise'. 'The great conclusion of the poem', he says, 'appears to me a marvel which hitherto had been scarcely conceived, and which has never been equaled since—and all this whether we consider the fabulous beauty of its images . . . or the superhuman depth of understanding manifest in the poet's revelation of the constraining power of love'.

Koeppel. Tennysonia. I, Armageddon and Timbuctoo. In Hallam Tennyson's Memoir of the poet the latter poem is said to have been the result of revamping an earlier effort, The Battle of Armageddon. The writer believes that Timbuctoo bears traces of an acquaintance with an epic entitled Armageddon, by George Townsend, a protégé of Richard Cumberland's. II, Sir William Jones' translation of Moâllakât and Locksley Hall. That the

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Tennysons were once interested in the work of Sir William appears from notes in the Poems by Two Brothers. Koeppel points out certain cases of correspondence in diction between Locksley Hall and the translation of the Moâllakât, and recalls the fact, which Tennyson is said once to have admitted, that the metre of Locksley Hall was suggested by the peculiar movement of Jones' transcription of the original into Roman letters.

The Reviews include a discussion by Fränkel and Glöde of five recent publications on Shakespeare, none of them especially significant. In a review of Cook's Biblical Quotations in Old English Writers, Förster proposes the theory that the West Saxon Gospels are based upon a Vulgate MS of the later West Saxon type, that is, a Vulgate founded upon a Roman basis, and incorporating numerous Irish readings.

YALE UNIVERSITY. CHARLES G. OSGOOD, JR.

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BRIEF MENTION.

In HIRZEL'S most interesting and instructive book, *Der Eid, Ein Beitrag zu seiner Geschichte* (Leipzig, S. Hirzel), the section 'der Eid als Fluch', in which he explains the formula, 'So help me God', brings up a bit of actuality, which gives striking confirmation to the author's remarks on the steady decline of the binding power of the oath. True, witnesses still 'kiss the book' but the time-honored formula, 'So help me God' has just disappeared from the Maryland courts. In fact, nothing would be easier than to write a commentary on antique life in terms of to-day. Demosthenes against Kallikles (LV), an old and especial favorite of mine, was illustrated a few years ago by a lawsuit concerning a drain at Roland Park, a suburb of Baltimore; and the Pseudo-Demosthenean speech, *πρὸς Ζηνόθεμιν* (XXXII)—a bottomry case—is made more vivid by the following clipping from a Baltimore newspaper of March 26, 1899: 'Greek sailing vessels visited this port many years ago, but merchants had little confidence in them, as they were apt to change their names while on the voyage, put into a port, sell the cargo and nothing more could ever be heard of them'. This is an instance of the continuity of history that would have delighted the heart of Mr. Freeman, who, by the way, was not a close student of the Attic orators (A. J. P. XII 521). These are the coincidences that commend the study of antiquity to the young and I have often asked myself why no enterprising scholar has been found to prepare a Greek Reader on the basis of the private orations of the Attic canon. The Greek would be beyond cavil and the contents would not be without human interest. To be sure, much has been done for the Attic Orators since I wrote, now some thirty years ago, a short series of sketches entitled 'On the Steps of the Bema' in which I insisted on the importance of this range of reading. About the same time, PERROT was doing similar work in the 'Revue des Deux Mondes', as I found out afterwards, and needless to say, doing it much better; and the purely philological literature that has gathered about the Attic Orators in the last score of years is immense. A portly Italian book on Isaios, CACCIALANZA, *Le Orazioni di Iseo* (Torino, 1901), is still awaiting review, to say nothing of monographs and dissertations, but the desiderated Reader has not made its appearance yet. Meanwhile we can all study WILAMOWITZ'S *Lesebuch*, which bids defiance to the restrictions of Atticism, and has for its ensign the head of Alexander the Great. To review the book would be to review one's own philological life and to confess one's own philological shortcomings, so that it is not surprising that the work has been more

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than once taken up in hope and laid down in despair. It is impossible for a man of my generation to consider it seriously as a schoolbook, and if I were to characterize it, I should echo the words of Pomtow, who in the *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift* (9. Mai 1903), calls it, 'das schönste und lehrreichste Geschenk—für die Philologen'. Nothing more stimulating, nothing more illuminating, nothing that serves better to remind old scholars as well as young of the gaps in their knowledge of antiquity, the imperfection of their acquaintance with the real significance of it for itself and for our own times. For this particular office the *Lesebuch* will be found as useful as Ovid's Ibis is, according to Niebuhr (A. J. P. III 87), for those who fancy that they know Greek mythology.

By the way, a reviewer of my 'Problems in Greek Syntax' has lately taken me to task for quoting BLASS against the *Lesebuch* in the matter of the tenses in later Greek (A. J. P. XXIII 241). 'Der von Gildersleeve behauptete Widerspruch zwischen Blass und Wilamowitz', says PH. WEBER in the *Neue Philologische Rundschau* 5. Sept. 1903', '<ist> bei näherem Zusehen völlig unbegründet. Blass hat in der zitierten Stelle, wo er sagt, die Unterscheidung zwischen dauernder und vollendeter Aktion geschehe im N. T. mit derselben Genauigkeit wie im klassischen Griechisch, nur das Imperfekt und den Indikativ Aorist im Auge, während es bei Wilamowitz heisst 'Der Unterschied zwischen den Imperativen des Praesens und des Aorists wird in den vulgären Rede vernachlässigt'. I am not afraid of 'das nähere Zusehen'. In the passage referred to, BLASS, G. N. T. G. § 57 (E. T.), says: 'The distinction between continuous and completed action is most sharply marked in the case of the imperfect and aorist indicative and moreover, this distinction is observed with the same accuracy in N. T. as in classical Greek'. By saying 'is most sharply marked in the case of the imperfect and aorist indicative', he does not exclude the distinction in the other moods, and in § 58 after saying that 'between the moods of the present and aorist there exists essentially the same relation as that which exists between the imperfect and aorist', he goes on to discuss at length the distinction between present and aorist imperative in the N. T., so that the conflict between the two authorities abides, as I stated it. The failure to feel the difference between the tenses of the moods may be the fault of the student and not the fault of the language, and I have said that 'learners must be made to distinguish with equal sharpness between the present and the aorist infinitive' (A. J. P. III 165). And yet I felt constrained to add, 'but after all, the indicative gives the main lines and the other moods only the shading'. There are very nice questions along this line of study and the imperatives of the

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N. T. demand a special treatment. The preference for the aorist in certain spheres of Hellenistic Greek is marked, as I pointed out many years ago, Just. Mart. Apol. I 16, 6 (1877), cited in A. J. P. XXIII 241. In classical times the present imperative is slightly ahead, if we may judge by the orators (cf. C. W. E. Miller, A. J. P. XIII 425). The aorist differentiates. In later times there seems to be a preference for the aorist. If so, the present would differentiate. Interesting is the Schol. AB on Σ 5 *<πίνε> ἀντὶ τοῦ πίθι ὡς τὸ διεφαίνετο χῶρος πιπτόντων ἀντὶ τοῦ πεσόντων.*

Much syntactical work goes to waste in out of the way places, in 'programmes' and 'Beilagen' and it is a pity that there is no clearing house, no 'Jahresbericht' to gather up the results, or, if there be no results, to affix the *mortiferum* Θ. In his *Beobachtungen über den Gebrauch des Artikels bei Personennamen*, a Nürnberg Beilage of 1899, which fell into my hands the other day, the author takes no notice of any of his predecessors. One of these predecessors, KARL SCHMIDT, as the attentive readers of the Journal know, declined to take up the articular proper name in Xenophon on account of the uncertainty of the text (A. J. P. XI 483). Cf. Joost's Xenophon (S. 63). But ZUCKER has no difficulty on that score and attacks the problem, as it presents itself in the Anabasis, with great vigor and lavish expenditure of words. The upshot of his investigations will not be novel to those who have looked into the subject at all. 'The true domain of the article with proper names is the narrative and not the speech'. 'In artistic narrative', he believes,—he need not have been so modest,—'especially in the purposely naive style, the element of poetic *ἐνάργεια* plays a far other rôle than in the speech, the mainspring of which is logical proof'. Now all that this 'poetische Anschaulichkeit', which I have just translated 'poetic *ἐνάργεια*' amounts to is conveyed by the term 'familiar language', the language of verbal gesture (cf. A. J. P. XXIII 9. 123). To dispose of the 'anaphora' formula as Professor ZUCKER has done is an easy matter (A. J. P. XI 483) but the average student will not be much helped by the word 'reaction', which really means nothing more than 'contrast', another old formula which certain scholars have worked pretty hard. See Herbst A. J. P. II 541 and cf. Monro, H. G. § 259. When 'reaction' fails, Professor ZUCKER,—and it must fail him when several articular proper nouns follow in succession,—then he has to fall back on such vaguenesses as 'special' or 'natural interest.' Like so many other grammatical observations, these categories may serve to help the appreciation, but apply the test of reproduction and what then? Take a translation of Xenophon's Anabasis and put the article before the proper names in accordance with ZUCKER'S canons and watch the result. In fine, the article with the proper noun is a superfluity.

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It is what I have just called it, a verbal gesture. The reaction is a responsive nudge of the elbow, the special interest is an aggressive thrust of the forefinger between the ribs. We read in Joost (p. 63) that in the Anabasis there are 390 proper names of persons with, and 900 without the article. Gemoll tells us that Xenophon says Κῦρος 196 times, ὁ Κῦρος 28 times. Schmidt (A. J. P. XI 483) shows how little the article is used in the orators. The figures tell the whole story better than Professor ZUCKER'S sixty odd pages have done.

Nothing in Lucian's Vera Historia ever tickled me more than the passage in which Homer is made to say that he composed all his spurious verses himself, and some of the Homeric verses that have fallen under the ban of the critic are especial favorites of mine, such as χείλεα μέν τ' ἐδίηνε, ὑπερφὴν δ' οὐκ ἐδίηνεν, perhaps because this particular line is an epitome of the behaviour of that stepdame, Fortune, towards most of us. But even if the experience goes no farther than the lips, it is worth something, and if I had not served for a few weeks in a cavalry regiment, I should not have warmed to W. HELBIG'S Ἱππεῖς *Athéniens* recently published in the *Mémoires de l' Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*. The article is profusely illustrated and the subject is thus brought within the reach of a wider public. Portentously alive are the figures of horses and men, and one is tempted to read again Cherbuliez's Cheval de Phidias and Morgan's edition of Xenophon on Horsemanship and to ride the ghost of a favorite mare bareback in spirit.

To all who value the high example of mature work, the rare example of work that from the beginning has shown no sign of weakness, no loss of power, the new edition of VAHLEN'S *Ennius* (Teubner)—the old edition goes back to 1854—will be doubly welcome both for its own sake and for the final disposition of the rumor so long current in philological circles that the master had resolved to leave the great work of his life as a legacy and not to await the reception of it as a gift. That there was some danger of this appears from the words that introduce the *Addenda et Corrigenda:* 'Propero ad finem, ut hic liber, cui non dicam quot annos vitae tribuerim—tandem in lucem publicam prodeat'. But that danger is past. There will be loud acclaim, there will be no lack of criticism. λίθον ἔψεις, ἔλεγεν. But these things are for the many. To very few will the book bring with it, as it does to me, a vision of the past, a renewal of youth, for very few are left of those who filled Ritschl's lecture room in 1852, very few that can remember the senior of the Philological Seminary as he sat on the front bench alone, already separated from the rest of us by gifts and attainments that roused no feeling but admiration.

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I have at my elbow the Ennius of 1854 and a bound volume of the dissertations of the day which contains Vahlen's Quaestiones Ennianae Criticae (1852). I remember as if it were yesterday the 'promotion' of Josephus Lawicki whose dissertation was entitled, De Fraude Pauli Merulae and among the 'adversaries' was Ioannes Vahlen, Phil. Dr. renuntiandus. The Vahlen of to-day passes Lawicki by in silence and simply agrees with the Dutch scholar who upholds 'de geloofwaar digheid van Paullus Merula.' No wonder then that I cut the leaves of the new Ennius eagerly, foretaste the pages that tell of the life of Ennius among men and the after-life of Ennius in the long lapses of Roman Literature and pause to read and reread the story of the prize essay, the generous competition, the memorable award. 'Erit fortasse' says VAHLEN, 'qui haec quae singularem vim et virtutem Ritschelii luculenter expressam tenent non invitus legat;' and the image of the great teacher comes up before me in his prime as I have elsewhere tried to set it forth (A. J. P. V 339 foll.)

Why do I indulge in this personal reminiscence? It is not the sentimentality of a man who has nothing better to do than to brood over the past. Nay, one cannot emphasize too much the importance of the work that Ritschl did and caused to be done and the spirit that he infused into it. Well-rounded schemes for a regular Triennium Philologicum are very desirable and when one scans closely the courses once followed at the German universities, still followed at the German universities, everything seems to be at loose ends. There is no unity, no system in them. But so long as the teacher sets fire and the pupil takes fire, there is hope, and it is a hope that maketh not ashamed. We were all Plautus-mad and Ennius-mad in those days and I set myself, as a subject worthy of study, the points of contact between Plautus and Ennius. The two poets were contemporaries and there must be some trace of influence. I made little out of my quest, and in VAHLEN's judgment little has been made out of it by anybody (p. XXI), but though my studies have drifted far from Plautus and Ennius, and I have no right to a judgment on the final work of such a masterpiece as VAHLEN'S *Ennius*, I know enough to appreciate in a measure the exquisite balance that is VAHLEN'S own. Ritschl's pupil he is, but no true master is the lunar rainbow of another.

W. H. K.: In reading the excellent introduction to Dr. WILSON'S *Juvenal*—a book which, long expected, fulfils expectation—I am reminded, at § 79, that, when discussing the *nec* of early Latin (in "Studies in Honor of B. L. Gildersleeve" pp.

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32 ff.), I failed to remark on *necdum*. In fact, this compound seemed to display its character so plainly in the company it kept, that I felt no impulse to protest against any future association of it with the venerable Plautine *nec recte*. Virgil first has it—certainly once, twice if we trust the Palatine at Aen. IV 698. Now this passage has no demonstrable relation to Naevius or Ennius; and it is not in the ninth, or any other, Eclogue that we ought to search hopefully after archaisms. *Cuium pecus* proves as little as *olli;* it is one thing to please the ear with a rounder vowel or the avoidance of a repeated sibilant, and another to revive a form which is recommended by no euphonic superiority. And revival is always a conscious effort; whereas the influence of Greek, the language alike of his great models and his contemporary instructors, was for the Latin writer no less subtle than hard to resist. In turning the Terentian *ne nunc quidem* into *nec nunc*, Horace did not hark back to the Plautus at whom he sneered, but reproduced the familiar μηδέ; and though Theocritus could not use οὐδέπω there was nothing to prevent Virgil, whose Greek was a matter of speech as well as of reading, of prose as well as of poetry, from fitting the Latin equivalent into his verse. When we consider the opportunities of the two poets, we can only stand astonished at their purism.—Besides, to prove that this non-copulative *necdum* was a revival, we should have to discover it before Virgil; but it occurs only after him, in Livy, who was no purist, in Columella and Palladius, Tacitus and Pliny (Kuehner, II p. 619). *Où diable l'archaïsme va-t-il se nicher?* And yet the only Livian example at my command, XXI 18. 8, necdum enim erant socii vestri, shows a certain scrupulosity. The copulative force of *neque enim* resided originally in the first particle; when the second usurped it by virtue of its usurped causality, *neque* suffered a paralysis which, in the same connection, would easily affect *necdum*.—As to Juvenal, he certainly knew that his *nec ille* matched οὐδ' ἐκεῖνος, and could hardly have felt his *necdum* differently, if he used it in the sense of *nondum*. But why should we so interpret in I 6? The asyndeton here would be at least odd; the copula is quite natural, and has the same adversative value that Dr. WILSON, in § 74, notes for *et*. There is an instructive parallel in Tacitus, A. I 10, concepto necdum edito partu; the attempt to treat these participles as asyndetically coordinated and *nec* as *non* ends in a physiological *reductio ad absurdum*.

H. L. W.: The last quarter century has seen the publication of a large number of those interesting books known as *Festschriften*, which celebrate birthdays and anniversaries and do honor to the veterans of the academic world. This delightful custom by which students and friends give enduring expression to their admiration and love for a great master has found its way across the Atlantic

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and several of the foremost American scholars also have thus been honored. The latest addition to literature of this class is the *Festschrift, zu Otto Hirschfelds sechzigstem Geburtstage* (Berlin, Weidmann, 1903, pp. 513, M. 20), to which sixty-three friends and pupils of the great epigraphist have contributed. The range of subjects represented in the volume is unusually wide, including Roman literature and various branches of Greek and Roman antiquities. The average value and importance, too, of the contributions, considered from a scientific point of view, are far greater than in many collections of a similar character. This is shown even by a glance at the table of contents, in which appear the names of C. Wessely, R. Schöne, F. Hiller von Gaertringen, U. Wilcken, S. de Ricci, B. Kübler, Th. Mommsen, A. von Premerstein, A. von Domaszewski, and others equally well known. Naturally a large nnmber of the contributions belongs to the domain of Roman literature and epigraphy. Here are interesting and valuable articles by I. Vahlen, L. Gurlitt, H. Dessau, O. Seeck, C. Cichorius, L. Friedländer, J. Dürr, H. Dressel, E. Bormann, R. Cagnat, A. Schulten, E. Löwy, C. Huelsen, and others, a mere list of which would occupy too much space. On the whole, it is a remarkable collection, a worthy monument to one of the foremost scholars of our time, whose colleagues on this side of the Atlantic unite with his friends and pupils in wishing him yet many happy years of fruitful labor.

On the sixth of December, 1903, the present number of the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY (No. 96) was nearly ready for issue, when the printing establishment of the Friedenwald Co. was wrecked by fire. In consequence of this disaster, it has not been found possible to resume publication until now and some time must elapse before the regular dates can be overtaken. During the long suspension of the printing, much copy has accumulated, many new books have been received, and the editor and the publishers invoke the indulgence of subscribers, contributors and correspondents.

B. L. G.

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Thanks are due to Messrs. Lemcke & Buechner, 812 Broadway, New York, for material furnished.

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
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